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Abstract 
This dissertation examines two ways by which duration can come to be experienced 
in analog cinema and digital installations: the interstice and the fold. Whereas the 
interstice is a material fissure that brings about temporal disruptions between 
shots/images, the fold is the ontological ground upon which the continuous relations 
l?etween image and mind arise. These two conceptual figures of time are 
contradictory, asymmetrical and unequal, giving rise to the question: how might 
duration be examined from two contrasting and contradictory points of view? If 
interstices present temporal disjunctions, how might temporal continuities also be a 
valid point of view? The fold introduces a difference by which a different type of 
thinking might occur about duration: it introduces a rupture in the orientation of 
thought about the interstice. Each figure is a different node of thinking of the 
rhizome, making up the multiplicity by which duration can come under scrutiny in 
media-objectiles. Each is part of the difference that constitutes the whole. 
Time is also the method and process by which duration is examined. As 
method, time is examined through the difference and repetition of the image. 
Important to the return is the nature of what returns: does the return bring about the 
same duration, or does it bring difference? Whereas the time-images of cinema give 
rise to movements between pasts and futures, the digital installations examined give 
rise to a continual "now," or to presentism. The digital-image as the returning 
difference to the analog-image presents its ontological difference, producing a 
ii 
different image of time. As process, the lived time of media-events queries the type 
of duration endured in nonlinear, asynchronous time. Pivoting between pasts and 
futures, this open and free time of duration gives rise to memories and visions in the 
experience of media. 
The media examples discussed are Claire Denis' s film L 'lntrus (2004 ), 
Susan Collins's installations Glenlandia, Fenlandia and The Spectroscope (2004-7), 
Andrei Tarkovsky's film Mirror (1975), Sound Research Laboratories's 
performance in Barcelona ( 1991 ), Granular Synthesis's performances Model! 5 
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Introduction 
Instants or duration? Opening up a dialogue 
Time in cinema has been conceived largely in two ways: as a series of instants or as 
continuous duration. Since the early experimental years of the medium in 
development, Etienne-Jules Marey and Eadweard Muybridge, the two progenitors of 
the apparatus, conceived the movement of images in time differently. Around 1878 
Marey recorded the continuous movement of humans, birds and other animals on a 
single chronophotographic plate. All the movements produced by a figure in space 
came to be recorded in continuous time through a single camera, in which all 
successive positions were registered on one fixed plate. 1 Muybridge, on the other 
hand, developed motion through the serial transitions of fixed frames in artificial 
time. He recorded each movement produced by a figure on a separate frame. Such a 
separation was artificial though, in that it was not possible to ascertain how each 
figure moved from one position to the next. Moreover, because each movement was 
recorded on a different plate, the passage of time between each movement in the 
series was unclear. 
Marey, in contrast, was able to record the continuous temporality of the 
movement of figures in space, however, his work suffered from a critical setback as 
it was visually incoherent. Since all successive movements produced by a figure in 
space were recorded on a single plate, there was a massive muddle of lines, making 
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the plate confusing to understand. A continuous record of time was only possible on 
a single frame, making his images blurred and increasingly unreadable. Thus, even 
though he was able to produce the continuous time of the movements of figures and 
objects in space, the illegibility of his images became the limits of his work.2 
Muybridge's figures, conversely, were discontinuous in time, but visually coherent. 
Each movement was distinct and legible, as each movement was produced on a 
separate frame. A distinct figure in motion could only be produced by virtue of a 
loss in continuous time, a concession that Marey was unwilling to make. 3 
The serial movement of film frames developed by Muybridge became the 
standard for films from 1895 on. In the early films of Georges Melies and Auguste 
and Louis Lumiere, subjects and objects were shown moving in rapid frame 
succession of 16 to 20 frames per second (fps). Mary Ann Doane writes that these 
early films mark the event's indexicality and historicity, in addition to constructing 
the archive of temporality. They were simply a record of time, which showed great 
exuberance in the sheer ability to record movement in time.4 The famous Lumieres's 
films, such as Workers Leaving a Factory (1895) or A Boat Leaving Harbour 
(1897), were single continuous shots that were limited to the length of the 17 metre 
film-roll. The entire duration of these films was approximately 50 seconds on screen 
and captured the raw material of the workers' lives.5 Tom Gunning writes that this 
cinema did not maintain any illusion of realism, which is prototypical of the classical 
narrative that followed this period. This early form before 1907, therefore, belonged 
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to a cinema outside of the narrative impulse of classical continuity, and thereafter 
continued in avant-garde traditions.6 
Nonetheless, the understanding that cinema was indexical to real movement 
and to real duration, much less an archive of temporality, did not sit well with the 
philosopher Henri Bergson. His assertions recalled Marey's objections to 
Muybridge's serial frames that they were discontinuous. He wrote that precisely 
because the filmstrip created serial movement, cinema did not yield real movement, 
as the gaps between the frames did not generate continuity but rather instants of 
time. Moreover, because it used the artificial, mechanized time of the projector, the 
movement produced was artificial. For both these reasons, he considered cinematic 
time to be different from real duration. 
Questions on duration 
This question of whether duration in cinema presents the series of instants or is 
continuous duration was debated often in the early part of the twentieth century, 
most notably with philosophers, film theorists and filmmakers such as Bergson, 
Andre Bazin, Siegfried Kracauer and Jean Epstein. Whether Epstein's writings on 
photogenie in the 1920s or the Cahiers du Cinema critics's writings on cinephilia in 
the 1940s and 1950s, their examinations presented film as the contingent moment, 
emphasizing the flux of the film. 7 However, while temporality was one of the 
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investigative axis in early film writing, this axis atrophied from the 1960s on with 
the surge in semiotic, psychoanalytical and ideology studies. 8 
Semiotic, psychoanalytical, ideology studies and cognitivist film-studies 
placed emphasis on the moment, thereby arresting the filmic flux. Matilda Mroz 
writes that "there seemed to be a conscious attempt to control and fix cinema's 
ungraspability by instituting a 'scientific' and rigorous mode of film analysis."9 
Semiotic and structuralist film theories isolated particular filmic fragments in their 
analysis, which then became repositories of meaning and signification. Moreover, 
Metz's semiotics, which emphasized the notion of film as "text," established the 
autonomy and control of the writer. 1° Filmic texts were considered as objects, which 
established spectatorial distance, emphasizing film's corporeality over its 
ephemerality. 11 Metz referred to film's fleeting qualities as having a "thousand 
paralyzing bonds of a tender unconditionality," revealing his uneasiness about film's 
transient qualities.1 2 Barthes's structuralist approach also emphasized still moments 
over movement in Image, Music, Text (1977), in which the film still becomes the 
"ideal object" by virtue of liberating the image from the narrative impulse and the 
constraints offilmic time. 13 Moreover, since the 1980s, Bordwell's cognitivist or 
formalist approach to film theory places emphasis on classical continuity editing, 
shot angles and framing styles, tending towards isolating moments and fixing filmic 
flow. In the shot by shot analysis distinctive of his theorization, he embraces the 
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spatialization and arrestation of the filmic moment rather than introduce or discuss 
duration. 14 
While the material basis of the celluloid filmstrip is a series of instants, the 
question of whether analog cinema is a series of instants or continuous duration still 
comes into debate. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1983/86), 15 Deleuze 
observed that there was a persistence of vision when watching films. In responding 
to Bergson's objection that cinema did not produce real continuity, 16 he noted that 
with modem technological advancements, the gaps in between frames were 
imperceptible to human perception. The rate of 24 fps produces natural perception, 
and as Paul Douglass has also noted, there is little straining that occurs in perceiving 
natural movement. The rapid movement of film frames coincides with natural 
movement, coming to duplicate the experiences of duration in natural life. 17 
Moreover, Deleuze wrote that Bergson's "cinematographic illusion" was an 
erroneous formula for cinema. Bergson's understanding of cinema as producing 
false movement was on account of the projector, which he said presented a 
mechanized movement. Such a movement, he wrote, produced an impersonal, 
uniform and abstract time. However, Deleuze questioned Bergson's thesis by asking, 
if the means of producing movement were artificial then would the movement also 
be artificial? Could the artificially induced movement of the projector produce real 
movement? In a reversal from Bergson, Deleuze eventually concluded that the 
movement of a celluloid filmstrip through a projector does present continuous 
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movement. Thus, even though the movement is produced by the artificial, 
mechanized means of the projector, the subject's experience is ofreal movement, 
and perception is natural. 
In The Emergence of Cinematic Time (2002) Doane, however, affirms 
Bergson's insistence that cinema presents a series of instants. 18 She writes, 
"cinematic representation and celebration of mobility are founded on a basic 
stillness or immobility subtended by darkness." 19 Notions of continuity, she argues, 
are based on the denial that cinema is a series of instants. Citing a kiss between two 
women in a documentary by Thom Andersen, Eadweard Muybridge, 
Zoopraxographer (1974), Doane writes that "the kiss never really takes place; its 
suggestion of union is only illusory, because movement can never be born from a 
series of immobilities."20 Alternately, in Temporality and Film Analysis (2012), 
Mroz utilizes both the instant and duration to critique works, especially to examine 
their interrelation in the temporal flux. 21 
In spite of these fundamental differences, it should be noted that without the 
passage of time, cinema, or what is cinematic, does not and cannot exist, hence its 
appellations: moving-images and/or time-based media. Whether understood as the 
series of instants or as continuous duration, cinema's necessary constitution is time, 
and while one of the major tasks of this dissertation will be to examine what tyPe of 
duration is produced in the various media works that I examine, my starting point 
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will be the position that in an image/shot (composed of many frames), the cinematic 
apparatus produces the continuous duration of natural perception. 
In clarifying the terminology that I use here, the concepts of time and 
duration are not to be considered as different from each other; time is what comes to 
be directly experienced in pure duration. As Suzanne Guerlac writes, "Time is the 
symbolic image of Pure Duration. It [time] stands in for it [duration] in reflective 
consciousness; it is what duration becomes when we think and speak it."22 Pure 
duration is, therefore, the direct experience of what is symbolically referred to as 
time. 
While I will introduce some claims in this introduction, I will develop and 
expand them further in the following chapters. I will begin by examining duration in 
analog and digital media installations not only to probe what type of duration occurs 
in each medium, but also to explore the images of time produced in each technology. 
I will extend the discussion on duration outlined above to show two varying 
processes by which the spectator experiences duration in time-based media works. 
The first process is the interstice, which is the physical interruption experienced in 
the transitions from shot to shot in time-images, and the second is the fold, which 
functions as the ontological ground upon which perception, memory and matter 
come to fold into each other to make up the experience of duration. These two 
processes are asymmetrical and unequal to each other, the first being material and 
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the second ontological. However, I will show that although they are 
incommensurate, each makes up the multiplicity that constitutes the whole of media. 
In pursuing the interstice and fold to consider duration, my work moves in a 
slightly different direction than is typically undertaken in cinema and media studies. 
As I will explain in the section on methodology, my approach to time is both 
methodological and processual. First, time will become the method by which I will 
undertake an examination of images. That is, in the unfolding of time in media 
works, the image that returns will present either its difference or identity with the 
one that preceded it. The image that returns in time will be considered at the local, 
immediate level and also at the historical level. 
At the local level I will consider what occurs in the transitions between shots 
in analog cinema and whether spatio-temporality is maintained in the flow. I 
examine what type of return occurs and whether the shot that follows maintains 
continuity or disrupts it. In the digital installations I will examine whether the return 
of the pixels, which make up a (digital) frame, maintain or disrupt the preceding 
flow. Thus, I examine what type oflocal movement is produced in analog cinema 
and the digital installations. At the historical level, I will consider analog and digital 
technologies and whether the digital image is a returning difference in time to the 
analog image. Time as a methodology will yield local and historical 
continuities/disruptions in the returning image. Taking up such a method will reveal 
a work's potential for bringing about the same or newer movements of thinking. 
8 
Second, time becomes processual through the workings of the interstice and 
the fold. Through interstitial disjunctions and in the folding among perception, 
memory and matter, the experience of duration moves outside the standard time of a 
clock. Rather than images unfolding as the continuous, linear movement of a past, 
present and future, interstitial disjunctions and foldings present nonlinear, 
asynchronous time. These processes unbind media works from chronometric 
measuring and duration is experienced not by the measurements of seconds, hours or 
years, but through the relation of movements generated among pasts and futures, 
which produce virtual times. The interstitial disjunctions between pasts and futures 
vary the movements of time back and forth and it is in the interstices that virtual 
connections come to be made. In the workings of the fold, virtual memories of pasts 
and of futures to come fold into the actual matter of the work being perceived. The 
virtual time of a media work, therefore, depends on how the work is structured by 
way of interstitial disjunctions, whereas in the fold, virtual time operates at the level 
of perception. Duration, thereby, should be understood as the lived time of the media 
work, in which virtual times are generated through disjunctive pasts and futures and 
through folding among perception, memory and matter. 
In considering time as methodology and as process, I explore how duration 
comes to be experienced at both the micro and macro levels, as well as scrutinize the 
experience of time beyond chronometric measurement. Through such an activity I 
hope to nudge media studies into examining further the vicissitudes of duration that 
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include temporal media objects. The virtual connections generated in the interstices 
and in the folds, show the temporal media object's potential for generating newer 
movements of thought. What occurs in the interstice between two images, or what 
occurs in the fold between two bodies, gives rise to thinking. In a film or temporal 
media object, therefore, the connections between shots/images bring about the 
virtual movements of thought. These virtual movements give rise to a non-
concretised, non-chronological time that moves freely and in undirected ways. It is 
not limited to what has been given. In conceptualizing the virtual times of media, 
therefore, newer relations in the movements of thinking can come to be produced. 
By exploring the lived time of media works, experience moves away from time as a 
measurable and distinct quantity, in which media objects occur as a priori, stable 
and determinable. An examination of the virtual relations produced in the interstices 
and folds, brings forth a measureless, open time instead, in which media objects are 
indistinct and in states of flux, perpetually in the making. Such an open time moves 
beyond what is given and determinable in the images, and therefore also in thinking. 
The movements oftime will be pursued through Deleuze's two books on 
cinema, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1983/86) and Cinema 2: The Time-Image 
(1985/89)23 and The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1993).24 The cinema books will 
be used to consider the material processes, functions and formal considerations of 
the interstice in constructing narrative time in cinema. I will specifically take up the 
time-images of cinema in the second chapter, but will deviate from Deleuze's 
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preoccupation with cinema in order to pursue my own interests in digital 
installations in the third chapter. Repeating my examination of the interstice in 
digital installations, I will consider the difference and repetition produced in the 
image of time in the two media. 
The interstice 
In Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze presents a way of thinking images through 
the movements of thought. That is, an image gives rise to thought and in the 
connection between images, thought is continuously moving from one image to 
another. The cut between images give rise to the virtual movements of thinking. The 
shots that are cut together in time-images are unrelated, making them spatio-
temporally discontinuous with each other. Rather than follow the continuity of 
movement, shots are cut together without following a narrative logic or continuity. 
Every shot/image in the film is a fragment of time. Linked together in a disjointed 
chain, the spectator encounters each image from what is an outside. They move 
away from the "inside" relations found in movement-images, in which the demand 
of a narrative continuity governs the whole. In time-images there is no whole to 
speak of, because shots are constituted not from the inside relations of a narrative 
logic, but from an outside, which is the Open. Each shot is a fragment of the outside, 
from which thought comes to be encountered. 
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The interstice is what forms the linkages in the chain of images. The 
shots/images being logically unrelated and spatio-temporally discontinuous makes 
their connections to each other irrational. The irrational connection between images 
jars the spectator and generates a shock to thought. The shock produced between 
images, Deleuze writes, produces the virtual movements of thought. The interstice is 
therefore not only a material and conceptual fissure, but generates a multiplicity of 
virtual movements in these fissures. 
A good example of the time-images of cinema is Claire Denis's film L 'lntrus 
(2004), which I take up in the second chapter. In this film there is a constant 
disruption in the flow of time experienced. The interstices connect the disparate 
shots to each other in a chain, bringing about a disjunctive flow in the duration 
experienced. Such temporal disjunctions continuously produce a heterogeneous 
time. With respect to the digital installations, I consider Susan Collins's Fenlandia, 
Glenlandia and The Spectroscope (2004-7). Each installation produces a continuous 
and singular trajectory of time that occurs without disruptions in the flow. The 
temporal flow is unidirectional and such a time is homogeneous, as there is no 
movement beyond the one generated by the movement of pixels on a screen. 
In considering these works certain assertions may be made, namely that the 
time-images found in analog cinema yield a heterogeneous time by virtue of the 
spatio-temporal disjunctions produced by the interstice. Spatio-temporal disjunctions 
generate intellectual aporias, which give rise to a multiplicity of virtual connections, 
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increasing the work's potential for the movements of thought to occur. The absence 
of interstitial disjunctions in the digital installations, on the other hand, produces a 
singular, homogeneous time. A homogeneous time does not generate different states 
of experience, which is critical in producing real duration. Moreover, in presenting 
the continuous whole of time that spans a year, time in these installations becomes a 
distinct and measurable quantity rather than the free and open qualitative experience 
of duration. In presenting the whole of time without gaps or disruptions, connections 
to the virtual decrease, and such works have less potential for the movements of 
thought to occur. 
The fold 
The fold presents a different viewpoint from which to conceive duration in media. 
Deleuze's notion of the fold, as developed in The Fold, is based on Gottfried 
Wilhem Leibniz's aesthetics of curvature and has been conceived in this dissertation 
as the metaphysics by which perception, memory and matter come to fold in time in 
the experience of a media event. In other words, as we encounter the world, the 
actual conditions perceived of the present, give rise to memory. 
In time-based media works, perceptions emerge not merely from the images 
being encountered in the present, but also from the telescoping of the "now" with the 
images that precede it. Bernard Stiegler has written that the synthesis of the recent 
past with the continuing present causes a "cinematic effect." 25 While the cinematic 
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effect takes into account the synthesis of the recent past with the continuing present, 
in Deleuze's metaphysics, layers of pasts and futures fold in with the perception of 
the object. It is i!l the folds of perception between actual object/image and virtual 
pasts/futures that the newness of experience comes to be made. However, the same 
object/image can give rise to many different virtual pasts/futures, generating 
difference in the experience of the same object. 
In perceiving the temporal media object, the spectator encounters its 
materiality, including its light intensities, sound tonalities, types of movement and 
density of matter: its genetic elements. These elements fold into perception as they 
modulate in time, giving rise to micro sensations and inklings. Micro sensations and 
inklings form shapes that are indistinct and produce thought that is obscure. 
However, as the object becomes clearer in perception in time, what is indistinct and 
obscure gives rise to thresholds of thought and consciousness. Perception, therefore, 
unfolds from the indistinct and obscure to what is distinct and clear. 
In the eighteenth century, Leibniz, in his considerations on the monad, 
showed the impossibility for thinking the subject without the world. He envisioned 
the world contained in a subject, just as much as the subject was contained in the 
world. As Gregory Flaxman writes, in Leibniz, "the subject is a point at which the 
universe sees itself."26 This relation of enfoldment between world and subject came 
to be extended to sensation and thought by the philosopher Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten in his Aesthetica (1750/58). In it he draws upon Leibniz's theory and 
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thereby widens his own on aesthetics, moving beyond the narrowness of logic and 
reason for the production of thought. In his works he includes other forms of 
thinking beyond the distinct and the clear, proposing instead that the "science of 
sensate thinking" is critical in the production of knowledge.27 
In the media works that I will examine, this fluid, enfolding relation of 
thought to the sensate becomes critical in the movements of thinking. If the temporal 
media object is understood as an objectile that is becoming in time, it breaks away 
from a discrete and distinct consideration. Perception of the media object produces 
sensations and inklings, which produce shapes of meanings, which give rise to 
thresholds of thought. Understood as fluid and open to becomings in time, a media 
object generates fluid states of thinking in the duration of media works. In the 
transient flow of time that comes to be experienced, therefore, consciousness is 
always in states of flux, continually flowing between clarity and obscurity. The 
temporal object being in states of flux brings about consciousness that is open-ended 
and fluctuating. 
In the folds of perception, into which memory and images fold, temporal 
media objects become elastic and fluid forms that undulate in time. The folding of 
perception, thereby, brings about durational continuities, differing from the 
disrupted, discontinuous time produced by interstices. In this different mode of 
experiencing duration, the fold generates a new image of time in media studies. The 
fold and the interstice are to be understood, however, not as being two separate 
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elements, but as two elements constitutive of a multiplicity. The image of the fold is 
a movement of variation from the interstice, the two being movements of variation 
within the whole of media studies. The fold introduces a difference by which a 
different type of thinking might occur about duration: it introduces a rupture in the 
orientation of thought about the interstice. It generates a different node of thought in 
my dissertation and is, as Martin writes, "on a different line [whereby] the rhizome 
is able to resume its growth and recompose its forces."28 In switching to the fold half 
way through my dissertation, I hope to generate a variation constitutive of the 
multiplicity by which duration can come to be conceived. In chapters four and five, 
therefore, I show how the fold generates a difference in how media, whether analog 
or digital, might come to be endured in time. 
In the examination of media works by Andrei Tarkovsky, Granular 
Synthesis, Sound Research Laboratories and others, my work will proceed to show 
the processes of perception at work. In chapter four I will start with the micro 
perception of matter, which takes on a "shapelikeness" and in chapter five, I will 
move on to macro perception, in which the sensate gives rise to consciousness/ 
thought.29 
Methodology 
The method by which my examination of the interstice and fold will take place 
proceeds through Deleuze's third synthesis of time in Difference and Repetition 
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(1968/94 ). The third synthesis shows that what returns in repetition occurs as 
difference to what preceded it, producing newer thinking in the history of thought. 
Newer methods and concepts, as Williams writes, present the opportunities for 
evaluating and revaluing older ones. 30 Difference and repetition bring forth that 
mode of thinking that breaks with dogma, the orthodox, the identity with what 
comes before, with what is the unconditional given, the presupposition of what is the 
moral code or the identification with Law and the State on the basis of past 
authority. 31 
In media studies, such a method allows for movement beyond the sensory-
motor images of the movement-image, to create newer connections and to generate 
newer futures as "a will to art."32 In The Time-Image, for instance, Deleuze presents 
the importance of fabulation, for a new people to come. The creation of new images, 
or new types of images, disrupts identification with the older ones, in which the new 
image "takes on the political dimension of the constitution of a people."33 Fabulating 
a new people means making a story, a story-telling that is an act of the imagination, 
which Perrault writes is "the flagrant offence of making up legends."34 That is, a 
political dimension of story-telling is one in which memory or legend of a new 
people to come is actively fabulated. 
Beyond the creation of the new, there is yet another aspect of difference and 
repetition that I take up in this dissertation: the return of the image through time. In 
my examination of duration, which occurs through the processes of the interstice and 
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the fold, each process, when repeated, brings about a difference in something. In the 
repetition of the interstice, difference reveals variation in the nature of the image 
produced: the digital image returns as difference to the analog image. In the 
repetition of the fold, difference occurs in the perspectival fields: perception moves 
continually between micro and macro perspectives. That is, the flux of media objects 
perceived in time produces corresponding movements in thinking in which, 
perception moves continually between micro and macro perspectives. 
Treating the returning image as difference breaks from some recent 
cinema/new media scholarship that primarily considers the digital image as the 
continuation in time of the analog image. 35 Given the difference in the material 
conditions of the two technologies, I question the idea of continuity by considering 
the material, formal and conceptual elements at work in the analog and digital 
image. In inquiring into the difference and repetition of the materiality of the two 
technologies, I come to examine their structural formations, which give rise to 
conceptual differences between them. However, paradoxically, despite their material 
difference, the ability of digital technologies to perfectly simulate the analog image 
presents a challenge as to whether the two kinds of image are different or similar. 
While some scholars such as D.N. Rodowick and Lev Manovich present differences 
between the two, Tom Gunning writes that it is not usually possible to tell the 
difference, making the two identical. 36 In light of this debate, a systematic unfolding 
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of their technological planes at work will show their repetitions and variations, and 
whether the digital image returns as difference to the analog. 
I begin this inquiry with Claire Denis's film L 'Jntrus, and then repeat this 
investigation in the following chapter with Susan Collins's (digital) installations, 
Glenlandia, Fenlandia and The Spectroscope. In Spinoza and the Problem of 
Expression (1968), Deleuze contrasts Descartes's methodology with Spinoza's, in 
which Descartes proceeds to investigate from the object, which was clearly and 
distinctly known, in order to find the processes at work. Spinoza, on the other hand, 
starts by considering the processes operating and works back to a cause, which was 
only known indeterminately.37 Given the uncertainty of knowing at the onset what 
analog or digital images are, Spinoza's mode of inquiry will be my preferred 
method. From the processes at work I will consider the type of image produced; this 
method will be different from proceeding from the identity of the image (as either 
analog or digital) and then finding the processes at work. 
In considering Deleuze's repetition with difference, Sarah Gendron writes 
that what returns has a dual character and is both affirmative and negative. What 
makes up the "imperceptible difference" is that which throws the return off centre, 
away from itself and into another direction. 38 Deleuze writes that within the 
philosophical tradition, the return of the same has been equated with wholeness and 
has been affirmed, whereas difference has been equated with lack and negation, and 
consequently disavowed. Instead, he writes, difference should be understood as 
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reinvigorating and revitalizing thinking. 39 Difference reinvigorates thinking because 
what returns occurs as difference to what preceded it. What returns destroys 
identification with its antecedent, including a fixed and stable identity in time. Such 
a method produces new thinking in philosophy. 
Understanding digital media as reinvigorating has at least one implication. 
One question that arises is whether the return, which yields difference, always makes 
for a positive outcome.40 The point that Deleuze makes is not that difference is 
affirmative or negative, but that difference occurs. Whatever the return presents, the 
difference that returns is indeterminate and unknown, bringing both affirmative and 
negative qualities. The difference between analog and digital images must be 
understood in such a vein: whatever returns is at the onset an indeterminable, 
unknowable entity that is qualitatively both affirmative and negative. In the return, 
the type of image that returns must be regarded in this way, as having a dual 
character. Thus, in chapters two and three I will examine the image that returns in 
terms of the relations between the actual and virtual, temporality and spatialization, 
memory and information. This method will allow for an understanding of whether 
the returning image is in fact a deterritorialization of the analog image and whether 
digital media is a new territory of thought. 
With respect to the fold I consider the repetition of folding with regard to 
topological views, which shift from micro to a macro perspective. Molecular, micro 
foldings of matter develop into macro, sinuous folds; the folds of matter produce 
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differences in perception, in which inklings and micro sensations develop into the 
conditions of thought and consciousness. Chapter four begins with an examination 
of the micro and mezzo folds in Tarkovsky's Mirror (1975) and chapter five 
examines the macro folds of consciousness among media-events such as Granular 
Synthesis's performances Model! 5 (1997) and POL (1998), Survival Research 
Laboratories's noise performance from 1991 and Toni Dove's Spectropia (2008) 
among others. 
The difference and repetition in the two chapters is in the folds of perception. 
Thus, two issues present themselves: the increase in the surface topology of my 
examination and the increasing size of the fold. That is, the surface topology of what 
is being examined increases from one to many events, presenting a difference in the 
perspectival field being examined, at the same time as micro foldings distend into 
the larger fold of consciousness. 
But how might the variation in the perspectival fields present difference? The 
theory of perspectivism, which Deleuze presents in The Fold, must be understood 
through Leibniz's theory of differential relations. Daniel Smith explains that for 
Leibniz, conscious perception is produced when minute perceptions merge into our 
conscious perception. For instance, two voices in the background that we may not 
necessarily be aware of enter our conscious perception. Such conscious perceptions 
make up singularities or events and produce shifts in thresholds of consciousness. 
Moreover, these thresholds present differentials by which a fuller understanding of 
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the object/event as perception might occur. Objects/events are to be understood as 
being produced through differential relations in conscious perception, rather than by 
empirical givens.41 The two perspectives given in chapters four and five occur as the 
differentials in the perspectival relations in the observations of micro and macro 
folds. This shift in perspectival fields therefore also produces a difference in 
perception and in the size of the fold. From the obscure rumblings of micro 
perception to the clearer perceptions of macro perception the folds become larger, 
causing a shift in the thresholds of perception. 
Whereas in chapter four I consider the basic constitution of the moving 
image (sound, movement, matter and light) to consider the image in time, chapter 
five considers the folds between media events, bringing into discussion perception, 
memory and consciousness. The micro folds of the moving image shift in chapter 
five towards the possibility of a single interpenetrative circuitry among different 
media events for the production of the newness of experience. What changes in the 
repetition is not only the size of the fold, but also the nature of the fields being 
examined: from image-perception-sensations to image-perception-sensations-events-
memory-consciousness. 
Overview of chapters 
In the first chapter I will present a brief survey of the interconnections among film 
studies, theory and philosophy over the last century. In doing so I hope to disturb the 
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limits of film theory and film-philosophy in favour of a more interdisciplinary 
approach. I begin by considering how a theoretical or a philosophical approach 
should be based not on traditional categories such as narrative and genre in film 
studies or duration and perception in philosophy, but rather on the methodological 
approach taken in a given examination. I follow this section by presenting the 
distinctions between a pedagogical approach and the becoming-philosophical of 
film. In the former, philosophical writing sometimes takes film as a tool for 
illuminating a philosophical concept, and in the latter, the approach I take in this 
dissertation, film or the image itself becomes the cause for philosophical thinking. In 
the second half of this chapter I elaborate on the major areas and questions of this 
dissertation and then move on to present some current developments in the field and 
my own approach to film-philosophy. 
I begin the second chapter by examining the time-images ofDenis's L'lntrus 
(2004), inquiring into how the interstice and interstitial repetition function in the 
film. This inquiry configures the types of durational flows, revealing three types of 
disjunctive synthesis at work in the film: the paradox, divergences and involution. 
Delving into Deleuze-Bergson's ontology of pure time and memory, I query the 
nature of the disjunctive syntheses in the film in relation to the actual-virtual, the 
virtual multiplicity of time-images, the heterogeneous rhythms of the various planes 
of consciousness and the workings of a global memory. Central to my concern is the 
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type of image produced in film's analog technology. Importantly, too, I analyze how 
these disjunctive syntheses produce the movements of thought. 
In chapter three the interstice returns in my examination of digital, 
automechanized installations such as Susan Collins's Fenlandia, Glenlandia and The 
Spectroscope (2004-7). I begin by inquiring into the technical processes and material 
conditions of these works, focusing on the duration of each. By considering the 
compositional direction, the function of the camera in the production of spatiality, 
the movement and composition of the pixel, the development of each frame and 
series, I examine how and what type of duration is produce in the installations. I 
consider the temporal relations of the whole through Deleuze-Bergson's observations 
on the workings of virtual and numerical multiplicities and ask whether the 
transmission system produces the series or simultaneity in the production of the 
digital image. Last, I examine what types of thought-movements are possible in such 
a system given the spatialization of duration and consider the image of time 
produced. 
Chapter four shifts focus to the fold. Leibniz's curvilinear aesthetics becomes 
the theoretical ground for this examination, allowing for thresholds in the experience 
of sensations and for the continual oscillation in the movements of thought. My 
analysis begins with how the micro folds among light, sound, movement and matter 
in time produce micro sensations or inklings. In Tarkovsky's Mirror these micro 
sensations bring about a constant flux between obscurity and clarity in thinking. 
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Starting at this level, I consider Massumi's intermodularity of the senses in the 
perception of the image. Changing gears to a mezzo perspective, in the second half 
of the chapter, I consider what he refers to as the "shapelikeness" of sensory 
perception to develop my notion of the painterly, auricular/poetic and musical flows 
of the film. Last, this chapter considers whether and how the sensate might unfold 
into the movements of conscious thinking. 
Continuing to explore the fold and Leibniz's curvilinear aesthetics, I repeat 
my query in chapter five with a difference. Changing the point of view to a macro 
perspective, I examine how various events unfold in perception to produce the larger 
folds of consciousness. My inquiry focuses on the folds among several events by 
considering Granular Synthesis's performances POL and Modell 5, Survival 
Research Laboratories's noise performances and Toni Dove's Spectropia. In the 
experience of an event, I query how virtual memory and perception fold into the 
present and probe how duration moves beyond the simple measurement of 
chronometric time, of continuing presents, to include the layers of virtual memory. 
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Chapter One 
Film-philosophy: assembling a field from practices, theory and philosophy 
Introduction 
My inquiry into the interstice and the fold, which includes an examination of 
duration, perception, memory, actual-virtual relations and the ontology of the image, 
arises from the intersection of media practices, studies and philosophy. In this 
undertaking I will move beyond the limits of traditionally defined areas, forming 
rhizomatic connections amongst their various conceptual, virtual and material 
components to make up a third field that is neither typically media theory or studies 
nor philosophy. Indeed, these rhizomatic connections between the fields of film and 
media studies and theory and philosophy have formally constituted what is the 
relatively newer field of film-philosophy. However, despite the recent constitution of 
this newer field of inquiry, the interconnections among theory, studies and 
philosophy have been present since the inception of early cinema. In the first part of 
this chapter, therefore, I will initiate a survey of some links between these fields to 
map out some conceptual developments, sketching out some of the antecedents over 
the last century. In presenting these interconnections, I hope to present glimpses of 
the theoretical ground and the nature of the topics from which film-philosophy 
emerges. 
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In the second half of this chapter I will lay out the theoretical ground of my 
inquiry on duration, which will give rise to the specific questions on the fold and 
interstice outlined in the introduction and central to this dissertation. In this section I 
will present a detailed understanding of the function, form and conceptual 
understanding of these two processes. While they are asymmetrical and 
incommensurate with each other, their differences are to be understood as making up 
the multiplicity of the whole of media studies. Each forms a different node on the 
rhizome, constituting a variation in how duration is experienced. This variation will 
allow me to end this chapter by considering the flux in how meaning is produced 
and in the instability of meaning itself. By assembling the various components into 
their particular relations in the chapters, I form the connections among them 
synthetically, rather than through a natural or historical process. The relations 
operate from an open outside rather than from the inside of (what might be 
constituted as) media studies. This method, which disassociates from inscribing 
traditional filiations or a genealogy, presents an ungrounding of how meaning comes 
to be produced, as well as of the certainty of meaning itself. 
An archeology of film and philosophy 
In her introduction to what is film-philosophy, Felicity Colman considers how film's 
theoretical and philosophical engagements both lie in "technological epistemologies" 
and "event epistemologies." In other words, the continual shifts in media 
29 
technologies produce shifts in epistemology, which bring about changes in film 
theory and philosophical thinking. Whereas Colman's approach shows the 
interrelationships between changing technologies, which produce shifts in 
theoretical and philosophical thinking, Daniel Shaw's approach differentiates film 
theory and criticism from philosophy in a way that tries to define each as distinct. He 
writes, "[w]hat distinguishes philosophy of film from the enterprise of film theory, 
which has a long and distinguished history? What does it mean to talk about a film 
philosophically, as opposed, say, to talking about it psychologically or 
sociologically? ... Are such disciplinary distinctions not merely artificial?"42 But 
despite this hesitance, Shaw proposes his first "tentative and commonsensical 
hypothesis," in which he writes that "philosophising about films is to be 
distinguished from traditional film theory and criticism by analyzing the terms in 
which films are being discussed. "43 Accordingly, issues ofrepression, neuroses or 
instinctual drives are given to a psychoanalytical approach; when discussing the 
values of a particular culture or subculture one is applying sociology; when 
unpacking the semiological "language" of film, one engages in linguistics; and, 
when one is engaged in a philosophical discussion on nihilism, in considering Kant's 
good will or in Nietzsche's eternal return, one is doing "philosophy" of film. 
While these distinctions appear reasonable on first consideration, a more 
detailed investigation into film theory and philosophy shows the complex, 
intertwined and cross-disciplinary nature of film writings: any shot by shot analysis 
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will show a theoretical as well as a philosophical engagement. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, Shaw himself writes that in his seminal essay, "A Dialectic Approach to 
Film Form" (1931 ), Sergei Eisenstein was doing philosophy ;'in the best sense of the 
term," wherein his intellectual montage is grounded in Marxist philosophy. 44 
Nonetheless, in his chapter "Philosophical Film Theorists," Shaw sketches out the 
folding over between film theory and philosophy where, in an attempt to attribute to 
film the status of an autonomous art form, early film theorists introduce 
philosophical concepts into their work. Citing Hugo Munsterberg, Eisenstein, 
Seigfried Kracauer and Andre Bazin as chief among these theorists, he considers 
how their works are grounded in traditional aesthetics, drawing upon Kant's 
formalism, Marx's philosophy, Aristotle's theory of mimesis and Henri Bergson's 
version of phenomenology, respectively.45 
In contrast, Colman's "technological epistemologies" takes into account how 
both film theory and film-philosophy consider form, style, narrative and 
architecture: both theoretical and philosophical works engage with the technological 
planes of media landscapes. In considering digital-analog technologies, single-
multiple channels, mobile-fixed projection screens (including hand-held devices), 
DVDs and web-based HDTV, differences in content as well as in the perception of 
images are generated.46 Thus while film-philosophy and film theory both consider 
the technological plane, the former distinguishes itself by its focus on ontology. 
Changing technologies, moreover, also produce transformations in the forms, styles 
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and narratives of film; these transformations produce alterations in perception and 
thereby propagate metaphysical shifts in the ontology of film.47 Changing 
technologies are therefore inextricably linked to the metaphysical, in which films 
produced by newer technologies generate their corresponding virtual thoughts and 
concepts. Transformations in technologies generate shifts in the event of the film 
itself, producing changes in the epistemology of the event, which creates shifts in 
thinking. "Event epistemology" may therefore be understood as a shift in thinking, 
which generates a new system in the ontology of cinema.48 
While film-philosophy investigates ontology considering, for instance, the 
sciences of movement, time, space and perception in cinema, presenting what may 
be the "larger dimensions of representational forms," it nonetheless also allows for a 
focus on the technical details of the everyday functioning of things and on methods 
of thinking.49 However, concepts such as movement or time may be brought to bear 
in any media work, enabling a theoretical, political or philosophical engagement 
with it. A philosophical undertaking of film and digital media is different from a 
political one, the two perspectives being asymmetrical but not oppositional. 
Additionally, while time and space may be treated aesthetically, politically or on a 
philosophical plane, it is not merely that the categories themselves come to be 
treated differentially on the different planes, but that the categories themselves 
change.50 
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While film theorists consider movement, time, space and perception in 
cinema, what differentiates film theory from film-philosophy lies only somewhat in 
the latter's investigation into "the ontology of something," wherein the internal 
pathways for theoretical or philosophical discussion might become discernable. 51 
Complexity arises as theoretical studies utilize screen-based ontologies and 
philosophical examinations utilize film theory to elucidate a point. A feminist 
theoretical discussion might enfold aspects of ontology, and vice versa. Even David 
Bordwell's cognitivist approach, which he defends as being an empiricism that is 
conceptually free from theoretical structure, presents a presupposition that takes on a 
philosophical stance. 52 Screen-based ontologies might therefore be theoretical, 
philosophical or a combination. 
What form the screen-based ontology takes depends on the type of 
methodological approach utilized, be it cognitivist, analytical, continental, empirical 
realist, feminist, formalist, psychoanalytical, phenomenological, postmodern or any 
other. A psychoanalytical methodology might traditionally be categorized as 
theoretical, nonetheless, Shaw's first chapter "Philosophical Film Theorists" includes 
the psychoanalytical approach of Laura Mulvey and Robin Wood.53 Moreover, a 
methodological approach might be differentiated further in terms of the specific 
categories of analysis that the writer employs, categories that examine questions of 
truth, the philosophy of knowledge, skepticism, reality, realism, aesthetics, rhetoric, 
poetics and others. 54 Perception or ways of seeing necessarily draws from theoretical 
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study and philosophical thought. Baudry's "Ideological Effects of the Basic 
Cinematographic Apparatus" (1970), for instance, analyses the cinematic apparatus 
and image construction within a psychoanalytical framework and also in light of 
Husserl's idealist philosophy. 55 As John Mullarkey points out, film studies, since the 
1960s, has always integrated schools of thought emerging from Freud, Adorno, 
Barthes, Althusser, Bourdieu, Lacan, Wittgenstein and others. It has consistently 
been an interdisciplinary field, intertwined with versions of linguistics, semiology, 
Marxist critical theory, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and others. 56 
From the 1960s onwards, cross-disciplinary analysis flourished in which 
structuralist, ideological, linguistic, psychoanalytical, gender, sexuality, postcolonial 
and other theoretical perspectives were frequently intertwined with philosophical 
questioning. Among these are Roland Barthes's Image-Music-Text (1977), 
Mythologies (1972) and Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (1981 ). 
Barthes's work in cine-semiology and structuralism presents a unique 
phenomenology of both textual and somatic excess, reversing the syntagmatic order 
of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, in which he writes that the theory 
of perception was already the theory of the body. 57 Christian Metz's Film Language: 
A Semiotics of Cinema (1974) and Language and Cinema (1974) are seminal in 
formulating the relations between Saussurian linguistics and cinematic language. His 
essay, "The Imaginary Signifier" (1975), draws from Freud and Lacan's thought with 
respect, for example, to the imaginary signifier in cinema, the pleasure principle in 
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cinematic experience, identification, the mirror phase, scopic drives and disavowal. 58 
Laura Mulvey's ground breaking essay "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" 
(1975) also references Freud and Lacan's psychoanalytical theory, but for a feminist 
approach in considering classical Hollywood cinema with respect to subject, subject 
positioning, the spectator, the gaze, voyeurism and fetishism. Kaja Silverman's essay 
"Suture" (1983) refers to the metaphor for the relation of the subject to a signifying 
chain, which she draws from Lacanian thought. She conceives the notion of suture 
as relations between lack and the inadequacy of the subject's position as 
opportunities for insertion in cultural discourse. 59 Wood's anthology, Hollywood 
from Vietnam to Reagan (1986), is a Marxo-Freudian ideological synthesis of class, 
capitalism and culture. His essays, "The Return of the Repressed" (1978) and "The 
American Nightmare: Horror in the 70s" (1986), analyze sexual politics and draw . 
upon Freudian psychoanalysis, focussing on the instinctual drives of eros and 
thanatos to analyze the return of the repressed in horror film. 60 Trihn T. Minh-ha's 
essay, "Outside In Inside Out" (1989), focuses on knowledge and questions the 
conceptual frameworks of knowledge-making-acquisition-production, particularly in 
relation to insiders and outsiders and anthropologist-filmmakers researching African 
societies. 
Since cinema's inception, film theorists have generated philosophically 
oriented texts. These texts include, most notably, Munsterberg's essay "The 
Photoplay" (1916); Eisenstein's "A Dialectic Approach to Film Form" (1931); 
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Rudolf Amheim's Film as Art (1957); Bazin's ontology of cinema in What is 
Cinema? (1954); Kraucauer's Theory of Film (1960); and Jean Mitry's The Aesthetics 
and Psychology of Cinema (1963). Likewise, the uptake of film by philosophers 
themselves began early, with Bergson's writings on cinema in Creative Evolution 
(1907/11), Maurice Merleau-Ponty's "The Film and the New Psychology" in Sense 
and Nonsense (1948/64), and Jean Lyotard's "Acinema" (1991). However, while 
these philosophers ventured into film, their works have been limited in scope. 
More notable and substantive writings on film began in the 1970s with 
philosophers such as Stanley Cavell and in the 1980s with Noel Carroll and Gilles 
Deleuze. Cavell's works on film such as The World Viewed: Reflections on the 
Ontology of Film (l 979) and Cavel/ on Film (a collection of essays and interviews, 
2005), were influenced by Wittgenstein; Deleuze's two books on cinema, The 
Afovement-lmage and The Time-Image were published in 1983/86 and 1985/89,61 
Carroll's Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory and Engaging the 
J\1oving Image were published in 1988 and 2003.62 More recently, in the last two 
decades, some noted philosophers's works on film include Slavoj Zizek's Looking 
Awry (1998), The Fright of Real Tears: Krzystof Kieslowski Between Theory and 
Post-Theory (1999) and others; Jacques Ranciere's The Future of the Image (2003) 
and Film Fables (2006); and Jean-Luc Nancy's Kiarostami Abbas: The Evidence of 
Film (2001) and The Ground of the Image (2005). 
36 
From these numerous examples it would be possible to say that the 
movements between the fields of film theory, studies and philosophy have been 
extensive. In questions related to form, style, medium, reality, ontology, 
epistemology, perception, aesthetics and others, theoretical studies have been 
philosophically orientated. In some seminal questions posed in film theory, such as 
what is cinema, what is the medium, how perception occurs, what is reality and 
realism, as well as issues of movement, the cut, subject, subject-positioning, the 
ideological apparatus and so on, philosophical pondering has always been integrated 
into the thoughts of film texts. Likewise, it is not surprising to note the interest 
amongst philosophers in writing about film in some of these categories. The 
boundaries of film theory and philosophy have been porous and flexible, blurring at 
the edges, at least since Bergson's writings on film in Creative Evolution in 1907 and 
Munsterberg's The Photoplay in 1916. 
Film and Philosophy: some difficulties in the nature of the field 
To the relatively new and emerging fields of "film and philosophy" and "film-
philosophy," we can say that the works that have emerged since the early twentieth 
century are in fact numerous. This flourishing of cross-disciplinary perspectives 
arising out of theory and philosophy has, in fact, only recently been acknowledged 
and inaugurated into a new field as film-philosophy. Nonetheless, film-philosophy 
must be understood as a mutant/bastard/third field and must be differentiated from 
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the other two. Neither purely film theory nor philosophy, it occurs at the edges of the 
two fields and holds a foot in both. 
While philosophers such as Cavell and Carroll continue to publish newer 
works, 63 a fresh scholarship emerged in the late 1990s. As might be expected, 
writings on film-philosophy traverse anything from epistemology to ontology to 
phenomenology, and from Plato to Kant to Cavell in the newer journals devoted 
specifically to the field such as Film and Philosophy (1994); Film-Philosophy 
Journal (1997); Senses of Cinema (1999); Deleuze Cinema (2012) and others. A fair 
amount of the new scholarship was also influenced by Deleuze's philosophical 
writings, including his cinema books, as the latter had just been translated into 
English in 1989. D.N. Rodowick's Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine (1997) was the 
forerunner among these works, presenting a comprehensive study of his works to 
Anglo-American film scholars and to philosophers, in which he attempts to show 
how cinema is central to the work of contemporary philosophy. 64 
These books and journals spawned another wave of publications and extend, 
in some cases, to include an analysis of digital media. Some remarkable works are 
Mark Hansen's New Philosophies for New Media (2004) and Bodies in Code (2006); 
Daniel Frampton's Filmosophy (2006); Jennifer Barker's The Tactile Eye: Touch and 
the Cinematic Experience (2009); and, John Mullarkey's Philosophy and the Moving 
Image: Refractions of Reality (2009).65 Very recent studies include the Journal of 
Philosophy and the Moving Image (201 O); Robert Sinnerbrink's New Philosophies of 
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Film: Thinking Images; and, Havi Carel and Greg Tuck's anthology, New Takes in 
Film-Philosophy (2011 ). As is clear from these works, the current field of debate 
and argument is dense and vigorous. 
Carel and Tuck's anthology presents three sections, including a range of 
approaches to film-philosophy, its limits and readings on three specific filmmakers. 
Barker's text presents an exploration of phenomenology and embodiment, including 
the notion that film experiences move beyond merely looking at visual imagery to 
penetrate and reverberate in the body. Sinnerbrink's volume offers an interesting 
cross-disciplinary approach among philosophy, film studies and cultural studies as 
well as readings of particular filmmakers such as David Lynch, Lars von Trier and 
Terrence Malick. Lastly, Mullarkey's book presents a critical overview of film-
philosophy in the twentieth century and takes a turn for a non-philosophy of cinema, 
in concert with Frarn;ois Larouelle's anti-philosophy. He writes that each of the 
philosophical takes presented within a film-philosophy framework shows only a 
singular approach; moreover, since film is an immanent set of processes in hybrid 
contexts which occur through varied relations, singular frameworks become pretexts 
for illustrating philosophy. 66 He critiques Deleuze for exemplifying his own 
philosophy through the examples that he furnishes in his film books. An anti-
philosophical approach, on the contrary, would permit us to get away from any 
definition of film, including of thinking and philosophy, allowing for an openness 
and "a democracy of thought. 1167 
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In regarding film as a medium of philosophical debate, there is argument 
about the validity of whether it is even possible to actually philosophize with film.68 
Thomas Wartenberg discusses four objections, the first being that of generality. 
General truths, which are characteristic of and essential to philosophy, are not 
possible in films, because films are specific and particular. Therefore, inasmuch as 
films are necessarily specific to the narrative, they are unable to communicate 
general truths. Second, because philosophical texts are necessarily written in explicit 
form and filmic ones are expressed through visual and narrative form, films cannot 
offer explicit determinate propositional content, as the visual mode is itself 
ambiguous. Third is the objection of imposition, wherein a philosopher imposes 
his/her own philosophical claim upon a film. While one's philosophical 
interpretation of a film counts as philosophy, overinterpreting the meaning of a film 
by imposing one's own philosophical ideas upon it is not philosophy. Rather, the 
task of the philosopher is to present how a certain issue arises in a film. The fourth 
objection is that of banality in that, even if a film might have philosophical content, 
it is usually trivial or banal. While art films such as Bergman's Persona (1966) or 
avant-garde films might not fall into this category, a wide range of films would, as 
they are made for popular appeal. 69 
While Wartenberg offers up these objections for further discussion, even 
presenting counter arguments to these in the subsection "Modes of the philosophical 
in film," his overall approach could be understood as an application of philosophical 
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argument to film. Not surprisingly, such an approach is not effective. This approach 
profoundly lacks the ability to understand film as a medium of visual expression that 
is deeply sensorial. The direct application of philosophical propositions by explicit 
argumentation misunderstands film, and thereby also the endeavour of film-
philosophy. This approach is limited to dialogue, plot, story, narrative and character 
motivations because it aims to make philosophical claims, illustrate philosophical 
theories, or develop social criticism. While he presents a cursory understanding of 
the importance of the visual form in structuralist filmmaking in "Film as self-
definitial," this segment is minimal and unsatisfactory. Ignoring cinematics, 
explanations such as Wartenberg' s are fixed on the established criteria and subject 
matter of academic philosophy, in which a film's importance is achieved by its 
ability to illustrate a given philosophical claim. 
In such an approach, film is used as a pedagogical tool and film-philosophy 
becomes an endeavour in illustrative methodology in which philosophical concepts 
are applied to the study of film. 70 This approach also presupposes an answer to the 
prior question of whether a film is a viable medium for presenting philosophical 
ideas, 71 and draws a parallel between a particular philosophy and a particular film, 
which may or may not be intentional. It presumes whether a film is applicable or 
appropriate to a given philosophical study and thereby limits its potential to a 
particular philosophical engagement. Such a perspective is also manifest in Shaw's 
Film and Philosophy, in which he writes that films, which parallel major 
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philosophies, intentionally or not, are themselves philosophical. In his approach, one 
does philosophy of film, for instance, when one writes about nihilism and the 
meaning oflife in Bergman's Nattvardsgasterna (Winter Light, 1962), or Nietzsche's 
Eternal Return in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004 ), or Kant's goodwill 
in Hotel Rwanda (2004).72 In his view, films are remarkable on the basis of their 
philosophical import: certain films are important in that they present a particular 
philosophical problem, and thus particular films merit study in their capacity to 
"flesh out" a philosophical problem. Film itself becomes secondary, serving as a tool 
in the study of philosophy. Moreover, this approach differentiates films from each 
other on the basis of their ability to reveal (or not) a given philosophical aspect. 
Film is a thinking machine: towards a philosophical claim 
Another strain of scholarship brings film itself to the fore, rather than play handmaid 
to philosophy. This strain of thinking is the becoming philosophical of film, which is 
the approach that I take. In the becoming philosophical of film, Mullarkey writes 
that film genuinely needs to be able to think, rather than merely illustrate a theory or 
a philosophical thought. Being a hybrid medium, it includes different types of 
technologies and incorporates many art forms. Its study therefore resists any singular 
reductive theorization applied to its processual being that would suppress its "elan 
cinematique. "73 Thus, just as a film has come under the influence of different types 
of theorization -- semiotic, ideological or psychoanalytic - any such theorization has 
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ultimately been a totalizing one, insufficient for considering film's multi-
componential qualities. Film's multilayered, contextual and processual nature cannot 
be reduced to a mere illustration of a thought. Rather, it has to be understood as a 
relational process, enfolding a multiplicity within it. The raw data, apparatus, 
materiality, textuality; the visual, cognitive and sensorial fields; the ontological 
worldview and theories related to these different dimensions, make for a stratified or 
layered approach. This multiplicity within film allows the film to think without the 
imposition of thought from the outside. That is, film is able to think itself beyond the 
theoretical positions ascribed to it, which come to define and fix it. In resisting any 
particular theorization, film becomes a heterogeneous region that holds together 
many possible universes; 74 in this quality, it is a feral zone, resisting 
theoretical/philosophical capture. This recalcitrance to our thought, Mullarkey 
writes, "may well be its form of thought too."75 As it is resistant to capture, we in 
tum come to think through its multifaceted complexities that go beyond our own 
thoughts. In thinking through these complexities, something is cogendered between 
film and ourselves. 76 
Frampton in Filmosophy (2006) writes that the early writers on film claimed 
it to be "thought-like."77 He writes that by linking film to thinking, Dulac, Bergson 
and Quesnoy considered film to be a visualization of memory. In 1924, Dulac wrote 
that cinema was equipped to manifest our psychological and emotional life, in its 
ability to express dreams and emotion, and Quesnoy, in 1928, considered how 
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cinema can "feel" time and memory, similar to Proust's novels. Bergson's link 
between cinema and memory considered whether the former was a model for 
consciousness, writing, " [ i]t might be able to assist in the synthesis of memory, or 
even of the thinking process." 78 
Considering writings from the early part of the twentieth century, Frampton's 
research traces how film has been linked to the imagination, the artist's soul, 
subjectivity, thinking and to forms of consciousness. For instance, he writes that 
Vuillermoz and Canudo linked film to be similar in form to our subconscious. 
Vuillermoz, in 1917, considered how each frame acted as a cell in the human brain 
and compared the camera to perception and editing to the imagination. Canudo, in 
1923, considered how cinema had the particular facility of "expressing the soul of 
the artist" and the "striking faculty of representing immateriality," linking cinema to 
the subconscious. 79 Frampton writes that along this string of ideas, linking film to 
thinking, a later scholarship emerged. In 1978, Kawin's notion of "mindscreen 
narration" considered how a character's mental images, including their thoughts, 
intentions and emotions presented the subjective world of a character -- his/her 
mindscreen -- which is the "field of the mind's eye. 1180 Wicclair, in 1978 and Carroll 
in 1988 in their own discussions on phenomenology and film-mind, come to take up 
Munsterberg's early theories on film's subjective-objective relations. 81 
Important to outline in all these micro-approaches to film is that film induces 
the spectator to think philosophically and becomes a catalyst for thinking. This 
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approach is different from applied pedagogy, in which a film is philosophical on the 
basis of its ability to demonstrate pre-established philosophical claims. Rather than 
film being handmaid to the tradition of written philosophical texts, in this approach, 
film images produce an encounter with the subject in which visual and aural images, 
among other components, generate thinking. Film is the thinking-machine, which 
generates the philosophical concepts, in the form of visual-sonic images. 
Recent developments: Deleuze, duration and the ontology of the moving image 
Besides the cognitivist approach set in motion by David Bordwell and Kristin 
Thompson in the 1980s, recent currents in cinema analysis frequently utilize socio-
political approaches. Psychoanalysis, Marxism, Frankfurt School cultural theory, 
semiotics, gender-sexuality and post-colonial frameworks heavily influence the 
terms of discussion and analysis of cinema. In coming to consider the importance of 
duration in cinema, however, Deleuze's two books on cinema and time, The 
j\fovement-Image and The Time-Image, become important. In these books there is a 
privileged relation between image and thought, in which the image is understood as 
a continual and fluid movement in time. Taking up Peirce's semiotics, Deleuze 
argues that cinematic images are neither static nor closed and make up a set of 
changing relations as they unfold in time. In their movement, they produce signals or 
signalectic material out of the "plastic mass" that makes them up. The image's 
plasticity modulates the image in all sorts of ways, including, "sensory, kinetic, 
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intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal and verbal (oral and written)," which means that 
the meanings produced are not merely arrived at through linguistic means.82 This 
plastic mass is "a-syntaxic and a-signifying" and in its modulations produces a 
multitude of different relations, moving beyond the merely linguistic. Deleuze's 
cinema books therefore move away from Metz's semiology, which was the 
dominant theory in cinema, derived from Saussure's linguistics. 83 
To this moving set oflogical relations, Deleuze introduces Bergson's 
duration, in which images endure through time. Both cinema books are connected 
together by the arc of time. In movement-images, the image of time is indirect and 
movement is the primary force. Images follow the sensory-motor regime, in which 
the interval between two shots produces the continuous relations among them. Shots 
move seamlessly from the perception-image to the action-image, the physical 
movement of images producing continuity in the movements of thought. In this 
system, time is subordinate to the needs of narrative logic. Movement-images are 
therefore the indirect image of time. 
In time-images, on the other hand, the direct experience of the event is 
produced, in which the narrative is subordinate to time. Each image is a fragment of 
time encountered outside of narrative logic. Shots are fragments of time linked 
together in a chain, producing disjointedness in their spatio-temporal relations. In 
this disjointedness, time itself becomes a force that produces thinking. Encountering 
disjointed shots in a chain of images, forces us to think. 84 Thus movement is no 
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longer the physical movement of images, but the form of change through time. In the 
encounter of one image to another, thought in relation to time is always changing. 
The time-image is therefore this relationship between thought and the form of 
time. 85 
Within a Deleuzian approach, cinema comes to be explored more in terms of 
the ontology of the image and its sensorial matter, through engagements in sound 
and image, perception and memory, on the relations of the movement of images, on 
the indirect and direct relations of time, philosophical and aesthetic matter, which 
had heretofore been less explored. 86 In Deleuze, Altered States and Film (2007) 
Anna Powell writes that affects impact not only the senses but also the brain, 
becoming the generator of thoughts and memories. 87 Frampton, similarly, pursues 
the notion of affects in his conceptualization of "film-mind," in which film presents 
its own organic condition for thinking, writing that, "the filmind is 'the film itself.11188 
Deleuze's metaphysical sense of what a film can do through sensorial and 
psychological experiences has shifted analysis further into connections with 
neurological and biological systems, and also toward the empirical, toward 
observations and encounters that emerge from the film experience itself. This 
approach moves away from analyzing narrative details and from carrying out 
cultural-ideological analysis emergent in narrative form, plot and industrial 
production; instead, it emphasizes such things as affect, the physical impact of the 
film on the neuro-sensory system, which presents the power to think. 89 
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Within the last decade, there has been a rise in scholarship among the 
different philosophical approaches, including Deleuze's. One of the earliest 
introductions on Deleuze's cinema books to an Anglo-American film scholarship 
was Rodowick's Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine. In his extensive study on the 
ontology of the moving image and duration, Rodowick interjects great depth into 
some of the major trajectories ofDeleuze's conceptualization of movement and the 
time image, including his three commentaries on Bergson's ontology of the image, 
together with movement, memory and time. This volume brought a great deal of 
interest to Deleuze's philosophical corpus and to the ontology of cinema, in tum 
spawning a series of new works on film-media scholarship, philosophy and Deleuze. 
Most recently, Timothy Murray9° and Rodowick91 work specifically with 
Deleuze and include digital works, examining the fold in relation to film and digital 
media (Murray) and duration and time more intensely (Rodowick). Ian Buchanan 
and Patricia Maccormack reject the segmentation ofDeleuze into cinema and the 
rest of his philosophy and consider instead how his works might be taken up as a 
whole. In their anthology they explore the possibility for synthesizing Deleuze and 
Guattari's books on schizophrenia into a new way of thinking about cinema.92 Elena 
Del Rio focuses on Deleuze and Spinoza's affective and kinetic movement of 
images, in which images have the capacity to affect and to be affected by others. 
Cinematic images make up the cinematic body, she writes, which is performative.93 
Her book unfolds the speeds and gestures of the performing cinematic body, 
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examining affect and performance in what she refers to as "affective-performative." 
These and numerous other publications present an idea of the varied directions taken 
in the field of film-philosophy over the last decade. 
Situating my own work within the field, I focus on duration and the ontology 
of the image. In taking up the visual, sensorial qualities of sound and moving images 
flowing in time, by way of the interstice or the fold, I speculate on how images 
might themselves come to philosophize. Images, rather than merely illustrating or 
representing given philosophical concepts, actually think for themselves. In other 
words, as Mullarkey writes, "we would have to learn more about how film 
concretizes philosophy, about how thought can be visual. "94 By consenting to the 
aesthetics of the image, a philosophical exchange can occur conveying the details of 
the medium. In considering images that have a capacity for philosophizing, I move 
away from anthropocentric and phenomenological observations, towards a non-
human "flat ontology." Images in this approach are not representational of human 
subjectivity, but rather are to be considered as having their own agency, their own 
subjectivity; they are "real" things in and of themselves and have a first order of 
reality. As I will try to show in subsequent chapters, images are not a representation 
of something: images are something. A flat ontology levels out hierarchy in which a 
dog, tree, mushroom or grain of sand has subjectivity or agency.95 A flat ontology 
within the context of media would attribute agency and subjectivity to images, 
undoing the ontological privileging of human beings. It is necessary to first consider 
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that cinematic or moving images have their own agency and present their affect on 
us directly.96 Moving images carry an agency that bears upon the viewing subject 
sensorially and emotionally, and in doing so, they induce thinking. Thinking and 
knowledge are produced in this experience with images, an experience that is as 
valid as any rational thought. 97 
In this dissertation, the language and texts of academic philosophy will be 
excluded as we move towards the ontology of the image itself. Deleuze's Movement-
lmage and Time-Image dispute the over-wrought applications of philosophical 
concepts to film, proposing that film is "a plastic mass, an a-signifying and a-
syntactic matter, a non-linguistically formed matter, though a matter that is not 
amorphous but semiotically, aesthetically and pragmatically formed. "98 This plastic 
mass is "a signaletic matter that bears the characteristics of modulations of all sorts 
of sensorial (visual and sonic), kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal and even 
verbal (oral and written) [matter]. "99 This plastic mass, the "stuff of which films are 
made," is encountered in the automatic movement of cinema, cinema's spiritual 
automaton that presents sensations. 100 Sensations unfold into the movements of 
thought and this circuit between images and thinking is where Gregory Flaxman 
writes that we "extract ourselves from chaos. 11101 The approach that this dissertation 
takes is towards this condition that film and digital media present, of the encounter 
with thought from the outside, an encounter that produces sensations and also the 
movements of thinking. If images have traditionally been understood as a secondary 
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order, as representations that are one order removed from the real, this relation 
becomes reversed here. Such a reversal simultaneously undoes the hierarchy 
associated with anthropocentric observation. As first order of reality, analog/digital 
images present their own agency, their own conditions of thinking in human subjects 
who are continually in processes of becoming, creating and thinking with them. 102 
How images directly affect us by producing sensations and emotions is an 
important dimension of my work. The engagement with images brings us into a 
relation with the reality of images, in which the nature of the aesthetic experience 
brings a cognitive or epistemological import. 103 The images of film and digital 
media bring sensations to the body, allowing for the movements of thought to occur. 
Moreover, the hybrid, multi-componential makeup of media works do not allow for 
their subordination to a singular theorization that would fix and unify their 
meanings. As heterogeneous zones, they are resistant to theoretical capture and their 
complexities, on the contrary, takes the spectator beyond their own thinking. Images 
are to be understood as a visual form of thinking. 
Understood as a form of thinking, images bring together the terrains of film 
studies, theory and philosophy, in what is now the field of film-philosophy. Drawing 
from these terrains, my work in film-philosophy straddles disciplinary boundaries, 
making it something of an in-between. In the chapters that follow, my work moves 
among analog and digital images, cinema, installations, duration, perception, 
memory, actual-virtual relations and the ontology of the image. Forming rhizomatic 
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connections outside of a textual interiority, without genesis, filiation or lineage 
amongst these components, I hope to perform shifts in how we might come to think 
media images. 104 
Major areas of inquiry 
Having presented the backdrop of my undertaking in film-philosophy, I will now lay 
the theoretical ground of duration. In order to conceive newer relations in the 
durational flows of analog and digital media, my specific questions in this 
dissertation will focus on the processes of the interstice and the fold. In this section, 
I will introduce their conceptual and material operations, their asymmetry and 
correspondences, how they operate in analog and digital media, and how each might 
produce a different image of time. 
Whereas duration in the time-images of cinema has been examined 
elsewhere and the interstice has been analyzed in recent works, 105 their specificity in 
the examination of an entire film or a digital installation has not. 106 Likewise, even 
as the ontology of the fold in philosophical texts has been taken up, 107 its operation 
in media studies remains to be examined beyond the few works noted here. The 
workings of the interstice will be examined in chapter two, in Claire Denis's film 
L'lntrus (2004) and then reexamined in the next chapter in Susan Collins's digital 
installations, Fenlandia, Glenlandia and The Spectroscope (2004-7). In chapter four 
I take up the fold in Andrei Tarkovsky's film Mirror (1975) and then reexamine the 
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concept in chapter five, in which I take up the folds of perception in various media 
works such as Granular Synthesis's Modell 5 (1997) and POL (1998); Survival 
Research Laboratory's noise performance (Barcelona Art Futura Exhibition, 1991), 
and Toni Dove's Spectropia (2008), among others. 
The interstice and duration in analog cinema and digital installations 
I will present a brief understanding of the interstice before I introduce the five 
questions concerning how it relates to duration in analog cinema and digital 
installations. 108 These questions are on how duration unfolds in the workings of the 
interstice, the image of time produced, the return of the same/difference, the nature 
of the whole, qualitative and quantitative multiplicity, and the visible-invisible. 
The interstice, first conceived by Deleuze in Cinema 2: The Time-Image, is 
the fracture produced when two shots are spliced together in a sequence. In time-
images, because each shot is a different fragment of time, the connection between 
them is irrational. The movement between shots jars the spectator, generating a 
shock to thought. What occurs is that the shots spliced together in this system are 
spatio-temporally discontinuous with each other, making them unrelated. Rather 
than follow the continuity of movement, shots are spliced together without narrative 
logic or continuity. Every shot/image in the film is a fragment, an image of time, 
which presents its own thought. Linked together in a disjointed chain, the spectator 
encounters each image from what is an outside of narrative continuity and logic. 109 
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Time-images move away from the mereological relation of movement-images, in 
that there is no longer the hermeneutic whole of montage systems, but an open 
outside from which thought comes to be encountered. 110 
Two spatio-temporally disconnected shots/images joined together produces 
an "in-between." This in-between, Deleuze writes, is the interstice, in which the 
virtual movements of thought occur. However, even as the interstice's presence 
comes to signal a place, Conley suggests that its infraliminary nature cannot be 
presented with the stability of a place. 111 Nonetheless, it is a conceptual and material 
disjunction in which a multiplicity of virtual movements comes to be generated. The 
interstice, generated by two discontinuous images linked together, is the focus of my 
examination in chapters two and three. 
While the interstice's operations have been explored in subsequent cinema 
studies, its analysis in digital technologies is sparse. I have extended Deleuze's 
interstice of the time-images in cinema to also consider duration in digital 
installations. In cinema, interstices generate temporal interruptions and random 
movements of time, which bounce between pasts and futures. However, in the live 
digital transmission systems of Collins's installations, there are few random 
movements of time, pointing to the diminished presence of the interstice. In 
uninterrupted digital transmission systems, their decreased appearance yields a 
continuous time that presents another type of temporality. A reduction in 
interruptions opens up the question to what type of temporality comes to be 
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experienced in the continuous transmission systems of contemporary digital art. As 
interruptions put thought into contact with the outside, I inquire into the relation 
between the movements of thought and continuous duration. 112 I ask what the 
movements of time experienced are in particular transmission systems, and what the 
potential is for such time for the movements of thought to occur. In such a context I 
inquire into the role and potential of the disruptive forces of the interstice, first in 
analog cinema and then in the live digital transmissions systems that endure over the 
length of a year. 
Type of duration and the image of time 
The first area will address how duration unfolds in media works by inquiring into the 
type of duration experienced in both analog cinema and digital technologies 
(specifically, single-channel, automechanized, digital installations). 113 This part 
inquires into whether the type of duration produced in the two technologies is 
ruptured or continuous. This issue is essential given the characteristics of the two 
media and the conceptual-material forms that they generate. While film typically 
utilizes the celluloid filmstrip, the projector and the (inert) screen, digital 
installations utilize pixels in real time transmission systems and the interactive 
electronic screen. Automechanized, digital installations are instantaneous, 
continuous and simultaneous in their materiality and functionality, and analog 
cinema presents pasts and futures, is discontinuous and is serial. 
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In a film or digital installation, depending on whether time unfolds 
continuously or discontinuously, each will generate a different image of time. This 
area is important for understanding real duration which, as Bergson wrote, produces 
a change in kind rather than a difference in degree. In other words, in a continuous, 
singular, uninterrupted temporality the same type of duration is experienced 
throughout. In such a continuous temporality, there will be minor differences in the 
degrees of temporality but no real changes in the kinds of duration experienced. For 
instance, in mainstream commercial films, continuity in time is a given. This 
continuity in time is usually the continuous present of the film. While flashbacks and 
dream sequences are used, these plot devices are used to propel the continuous 
progression of the narrative's present. 114 Thus, this type of filmmaking (the 
movement-image) produces a continuous, singular temporality, with differences in 
degree of the duration experienced. 
Another type of duration experienced in film is the discontinuous one. A 
discontinuous duration proceeds by generating variations in the movements of time. 
These are Deleuze' s time-images in which time moves back and forth between pasts 
and futures, but not as flashbacks or dreams. In time-images, shots are fragments of 
pasts and futures that pivot just as in a crystal. The movement between different 
pasts and futures produces a heterogeneous time, which unhinges any continuity in 
duration. Such duration has the capacity for producing changes in kind, in the types 
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of duration experienced. The capacity for a media work to produce heterogeneous 
relations in time that move between pasts and futures, produces real duration. 
Whereas repeated pronouncements assert that digital and analog technologies 
produce the same type of duration and the same type of image, in this dissertation I 
wish to consider whether they actually do. I will consider how analog and digital 
technologies actually work in order to understand the duration produced and the 
makeup of an image. Inquiring into their material, formal and conceptual basis, I 
will probe how images are produced and how duration endures in particular works. 
Only upon examining the basic elements of the technologies used can we develop an 
understanding of the duration experienced and the type of images produced. Analog 
and digital technologies give rise to two types of mediums and can present a 
variation in the workings of the interstice. I distinguish celluloid-analog film from 
digital-computerized technology for their visual, affective, technical and formal 
differences. This stance departs from the understanding that digital technologies 
produce images that look similar to analog ones and are therefore the same. 115 
The return: same or difference? 
If interstices produce temporal discontinuities in analog cinema, then a question 
arises concerning the issue of the succeeding shot, what Nietzsche, in a historical 
context, called the "eternal return." 116 Important to the return is the nature of what 
returns: does the return bring about the same duration that preceded it, or does it 
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bring difference? With respect to Denis's L'lntrus, I inquire into the nature of the 
shots linked together in the interstice: what is the nature of the returning shot, of the 
image that follows? Repeating this question in the next chapter, I inquire into how 
the interstice operates in digital installations such as Glenlandia or Fenlandia, where 
the pixels move laterally along a digital screen. Such a movement produces fissures, 
rather than temporal disjunctures, and being minor, they are imperceptible to the 
eye. Thus I consider the temporal unfolding of these works and the type of return 
that they bring. Do the pixels and frames in the digital installations bring about 
sameness or difference in their repetitions? Does the type of return that occurs 
produce the movements of thought? How durational works facilitate the movements 
of thought and thinking becomes an important current in my dissertation. That is, I 
question whether the return brings thought into an encounter with the same, or if it 
presents the possibility for a movement into a beyond outside, into what is as yet the 
unthought in thought. 
The whole 
An inquiry into duration requires an understanding into the nature of the whole. The 
question of the whole in relation to the open outside becomes important in durational 
works, such as Collins's, which extend over a year. Yet, what does such an extended 
duration express in relation to L 'lntrus, a film that is just over two hours long? This 
difference needs to be examined especially in light of Bergson's assertion that real 
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duration is that which changes continually and of Rodowick's position that a 
qualitative duration occurs in the camera's movement through space. Both these 
limits make Collins's installations questionable as works expressing true duration, as 
the installations produce a single continuous temporality and the cameras are 
immobile and do not move through space. Intuitively it might appear that the 
expansive period of the installations in and of itself constitutes qualitative duration; 
however, this proposition needs examination. 
Qualitative and quantitative multiplicities 
In movement-images, the spatio-temporal continuity among shots occurs by virtue 
of the plot and narrative. The different parts of the narrative are necessarily 
composed in relation to the whole film. This is a mereological relation in which the 
different parts make up the whole. The whole is therefore constituted by the "inside" 
relations of the specific narrative and the different parts of the narrative make up the 
whole of the work. 117 
The parts in movement-images change other parts of the narrative according 
to the logic of that narrative. For instance, perception of something produces a 
reaction/action in the character. The parts (the perception-image and the 
reaction/action-image) therefore, affect each other, changing the whole. In this sense 
the parts are not quantifiable as they qualitatively change the whole. 118 Nonetheless, 
because the sequence of shots in movement-images is spatio-temporally continuous 
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with each other, the returning shot produces the same spatio-temporality as the 
preceding one (of the present). In this return of the same, movement-images produce 
a singular time rather than the interpenetration of different times. 119 The relation of 
the part to the whole therefore becomes a difference of degree (the differences 
among various parts constituting the whole) rather than a difference in kind. 
In time-images, on the other hand, there is no narrative continuity. Time-
images are different fragments of time linked to each other in a chain and are spatio-
temporally discontinuous with each other. In this discontinuity, time-images do not 
have a mereological relation found in movement-images in which the parts make up 
the whole. In fact, there is no whole to speak of because what is the whole is 
constituted by the infinite outside (rather than the interiority of a specific narrative), 
which is indivisible into parts. 120 
In film, when discontinuous shots are linked together in a chain, a 
heterogeneous movement of time is produced. Each shot is a different fragment of 
time that plunges the work into a different temporal dimension in which the work 
flows erratically between different pasts and futures. These varying movements of 
time produce a confused multiplicity, in that the different times penetrate and fuse 
into each other, producing what Bergson called a "qualitative multiplicity." A 
qualitative multiplicity is non-numerical and implies temporal differences rather 
than spatial differences. 121 
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A quantitative multiplicity, on the other hand, is given to numerical or spatial 
changes. It implies an actual or material change in the numerical constitution of the 
object and presupposes a numerical multiplicity that is in opposition to the singular 
or the one: the one-many. Differing from a qualitative multiplicity, which is an 
"internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion of different times," a quantitative 
multiplicity would divide and make distinct each different time, producing a 
multiplicity of exteriority, or the spatialization of time. 122 Thus the former is non-
actual, purely internal and without exteriority and produces connections to the 
virtual. Quantitative multiplicities, being actual, exteriorized and an order, have 
limited connections to the virtual. Whereas a qualitative multiplicity produces 
differences in kind, a quantitative multiplicity produces minor differences in the 
degree of the duration experienced and therefore does not produce real duration. 
Thus I inquire into whether the analog and digital works examined produce 
qualitative/quantitative multiplicities and what the images of time are. I examine 
what type of multiplicity is produced in L 'Intrus and in the digital installations. 
The actual-virtual circuit, the visible/invisible and the movements of thought 
While most studies in analog cinema or digital media present the significance, 
meaning and importance of the content of artworks, this study will consider the 
potential of the technologies themselves for the production of thought. Continuous 
or discontinuous duration is important to the production of thought because of their 
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relation to the virtual. A temporal continuity presents a singular, continuous time, 
whereas a temporal discontinuity necessarily shifts among many different times. 
These shifts produce virtual connections in time between pasts and futures, 
presenting the potential for the movements of thought to occur. Durational 
continuities, having fewer movements, produce a homogeneous time. They produce 
fewer connections to the virtual and therefore they have less potential for the 
movements of thought to occur. As noted earlier, virtual relations between shots 
produce the movements of thought. This area inquires into the capacity of analog 
and digital technologies for their connections to the virtual, which is crucial in 
producing the movements of thought. 
The interstice, crucial in observing the type of duration in images, is also 
important for understanding the nature of the actual-virtual circuit. The actual is that 
which is observable, the virtual is the invisible potential. In Bergsonism (1988), 
Deleuze writes that the virtual is the potentiality that is on course to becoming 
actualized. 123 It is an ungiven potential in relation to the actual. As a consequence, if 
everything is already given, if an actual image (of the whole) is readily visible, as in 
the digital installations, what occurs with respect to their (installations') virtual 
potential? And, conversely, as in L'lntrus, when only fragments of time are 
presented, visibility is reduced. What relations emerge in the connections between 
the actual and the virtual? I inquire into the implications of this question of the 
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visible/invisible in relation to virtual multiplicity and connect the virtual multiplicity 
of media works to their potential for inducing the movements of thought. 
This relation of the virtual for producing thought becomes a pressing concern 
not only in light of digital media's ubiquity, but also for the blurring relation of 
digital art to information technologies. If artworks now mimic the working of 
informational systems by tracking, mapping and archiving information flows, they 
also come to mimic the informational present of data flows, possibly losing their 
connection to virtual pasts and of futures to come. Bernard Steigler has suggested 
the connection of digital art to information flows and data processing systems, which 
come to align it with worlds of informatics and mathematics. This connection raises 
the question of generating artworlds that are calculable, predictable and 
determinable, differing remarkably from previous worlds of art in their relation to 
the open and the unforeseen, as possibilities. 124 A comprehension of the virtual 
connections generated in the two technologies will point to their potential for 
producing the movements of thought. 
The fold: how the sensate gives rise to thought/consciousness 
Finally, the last area for examination and inquiry is how the sensate gives rise to 
thought or to consciousness in the media works examined. In order to do so I 
consider Deleuze's The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1993) with respect to the 
folding of perception, memory and matter to present the fluidity in the encounter 
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with media works. Media works, as they endure in time, present variations in 
sensation. Tiny sensations give rise to indistinct perception, whereas stronger 
sensations give rise to clearer perception. Perceptions, therefore, give rise to 
thoughts: indistinct perception gives rise to obscure thought and distinct perception 
to clear thought. 125 As we are continually sensing the world around us, sensations 
give rise to thought, which continually move between obscurity and clarity. In light 
of this sensing function, the folding of perception with the temporal media object 
shows tenuousness, fluidity and uncertainty in how media events come to emerge. 
This is different than understanding a work as a clearly defined plane that is 
immediately understandable and fixed in time, and as one that transmits definable, 
knowable meanings. In the encounter with a media event, perception unfolds and 
folds between clarity and obscurity, producing thresholds of thought and meaning. 
While Deleuze's The Fold does not consider cinema or media, its appeal to 
the history and theory of art allows for conceptual and formal workings in film and 
digital media. 126 By considering micro folds in chapter four and macro folds in 
chapter five, I generate an extensive relationship between the two chapters. Through 
these chapters I construct a conceptual analysis that successively presents three types 
of topological views or perspectives of the fold: micro, mezzo and macro. 
Starting with a micro perspective in chapter four, the genetic elements of the 
image - light, sound, movement and matter -- are taken up to consider the 
modulation of the image in time. This perspective lengthens to include a mezzo 
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point of view, in which the micro fields enlarge to become the auricular, literary and 
painterly fields in Mirror. The topological point of view lengthens further in chapter 
five to include macro folds, where I examine how the movements of folding occur 
among various media events such as the noise performance by Survival Research 
Laboratory, Granular Synthesis's POL and Model! 5 and Toni Dove's interactive 
cinema performance Spectropia. Chapter five delves into how perception of actual 
events and the virtual memory of past events/performances fold into each other, 
bringing about what we experience as the "newness" and complexity of the present 
moment. 
In both chapters I consider how the lived time of media objects comes to be 
experienced by examining the quadripartite relations among sensation, perception, 
duration and the ontology of the image. It is in these relations among the perception 
of an image and the sensations that it produces giving rise to thinking that time 
comes to be endured. The area upon which this inquiry is based, therefore, parallels 
the one in the interstice, in that both scrutinize the capacity for producing thought; 
however, the two operate at different levels. In the interstice, the capacity of the 
work's structure (movements of pasts and futures) to connect to the virtual is 
emphasized so that the movements of thought occur. In the fold, how sensations give 
rise to thought are examined. The former operates at the level of structure, the latter 
at the level of perception. 
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In perceiving the world Deleuze writes that perception continually modulates 
between distinct sensations and obscure ones. 127 Such a relation of sensations to the 
production of thinking presents gradations and transparencies in the thoughts 
produced. I inquire into the relation between these thresholds of thought to the 
virtual. Do virtual relations increase or decrease in the production of clear 
perceptions? That is, what is the relation of obscure or clear perceptions to the 
virtual in media art? If virtual multiplicity amplifies the connections to the unknown, 
to the indeterminate and to the open, then what might clear perceptions bring to 
worlds of art? If links are oriented towards actual relations where everything is a 
given, rather than oriented towards the virtual, where might such works take us with 
respect to the movements of thought? In the works that I examine, I consider how 
sensations produce thresholds of thought that move between obscurity and clarity, 
continually making and unmaking the world. 
In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's aesthetics, upon which Deleuze's The Fold is 
conceived, the immediately clear and stable grid of intelligible information, given to 
the flat plane of Euclidean geometry, changes. His aesthetics are conceived on a 
curvilinear, hyperbolic plane and are the aesthetics of curvature. On a curvilinear 
plane, perception, memory and matter, which make up an event, fold into and out of 
each other and tend to inflect the other. Such an inflection resists any discrete or 
stable identification of an event. Like the baroque chiaroscuro, a figure of the curved 
line in which there is a dramatic play between darkness and light allowing for 
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gradients of visibility and invisibility in figurative paintings, the folds of perception 
present degrees of transparency between visibility and invisibility in the temporal 
object. 128 The folds of perception lead to an understanding of how movements 
between light and shadow, or visibility and invisibility, produce clarity and obscurity 
in perception. Perceptual clarity and obscurity are brought about through shifts in the 
expression of the temporal object. Shifts in expression generate their relation in the 
sensations experienced, bringing about variations in thought. 
In my examination of films and media works in chapters four and five, the 
oscillation between clarity and obscurity in perception, which presents the condition 
for continual variation in thought, is pursued. Chapter four examines how this 
perceptual movement might occur in the micro foldings among sound, light, 
movement and matter in time. I inquire into the nature of perception and the 
movements of thought produced in Tarkovsky's Mirror. I conclude this inquiry in 
chapter five by mapping how matter, perception and memory fold into each other in 
the experience of media events. 
Incipient to the folds of matter is perception. Matter and perception are 
inextricably connected to each other in that perception occurs in the folds of matter, 
in which micro folds bring about micro perceptions and macro folds, macro 
perceptions. I inquire into the perception of matter such as art events, in which 
inklings and micro sensations arise in perception. I consider how micro sensations 
develop into a "shapelikeness" 129 from which the possibility of knowing in the world 
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occurs. Because art works produce sensations, 130 I will probe how the sensations 
experienced can come to make up the folds of consciousness. The major question in 
chapters four and five is, therefore: how might the sensate unfold into conceptual 
thought? The implications of the sensate for producing thought are consequential not 
only to the fine arts, but also to the sciences as expressions of an image become 
thought-full and also produce the movements of thought itself. 131 The folds of 
perception, which enact the various possibilities for contouring expression on a 
curvilinear surface inflect and refract a multitude of expressions to yield an infinity 
of thoughts. 
A multiplicity: difference in the workings of the interstice and the fold 
The workings of the interstice and the fold present their differences from each other, 
in that they are remarkably dissimilar and sometimes paradoxical to each other in 
their performances. In these differences they are to be understood as two processes 
that resist any unitary theoretical and philosophical conceptualizations; however, 
their performances might resonate and overlap. In their difference they are to be 
understood as two systems that are part of a multiplicity by which duration in film 
and digital media comes into examination. As Mullarkey, Ranciere, Martin and 
others have pointed out, there is no singular theory or mechanism of cinema/media 
that can unify or exhaust all its problems. 132 Thus, while I have utilized the interstice 
and the fold to examine duration in media, it must be emphasized that each process 
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presents its particular logic and sense to the examination of media that might 
complement, contradict or negate the other understanding. The same matter 
examined through another system will probably bear different results. 
For instance, in time-images, the interstice generates gaps and fissures 
producing aporias and discontinuities in knowledge and duration. The constant 
disruption of the image encountered from the outside produces a shock to the neuro-
sensory system and allows for the movements of thought to occur. The fold, on the 
other hand, produces a continual line of duration sustaining, seemingly, what would 
be a temporal continuity flowing from the perception of micro matter to varying 
states of consciousness. 
In this temporal continuity of the fold, perception moves constantly between 
clarity and obscurity. Objects become fluid, mobile and flexible in time and show 
levels of transparency and permeability. Gradients, transparencies and permeability 
produce layers of sensation and thresholds of thought, generating the movements of 
thinking that range from being diffused, inflected and clear. From a different 
viewpoint, in the time-image, the interstice produces the segmenting of 
visibility/invisibility. Revealing and concealing, breaking or fracturing vision and 
time, the interstice can plunge thought to the invisible depths to later reemerge as a 
new one. The interstice's presence insists on breakage in duration and increases the 
image's relation to the virtual. Its absence in the digital installations, however, 
shows a reduced relation to the virtual and conversely, presents a durational and 
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visual continuity. Without the presence of the interstice, duration in media ensues 
without the temporal interruption of pasts and futures. Proceeding without temporal 
or visual breakage, the whole of time becomes visible and spatialized in the digital 
installations. 
However, this actual whole is to be differentiated from the virtual whole. 133 
In the digital installations, what we see is the actual single continuous whole of the 
work. In the time-images, each shot is a fragment of the virtual whole of Time, 
linked together in a chain. Time is the virtual whole in time-images, and this virtual 
whole can never be given, as it extends towards infinity and encompasses the totality 
of the universe, including all material and virtual elements. In time-images, shots 
arise from this Open outside (rather than from the needs of the narrative), each shot 
being a fragment of the virtual whole of Time. Fragments of time linked together in 
a chain present the fragmentation of time and space. In the installations, on the other 
hand, space becomes the actual continuous whole. In the latter, which presents the 
actual whole, fragmentation in time does not ensue, and the entirety of the 
object/work becomes perceivable. 
Yet, this continuity of the actual, perceivable whole of the digital 
installations is different from what appears in the durational continuity of the folds 
of perception. The continuous line of duration makes up greater and smaller wholes, 
but these increasing or decreasing wholes are themselves only partial wholes; they 
extend in each direction towards the virtual infinitesimal and the infinite, which are 
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not given. 134 Whereas in the digital works discussed, the continuity of the whole is 
spatialized and therefore fully perceivable, the continuity of duration in the fold 
depends on the topological view on a curvilinear plane, or on the size of the 
perspectival field. 
Through this type of examination, I will inquire into the workings of the 
interstice and the fold, as two different figures by which duration in media are 
contemplated. The interstice operates as a physical, material fissure, and the fold 
arises from the ontological ground of philosophy; in this respect they are unequal, 
asymmetrical and incommensurate. Despite this asymmetry, however, their 
movements sometimes resonate with the other, giving rise to certain conditions such 
as those of invisibility/visibility and to the relations of the real-imaginary, 
interiority-exteriority, and subject-object. However, while certain relations resonate, 
different processes express differing ways by which duration, the whole, or the 
virtual come to be distributed. In their resonances and differences, the way that they 
function in media sometimes parallels the other and at other times elides or traverses 
the other. In their varying speeds and geometries, they present variations in how the 
spectator comes into an encounter with the image's asignifying mass, each process 
presenting a different image of thought. The sensate arrives by the different process 
in each system, and the movements of thought produced occur, thereby, through 
varying rhythms and tonalities. 
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Works in the field and lines of flight 
Whereas this dissertation draws upon the work of Deleuze, Bergson, Deleuzians and 
media scholars, the direction and assemblages created present my own 
preoccupations with duration and media. While the areas of scholarship considered 
in this dissertation have been considered in philosophy and media studies, how they 
have come to be combined in this dissertation is largely of my own experimental 
design. I have intertwined Deleuze's insights on the interstice, the fold, memory and 
perception with contemporary issues in media studies. 
In considering the interstice and fold through difference and repetition in 
time, time becomes the method by which the two concepts come to be examined. 
The interstice is examined first in analog film and then in digital installations. In 
repeating the inquiry on the interstice material, conceptual and formal differences in 
analog and digital media emerge. The digital image returns as difference to the 
analog by way of its limited relations to the virtual, its homogeneous temporality, its 
continuity and to its spatialization of time. In repeating my inquiry on the fold, 
macro folds return as difference to micro folds, in which what changes are the 
perspectival fields. Tiny sensations distend into the larger fold of consciousness, in 
which the sensate become the condition for conceptual thinking. The processes of 
perception brought to bear through the folding remain the thing in examination. In 
repeating my inquiry into the fold, the perspectival fields by which these processes 
come into examination shift. By considering the interstice and fold through 
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difference and repetition, time becomes the method by which duration comes into 
examination. 
Time as process performs shifts in media studies. Rather than conceiving 
time as merely continuous or discontinuous, I show how interstitial repetition and 
the folds of perception produce the virtual relations of time in media. This approach 
shifts the understanding of time from being a priori, quantifiable and the standard 
time of the clock, to one where it is processual. Time as a lived process reveals a 
work's relations with virtual pasts and futures, giving rise to the free and open time 
of experience, outside of chronometric measurement. Furthermore, in my work on 
the fold, I attempt to consider cinema through the processes of micro foldings, in 
which the poetical, painterly and musical flows come to fold into each other in 
Tarkovsky's Mirror. 135 Such an approach differs from those in cinema studies in 
which a work might be understood through singular frames of art, as either being 
poetical, painterly or musical, or conversely, through a perspective in which cinema 
is not a complete art form in itself. 136 In my examination of perception, duration and 
memory, the flows of various art forms fold into what makes up cinematic art. In my 
approach to time as process and method, I hope to nudge media studies into 
conceptualizing newer relationships and performativities, exploring variations in the 
experience and understanding of time-based media. 
Furthermore, my methodological approach to screen-based ontology may be 
characterized as being philosophical. As Colman writes, the internal pathways for 
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discussion and examination become more important than the categories 
themselves. 137 Categories such as duration, perception, memory and the ontology of 
images cannot be considered in and of themselves to be either theoretical or 
philosophical; rather, the method by which their analysis takes place makes them 
theoretical or philosophical. 
While my questions on duration have been significantly influenced by 
Deleuze's works on cinema, aesthetics and philosophy, some of them have also been 
taken up in different variations by Rodowick and other media scholars such as 
Murray, Mullarkey and Mroz. While their works converge with mine at certain 
points, there are also differences among our conceptual assemblages and intentions. 
For instance, while my work on duration is drawn from Deleuze's concepts of 
movement and time-images as well as his work on Bergson's ontology of the image, 
perception and duration, I consider these concepts through the specificities of 
singular media works. 
In Rodowick's The Virtual Life of Film (2007) he considers the philosophy 
of Cavell and draws upon the ontological difference between analog and digital 
media. The book presents singular insight into the material and conceptual basis of 
the two technologies, focusing on perceptual realism, the logic of computerization 
and the photographic arts as historical documents. Working out problems in my own 
thinking on analog and digital images has been significantly influenced by his 
books, however, my work also proceeds in a different direction with Deleuze. Where 
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I consider the two media, I specifically focus on the processes of the interstice and 
the fold and how they can be used for conceptualizing duration in media. At the 
same time, while Deleuze's The Fold is the metaphysics upon which my notion of 
the fold has been conceived, I have tried to concentrate its workings to understand 
media studies, showing how the folds of perception might begin to be conceived in 
cinema and digital media. While Murray's Digital Baroque: New Media Art and 
Cinematic Folds (2008) has considered the institutional and material folding 
between text, film and computer, my work focuses quite explicitly on the folds 
between perception and memory at the micro, mezzo and macro levels, to examine 
duration in media works. 138 Lastly, Matilda Mroz's Temporality and Film Analysis 
(2012), a work that comes closest to my dissertation in terms of examining duration, 
focuses on the many ways in which duration is produced in the films that she 
analyses. For instance, her focus on duration occurs through the structures oflooking 
and imaging, the thematization of passing time and on the fluidity of meaning and 
significance. My focus lies in how duration is conceived and produced specifically 
through the workings of the interstice and the fold. Moreover, my preoccupation 
with analog and digital technologies changes direction from hers. 
Uncertainty and meaning 
I have considered the workings of the interstice and the fold in order to examine how 
durational discontinuity and continuity work in analog cinema and digital media. 
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The interstice and fold are two processual variations, the one a material fissure and 
the other an ontological ground; their differences pattern two asymmetrical 
movements. 139 Each makes up a movement of variation in constituting duration as 
process in media. However, sometimes their differences relay similar movements 
that cause resonances by overlapping and criss-crossing each other. In these relations 
of difference and correspondence, the interstice and the fold should not be 
considered as having separate parts and elements but as having qualitative actual and 
viirtual forces that make up the whole. Each presents a movement of variation in the 
image of thought produced in what is the whole of media studies. 140 
Such a whole means that the interstice and the fold, in their actual discussion 
here, should be understood as only partially visible, and therefore are continually 
forming in other discussions elsewhere. They are neither fixed nor stable, and in 
different contexts will produce different movements and outcomes. In their continual 
formation, in this study and others, interstices and folds should be understood as not 
quite complete in their expressions of duration in media. They are to be construed as 
imagined spaces, whose spatial length, breadth and depth are in discovery. 141 It must 
be emphasized that my work should be understood in this vein, as speculative and as 
being in modes of discovery. 
Moreover, rather than being drawn from a set of so-called problems that have 
been defined in media studies as needing solving, my dissertation moves through the 
many vector flows of material, conceptual and virtual elements criss-crossing each 
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other. Drawing from film theory, studies and philosophy, the flows at play here are 
external to each other, and do not restore any "inside" relations in media studies. 142 
Rather than emerging from an organic relation, of what is film theory, the 
connections made among components drawn from the three fields is synthetic. I 
cobble together material, conceptual and virtual elements among philosophical 
concepts, digital media studies and analog cinema; I regroup and recontextualize 
them to develop other terrains of possible thoughts and meanings. My preoccupation 
lies in bringing about shifts and transformations in thinking by connecting disparate 
texts, artworks and technologies, without "descendants or lineage" to see what 
appears. 143 That is, my interests do not lie with developing filiations, lineages or in 
tracing a genealogy in either media studies or in philosophical concepts. Constructed 
from non-genealogical components, my approach can be understood as being 
"anhistorical." 144 This dissertation should work as a machinic system from which 
many movements might arise and modulate in time. The meanings of the different 
assemblages constructed from duration, perception, virtual objects, the fold, the 
interstice, the sensate etc., generate different possibilities, as they come together in 
their variations in the different chapters. The conceptual and material movements of 
this dissertation arise therefore by willing together various unnatural connections, 
making for a more experimental approach. 
My hope is that this tinkering will bring about collisions, realignments and 
deviations, destabilizing regimes of signs in media frameworks, to put "meaning in 
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flux," in Mroz's terms. 145 Meaning attributed to any media work at any rate is 
unstable, continually shifting and modifying in light of the conceptual frameworks 
utilized, the points of view revealed and the subjects' emphasis on a particular 
aspect. 146 Meanings of artworks are always in processes of development, exchange 
and liquefaction. 147 The shifting ground of meanings require shifting strategies for 
conceiving works, and such shifts have meant the greater inclusion of philosophical 
pathways for media studies. My work aims to present duration as a method in media 
studies in which media might be conceived in a newer way and become "live," 
changing with viewpoints and subjects in time. 148 Moreover, the interstice and the 
fold operate as two viewpoints in the making, from which media events come to be 
perceived. As material and conceptual movements, their processes are asymmetrical 
and unequal, and the image of time that they present elide each other. From the 
assemblages presented in every chapter, multiple contested meanings may arise, 
generating a measure of uncertainty and instability for each meaning. For instance, 
while the interstice presents durational discontinuity and the fold continuity, the two 
processes are collisional in terms of how time is constituted as either one or the 
other. Duration constituted through the interstice and fold, then, presents two 
contradictory positions, but as I will try to show, each is part of the multiplicity that 
constitutes the whole. 
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Chapter Two 
That interrupting feeling: interstitial disjunctions in Claire Denis's L 'lntrus 
Introdluction 
In an interview, Claire Denis discloses: 
Cinema is not made to give a psychological explanation. For me, 
cinema is montage, editing -- To make blocks of impressions or 
emotions meet another block of impressions or emotions, and to put 
in between pieces of explanation, to me it's boring ... I think that 
making films for me is to get rid of explanation. 149 
From this point of view we may consider that Deni s's films operate outside 
explanations, which describe, interpret and clarify narratives, deoccupying what is 
the traditional convention or the "maternal grammar" of a classical continuity film 
narrative. 150 Explanations, which are part of a traditional filmmaking convention, 
present the causal ground of the plot. They propel the film's narrative flow and 
chronometric sequence of events, 151 grounded upon the successive passage of what 
are the past, present and future of a narrative. While a plot-driven narrative is one in 
which chronometric time reveals the heights of sense and intellection, Denis's film 
L 'lntrus (2004), moves through interstitial disjunctions that effect dissonances, gaps 
and discontinuity in the flow of images. 
In the quote Denis rejects explanations, and while it may not seem 
immediately evident, eliminating explanations becomes important to how duration 
unfolds, an important aspect of this chapter and dissertation. Eliminating 
86 
explanations removes causal reasoning, which is an integral element of progress in 
the continuity narrative. Not only are actions delinked from causes, but the action 
itself, in the conventional sense of the antagonist/hero "doing something," does not 
necessarily occur. In my broader goal, of considering how duration unfolds in analog 
cinema, I query in this chapter whether a different narrative form is produced in the 
elimination of explanations. Furthermore, I question what the relation of this 
narrative form is to duration. One of the tasks of this dissertation probes how the 
flow of images occurs in time with respect to a film or digital media work. In this 
chapter I consider what type of duration unfolds without causal reasoning by which 
the conventional narrative finds it justification for events. 
Most importantly, in this chapter, duration in L 'Jntrus will be examined 
through the workings of the interstice. I will introduce its material, functional and 
conceptual form in the next section, leading to the three types of durational 
discontinuities that it produces in the film. The interstice is the link produced when 
two time-images are cut together. It forms the connecting point between two 
unrelated shots and therefore its presence signals interruptions and discontinuity in 
the film's narrative flow. In connecting two unrelated shots, or images of time, the 
interstice becomes a critical process in constituting the relations, connections, speeds 
and movements of how we come to experience the flow of the film. In a film, the cut 
between shots is a process that creates certain connections, constituting the mobile 
relations of the film's onto genesis or it's becoming in time. In producing the link 
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between two images, an interstice can create spatio-temporal discontinuity, generate 
a paradox, produce difference or heterogeneous time, bear multiple virtuality and 
form ideas, and in this manner, it constructs entire filmworlds. In these 
performances, an interstice produces entities by virtue of creating the connections, 
relations, rhythms and speeds between two shots. Thus I inquire into what type of 
duration is produced by the interstice in L 'Jntrus. Moreover, in generating the 
movements between images, I consider whether the interstice is critical in generating 
the movements of thought. 
Second, I inquire into whether the image-flows in L 'Intrus put thought in 
relation with the open outside, with the unknown. This encounter with the unknown, 
with images that enter from an outside, and which we cannot as yet think, 152 lurks at 
the heart of this inquiry into cinema and media studies. As Deleuze and Guattari 
write, the non-thought is at the centre of thought itself, having the capability of 
moving thought beyond experience. 153 In this pursuit of putting thought in touch 
with the non-thought, Denis's interview quoted above becomes illuminating. By not 
providing explanations one image becomes linked to another in a random fashion, 
rather than offer causal relations in the sequence of events presented. Random 
images linked to each other haphazardly present the spectator with an opportunity to 
think what their connections might be to each other. A random sequencing of 
images, therefore, puts thought in touch with what is an unknown, unexplained 
image, which occurs from outside narrative logic -- an outside that is the non-
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thought -- presenting an image sequence that belies the logic of common sense or of 
rational ordering. 
Third, the encounter of images from the outside brings into focus another 
question tracked throughout this dissertation on interiority. In the non-relation of 
causes to the production of action in L 'Jntrus, the narrative form moves away from 
the relations of interiority, to that of an outside. This question therefore considers the 
interiority and exteriority of the narrative form by way of the image that returns. In 
maintaining the interiority of the narrative form, spatio-temporal continuities in time 
are produced; in temporal discontinuities, the narrative form becomes a chain of 
unrelated images, which connect to an outside. Thus, this aspect of the chapter 
considers the disruption of spatio-temporal continuities that the returning image 
brings in its capacity for producing connections to what is the open, unknown, 
outside, and hence, for producing difference in the movements of thought. 
The ability of images to produce the movements of thought is connected to 
the fourth aspect of this chapter, which will examine the relation of duration to the 
virtual. This aspect will consider the flow of images in time and whether the 
duration produced in L 'Jntrus generates connections to the virtual. Thus, if 
continuity narratives produce what is known and recognizable within the narrative 
form with respect to the action, characters and narrative development, discontinuous 
ones produce a disjointed spatio-temporality in the film. A disjointed movement is 
produced from the relations of the outside, in which the image encountered by the 
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spectator is an unknown, unrecognizable image. My examination will therefore 
consider these two types of narrative forms with respect to the movements of 
thought produced and their connections to the virtual. 
·- ,.-~, 
Last, I will consider how the interstice operates simultaneously in the 
production of both the event and the movements of thought. In producing the non-
chronological temporalities among pasts, presents or futures of the events-forming, it 
is coextensive with the movements of thought experienced in the film. In this sense 
the gaps, discontinuities and transitions, between what is the event-becoming and 
what is thought-becoming, share the limits and boundaries brought about through the 
interstice. This coextensivity is to be considered as a mobile and unstable relation 
that constantly changes throughout the film. In considering thought and the event, 
therefore, neither can be said to have an exclusive relation to the interstice, as both 
continually fold into and out of the other, creating the whole film. The event-
becoming is also the becoming-thought of the film, each inflecting and responding 
relationally to the other through the film's temporal movements. Where appropriate 
throughout this chapter, I will examine how the coextensive relation of thought with 
event is brought about primarily through the work of the interstice. 
This chapter inquires into the disruption of spatio-temporal continuities that 
the returning image brings in its capacity for producing difference in the movements 
of thought. The maintenance or disruption of spatio-temporal continuities through 
the interstice in cinema, therefore, yields two very different relations to duration, 
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bringing about differences in the image of time. What is more, the question of 
continuous or discontinuous duration brings into discussion issues critical to film 
narratives, such as the causal ordering of a plot, the logic of sense and the notion of 
action and events in time-images. These issues of narrative form will be tied into 
questions of the actual-virtual circuit, questions of visibility-invisibility, 
considerations of what makes up the whole, the planes of consciousness and a 
world-memory. I will begin the next section by setting up the work and function of 
the interstice itself. 
The nervous system of the interstice 
In the following pages I will present how interstitial repetition in L'Intrus produces 
disjunctions, syntheses and transformations, configuring the connections and 
relations between images. I construct three types of relations as marking the film: the 
paradoxical element; divergences and intensities through lines of flights; and the 
involution of the image's internal milieu. These three types of disjunctive syntheses, 
which configure the film's internal relations, connections and associations, produce 
qualitatively different types of images. And these syntheses, which continually 
oscillate in their movement through the film, yield a film-world woven in threads 
that is sometimes comprehensible and sometimes not. The connections, disjunctions 
and paradoxes experienced through the images' connections to each other therefore 
continually oscillate between what we can make sense of and what we cannot. This 
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movement between sense and non-sense creates the film's internal pulse of what is 
true, moving well beyond what could be relegated to an official film grammar, it's 
maternal grammar, of plot-action-reaction, where causes lead to actions and where 
narrative plot lines generate what is knowable and therefore understandable. On the 
contrary, a zigzagging movement such as the one found in L'lntrus, folds between 
events and thoughts in processes of breakage, aporias and reconnections that leave 
little room for certainty or for what is knowable. 
In the movement-image, the interval 154 links image to image through a 
rational logic, as Deleuze shows. 155 What is understood to be the convention of 
continuity editing in the movement-image proceeds by the use of the cut, which 
utilizes the eye line match, the 180° axis rule, and action-reaction shots, to produce 
the seamless spatio-temporal continuities of the narrative structure. These and other 
film techniques make the cut between two images invisible, and the cut therefore 
creates the false appearance of two images being continuous in space and time. What 
returns in such a system therefore, through the cut or the interval, is more of the 
same images; these images, which maintain the spatio-temporal continuity with the 
ones preceding them, sustain the same movements in space and movements of 
thought. The repetition of the image, which occurs through the interval therefore, 
functions as the return of the same. Here there is little cognitive dissonance and the 
images move by similarity, representation and identity, rather than through 
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difference. Thus, in the movement-image, the interval operates in fact to produce 
continuity, by virtue of artificially creating a continuous spatio-temporal dynamic. 
In L'lntrus, we find a different regime, one where the links occurring 
between images are, on the contrary, irrational. These images generated by irrational 
logic are those of the time-image, where disconnected space-times come to be 
connected together randomly. These different space-times linked to each other 
produce what Deleuze calls the "any-space-whatever," where one image or shot is 
connected to the other without a logical reason or cause (given to action in plot-
based narratives, for instance) that disrupts the spatio-temporal continuity of the 
movement-image. The cut, which connects one space-time (or image) to another, 
therefore, generates the film's direction, its associations, meanings and purposes. In 
the time-image these spatio-temporal capsules connect the film's surface in no 
particular order which would give it a logical coherence readily understood by the 
spectator. The chain of disconnected shots of the time-image therefore disorients the 
spectator, whose bearings in space and time become a confusing experience. In 
continuity narratives chronometric time determines the spectator's spatio-temporal 
orientation; in the time-image, the any-space-whatever becomes an indeterminable, 
unlocatable spatio-temporality. In L'Intrus, which generates such a disorienting 
experience, the any-space-whatever produces the time of the event, which is 
coextensive with the movement of thought-becoming; that is, the film's events are 
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coextensive with the rhythms, movements, associations and paradoxes that compose 
the movements of thought. 
The movement-image and time-image produce experiences that are therefore 
remarkably dissimilar. Rather than producing the return of the same brought about 
through the convention of continuity editing, which reproduces the orders of 
convention and what are known quantities, in L 'Intrus we find ourselves 
experiencing unknown qualities and intellectual challenges by virtue of the 
difference in the succession of images. Interstitial repetition, producing interruptions 
and dissonance between images, induces a shock to the automatic sensory-motor 
schema of the movement-image. Instead of a continuous movement of action-
affection-reaction, an irrational cut disrupts the "sublime" flow of motorized 
movement and thought. It introduces a gap between the preceding and succeeding 
image, which no longer sustain the same spatio-temporal continuity. By creating 
dissonance and gaps within the narrative, what is the habitual continuity of thought 
comes to offer an experience of shock. The displacement of one image by another 
forces the spectator into thinking a new thought and therefore the interstice in its 
function operates as a micro-projectile, by introducing a new image in the spectator's 
brain, forcing them to think. The destruction of one thought by another is necessary 
for the renewal of thought itself, which not only generates a new image but also the 
conditions for change to occur. And such a new thought also disturbs the boundaries 
of what is a given (prior) order. The intellectual aporias created by interstitial 
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repetition, I therefore argue, generate the production of difference, multiply ways of 
seeing, expand the production of unknown qualities, produce different languages and 
also create different unexpected associations in the movements of thought. 
The three types of syntheses produced by the interstice examined in this 
chapter constituting the paradoxical element, divergence and intensity and 
involution, produce disjunctions, syntheses and transformations in the film's 
trajectory. In the first, the interstice operates to produce the paradox, bringing into 
focus the paradoxical element which has two sides: sense and non-sense. In 
considering the paradox I present two examples. In the first I present how the 
interstice operates to juxtapose the image of the dead and live body of the main 
character Trebor, and more importantly, in the second example, I show how the 
image of the scar forged from his heart surgery operates as a virtual event, where the 
event, as Conley writes, "resemble[ s] the trace of a vanishing line with 'thousands of 
traits."' 156 Thus although we see the image of the scar marking its importance as 
event, the operation remains ambiguous and indeterminable, germinating from the 
sketchy details of class exploitation and an illegal trade in body parts of a 
"somewhere" in Eastern Europe. The interstitial process in this instance makes the 
relations between what is real and what is imaginary not only indiscernible, but as 
Deleuze points out, we no longer even have a place from which to inquire. 
Divergences and intensities through lines of flight is the second disjunctive 
relation that I establish, which occurs through connections in a sequence or in a 
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series of shots strung together into a chain. Each shot bears no narrative continuity, 
much less any sort of spatio-temporal flow in the sequence, where each shot takes its 
own line of flight. The shots are remarkably divergent from each other, however, I 
try to show how their intensities are similar, allowing the "pitch" of each image to 
follow into the constitution of the next image. The interstitial moments, in 
generating the disruption between shots are therefore connected by their intensities, 
where, in the return of a different image, the movement, and thereby the renewal of 
thought, become possible. Following an example from one of the film's opening 
sequences, I move into an analysis of what Bergson has called pure memory. Pure 
memory, which moves beyond an individual psychological memory, is a world 
memory to which we all belong. Such a world memory cuts and leaps between what 
are the different planes of consciousness in L'lntrus, offering random fragments of 
consciousness and aberrant movements of time. By engaging in this method Denis 
experiments with the creative forces of images, operating through what Bergson 
called the intuitive method, bypassing the limits of what is knowable and 
understandable intellectually. 
The last type of disjunctive synthesis occurs on a mental or psychic level, 
rather than in the physical cut between two time-images. The length of the shots 
themselves present stretches of time which, instead of being cut into, open up to the 
duration of the universe. Disjunctions, which occur in these types of shots, occur 
within the duration of a single shot itself, by virtue of the plurality of movements 
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and speeds found in the characters, landscapes or weather, which proceed by their 
internal rhythms rather than through the logic of filmmaking practices (mise-en-
scene, direction, composition). These shots are those which, in following the internal 
rhythms of the actors, landscapes or objects, transform from scripted direction into 
their various becomings. The shots, I argue, involute in between what is script and 
environment, becoming what they will. The duration of each shot, drifting through 
as passing moments, makes up the singular, impersonal and heterogeneous time of 
the film, constituted by what Deleuze calls camera consciousness. All things flowing 
before the mechanical camera eye -- the rhythms of the universe -- appear therefore 
in the single duration of a shot, replete with diverging movements within it. The 
many shots linked by interstices, therefore, make up the entire film. Divergences in a 
single shot, and between two shots connected by the interstice, generate the 
heterogeneous movements of the single continuous time of a film, which spreads 
into the world, expanding such movements to infinity. These many rhythms 
participate in what Bergson noted as the virtual whole, constituting the single Time 
of the universe. 
I conclude this chapter by considering the conditions that Denis offers in 
L 'lntrus for the production of the movements of thought. Her film pushes to the limit 
what is knowable, determinable or explicable, leaving the spectator in pieces. But 
from these very pieces, when the faculties are in disarray and unable to form any 
coherent coordinates amongst them, a new thought can actually arise, forcing the 
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spectator to think. The unrecognizability in the flow of images causes a grasping in 
which different faculties might operate in unexpected, non-habitual ways, impelling 
a new idea to emerge. In the continual disruptions brought about by the interstice 
generating intellectual aporias, the spectator struggles to cope cognitively and 
psychically, forcing the limits of the intellect. Ideas, which Deleuze shows are 
formed in fractures and connect to actual things, come to be formed in interstitial 
moments, expressing their connections in images. Ideas, as virtual entities connected 
to images and forming in the interstice, thereby make up multiple virtualities. Their 
multiple and approximating relations with images, found in L'Intrus, expressing 
paradoxes, divergences and intensities are therefore always continually forming and 
unfinished by way of their multiple virtualities. In this sense, ideas are 
indeterminable and always on edges continually forming, aggregating and becoming 
with the images. 
First type of disjunctive synthesis: the paradoxical element 
Cinema is a chain of images in succession where one image cuts into another. As 
Deleuze writes in Cinema 2: The Time Image (1989), in time-images, the image 
which follows is the image that materializes from the outside. Cutting into the 
former image, the image emerging from the outside presents thought from the 
outside. This encounter between the film's ensuing narrative and the outside, 
presents a shock to thought as the image from the outside breaks up the interiority of 
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the narrative events by inserting its own presence into the chain. The break up of the 
film's narrative interiority from the outside produces spatio-temporal, intellectual 
and affective dissonances. Deleuze refers to such a dissonance between two shots as 
the interstice, which is at the heart of what makes up the time-images of cinema. 157 
Interstices not only allow for the production of different images to appear 
producing the changing relations, speeds and affectivity between images, but also 
continually modulate and generate the virtual connections between two images. The 
interstice, therefore, which occurs between two images, is where the virtual time of 
the event unfolds. These virtual events in L'lntrus become the sites of my 
examination in the first type of relation, the paradox. The measureless time given to 
the interstice is therefore of great importance as it generates the force and propulsion 
moving the work along. Such a force is not only the physical movement of film-
matter, the chain of image-frames which propel through the film projector, but also, 
more importantly, operates the virtual dimension of the work. 
The interstice can produce an interruption or jarring effect in the momentum 
of images streaming through a film. In its continual repetitions, an interstice can 
produce a kind of "stuttering," a form of a spasm bringing about a convulsive effect 
with respect to film's spatio-temporal continuity. A spasm creates disjunctions in the 
continuous flow of movements and thought where an oscillatory movement 
swerving back and forth in time is experienced. Such an oscillation or continual state 
of fluctuation in time and in thought occurs in L 'lntrus, which moves between what 
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we understand and what we do not. The film's persistent oscillatory movements 
generate confusion and contradictions and such disorientation is exacerbated by the 
recit, in which the sparing words and fragmentary sentences do not qualify or 
synchronize with the images. And the images that we see, moreover, seem to appear 
from out of the blue and do not form connections in our mind with the preceding 
events or characters. The events, or what takes place in the film, arrive from 
different directions rather than from a centralizing plot and for that reason, events 
are constantly forming and disappearing as the film proceeds. They are 
indeterminate and for that reason indeterminable. The events in the film proceed by 
movement between what we can make sense of and that which appears to be non-
sense. 
This oscillatory movement between sense and non-sense occurs, for instance, 
in what is possibly one of the film's most affective shot where we see the main 
character, Trebor, being dragged through a snowy landscape by two individuals on 
horses. The riders then dispose of him in the open wilderness presumably to die, yet 
in the very next shot, we see Trebor lying in a comfortable bed with warm orange 
tones softly lighting the room. In such a contradiction, the preceding shot functions 
as a difference from the latter one, making the two incompossible. Nonetheless, this 
forking of time, paradox or incompossibility between the two images also functions 
to operate as the continuity of a line which forks and keeps forking throughout the 
film, while simultaneously advancing the spasmodic affects in the film. 
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There is a paradoxical element circulating through these two shots, the 
paradoxical element making each shot resonate with the other. The shots converge 
with each other and at the same time they are discontinuous and disjunctive. This 
paradoxical element, therefore, while belonging to each of these series, shows that it 
has two sides but in each instance we can see that these two sides are never balanced 
or in equilibrium. 158 Trebor's death and what constitutes his life extend in two 
different directions: a future and a past of the body. The image of his crooked fingers 
frozen on his dead body are followed immediately by the warm tones of life in 
which we see Trebor contemplating in bed in a Swiss hotel. The paradoxical element 
contained in the body as dead and alive functions thereby through a duality, and 
simultaneously, through an excess and a lack: 159 an excess by virtue of the 
production of desire in which Trebor contemplates purchasing a new heart in order 
to find his lost son and to make up for lost relations, and a lack by virtue of a mute, 
disgraced and impotent body abandoned in the wilderness. The body's duality 
generates recognition in both senses: being simultaneously excess and lack, in 
various states of living and dying. 
Rather than understand the paradoxical element as operating in contradiction 
however, the deadening and livening body must be seen to operate as copresences in 
that there is an intrinsic relation between the two states of the body. While the body 
exists simultaneously in different states in the film, it is also the same body. In the 
tradition of what constitutes the logic of sense, Deleuze writes, sense and nonsense 
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have come to be seen as separated from each other. However, he writes, sense must 
be seen to have a relation with nonsense, where nonsense becomes the condition of 
sense, giving rise to the paradox. The paradoxical element becomes the condition of 
the relation between sense and nonsense. 160 Each virtual part of the paradoxical 
element must function in relation to it as it expresses itself thorough simultaneity. 
Trebor alive simultaneously forms the virtual circuit with him dead. The same object 
-- Trebor's body -- expresses the sense of its entire form, including dead and live 
states as copresences, creating a paradox in the film. As Massumi shows in Stelarc's 
performance Anesthesized Body, the body sown up, suspended and cut off from all 
expression, rather than being inactive and shut-down, is the chaotic body in ferment: 
the body is passive but the mind is restless. 161 
Traditionally, an object's signification is attributed by a non-contradictory 
status, where the body in a traditional sense could only be either dead or alive at a 
given point in time. Such a non-contradictory status is thereby dislodged in the 
paradox. The paradoxical element exists outside traditional signification in that, in 
L'Intrus, it exhibits a contradiction of relations within itself by including its 
dual/many senses. But it is not difficult to grasp that even while expressing such a 
contradictory signification, our cognizance is able to grasp the relation of life to 
death. In this cognizance, we can understand how one of the themes comes to 
operate in the film, in which Trebor's alienation from the world gives rise to self-
estrangement, in which his heart becomes a foreign body to him. This vacillating 
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recognition between what are the dead/deadening body and the live/livening one 
operate through the micro-relations of the interstice which causes a spatio-temporal 
disconnection in what might either be deadening or livening. The disruption makes 
possible the direct and instantaneous connection between the two senses and also 
modulates what is intrinsic and vital with what is alien and unfamiliar. 
The powerful affects of this splendid entwining of what is live/livening and 
dead/ deadening circulates through the entire film creating optical resonances. These 
are the images in which we see Trebor in various states of sickness, melancholia and 
stillness or those in which he is biking, walking or swimming, each series forming 
two chains. The livening/deadening states in each series are intensified aurally by 
the musical refrains, which are dispersed and echo throughout the film. These sound 
and image resonances, which function through interruptions brought upon by the 
interstice, prevent what could have been a singular trajectory of the film's spatio-
temporal continuity. The singular linear time found in the movement-image is 
absent. Instead, we find dispersionary movements where images, rather than relating 
to actions (as in the movement-image), relate to other images recalled in the time-
image.162 This particular sense of the series generates the varying senses of what is 
deadening and livening (different states and stages in each), expanding and 
spreading over the surface of the film. Each image, thereby, becomes copresent with 
the others. In the time-image, images correspond with other images, and Rodowick 
writes that such correspondences form chains of associations and memories of 
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experiences that circulate like infinite reflections of each other in a crystal. These 
reflections of images echoing and resonating with each other abound in what 
Deleuze calls the crystalline regime of the time-image. 
The disjunctive synthesis functions in this particular instance not only 
through the initial perception of the paradox but also through its echoes and 
resonance, which circulate throughout the film. Trebor dying and Trebor living form 
the film's surface of visible signs. They make up the zigzagging expressions which 
operate through interstitial repetitions, the interstice in this instance functioning as 
disjunctive synthesis. The paradoxical element thereby contains such a movement 
within it that proceeds by oscillating between the dual senses of the body that are 
intrinsically related. 163 But here also lies the synthesis: the paradox has two sides. By 
virtue of having two sides the paradoxical element creates resonance and echoes into 
the past and future. The disjunctions in the spatio-temporal order, however, also 
form a synthesis by virtue of this dual nature or the two sides of the paradox. What is 
disjunctive also operates by what connects it to the other, in that, what is deadening 
is connected to what is livening. In this sense the echoes and resonances between the 
different images of living and dying in the film on the one hand operate by their 
difference to each other, but on the other, are also intrinsically related to each other 
forming a synthesis. 
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Virtual event actual scar 
I will proceed next to what I constitute to be a critical and major interstitial moment 
and also one of the great paradoxes in the film. I will delve into a more detailed 
examination of the great "spasm" in the film, where I propose the main event of the 
film is revealed. The nature of this event is paradoxical, as its visibility does not 
occur within the film. In this sense it is incorporeal and virtual, unfolding within the 
interstitial moment. Nonetheless, the singularity of this event, which is incorporeal, 
is powerful, as it distributes its echoes and resonances throughout the film. As noted, 
echoes and resonances in the time-image are the relations occurring between images, 
forming chains of associations and memories. In this sense, echoes are repetitions 
with differences. In the movement-image, the main event becomes the central and 
critical point within a chain of other minor events of a chronological plot. Such a 
central point would have been constituted through minor movements leading up to 
the enactment of the main event. In L'Intrus's time-image, however, we see that the 
event itself becomes incorporeal, and we can only feel its presence through its 
multiplication and proliferation in its many different interstitial repetitions occurring 
through the unfolding film. In L'Jntrus, the echoes and resonances, forming chains of 
memories, are of this incorporeal event. 
If the continually occurring disjunctions generate the film's spasmodic 
effects, then a great chasm forged right into Trebor's body transmits tremors that 
echo throughout the film. It is that immense silent scar extending in a straight line on 
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his torso travelling on the skin, a hardened, sewn-up surface. The scar that lines the 
body is an actual image in the film, a visible sign; the event of the heart transplant 
however, becoming incorporeal, is its corresponding virtual movement in the film, 
which is never seen. While we see the massive scar from this operation, we neither 
see the actual operation, a human-human transplant, nor any of the preparations 
taking place. We do however see a woman appearing suddenly with x-rays and who 
disappears as suddenly as she arrives, in addition to money exchanging hands. We 
are also presented with inklings about who might serve as possible donors in the 
illegal underground market of buyers of body parts, which by inference could be 
slavic accents, expressing a "somewhere" in Eastern Europe. Thus, as one of the 
defining moments in the film, the heart transplant's invisibility is striking for its 
ability to orient the viewer towards this event. We only see the operation's traceable 
effects, quite suddenly, when a blind masseuse stumbles her withering hands over 
what is a massive scar and subsequently through the film we notice Trebor 
continually stroking it, as if a reminder of both the depths of that surface and also of 
its untraceable depth. 164 However, we only see fleeting glimpses of this scar, which 
lines the body's surface. When we see the scar we trace that scar to an operation but 
we do not see the moment of the operation, which is a discrete moment in the film. 
We instead endure what precedes and succeeds it, the event of the operation itself 
becoming incorporeal. 
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This pivotal event of the operation in the film intersects with the interstitial 
period. The event is immersed in the interstice, in that all-pervading depth of what is 
invisible, and all the more potent for being a potential. The event occurs between 
two different images, a measureless period in the "nothing really happens" of a gap, 
but in which we find the greatest movements occurring. The event becoming 
incorporeal remains invisible, implied, circulating on the horizon and functioning in 
a circuit with the images that do appear. While dissimilar from each other, the 
images and the event are partial objects, which remain non-totalisable and unable to 
exist without each other. In this sense the real and the virtual cannot be considered 
separately. Rather than being two partial objects, as Deleuze writes, the virtual and 
actual should be understood to make up the total object. 165 In the circuit between the 
film's virtual events that correspond to the actual images, which reveal bodies and 
things, lies another movement in the film. This continual pure movement of actual 
and virtual images, I will try to show in the conclusion of this chapter, forces the 
movements of thought. 
Scar/crack 
I will first consider the actual-virtual movements of the scar/" crack," not only on the 
surface of Trebor's body, but also on the body of the film. The scar's marking is a 
visible sign and as a visible sign it functions as a remainder (we see how much is 
actually left to heal) and also a reminder of the real crack in the body that it once 
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was (this function is virtual and operates here through memory). The actual 
operation of the heart transplant, which is the invasive penetration into the body, 
constitutes a real event that we never see as it occurs in the interstitial moment. We 
can only see the operation through its dual references, as something that is about to 
occur and as that which has already occurred. In its post-operational state we see it 
by the scar that has marked the body, as something that occurred in the near past, as 
a "has been." 166 In its pre-operational state we see it when Trebor anticipates the 
heart operation's future moment, as something that is yet to come. Much as the 
memory of the operation is drawn out (signaled through the scar) tracing the 
movements ofTrebor in search of his lost son, the anticipation of the event itself is 
also drawn out in the first half of the film. Here, while we see the multiple activities 
occurring between Trebor and various parties, which seem unconnected and 
unrelated, including e-mail negotiations, bank transactions, endless waiting in hotel 
rooms, hands exchanging money, x-rays and medical reports, the event itself occurs 
in a flash: so much of a flash that the event in this sense has no present. This main 
event instead divides the present into two streams of past and future and advances 
two questions: "what will happen?" and "what has just happened?" 167 
Experienced only through its invisibility, the event continues onward to what 
appears to be its memory in Trebor's journey across the oceans. In its anticipation 
and in its memory, the operation-scar, in its continual presence, enacts its 
reverberations throughout, its powerful forces spreading along the film's entire time-
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span. L'Intrus, one might say, is arranged around this virtual event and this event 
gives rise to the central paradox of the film. We experience or know about the 
operation through its anticipation and its pain: as a virtual movement arising in the 
circuit with the film's actual images. As Deleuze notes, the actual and virtual make 
up a double series constantly in circuit with each other. And while they are 
correlates and cannot exist without each other, they do not resemble each other. 168 In 
this way, the interstitial moments in L'Intrus, which link different images randomly 
connected together, enact this constant play or circuitry between images actually 
present and the virtual event. 
However, not only is the event virtual, but its presence is felt throughout the 
film in its virtual state. What is the present of the film, is constantly haunted, or as 
Deleuze writes, in a circuit with the virtual event. The film's present, where the 
actual images unfold, forms a circuit with the always present virtual. In this sense 
the present is to be understood as the mobile frontier of the film. The present of the 
film, inhabited by the virtual, operates through the various states of the operations as 
anticipation/memory (virtual) and through the different stages of the healing scar 
that marks Trebor's body (actual). Expressed in another way, the present is the 
intersecting point of the figure "8" forming continual circuits between actual images 
and the virtual event. In this sense it must be understood that the present is not 
merely the actual images, it is that which forms an intersecting point between what is 
virtual and actual. The present is therefore a mobile frontier situated at the limits of 
109 
what is actual and virtual continually splitting the film on the vertical axis. It occurs 
at the (mobile) fold between the two perpetual movements. The actual images of the 
scar (including its absence in the first half of the film) are therefore always in circuit 
with the virtual event (in anticipation of the operation or as its memory), making up 
the present of the film. 
But, to be sure, there is yet another movement of the present that occurs 
transversally to the actual-virtual circuits. A transversal movement is that which cuts 
across the strata which, in this case, is the actual-virtual circuit. If, as noted, the 
actual-virtual circuit is a vertical line, then the movement of the present cuts across 
it. This present is the horizontal trajectory of the film, which chiefly occurs in two 
ways. The first of these generates leaps of time, but which progresses in a singular 
direction. In this type, the temporal gaps produce visual and temporal disjunctions, 
and also intellectual aporias; nonetheless, the present shows the singular and forward 
moving trajectory of time. The second type shows a non-chronological present, in 
which the film's present continuously flips backwards and forwards, presenting 
heterogeneous capsules of pasts and futures. In this sense the horizontal movement 
of the present functions as a pivot, jumping between images of past and future times 
in non-chronological order; Such duration fissures the film's temporal plane, 
bringing into the mix questions such as "what will happen?" and "what has just 
happened?" The rotating present incessantly splits the film into moments preceding a 
given shot, which does not continue into a past, but shows a future instead. In the 
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same way, a shot that follows (the present shot) might not necessarily proceed 
towards a future, but might lead towards a past instead. Thus, while the movement 
of the present is horizontal, it can be non-continuous and also non-chronological. 
In a chronologically ordered film, where causes lead to actions and reactions 
following the spatio-temporal continuity of the movement-image, the present neatly 
divides what is the past and future. In such a regime, the addition of a single random 
moment would disrupt the narrative continuity of the film. Nonetheless, such 
random moments do arise in the movement-image and these occur by way of 
narrative techniques such as the flashback, dream sequences or through the use of 
extremely subjective shots. These shots occur as recollection images that restore the 
narrative causality within the film's linear time structure which, as Rodowick 
explains, remain within the regime of the sensory-motor schema. 169 
Alternatively, in L'lntrus, the images arrive non-chronologically throughout 
the film, where the interstice continually disrupts spatio-temporal progression. 
Through such a process, interstitial repetition interrupts the continuous progression 
between the past and future. Continual spatio-temporal disruptions bring about 
increasingly shorter time-spans of what are pasts and futures, shredding the film's 
surface of time into tiny fissures. These pasts and futures linked to each other as the 
any-space-whatever form the labyrinthine time of the present, of Borges's "garden of 
forking paths." 170 
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IT. 
In the time-image the incorporeal event, as Conley writes, "is coextensive 
with a state of extenuation, a condition of being beyond oneself ... [where] nothing is 
contained in an event." 171 An event such as the operation is not thick with the 
present, it instead stretches out like a line moving on the surface of things unfolding 
in different pasts and futures. Its affects reverberate into the many folds of the film 
forming its multiplying echoes and resonances. Pasts and futures are cut into and 
reverberate with each other continuously in time. Such a structure destroys the 
possibility of the discreteness of space-time, which lays claim to the real. The event 
becomes exhausted by all possibilities, cutting up the words and actions of a typical 
chronological plot, where events and causes propel the narrative. In this cutting up, 
the film of the time-image moves beyond language, into an outside, leading Deleuze 
to write, " ... now to be done with words." 172 When words evaporate, actions become 
indecipherable and ambiguous, moving in amorphous ways. 
Trebor's journey from France to the South Pacific moves through such an 
outside beyond words or actions. We see that the present is never that of the now, 
but always the "folds and creases" 173 moving constantly between pasts and the 
futures to follow; the present unfolds as Trebor is frequently looking out of windows 
or pensive in bed, thinking about what is to follow or what came before. The present 
is always a remote field of activity, without action, in which Trebor feels the "effect 
of the effect," 174 the scar reflecting its multiplying images every time he rubs it, or 
when he looks forward to finding his lost son (the scar in this instance becoming a 
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virtual, incorporeal one). The present has, in this way, "lost its hold and faded" into 
the future. 175 The past and the future unfold in his distanced and fading present, 
while he observes young Asian men who laugh at him, when he collapses in his 
shack by the sea, or while he rests in his hospital bed caught in its resonant tremors, 
but also as he anticipates a future to come in his hotel bed in Switzerland or by the 
lake where he rests and swims with his Huskies. 
What we are left with are pure images and visions of the any-spaces-
whatever. Linking different pasts and futures, they cut into Trebor's anticipation and 
wandering to the South Pacific. These any-spaces-whatever are of pasts that have 
been and of futures yet to come. Strung out in a chain they simultaneously reveal 
their transversal movement, presenting the two-limit conditions of their present: the 
actual-virtual circuits and the back and forth between pasts and futures, which cut 
across. The two jointly make up a labyrinthine line stretched out in endless twists 
and turns, and move as if lost in the nooks and fissures of pasts and futures, the 
actual and virtual, through constant divergences signaled by interstices. This is 
aionic time in L 'lntrus, yielding the unlimited, lost time of incorporeal events. 176 It 
is the pure and empty form of time, a line that is freed from the thickness of events, 
actions and plots of the movement-image, making up the pure optical and sound 
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In all these pasts and futures connected to each other randomly, we have 
arrived at what Deleuze has called the crystal image of time, in which there is no 
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way to orient ourselves between what is real and what is imaginary. There is a point 
of indiscemibility, where there is no longer a definable progression of successive 
presents nor any method by which it would be possible to say that the actual follows 
the virtual or vice-versa. And as Rodowick points out, these are not merely 
subjective illusions but rather genuine chasms in which one fades in and the other 
fades out. Interstitial repetition thereby presents such an inability to distinguish 
between what is real and imaginary, yielding a paradox, in which we are unable to 
choose between equally possible yet mutually contradicting narrative 
explanations. 178 We have no way of knowing in L 'lntrus whether the wild woman 
laughing on the dog-sled is real or imaginary, whether Trebor being dragged by the 
couple to his death is actual or fantasy, whether the head frozen in ice is real or not, 
whether the heart dripping with blood in the snow is imaginary, whether the dead 
torso wrapped in tarpaulin is real, or whether the many encounters with the different 
intruders that watch Trebor through the woods, in his cabin or on the streets are part 
of his imagination or whether the interviews conducted for finding a substitute son 
for him were real or not. Cues that would distinguish the real from the imaginary are 
unavailable. And, as Deleuze muses, we no longer even have a place from which to 
inquire what is real or imaginary. The reactive and mechanical actions of the 
sensory-motor regime of the movement-image that present plots, actions and 
reactions have been replaced by the purely visual time-images where the real-
imaginary relations of images have now reached a point of indiscemibility: 
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... the distinction between subjective and objective ... also tends to lose 
its importance, to the extent that the optical situation or visual 
description replaces the motor action. We run in fact into a principle 
of indeterminability, of indiscemibility: we no longer know what is 
imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation, not because 
they are confused, but because we do not have to know and there is 
rio longer even a place from which to ask. It is as if the real and the 
imaginary were running after each other, as if each was being 
reflected in the other, around a point of indiscemibility. 179 
The empty, disconnected spaces of the any-spaces-whatever of the time-image 180 
express the banality and idleness of the characters' lives. The actors are seen but 
their intentions are revealed only by the amorphous signs of their bodies. Trebor's 
physical presence is forceful and this physical sense denotes all possibilities in the 
spectator's impressions of him. What is seen of the characters or locations proceeds 
with a familiarity that, at best, sheds dim light on the situation. We see the familiar 
forms of characters wandering around in the woods or in what we comprehend to be 
city streets; what we cannot understand are their connections, relationships or 
encounters with each other (who is the woman who breeds the Huskies? who are the 
young East Asian men?). In what could have been the development of a plot, action 
or events of chronometric time, we now find purely visual time-images that show the 
aftermath or a before of what makes up an event. The spectator follows Trebor 
roaming around on city streets or travelling across continents and we never quite 
know the nature of what is unfolding before us. In fact we are led to a point where 
we are uncertain as to what is real and imaginary, physical or mental. 
115 
Interstitial repetitions thereby disrupt spatio-temporal continuity and link 
any-spaces-whatever. Their fleeting existence, however, occur less by their elusive 
presence than by creating visual disjunctions. 181 Seen and visible, interstices 
constitute visual ruptures expressing the spatio-temporal differences among images, 
shots or sequences by creating disjunctions. Their occurrence does not produce 
ordinary repetitions of continuation and prolongation of the same spatio-
temporalities or of thought. Interstitial repetitions do not therefore produce bare 
repetitions, which reproduce the same identities, ideas or concepts. Instead, 
interstitial repetitions, enacted in a chain dispersed throughout the film, produce the 
differential of images, and therefore of thought, in which each image or shot propels 
its own particular direction in the film. 182 
Left to our own devices, we fabulate through the interstices that link different 
time-images together. In fabulating thinking is produced. Our thoughts fabulate 
connections among people, animals and things materializing on the film's visible 
surface (the actual). The interstices that generate the disjunctions between shots give 
rise to what is paradoxical, contradictory or unfathomable and thus also, 
simultaneously, become the moments for fabulation. The actual images that we see, 
the pure visual and optical signs realized in the any-spaces-whatever, create the 
disjunctions between pasts and futures that also circulate with the virtual. This 
constant modulation between pasts and futures, and between the actual-virtual 
circuits of the any-space-whatever, therefore, executes film's spiritual automation: it 
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connects the conscious and unconscious in thought and creates, in tum, psychic and 
emotional connections in the spectator's internal monologue. 183 In the perpetual 
repetition of the interstice there is simultaneously also a continual fabulation of 
events, people and things. In fabulating we respond emotionally, psychologically 
and psychically to the actual images in the film, where the spectator invariably 
creates connections between the spatio-temporal gaps and dissonances. In fabulating 
the spectator therefore generates virtual times, which come to proliferate the film. 
Interstitial repetition thus constantly enacts the virtual multiplicity in a film. 184 
Second type of disjunctive synthesis: divergence and intensity 
On another level, however, the disjunctive synthesis in film can work in a different 
way. In L'lntrus, it isn't a spoken language, script or dialogue that finds itself written 
into the film. Instead, passions are expressed through affective elements that Denis 
cuts together: howling dogs, disemboweled heart, frozen head in ice and open, wild 
landscapes. In one of the early sequences, for instance, Trebor's dogs begin to bark 
as they sense an intruder. This shot is cut to Trebor polishing his shiny dagger, 
followed by a brief glimpse of a dead man, followed by Trebor making love to an 
unknown woman. Each of these images, cut together in a sequence, is charged with 
the varying affects of the series, much like a stone skimming the water jounces from 
point to point: howls, sharp gleaming knife, dead man's torso, lovers' embraces. In 
what is a continually diverging and multiplying series, we are unsure of what has 
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just taken place in this sequence. For instance, while death is glimpsed in one of 
these shots through a dead man's torso, we never do come to an understanding of 
who the intruder is or why such a killing has taken place. More baffling, the shot of 
the dead man being wrapped in tarpaulin is succeeded by the two lovers' embrace. 
While disjunctions between such shots forming a sequence do not merely 
become conjunctions by way of suturing, the synthesis in this disjunctive series is 
one in which divergences are distributed by the many shots linked together in a 
chain. 185 The disjunctions are not, however, merely connected by virtue of being 
stitched together to form a continuous whole. Instead, we could say that divergences 
persist without being consumed into a continuation in a manner that allows such 
diverging shots in a sequence to persist in their own infinite movements. The 
problem of the "logic of sense," Deleuze writes, is to know how to transcend its 
form, to cut its syntactical link beyond mere logical contradiction. What Deleuze 
means is that the sense of logic of a disjunctive synthesis must be found. 186 In the 
shot sequence referred to above the images are neither logically contradictory, as 
seen in paradoxical disjunction, nor are they oppositional movements. The basis for 
the images' linking together is, in fact, unclear in the film. But even such a chain of 
incompossible, diverging images can become a mode of communication. The 
important aspect that needs addressing in this type of sequence is the abandonment 
of what constitutes identity. Through identity opposites can come to be affirmed or 
similarities can be attributed to two things. That is, in the identification process, we 
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come to classify an object, concept or image as having differences or similarities in 
terms of their representation. In the process of identification, differences occur from 
the external comparison between two things, rather than from the pure internal 
· differences of the thing itself. Similarities are therefore produced by the return of the 
same through its identification with what preceded it. However, once prior identities 
disintegrate in the return, that is, when what returns occurs as difference to what 
preceded it, what returns become unhinged in the process of identification. Within 
such systematization, difference is given a negative attribution. Identity is 
constituted by the return of the same; what returns is the same identity given to a 
group or to an idea, becoming inclusionary. Difference, on the other hand, becomes 
negative and exclusionary. 
From such a point of view, we understand the succession of images by virtue 
of their continuous spatio-temporal relations, which establish the continuity of the 
narrative through plot progression, cause and effect, or through the events brought 
about by the flow in the characters' action and reactions. In these movement-images, 
spectatorial identification stabilizes with the return of the same characters, sets and 
objects in the narrative. On the other hand, in a sequence where such identification 
through similarity does not occur, we understand images through negative 
difference, which performs its task by way of excluding one image from the next. 
Instead, we can come to understand L 'Intrus 's chain of different images 
through positive difference: 187 In the case of two different images that present their 
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different elements, rather than compare the second to the first by way of the second 
image's repetition with the first -- which would present its difference or similarity to 
it -- we need to affirm the distance between them as that which relates to the other 
by virtue of their link in the chain. Drawing from Klossowski, Deleuze writes that in 
the return, that which returns dissolves itself. For our purpose here, therefore, each 
image or shot cut into the sequence within a disjunctive chain, the returning image, 
lacks identity and dissolves itself. The dissolved self, returning, moves as an 
intensity of a pure movement, as a pure event. In the return, the dissolved self 
"already comprehends d.ifference in itself, the unequal within itself, which, 
penetrates all others, across and within multiple bodies." 188 Herein we can say lies 
the penetration of one image with another in the sequence through what Klossowski 
calls the insufflation of one breath within the other: within a breath is contained 
another, within one thought another is contained, and within one machine another 
machine. 189 Within one image therefore, another is contained. The emerging 
intensity of a single shot expresses a difference, a pre-individual singularity, which 
communicates with all other shots without forming disjunctions with them. The 
intensity passes through all the different images and simultaneously affirms them, 
rather than excludes them. The synthesis in this chain of disjunctive images thereby 
becomes no longer exclusionary or negative; it takes on an affirmative and positive 
sense by means of this mobile entity, which passes through all the disjunctions.1 90 
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The cuts between the howls, sharp gleaming knife, dead man's torso, lovers' 
embrace, it could be said, are all charged with an intensity which passes through 
them all. Intensity here is pure motion or pure spirit and occurs as a pre-individual 
singularity in the entire sequence; this pre-individual singularity is charged moreover 
with an intensity that is willed and which possesses an intention. 191 Nietzsche 
atticulates such a will to be Physis which, he writes, is superior to the reign of laws 
as it is the "will that wills itself through all change, amounting to a 'power' opposed 
to law." 192 
Each different shot in the sequence, therefore, as a field of individuation 
possesses this pre-individual singularity and intensity which, in passing through the 
other, takes on that other intensity through the entire sequence. The intensity that we 
feel in the Huskies' howls passes through another image found in the form of the 
sharp gleaming knife with its threatening contours and a cold hard surface that 
shows a malevolent force. The knife then cuts to the image of the dead man's torso 
and into the lovers' embrace. The changing images lose their forms but the intensity 
that each image expresses conveys the emotional charge of the entire sequence. Thus 
we have a sequence, a chain of different images strung together, in which the 
intensity that passes through them all continually returns in each different image. 
This affirmative sense of the disjunctive sequence is one in which the images, 
although different in their spatio-temporal locations, are nonetheless held together 
by the intensity passing through them all. 
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Seen from this angle, divergences cease to be of a negative order that 
excludes other images based on their differential identities. In this way divergences 
and disjunctions operate through affirmation, through positive difference rather than 
through a negative difference in which divergence no longer becomes the principle 
of separation. Positive differences come to be measured by their finitude rather than 
by their infinite contradictions with each other (the identity of an object constituted 
in infinite ways is understood by its negative difference from another). 
Incompossibility between diverging images instead becomes a way of 
communication rather than separation or exclusion. 193 
Nonetheless, we do need to recognize that these disjunctions are not to be 
reduced to conjunctions because they continue to bear differences from each other: 
the images in the sequence do diverge from each other. In the case of convergence 
through identity, such as found in the movement-image in which shots are spatio-
temporally continuous, each object would have to lose certain elements of itself in 
order to be constituted into a definable category that forms its identity. In narrative 
continuity, convergence through identity becomes possible through the shot-reverse-
shot sequence, the 180° axis rule and the eye-line matches which present the spatio-
temporal elements within a sequence as unified. Rather than lose their various 
differential elements to this disciplining, each diverging image in the L 'lntrus 
sequence instead returns as a pre-individual singularity, as pure event. As pre-
individual singularities, each image opens up to an infinity of possibilities and in 
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doing so, loses its centre and its self as it passes through all the other images in the 
sequence. What we have then are intensities of images that are pure events, rather 
than an identification with shots, objects, events, images or concepts that would 
convey a narrative continuity. This disjunctive synthesis, therefore, has a centre, 
which is perpetually decentered and functions to affirm divergence. 194 The 
passionate and strangely stirring images in the sequence come to be cut together195 
in which the film's line of becoming becomes a broken one. 196 Continuity editing, by 
which a film achieves its narrative sense in the movement-image, is strained to its 
limit and altogether lost within the disjunctive sequence of the time-image. 
Planes of consciousness 
As we have seen so far, movement-images, which present our intellect with the logic 
of coherently penetrating filmic space and time, collapse in L'Intrus. Our orientation 
in space and time is undermined as we can move only indeterminately through the 
affective forces of images and through disjunctive syntheses, both of which we 
experience as confused multiplicities. 197 From one scene to the next the film unfolds 
through image-impressions without an identifiable plot or narrative. The image-
flows lead nowhere and seem to buckle under from presenting an account of 
anything. The ambiguity and indetermination is also manifest on the impersonal 
plane, where runaway glimpses of howling Huskies, snowy landscapes and heaving 
oceanic sighs leave little chance for personally identifying with them; these images 
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do, however, propel their affects through the film. These images also present the 
affective forces, which are impersonal, 198 creating sensations with their different 
movements and speeds circulating through the film. The movements and speeds of 
the different images, added to their varying colour luminosities, light intensities and 
sound densities, pull the film in different directions, and while we recognize familiar 
sounds and images, we also become aware of the film's illegibility and intellectual 
inapproachability. 199 Partially recognizable characters meander through a flow of 
undulating images without purposefulness, reason or meaning. This flow of images 
captures the heterogeneous movements of time. This flow further expresses Denis's 
play with the images through the process of dynamic genesis,200 or intuition, which 
endures beyond a maternal language. 201 
The problem with the official grammar of a language is that it imposes a 
stable and constant word-order chain of command, organizing the world in a 
particular way. Set within such an ordering, the universe comes to be conceived and 
understood from a given set of rules rather than from internal experience; feelings 
and impressions are ordered, organized and governed according to an effecting and 
correcting logic of a maternal language. A grammar imposed externally from the 
rules of a language structure can therefore come to alienate the pure qualities that we 
experience internally, as we function in the world. The demands of social life take 
on greater practical significance than our internal experiences; language enforces 
distinctive multiplicity,202 in that what is imposed from the outside, whether 
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scientific laws of spatialization or a given film's orientation in space and time, comes 
into effect. Bergson writes that what happens is that "we instinctively tend to 
solidify our impressions in order to express them in language. 11203 Our fleeting 
experiences, which are internal to us (in the form of confused multiplicity), become 
projected within a homogenized space so that "our impressions are constantly 
changing, wrapping themselves round the external object, which is its cause, 
adopting its precise contours and immobility. 11204 
The affective forces brought about by interstitial repetitions that form a chain 
of diverging shots, release film from language and from the grasp of a maternal 
grammar. In a diverging sequence the impressions of our inner duration come to 
express themselves more freely and their production is attuned more towards real 
experiences than the law which comes into effect. These freely roving expressions 
that collide and disappear come to make up L'lntrus. Evacuated from the burden of 
the stable, common and determining elements, the logic and excessive sense of a 
maternal language of the movement-image, these roving expressive forces instead 
present their fugitive and unstable sensations. Precarious, these images in the film 
seem to oscillate between what is decipherable and what is not. Visible are the 
roving forces in their varied speeds and movements -- human, animal and landscape 
-- but what is incomprehensible are their binding agents, their connections, relations 
and continuities to each other. These shots are radically free agents populating the 
film. Randomly appearing and lacunary, these forces, in effect, present the spectator 
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with an endless series of gaps in intellectual understanding. These intellectual gaps 
are persistent and chronic, imperiling the film with threats of implosion. The living 
line is a broken line. 205 We see figures and characters walking, biking, driving, 
being dragged, city-scapes, open stretches of land and water, animals grazing, dogs 
roaming through landscapes, and sometimes, we see their interactions with each 
other. However, we never come to an understanding of their relations to each other 
or grasp their purpose in the film; each fragment of time is disrupted by another 
fragment, making up the filmic chain. 
As noted earlier, the recollection of the past in the movement-image 
(frequently devised through the use of a flashback occurring in the present) refers 
spectators to past events. Time in such instances, Deleuze writes, is represented 
indirectly based on the chain of presents in the movement-image that leaves us 
beholden to a psychological memory.206 A deeper memory is one that roves through 
the depths of time, a "pure memory" that is "in excess of recollection, actuality and 
consciousness. 11207 Pure memory is therefore a world memory to which we all 
belong, one that was Alain Resnais's and one also to be found in Denis's L'lntrus. 
Such a world memory cuts and leaps between the different planes208 or fragments of 
consciousness, causing disruptions in the mechanized and reactive sensory-motor 
regime of the movement-image. None of the images in the film is connected to the 
other in successive presents; instead, each opens itself up to time as an "impossible 
continuity," as an "aberrant movement" shattering the "sublime flow" from 
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perception-image to action-image from the inside.209 The interstitial disjunction 
occurring in the automatic sensory-motor flow from perception to affection and 
action creates an internal fracturing in the image, generating an incommensurable 
space between the two.210 Here we find Trebor frequently in contemplation looking 
out of windows, lying awake in bed restless or wandering off to the South Pacific 
Islands in the search for his lost son. What would be given to the character's action is 
instead given to Trebor losing himself in his thoughts, to a free and open time that is 
dislocated and non-localizable. Such stretches of emptied time are aberrant because 
they are no longer dependent on movement; instead, Deleuze writes, "it is aberrant 
movement that depends on time. 11211 
Rather than connect a character's perception of something to an action, 
interstitial repetitions link diverging fragments leaping between different planes of 
consciousness. These image fragments are the various flows of time: from Trebor 
being dragged in the snow, the interviews conducted to find a substitute son for him, 
the head in frozen ice, the cacophony of wailing Huskies, the schooner loosing itself 
to the storm, to the repeating image of the laughing woman on the sled. These are 
the erratic, dissonant and polyphonic rhythms of a modem symphony, singularities 
and intensities which, rather than harmonizing, present dizzying, confusing and 
discordant tongues that seem to emanate from different and sometimes unknown 
planes of time. 
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These different flows of time are not subject to the ordered memory of 
consciousness retrieving what needs recollection such as we find in the movement-
image in which the character recalls a particular memory in order to explain the 
actions of a character or the details or an unfolding plot. The flows of time in 
L 'lntrus are rather haphazard and random coming to touch each other in time 
spontaneously through dynamic genesis; they are fragments of the whole of pure 
memory. Resistant to logic emanating from the continuous flow of a singular 
consciousness, these random flows occur among the various planes of 
consciousness, constantly cutting into the film from the outside. Each shot, which is 
a :fragment of time, arises from outside a narrative logic. The whole of the film is 
constituted through the outside. These flows that constitute the filmic flux are 
therefore confusing and bewildering to the spectator as their random appearance 
cannot orient the spectator within the narrative spatio-temporally. Unable to produce 
the logic necessary for such an orientation, the relations and connections among 
shots and sequences also lose their links to each other, bringing about confusion. 
Such a flustering of images is constituent to what Deleuze maintains is the 
flow emanating in perception that folds and unfolds between clarity and obscurity. 
Writing that clarity is "in itself confused [and] it is confused in so far as it is 
clear,"212 Deleuze presents the movement of ordinary perception, which oscillates 
continually between its two poles of clarity and obscurity. Williams explains that 
any individuation is constituent to a series of processes in which ideas, intensities 
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and actual identities come to be interlinked and interdependent on each other.213 
These interconnections, dependencies and relations generate individuation. Each 
image present, such as the scar, Huskies or a field of cows courses through the film, 
and moves with varying intensities as it unfolds in different sequences. The greater 
the intensity with which an image or an idea comes to be expressed produces greater 
clarity in the image; the lesser the intensity, the more obscure an image or an idea 
will be. At points an image will be expressed with greater intensity than at others, 
such as that of a heart dripping with blood on ice, or the masseuse massaging the 
scar; the field of cows or the meeting with some official Japanese men is, on the 
other hand, less intense. The entire duration of the film comes to express such 
undulating intensities and obscurities. These fluctuations between clarity and 
obscurity also create the internal movements of the film. And this internal movement 
between clarity and obscurity disturbs the maternal grammar of the movement-
image, which moves from plot point to plot point through clear definition, if even 
sometimes purposefully concealing or shading bits of useful information. The 
logical ordering of a film that is enacted through the force of a plot or through 
continuity editing wraps itself around pre-givens: around a clarity of ordering that 
appears from an external, pre-given rule (its maternal language). And as Bergson has 
noted, such logic flows through the workings of a conscious thought that wraps itself 
over the internal workings of intuition. 
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Pearson points out that Deleuze's aim in thinking radical difference214 is to 
reveal the difficulty and complexity <?f intensities and the field of individuation. 
Intensities, being anonymous matter, do not possess the simple clarity that we may 
be looking for, seeing how the clear and confused maintain their relation to an idea 
or an image. This twofold relation between the clear and confused, I would therefore 
claim, unravels the power of this film in which we are taken through mobile, 
multiple points of intensities and also through obscure, indiscernible ones that 
implicate the film's very matter.215 Each fragment from the plane of consciousness 
that leaps into the film arises from what we have noted to be world memory that falls 
into different phyla. While Pearson refers to "phyletic lineages" that would consist of 
the generally accepted groupings of plants and animals with evolutionary traits,216 I 
regard phyla here as the different groupings between organic-inorganic-synthetic 
systems: non-human animals (Huskies, horses, cows, birds, other animals);. 
landscapes (oceans, lakes, cityscapes, country roads, snowy/green fields of winter 
and summer); humans (the intruders, Louis, "wild woman," blind masseuse, and 
others); organic-inorganic assemblages (frozen heart in snow, faces in ice); and 
synthetic elements (interstices, editing, mise-en-scene etc.). 
As noted earlier, this second type of disjunctive synthesis, which is 
divergent, an intensity passes through a myriad of different images. In this passing 
of intensity from one image to another we constantly traverse the different phyla in 
the film (albeit within the class of what constitutes the time-image). In the spectator's 
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exposure to, for instance, the Huskies' frenzied barking or the tropical storm, we find 
variables within fields of individuation in the film: it is not possible to fix fields of 
individuation (dog or storm). While on the one hand the storm and barking Huskies 
are precisely that, fixed individuations, on a molecular level, however, is it not also 
possible to say that the intensity given to the barking Huskies is also that of the 
storm? In the passing of intensity through images, the field of individuation has 
changed from Husky to storm, but the intensity has returned. What defined the 
clarity of a field of individuation on a molar level becomes fluid and less clearly 
d . l l 211 expresse on a micro eve. 
Moreover, the relations that pass between two images such as the Huskies' 
barking and the storm's fury generate their own varied actual-virtual circuits. These 
actual-virtual circuits are the realms of "enveloped life,"218 and in a film, constantly 
connect the variables within fields of individuation. In these variable relations of the 
actual-virtual circuits, a film moves between moments of clarity and obscurity. 
L 'Intrus brings about such mobility between what is obscure and clear and thereupon 
enacts not only what makes it singular but also gives rise to its multiplicities. 
The chain of disconnected shots presents the multiple and random flows of 
time. These time-images comprise a world memory that open themselves up to 
different histories and forms of remembering, to other voices and images including, 
as Al-Saji writes, "the material universe, animal life, human subjects, [which] are 
already there in pure memory and demand to be heard. "219 We hear the chattering 
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winds sweeping over the open seas, Huskies barking, money changing hands, frozen 
heads in ice and horses galloping. These are the different planes of consciousness of 
the different organic-inorganic-synthetic systems of random time flows that seem to 
collide, reveal intensities and slip miraculously from unknown places into the film. 
The forces of memories from different planes of consciousness rove around, leaping 
out of the order of chronometric time, a the logic of maternal grammar, revealing the 
different planes of memory. These are Bergson's pluralities of the different rhythms 
of duration in which, each rhythm, as Deleuze points out, "is an absolute, and ... each 
rhythm is itself a duration. 11220 Duration, here, becomes a heterogeneous continuity. 
Strung together in a chain, each shot presents its own image of time, the film 
thereby, presents duration that is continually diverging. The different regions of pure 
memory in foment, the film is out of chronometric time as it unfolds through 
disjunctions and continuity, which are maintained in the synthesizing present.221 The 
present, as I have noted, becomes a synthesizing moment as it stretches into the past 
and future of this world memory. 
Drawing upon the different phyletic fragments, the method by which the film 
proceeds is in the form of nomadic movements that shift from the personal to the 
impersonal, from indirect speech to animal howls, to inorganic, impersonal 
consciousness. These shifts can only occur through the work of the interstice, which 
continually interrupts each movement; the interstice, in this way, continually jars the 
film's flow and continuity. These variations create a continual flux in expression 
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where the personal sometimes occupies a foreign territory, as with Trebor's growing 
alienation from the world (and indeed from himself) in the image of the dripping 
heart severed in the snow. Sometimes the movements express unknown intensive 
qualities of familiar spheres such as a city, an animal or humans. In the images from 
Southeast Asia we see Korean businessmen conducting their affairs, we also 
experience a sense of alienation in the exchange of medical reports and money in 
Geneva. The pack of Huskies barking presents an intensity that is fierce. Sometimes 
we experience the repetition of similar images, as with the woman laughing on the 
sled or with the constant trespass of intruders. In other images we find the humorous, 
as in Henry's interviews to find a substitute son for Trebor. By engaging in this 
method, Denis experiments with the creative forces of images, not so much by 
expressing the merely personal but rather, in operating through intuitive forces as a 
method, as Bergson appealed to, in order to bypass the limits of the intellect.222 The 
image from the outside can only appear through the workings of the interstice, which 
interrupts the preceding flow of thought. The interstitial moment thereby breaks up 
the movement of thought, introducing a new image into the mix. It forces a 
disruption in the continuity of images, forcing a new thought into consciousness. It 
forces us to unthink the habit of image-continuity in chronometric time. The habit of 
thinking images and thought within continuous time is the limit of the intellect. 
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Third disjunctive synthesis: involution 
The third type of disjunctive synthesis found in L'Intrus occurs by way of the length 
of the shots themselves and is constituted not by the physical cut but by disjunctions 
occurring on a psychical or mental plane. If the conventional long-take, such as 
Hitchcock's famous opening shot in Frenzy (1.17 minutes), occurs by carefully 
designed stage direction, mise-en-scene, cinematography and script writing, then 
some of the longer takes of L'Intrus present a variation from narrative film 
convention.223 This type of shot should not be mistaken for the deep-focus shots of 
Citizen Kane either, where characters acting on different planes224 render their 
performances according to the written script. A change from these types of shots 
cannot be achieved through the logic of simple opposition between the movement-
image and time-image. In Antonioni's The Passenger, which would also be an 
example of the time-image, we find a long rambling shot spanning 6.15 minutes, but 
which, as Totaro writes, took several days to compose.225 Rather, what we have in 
L'lntrus are stretches of time, which in resisting the cut, find themselves opening up 
to the universe. In this movement of expansion, we might say that the grammar of 
filmmaking with respect to the shot's mise-en-scene or direction is almost lost. We 
are caught in the movement of characters (human or non-human) and landscapes, 
which follow their own internal rhythms rather than the intrusions of an excessive 
filmmaking logic that follows the rationale of shot composition, direction or which 
follows a narrative plot or action. In this sense the shots in L'Intrus are qualitatively 
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different by showing ordinary environments where flows of life occur, and by 
chance, come to be populated by fictional characters. In this sense they combine 
senses of "documentation" and "fiction" as ensemble.226 
One aspect of these open, meandering shots in L 'Jntrus is where characters 
and their movements take up their own speeds and in doing so, they create 
imperceptible changes, constituting micro-divergences within such shots. The long 
takes of Trebor biking through the countryside or swimming in the lake or the 
interviews that Henri conducts to find a substitute son for Trebor would constitute 
such shots. These shots increasingly challenge the notions of identity of the actor as 
a character whose characterization unfolds in the film performance. As Margulies 
writes about Chantal Akerman's Je tu ii elle (1976), the main character is 
desubjectified escaping the proper subject of enunciation. The character conveys 
pluralities rather than a unified subjecthood moving between what is "I," "you," 
"him," "her. "227 Similarly, in L 'lntrus, we find that Trebor and the interviewees 
vacillate in between characters and actors, between figure and selfhood. Left to 
follow his/their bodily inclinations, characters involute between what is script and 
being, bringing about their various becomings.228 These becomings constitute micro-
shifts from what are the more staged elements of filmmaking as the characters seem 
to "go their own way," following their own dispositions rather than a script. The 
logic in L 'lntrus moves therefore from the requirements of conveying a narrative 
sense into a loosening of that sense to the point of exclusion, so much so that such 
135 
shots are "strained to their limits" in terms of their mise-en-scene, plot or direction. 
Such imperceptible shifts are slippages produced between acting and the becomings 
of characters-actors-persons, constituting divergences that occur purely on a 
psychical level. 
Another point of note is that the disjunction occurring in these types of shots 
occurs within the shot itself, which is drawn out and expansive. Rather than use 
specific scripts, give precise directions or acting instructions, disjunction occurs by 
way of the images involuting into the internal durations of actors, landscapes and 
things. Involution occurs therefore in the movement of becoming between what is 
script and the becoming of actors/landscapes. For instance when we see the Huskies 
running through the landscapes, snow drifting through city streets or the long 
oceanic shots, the shots involute transforming into their elemental rhythms and 
movements. The shot thereby moves between what appears directed and the internal 
durations of characters-actors, of the weather, of landscapes or of objects such as 
buildings. The duration of these shots indirectly also carries out their interruptive 
disjunctions from the other shots, which precede and succeed them in the film. 
Last, there are divergences in these shots by virtue of elements within the 
same shot flying off in different directions. These elements might be a stray bird 
flying off in the landscape, plastic bags being carried off by a breeze on a city street 
or leaves rustling in a forest. These "extra" or "supra" moments also generate 
divergences within the same shot. None of these divergences is formed by the 
136 
interstice per say, as physical cuts, yet they make up what constitutes 
psychical/mental divergences within a shot. They are not exclusionary or separate 
from the shot, but rather become the means for communicating such differences. 229 
In these shots we come to observe that the animals grazing in pastures, the 
rhythms of the ocean or snow descending over the cityscape all enact their own time. 
The spectator experiences many movements that constitute the impersonality of the 
universe: pelting rain, howling Huskies, galloping horses, dripping hearts, sailing 
barges, machinery operating: the different elements roving around the film that come 
to touch each other intuitively.230 Through what Smith calls the method of dynamic 
genesis or intuition, we come into the film's own singular logic of sense. And it is in 
this sense of the shots following their own internal logic which produce divergences, 
interruptions and slippage that truth can be said to arise from within them. Rather 
than presuming truth as arising from the factual grammar of a maternal language, 
which then seeks its own condition, Deleuze demands that sense itself -- the sense of 
snow drifting over the city -- should be seen as producing truth, rather than 
occurring by way of a grammar of filmmaking that conforms to states of affairs of a 
plot. Narrative continuity demands the development of a plot, characters, dialogue 
and events in tow. The ascription of truth (and falsity) merely to propositions that 
are commanded by a maternal grammar, therefore, remains indifferent to what they 
ground, and such indifference, Deleuze notes, is the seductive problem with the 
logic of sense. 231 
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Time and virtual multiplicity 
Images (including sounds) in L'Intrus drift into our brain as passing moments, come 
into being and then vanish into other moments of duration. Duration, Bergson wrote, 
is experienced as both continuous and heterogeneous and through a single Time. 
The notion of virtual multiplicity is one in which a single Time is replete with the 
heterogeneous movements of the universe. The heterogeneous rhythms of the 
various planes of consciousness noted above, that come to inhabit L'Intrus, each take 
on their own duration within the single continuous time of a shot. Each of these 
shots, strung into a chain generates the film's involutions, its internal movements 
that flee the order of Chronos or chronometric time. Furthermore, as Pearson notes, 
we can come to consider that the notion of a single time does not mean that 
everything that exists follows the same rhythm of time, or that there is only a single 
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Even more, multiple divergences should not be equated to the theory of 
relativity, which defers to the time units of clocks. To Bergson, clock-time is not a 
lived time and therefore the time of relativity is not real; virtual multiplicity cannot 
therefore be confused with the mathematical time that the theory of relativity 
proposes.233 Virtual multiplicity, being qualitative duration, is rather to be 
considered as the time of living systems the durations and spatio-temporal dynamic 
flows of which are bound up with things in nature and the environment. The 
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reoccurring shot ofTrebor gazing through the window is one such example of being 
bound up with the world, even as he stands still. 
In Deleuze's Bergsonism, he makes the case for a single time, in which a 
single time refers to a whole that is virtual. Moreover, as it is bound up with the 
virtual whole of duration, a single time refers to a universal and impersonal time, 
removing time from the problem of an individual conscious observer. 234 Whereas 
Bergson had presented a single time through the duration of a single perceiving 
subject as containing all the other fluxes,235 Deleuze radicalizes this notion of a 
single time by presenting it as an impersonal time. This notion of an impersonal time 
is an important point here for two reasons. First, in considering L'Intrus, we have 
come to understand that in the notion of the different planes of consciousness 
touching each other, each plane moves in time with its own heterogeneous internal 
rhythm and speed. Each of these planes (each shot), therefore, is constituted as 
continuous and heterogeneous and experienced within a single Time. The 
divergences occurring on a psychical/mental plane within a single shot noted above 
(e.g., a dog chasing a fly while a character walks in the woods, where it is raining 
and the branches are swaying) constitutes its heterogeneity. Second, as we will see 
below, the notion of impersonal time is important in considering the movements of 
the universe, which come to be captured through the impersonal, mechanical view of 
camera consciousness, which is bound up with the virtual whole of duration.236 
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All the heterogeneous flows of time that are experienced are the different 
rhythms but they, Bergson wrote, can be "a single one, at will."237 However Deleuze 
postulates uncomfortably that such a conceptualization presents the duration of a 
single perceiving subject as the one that contains all the other fluxes. Such a notion 
would mean, he writes, that "Bergson's whole thesis consists in demonstrating that 
the fluxes can only be livable or lived in the perspective of a single time. "238 In 
Bergsonism, Deleuze therefore changes the personal and subjective nature of 
Bergson's duration to that which makes it impersonal by eliminating human 
consciousness. He writes, "a single duration will pick up along its route the events of 
a totality of the material world; and we will then be able to eliminate the human 
consciousness that we had initially available ... there will now only be impersonal 
time in which all things will flow. "239 Similarly, Pisters writes that in filmmaking, in 
the elimination of a singular human consciousness, such as that of the director's or 
cinematographer's, we can find Deleuze's notion of an impersonal time in "camera 
consciousness"240 as impersonal individuation, or what is referred to as haecceity.241 
Through camera consciousness it becomes possible to record impersonal 
time in film in which all things that flow before the camera eye -- the rhythms of life 
-- appear in cinema. In this single duration of a shot, the recording camera is both 
flux (as a part of the larger movement of the entire film) and also representative of 
Time (in which all the fluxes of a single shot become engulfed). Here the director's 
rhythms come to play out, and also those of characters-actors, the temporal 
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movements of landscapes and weather, be it snow falling, cows in a pasture, a bird 
flying through a shot or wind rustling the leaves of a branch. Many rhythms come to 
be constituted in a single shot recorded by the mechanical eye. In Trebor's gaze 
through the window, we also notice the rhythms of the dogs, the landscape and 
weather. Here, in a single shot, there is only one time, the duration of the recording 
camera, although there is an infinity of fluxes that participate in the same virtual 
whole of that shot. (Such fluxes will continue to expand exponentially for the entire 
film, which then expands into the movements of the universe.) A single time of the 
shot, therefore, implies the different fluxes. Duration as virtual multiplicity, 
therefore, is to be found in the impersonal time of camera consciousness, as this 
single Time. 242 A shot in this way is a representative of Time, in which all fluxes --
actual and virtual -- are engulfed. 
The duration of each shot creates multiple divergences within it by virtue of 
the movements arising from the different fluxes. Shots constituting the drift of 
different images, linked together through the interstice, multiply further such 
divergences. Movements that arise in a shot and in the interstitial moments between 
two shots create films' ever-expanding heterogeneous continuity to infinity: its single 
Time with virtual multiplicity. Here the notion of a machine existing within a 
machine onto infinity will be useful in understanding the impersonal single Time of 
the universe. A single shot with its multiple rhythms and durations is contained 
within the film, which is contained within the single Time of the universe. 
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Virtual multiplicity and the image of thought 
As I have tried to show, each image in L'lntrus, which occurs on a different plane of 
consciousness, flows from the void and offers thought from the outside. The 
interstice makes possible the continual drift of images into the film-space, opening 
up the film to the whole outside. The flux of images streaming through before 
vanishing into the void from which it arises, creates disjunctions and unfamiliarity. 
Continually moving beyond what is knowable, visible and conscious, each shot from 
a different plane of consciousness pushes Denis' film to its limit, folding into that 
which is inexplicable, inscrutable, exhausting. In the serial repetition of the interstice 
the image returns as an unknown, unrecognized quality, forcing the limits of our 
own intellectual engagement with it. This unrecognizability in the flow of images 
forces us to think. In the midst of such strain the different faculties are raised to 
perform a transcendent exercise as the spectator's senses grasp at the streaming 
images. Such a grasping, Deleuze writes, is the "education of the senses. "243 Faced 
with indeterminable, unknown images the faculties continually break down rather 
than coincide and correlate with others to form what is a determinable or known 
identity of an object or an idea. Indeed, Deleuze writes that it is in this breakdown or 
disarray between our various faculties that we actually come to learn anything new. 
In this breakdown we might come upon unexpected ways of perceiving, 
remembering or understanding things, in which a given faculty might operate in 
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peculiar ways, in an unexpected capacity, almost miraculously. Unawares, our 
memory might become useful for seeing and our vision for operating cognition. To 
this effect, Deleuze writes: 
The limits of the faculties are encased one in the other in the broken 
shape of that which bears and transmits difference. There is no more 
method for learning than there is a method for finding treasures, but a 
violent training, a culture or paideia which affects the entire 
individual (an albino in whom emerges the act of sensing in 
sensibility, an aphasic in whom emerges the act of speech in 
language, an acephalous being in whom emerges the act of thinking 
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Showered by the endlessly repeating interstice, which generates paradoxes, 
disrupts thought-flows and multiplies unknown factors, the spectator is left in a 
whirlwind of heterogeneous time flows struggling to cope cognitively and 
psychically. Interstitial repetition facilitates the breakup of images and therefore the 
flow of thought itself, where each image arising from the outside forces the limits of 
the intellect, propelling the movement of thought. As Deleuze writes, ideas, by 
themselves do not possess an actuality and are therefore purely virtual, as they are 
brought about by numerous differential relations that compose them. 245 Ideas 
themselves are the thoughts of the cogito, and the fractured I of the cogito make 
them indeterminate. The multitude of thoughts that are generated in the fracturing I, 
therefore, exist in their different aggregated ways. Ideas, therefore, necessarily 
subsist in these fractures, in the interstice, and "emerge on their edges," 
indeterminate and ceaselessly forming and disappearing.246 
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We can come to see, therefore, how ideas existing in the interstitial fracture 
between two time-images emerge in states of pure virtuality, in their multiple, 
indeterminate forms.247 This indetermination, existing in the state of pure virtual 
relations, is manifest when we see L 'Intrus 's concluding sequence. The shots move 
by their pure virtual connections to each other, in the visual-cognitive rupturing 
produced in the interstitial moments, rather than in the binding of narrative 
continuity. We fabulate through the different time-images linked together where, out 
of the blue, we see the same woman who stalks Trebor in Europe. She is pursuing 
him somewhere in East Asia and then to the Pacific Islands, where she intrudes upon 
him again when he is deeply ill in hospital. A close-up of her peering face is cut to 
the scene in a morgue, where a huge scar reveals a corpse's chest. Following only 
what could be our speculation about who the intruder is, or the image of the scar on 
the corpse (the identity of which remains unrevealed but which we venture to guess), 
we come to the film's conclusion. With the infirm Trebor returning home we see 
images of the coffin being loaded onto a ship with the piercing, invasive noises of 
operating machinery, followed by images that show the dark presence of expansive 
waters. The ship's swaying motion ensues as it veers away and then the image cuts to 
the young man, ostensibly the substitute-son, giving the ailing Trebor some water. 
Last, we see the nameless woman's unrestrained laughing as she pulls away in her 
sled drawn by excited Huskies in the snowy wilderness, presumably somewhere in 
the Jura Mountains in France. 
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In this concluding sequence, heterogeneous images are linked together by the 
interstice in which multiple virtualities emerge and ideas come to be generated. 
Ideas, as pure virtual entities, therefore exist in an inexhaustible state in the 
interstice. And being indeterminate, ideas, Williams writes, "can only ever be 
approximated through constructs that reveal aspects of its internal relations. "248 An 
idea therefore expresses only aspects of an actual thing, such as an image. The image 
of the scar circulates with its multiple virtualities, of which three of its reciprocal 
virtual relations may been noted: as the expression of pain for the lost son; the 
intrusive presence of the foreign heart that is snatched from the bodies of others; 
and, the mobile frontier that splits the film into its two streams of past and future. By 
virtue of the scar's expression in something, it reveals the other through a reciprocal 
relation whereby they come to determine each other. The scar reveals pain, the lost 
son, the illegal trade in body parts, Trebor's self-estrangement and much more. And 
just as an equation in differential calculus can never be exhausted, ideas cannot be 
either. Deleuze shows how ideas and problems are relatable to equations and their 
differentials. Ideas, he writes, are the "differentials of thought" in which each idea, 
being available to a differential calculus, means that its imaginative qualities move 
beyond the utilitarian subordination of thought to things or to a purpose. The 
important point here is that an idea can be viewed in endlessly different ways which, 
in tum, reveals its endless significant reciprocal points. But with respect to 
qualitative multiplicity, these endless differential points of view cannot be reduced 
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to mere numbers, and even more importantly, to some identifiable unity. Rather, a 
multiplicity is to be understood more through its positive differences, through its 
continuous variations rather than through its negative difference, which arises from 
quantitative or numerical values. Williams explains that qualitative states of 
difference are constituted, for instance, by allowing various shades of a colour to 
drift through you rather than in counting the actual number of shades a colour has. 
He writes therefore that we must connect to the pure variations in ideas and 
sensations (which are finite and affirmative) rather than connect to the actual objects 
themselves (which are infinite and negative in their differences).249 
Through these relations between ideas and their qualitative variations, we 
understand the relations between two time-images brought together through the 
interstice generating their virtual multiplicity. Thus, an idea emerges in the 
interstitial moment between two images expressing virtual multiplicity and revealing 
its many reciprocal points in the two images connected to it. The idea of "pain" or 
"lost son" or "illegal trade in body parts," which are never articulated in the film as 
such, come to be generated in the interstices connecting images. In this sense they 
are never determinate and always forming, adding, eliminating, reforming, always 
on edges. The sign of the scar operates as a structure of elements in continuous 
variation, as positive difference, and is resistant to identification as such. The scar 
functions as a visible sign always in different stages of recovery corresponding to 
virtual presences throughout the film. And by the film's conclusion it functions fully 
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outside of Trebor's body, revealing what may be his son's dead body. The relations 
now between the two actual scars, on two bodies, connected through the interstice, 
produce in tum their own different virtual multiplicity. The two actual forms that are 
now two different scars subsequently produce their own virtual relations. The two 
scars extend and multiply into a relation between two things that spreads into the 
world. The virtual, is therefore also the totality of ideas and intensities that circulate 
between the actual images; the actual images, on the other hand, operate by the 
things that they incarnate in the physical manifestation of objects and things, in 
signs. 250 Thus, just as experience is not possible outside of ideas, a film is not 
possible outside of its actual-virtual circuits. 
Conclusion 
In the time-images of cinema, the interstice forms the points of connection between 
spatio-temporally unrelated shots, giving rise to visual and cognitive disjunctions. In 
Denis's L 'lntrus, I have identified three types of disjunctions at work: the paradox; 
divergences and intensities; and, involution. In identifying these disjunctions the 
flow of duration in the film moves continuously through heterogeneous images. 
Duration in time-images of cinema proceeds, therefore, by discontinuities. 
Each image, which is part of the heterogeneous flow, produces visual and 
cognitive stoppages, gaps and fissures in the film. The spatio-temporal 
discontinuities linking one shot to another means that with each returning shot, the 
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spectator encounters the outside. The images arising from the outside break up the 
interiority of the narrative form. The hermeneutic space of the continuity narrative is 
undone. Images no longer connect to the psychological interiority of the antagonists' 
actions by way of causes and effects, but connect to an open, unknown outside. Each 
image, which is the any-space-whatever, comes to form a link in the chain of 
disconnected images; each image emerges from the open outside, presenting its own 
condition of thought. The open outside is the infinite, the virtual whole of Time or 
what Bergson called pure memory. Each image is a fragment of the whole. 
In the any-spaces-whatever, the returning difference in the visual image 
produces a dissonance and shock in cognitive functioning, forcing the spectator to 
think. In the space between two disconnected images, visual and cognitive 
dis junctures are produced, bringing about the movements of thought. Two unrelated 
images force the faculties to perform beyond the unification that occurs amongst the 
senses of what is knowable and recognizable. In the grasping that occurs from the 
unrecognizability or unintelligibility between images/things, Deleuze writes that the 
faculties break down, generating alternative or new connections and relations among 
them. New connections might bring thought through vision, or bring speech to an 
aphasic. 
Moreover, in visual disjunctures, which produce cognitive dissonance, a pure 
virtual space is generated. In the differential relations between two disjointed 
images, which produce the grasping of the faculties, ideas come to be generated. In 
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the fractures between images, a multitude of indeterminate thoughts come to form 
and disappear. In the interstices, therefore, we come to fabulate the many 
connections in L 'lntrus, between the people and things. The interstices, which cause 
fracturing, generate the fabulation of the actual images that circulate in the film. 
Denis, in not providing explanations in the narrative, brings about spectatorial 
fabulation about the characters and their actions, which seem to have no purpose; the 
reasons for their wandering; and their connections to each other. The scar, the 
intruders, the laughing woman, the frozen head in ice and a host of different images 
connected together in a chain, are moments of fabulation that bring about the 
movements of thought. 
The actual images, which circulate in the film, thereby, generate their virtual 
connections. The unknown and indecipherable relations of the actual images bring 
about their indeterminations and their multiple possible virtual connections to each 
other. In the interstitial fractures, the connections between two time-images exist in 
states of virtuality, as partially understandable and as possibilities, rather than as 
fully known and understandable. Interstices, for their ability to bring about 
difference in the returning shot, generate multiple virtual connections to each other. 
Interstitial fractures in generating fissures, gaps and dissonance, produce 
possibilities for new connections, relations and thinking. Their absence, on the 
contrary, brings about the return of the same relations through continuity, limiting 
thoughts to only what is possible through recognizable, known, relations. I will 
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repeat my inquiry into the interstice again in the next chapter, to examine what type 
of duration is produced and what the image of time is in the digital, automechanized 
installations of UK artist, Susan Collins. 
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Chapter Three 
Continuous Space: the eternal worlds of automechanized art 
Introduction 
In keeping with the broader aims of this dissertation, to examine the image of time 
produced in media, I will consider the type of duration produced in digital 
technologies. My examination undertakes a repetition in the type of inquiry pursued 
in the previous chapter, but in what is a different medium. In this chapter I will 
specifically consider Fenlandia, Glenlandia and The Spectroscope (2004-7), which 
are live, single-channel, automechanized, digital media installations by UK artist, 
Susan Collins.251 In order to examine the image of time produced, I will consider the 
material constitution and the physical processes created by way of the structural 
composition of the installations. I will begin by examining the pixels, the real-time 
transmission system and digital-frames. These material components, as they come to 
be structured within the installations, will be significant in analyzing the processes 
operating in the installations, such as the type of movement-flows generated, how 
duration unfolds and the image of time produced. From these processes at work I 
will consider the relation between the actual and virtual, what constitutes the whole 
and the potential of these installations to produce the movements of thought, which 
are all central to the concerns of this dissertation. It is from the material and 
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processual that I will develop the conceptual and formal elements specific to the 
installations, which will give rise to an understanding of live digital media. 
Repetition, as the method of inquiry into the processes of media production, 
is not so much to compare and contrast analog cinema with digital installations, but 
rather to delve into the movements of each by examining their affects and the logic 
of the universes that they come to unfold. In Difference and Repetition (1994), 
Deleuze states the importance of difference as a positive and affirmative quality. He 
writes that difference should be understood as a difference-in-itself, rather than as a 
difference between two things. The latter presents difference as external, based on 
the identity between two identifiable ideas/things, which subsequently is constituted 
as negative. He writes that in the history of western philosophy, difference has not 
been accepted on its own, but only in relation to the self-identity of 
ideas/objects/things, based on Plato's system of idea, copy and simulacrum. In 
reversing this understanding of difference, he states that difference, whether small or 
large, should be understood as being internal to the idea/object. What needs to be 
grasped, therefore, is that we understand the pure internal relations of an idea or 
thing, in order to understand it. What we need to understand about a distinctive 
concept or a thing is its purity, its interiority, its productivity and transportivity. 252 In 
delving into the particular movements of the installations, therefore, the singularity 
of their universes come to be revealed in and of themselves, rather than through a 
comparison with analog cinema. 
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In repeating my inquiry on the type of duration produced in digital media, 
different elements seem to emerge: numerical multiplicity, spatiality, continuity, 
presentism, instantaneity and simultaneity. These elements, rather than be construed 
as the causes or the known conditions from which my examination proceeded, as 
already pre-determined and apriori, on the contrary, emerge from the materiality and 
processes that I set out to examine. In this sense, I have not attempted in any way to 
devote this chapter to them; they have arisen from my examination, rather than the 
examination proceeding from them. These elements are the outcome of probing the 
internal processes of the installations in my inquiry into the types of duration 
produced in media. Continuity, presentism, numerical multiplicity and spatiality, 
therefore, arise from the particular structural configurations of the particular 
installations I examine. They give rise to one type of image in the multiplicity that is 
digital media. It is from processes and compositions such as these and others that 
digital media, in all variations, come to take shape. 
In trying to explore the internal pathways of the installations in question, I 
begin by examining their technical plane, but also consider their affective plane. The 
form of content (the technological assemblage) and the form of expression (what 
comes to be expressed), thereby, are the two sides of the same form. Moreover, such 
an approach takes into account the "nomadic" essence of the technological 
assemblage, which explores, experiments and connects, rather than enframes and 
designates what a technological apparatus will do.253 After all, technologies in 
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different aggregations produce differences and cannot be said to have simple causes 
that produce the same determining effects in different compositions. The vector-
flows differ from each other depending on their assemblage -- so also with digital 
media works, which are varied and wide-ranging. The works that I have selected 
therefore, do not and cannot come to establish a singular understanding of all live, 
single-channel, automechanized, digital media works. A comparable work with 
minor changes in its technological assemblage might therefore produce a contrasting 
experience. In short, the vector forces of each different assemblage produce their 
own internal differences, regardless of whether they are live single-channel or multi-
channel digital media works, or for that matter, film. 
I have attempted to examine the relations and connections of three similarly 
functioning works that come to be swept up in the multitude of what are timescapes 
or durational works. Each of the installations was selected for its lengthy duration, 
which extended over the period of a year, presenting the opportunity of exploring the 
type of duration produced. While each installation has a different location, two have 
cameras located outdoors and the third one is located indoors. With the exception of 
the locations, they are identical with respect to their structural composition, material 
components and processual functions. However, despite their similar structuring and 
processes, each produces a different image given the varying landscape in the 
different locations. An aspect of this chapter therefore attempts to scrutinize the 
relationship between the image produced in each work and the type of duration 
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endured: while the images produced are different, what is the type of duration 
endured? If the three installations produce three different images, can it be assumed 
that there are also differences in the types of duration endured? As we will see, 
differences in the image cannot assume differences in the types of duration 
produced. The same type of duration, which is of the continuous present, produces 
differences in the images. 
I argue that the differences seen in the images are produced by virtue of the 
quantitative relations in the works, rather than in the qualitative relations produced. 
That is, the progress in the installations comes to be measured by the instantaneous 
and continuous accumulation of data. The mechanized data-transmission system, 
which accumulates data every second, generates a complete image on a digital-
screen every 21. 3 3 hours. Such data buildup over the period of a year produces a 
quantitative multiplicity, in which the parts add up to make the whole. That is, every 
second amasses on the digital-screen to make up the whole temporality of the 
installation. There are few qualitative changes in the duration experienced, and what 
we find instead is the steady and continuous amassing of data, which is of the 
present. 
It is within this context of durational continuity and of quantitative 
multiplicity that I will come to consider the actual-virtual relations of the works. If 
the actual whole of time is given, my examination probes the installations' relation 
to the virtual. In the actualization of every second, the totality of the installation 
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comes to be visually inscribed. Time becomes a visual representation, the 
accumulation of data; the experience of time becomes a spatialization of visual data. 
In this given totality, I consider whether there is a loss in the open and free time 
experienced in duration, which is critical for generating the unbounded movements 
of thought. Thus, I question whether works such as these, which map and chart the 
entirety of time, produce an actual eternity or what Bergson called real duration. 
The inquiry into the image of time is only applicable to these specific works, 
rather than apply generally to all works with similar technological set ups and 
thematic preoccupations related to temporality. However, having said this, it is also 
important to note certain tendencies and directions that digital media works have 
come to reveal in the last decade, for which a certain type of image could come to be 
developed in future inquiries. For instance, the predominance of mapping, tracking 
and enumerating objects or phenomena live over long periods of time, set us to 
experience endless data flows of information. These maps, tracks and charts position 
us in varied relations with informatics, where thought comes into relations with 
calculation and mathematics, generating what Stiegler has called a mathesis 
universalis.254 These worlds of calculation infect everything, including art-worlds. 
Calculations put the experience of artworks in a particular position in which they 
come to reflect, inflect and redistribute societal engrossment with the endless 
mining, collecting and exhibiting of data flows. This type of art production needs to 
be questioned for its relations to the Open, for producing the indeterminable and for 
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their potential to bring about relations and connections that have not been thought as 
yet. 
The overall objectives of this dissertation extend to this chapter's, in that 
both inquire into the nature of the return of the works in question. Moreover, I 
inquire into how time comes to be experienced by considering the temporal relations 
specific to the installations. I explore the nature of the image of time in live, 
automated works, which endure over a year. Furthermore, I also seek to consider 
whether these works put thought in touch with the Open and question whether 
digital automata bring forth the possibilities for qualitative changes in which new 
connections, relations and intensities might be experienced. Through these inquiries 
this chapter delves into the possibilities of the virtual relations of thought with 
respect to live, single-channel, digital autopresentations. 
I will begin this chapter by mapping out the installations' structural and 
temporal configurations. From this general orientation I will proceed to analyze what 
characterizes movement in the installations, which will reveal the processes that 
come to be generated in the works. In order to examine the whole movement in the 
work, I will individually consider the pixels, frames and then the series as a whole. I 
will begin with the movement of each pixel and how it is constituted, as that will 
allow me to approach how each frame is constituted. Following an analysis of how 
the digital-frame is constituted, I will address the relationship between the two 
provisional sets of the installations: the camera, situated on remote sites and the 
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digital-screen, located in various galleries. Finally, I will examine the relationship 
between the different frames produced in each series. Only when the nature of the 
relations between the pixel-frame-series can be mapped out can the whole 
movement of each installation be understood. An understanding of how the whole 
movement operates will bring insight into the formation of the intervallic period 
between pixel, frame and series, leading to an understanding of the nature of the 
duration experienced and the image of time produced. The structural composition 
will ascertain the flow of time produced from which the processes of the system 
such as numerical multiplicity, instantaneity and simultaneity will come to be 
identified. These processes will be critical in considering the conceptual facets of the 
installations in which ideas of the continuous present, the spatialization of time and 
the relations of the actual-virtual in the production of thought will be developed. 
Contouring the temporal 
UK artist Susan Collins creates digital timescapes in her recent works. The three 
works under consideration in this chapter are Fenlandia,255 .Glenlandia256 and The 
Spectroscope,257 which are live digital transmissions that are generated by remote 
webcams operating in different locations. Running continually over the period of a 
year in locations such as Cambridgeshire, Perthshire and in Berkshire (the latter 
inside a haunted house),258 the cameras transmitted information instantaneously and 
continuously, to remote digital-screens located elsewhere. The image transmitted 
163 
from these webcams was processed by computer software to produce a pixel every 
second, which was then transmitted to a digital-screen in various galleries, namely, 
Babylon Gallery,259 Threshold Artspace260 and Warehouse of the Museum of 
Science and Industry.261 Additionally, the pixels, generated from the live webcam-
images could be transmitted to personal computers as screen savers, after special 
image capture software had been downloaded. In the galleries, the transfer of pixels 
to the digital-screens produced an image of the landscape, in which each screen took 
21.33 hours to complete. This process continued uninterrupted over the span of a 
year, with a new image starting immediately without a break, overlaying an older 
version on the screen. A digital imprint of the image was archived every two hours 
and also after each screen was completed. 
The pixel-transfer, from webcam to software to digital-screen, presented 
differences in the colour tones, light intensities, the amount of light received each 
day and the physical movements occurring in the location. In this manner the 
second-by-second pixel-flow from location to screen captured the "present" of the 
conditions found on location. With each series spanning over a year, the temporally-
oriented installations captured variations in micro-moveme~ts and light tones, over 
seconds, days, months and the four seasons. Seasonal changes produced variations in 
the light tonalities, changing from the cool blue tones of winter, to the warm golden 
ones of summer. Nights, lacking light, appear visually as black bands in each frame. 
The shorter winter days have thicker black bands, whereas summer days have 
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thinner black bands, given the longer daylight hours. In the landscape series, 
Fenlandia and Glenlandia, these black bands are oriented horizontally, and in The 
Spectroscope, where the webcam is located inside a haunted house, the black bands 
are oriented vertically. 
As a fully completed image was produced every 21.33 hours, Collins 
establishes an asymmetry between the time of each frame/screen and the rhythm of 
the 24-hour night and day cycle. Due to this asymmetry between the cycles, the 
black bands, which are either horizontal or vertical, appear in succession, moving 
either from top to bottom, or alternately, from left to right of the screen. The 
appearances of these black bands, which vary from screen to screen due to the time 
asymmetry, are nonetheless constant and systematic throughout the series. Moving 
consistently in one direction within a series, they are reminiscent of signal 
interferences characteristic to poor reception in television transmissions. 
The return in every screen of the black bands is where, one might say, "the 
universe begins to repeat itself. "262 One might ask if it is a simple return bringing 
forth a bare repetition or one that brings difference. This inquiry will become one of 
the questions of this chapter. As we might note, the variations in sunlight received 
each day changes the atmospheric tonalities of these digital paintings from moment 
to moment. Movements occurring within the environment, such as a flock of birds, 
clouds, cars or people, also change the picture. These moving elements are captured 
as fleeting specs or as "stray pixels" on the screen and sometimes, if they hovered in 
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the space for long periods, their presence is visually inscribed as cloudy material. 
The continuous temporal recording of each installation produces visible differences 
in the placement of the black bands on each screen. On the other hand, the seasonal 
changes produce differences in their width and these increases or decreases occur on 
a micro level. Over the period of a few weeks such differences enter the horizon of 
our consciousness and start becoming perceptible, and moreover, these differences 
become perceptible only when the screens are observed in relation to each other. It 
would be impossible to notice such changes at the moment of their inception when 
the digital transmissions actually occur. 
While each pixel captures the "now" of the environment, one might ask 
nonetheless if the present is ever present in these images. While watching pixels 
migrate every second, in a moment that constitutes the "now," it is only possible to 
understand the "now" as part of a process that is uncertain and involuting live on 
screen. The present is therefore never a "firm foundation" but as Birnbaum writes, in 
a different context, it is "the effect of a play of differences. "263 The differences being 
the light intensities, atmospheric colours and movements from frame to frame, 
which are always changing. Moreover, the image on the screen is never quite 
completed, as it is nearly always in the process of "filling up" one second at a time, 
to become a completed image. Each new pixel erases an older one from the image 
laying underneath. The screen is perpetually in stages of doing and undoing, in 
which a making of the present, undoes the recent past. The present image-in-
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formation and the past image, therefore, coexist simultaneously on each screen, 
where each is in various stages of change. This obliteration of the recent past by the 
"now" presents a sense of ephemerality and of"touching" between them. Once the 
new image is completed, the process repeats immediately again. However, in the 
archiving of these images, the past image is completely erased and no longer 
visually present. 
Movement 
The remote camera overlooking a landscape/haunted house produces an image of the 
landscape. A specific point in space of the webcam image is calibrated by computer 
software into a pixel every second, which is transmitted instantaneously via the 
internet to a digital-screen located in a gallery. Each digital-screen takes 21.33 hours 
to complete at the rate of 1 pixel per second (pps). With the understanding that 
digital imaging is traceable to a materialist reality, 264 we can appreciate that the 
digital camera used in Collins's works records and transfers the material reality of 
the landscape or haunted house. In terms of the rate of transmission, Collins' s 
timescapes move at a glacial rate, the software calibrating a mere pixel every 
second. To give this slow movement some perspective, it is remarkably different 
from film, which produces natural movement at 24 frames per second (fps) and 
video, 30 fps. Within the parameters of (contemporary) human perception, therefore, 
the frame rate of Collins's works can be said to be perceptible, although it occurs as 
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a micro-movement. A question that concerns our present context therefore is, does 
this frame rate slowed down in digital media produce a mobile section with real 
duration? That is, do we have a movement-image, or do we have what Deleuze 
referred to as an image with movement?265 The former is a shot with mobile 
framing, and the latter is a shot with static framing. 
In order to consider movement in the digital installations, I will begin by 
briefly considering natural movement in cinema. Film projectors, which were 
developed and built to calibrate natural movement have, over time, come to 
duplicate what we experience as the movements of ordinary life within a given shot. 
However, in the early days, natural movement was less evident at 19 fps. Natural 
movement, which was still being calibrated, prompted Bergson to write in Creative 
Evolution (1907) that because the movement of time was regulated in a 
cinematographic device, it presented a fixed time rate. He argued that the projector, 
which was a mechanical device, produced artificial movement; cinema presented the 
illusion of movement rather than real movement. Moreover, he wrote that the 
celluloid filmstrip did not yield continuity, given the gaps in time between frames. 266 
Film frames, strung together in a strip, represented immobile sections, which were 
artificially pulled to produce movement. However, in his earlier work, Deleuze 
points out that Bergson was already aware that shots were mobile sections 
(producing duration) rather than immobile sections (which do not produce duration). 
In Matter and Memory (1896) Bergson had already considered space and movement 
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to be indivisible from each other. A shot, even with a static frame, is already a 
mobile section with real duration. Whether movements were only occurring inside a 
static frame or were covered through space in a mobile frame, movement is 
indivisible from that space. A shot therefore, is already a movement-image, with real 
duration. 267 
Bergson's criticism of cinema had been that it produced artificial movement. 
The artificial time of the film projector produced an abstract time by virtue of its set 
mechanical rate, calibrated in early film projectors at 19 fps. We can find a 
correspondence therefore in Bergson's criticism of the cinema which might be 
applicable to Collins's works where, in the different context of digital technology, a 
pixel is produced by computer software every second. In the installations, pixels 
move across the digital-screen at a set rate, which is artificially calibrated. Thus, the 
type of movement produced in the installations needs to be analyzed. 
Second, Bergson's criticism of cinema had also been that cinema produced 
immobile shots, rather than mobile ones. As Deleuze, Rodowick, Bogue and others 
have written,268 Bergson's criticism was based on early cinema contemporaneous 
with his times, where the massive cameras were stationary objects with fixed frames. 
The movement derived in these images was primitive, in that it took place in front of 
an immobile camera, inside a shot. In an immobile shot, an actor could be seen 
walking across in space, while the shot itself had a static frame. The movement that 
takes place, therefore, occurs inside an immobile frame, producing the immobile 
169 
shot. On the other hand, the dynamic movement of the camera through space, 
achieved in mobile framing arrived later, with the relatively smaller and lighter 
cameras. In Vertov's Man with a Movie Camera (1929), the camera is placed on a 
bicycle or on a car and moves through space. In the shots, therefore, the camera 
itself moves through space, and such a movement occurs independently from the 
movements taking place inside the frame, giving rise to the mobile shot. 
The immobile shot of early cinema, therefore, added to Bergson's critique 
that cinema failed to produce real movement found in natural perception. However, 
as I have already noted, in The Movement-Image, Deleuze points out that such shots, 
even if they show primitive movement, are to be understood as being mobile 
sections of time, as space and movement are indivisible from each other. The 
mobility of the actor walking through space in a shot produces movement, even 
though the camera itself is immobile. Immobile shots, thereby, produce real 
movement that leads to concrete duration. This theoretical background is important 
for considering movement in Collins' s works as I begin to examine her timescapes. 
Collins's framing is similar to what we find in early cinema, where the camera is 
immobile, and what movement occurs, takes place in front of a static webcam over 
the span of a year. Moreover, computer software determines the set pixel rate, which 
is transmitted live to the digital-screen. Thus, how do we start conceiving movement 
in her works? 
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The pixel's movement and its constitution 
In Collins's three installations, the camera to digital-screen transmission is a grid-to-
grid transfer, in which the number of pixels on each grid - the camera-frame and the 
digital-screen -- is the same. The number of pixels, which make up the image of the 
landscape in the camera, matches the number of pixels on the digital-screen. The 
transfer of a pixel from the first grid to the second occurs through the linear 
progression of time which, in human perception, creates a seamless moving line of 
pixels on the digital-screen.269 
In the continuous recording of the landscape, each point in space of the 
image recorded by the camera is processed by software and transferred second-by-
second, as an individual pixel to the digital-screen. In this manner, the pixels's linear 
progression on the digital-screen, develops into a complete image of the landscape 
every 21.33 hours. Each pixel, therefore, transmitted every second, represents a 
different time on the same image. As a result, each complete image on the digital-
screen can be characterized as constituting a block of time spanning 21.33 hours. 
This electronic transmission from webcam to digital-screen over a year, forms the 
installations's continuous temporality. 
While the camera overlooking the landscape frames the view from a defined 
and particular perspective, the view itself changes with the different light intensities 
and movements occurring in the landscape from minute to minute. When a flock of 
birds flies into the landscape, not only does the whole landscape change, but also the 
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view. This change is one where a minor movement in the landscape changes the 
image produced in the camera. Any variations occurring in the landscape over time 
are expressed by a change in the hue, luminosity and intensity of the pixel calibrated 
and transmitted to the digital-screen. Each pixel, therefore, expresses the material 
conditions of the variable movements occurring in time in the camera-image, such as 
the clouds, fog, birds and light intensities. A gradually moving dark cloud will 
express graying light conditions and linger in the image longer than a fleeting one. 
Similarly, a cat or car entering and leaving the enclosed frame will depend on its 
speed or slowness for its micro traces on the digital-screen. The movements of these 
variable elements are captured in the pixels as their values are calibrated anew every 
second, and therefore, each pixel's value is directly dependent on the environment 
and the changes occurring in the landscape. 
The relations between the two sets: camera-frame and digital-screen 
In considering the relations between the camera and the digital-screen, the grid of 
the camera-frame corresponds spatially to the grid of the digital-screen, the latter 
becoming a (magnified) copy of the former. The image that forms on the webcam's 
viewing grid, however, is different from the image forming on the grid of the digital-
screen. Whereas the webcam surveys the entire landscape from a fixed point of view 
in continuous time, the digital-screen receives pixels from specific points-in-space 
from the camera-image, to form a complete image every 21. 33 hours. What forms 
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and aggregates over time on the digital-screen are points-in-space generated from 
the camera-image by software. 
The pixel's transmission to the digital-screen instantaneously duplicates the 
spatio-temporal conditions of the "now" of the landscape. However, this 
instantaneous duplication is only true for the single pixel that is being transferred at 
that moment. Since a new pixel is transmitted every second, only the current pixel 
can present the conditions of the "now" from a particular point-in-space of the 
image of the landscape, and no more. This means that not all movements occurring 
in the landscape are going to be captured by the current pixel being transmitted on 
the digital-screen. For instance, if the pixels transmitted from the camera have just 
started from the top of the camera-image, conditions prevalent in the sky will be 
transmitted and not those on the ground (grass or cats). The pixel's movement, in 
this sense, is independent of the movements occurring in the landscape or in the 
image of the landscape, as it is transmitted from the camera-frame to the digital-
screen.270 The two movements are asymmetrical and do not have a one-to-one 
correspondence. 
While these two movements are asymmetrical, it should also be noted 
however that the digital-screen does correspond temporally with what occurs in the 
camera-frame. There is a direct and continuous connection between them, albeit this 
connection is what Bergson characterized, in a different context, as a "thin 
thread."271 Thus, even to an isolated system, such as the installations, the duration 
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immanent to the entire universe (as seen through the camera-eye) is transmitted via 
this thread to the smallest element: the digital-screen is connected to the duration of 
the universe by way of the pixel, which is a point-in-space. As a result, even while 
the movement of the pixel on the digital-screen is autonomous from the movements 
found in the landscape, what occurs in the latter is instantaneously and continuously 
transmitted in the form of a pixel, as a line moving across the digital-screen. 
There is also a correspondence in the frame-sizes of the camera-frame and 
digital-screen. Both are electronic grids that communicate with each other, with the 
size of the digital-screen being larger than the camera-frame. But while there is 
correspondence in the frame-sizes, the camera-frame and digital-screen are spatially 
separated by virtue of their different locations. Moreover, their functions vary. While 
the camera-frame designates the image's boundary, the camera itself functions as a 
recording device, while the digital-screen is the receptacle of the pixel transmission. 
Because of their different locations and functions, I will temporarily designate the 
camera and the digital-screen as two different sets. Importantly, the camera and 
digital-screen, which are in two different locations with differing images,272 are 
synchronized temporally through the pixel's movement. This temporal 
synchronization between the two spaces warrants a further examination. However, 
before I am able to discuss this correspondence, I will need to consider two other 
aspects, namely, the relations between the different frames and the overall relations 
occurring between pixel-frame-series. 
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Relationality between frames 
In the translation of visual matter from landscape to camera-image and from camera-
image to digital-screen, the structural configuration of the piece is set. However, 
despite this determinability, the images that result are to the contrary. Each image 
produced on the digital-screen every 21.33 hours, is exceptional and shows a 
remarkable difference to the others in its light intensities, colourscapes, textures, 
striations, densities, the placement of the black bands and so forth. What I would 
like to emphasize, however, is that even within a defined and fixed system, fluid and 
unique images are the outcome. An unvarying direction and a set rate of the flow in 
the system results in effects, which are continually variable. The variations produced 
in the pixels, and hence each digital-frame or image, is the direct result of the 
constant variations in the conditions prevalent upon the landscape. 
Such variation in movement occurs to a lesser extent in The Spectroscope, 
which is set inside the room of a haunted house, which does not appear to have any 
visible traces of paranormal activity. In this piece the movement of sunlight filtering 
through the closed windows produces changes in the levels of light intensity and its 
direction, in conjunction with the light produced by a large chandelier hanging from 
the ceiling. Given the non-variable weather conditions and no visible movements 
inside the "haunted" room, the variability in the image's appearance is limited to the 
intensity and the length of light received. When variables in the environment are 
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minimal, the image on the digital-screen reproduces what the camera-image 
produces with minimal differences. Thus, making predictions as to what will occur 
in the digital-image would be possible after viewing the installation a few times, as it 
has fixed variations. 
For each digital-screen/frame to produce a difference, therefore, 
environmental factors, along with the pixel transfer of a point-in-space and the rate 
of its autonomous movement across the digital-screen, play a role. Regardless of the 
technology used, the structural composition has a fixed circuitry. The camera 
produces an image in continuous time of the conditions prevalent in the landscape, 
software calibrates a point-in-space from that image, in which a pixel from the 
camera-image is transferred at a fixed rate in linear progression to the digital-screen. 
Each of these parts produces change in the digital-image.273 
It must be noted however that the fixed circuitry produces a structural 
determinacy in the pixel's linear direction and rate of movement on the digital-
screen. Movement occurs in only one direction from camera to digital-screen and at 
a single rate of 1 pps. Subsequently, the relation between the present "now" 
overlaying the recent past, remains stable throughout the series. When the 
installations were experienced live, the past and the present coexisted 
simultaneously on the same frame. However, the flow of the present eroding the 
image of the recent past maintained an unmodified trajectory and an unvarying rate 
throughout the duration of the installation. In this unidirectional flow and steady 
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rate, movement occurs, but one that is limited to a singular, regular motion in space, 
which yields predictability to that movement. 
What we have therefore are two interesting and differing outcomes 
dependent on whether the installation is experienced live or when digging through 
the archives. When the installations are seen live in the gallery, the spectator 
experiences the relentless physical flow of each pixel flowing across the digital-
screen. Each change in the environment produces a micro-change in its calibration. 
However, as noted, the movement occurs in only one direction and at a set rate, 
which becomes anticipated. On the other hand, if one views only the archives, the 
live activity of the pixels moving across the digital-screen is lost. As a result, the 
archived images are not experienced as a flow or a movement any more, but only as 
stills. As still images, they are nonetheless singular expressions, but experienced 
without anticipating the flow. 
The nature of relations between pixel-frame-series 
The linear progression of the pixels from the top to the bottom of every screen takes 
21.33 hours. After reaching the bottom, it starts uninterrupted from the top again. 
Each completed screen, therefore, forms an intermediate image in the series, and 
each series spans a year or more. Each screen (from a total of approximately 411 
screens for the year), becomes a section within that series of continuously recorded 
time. From the fixed camera framing only a single perspective in space is possible. 
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The immobility of the camera-frame creates an invariable set where, the movements 
that occur take place inside the camera's static frame. The movement occurring in 
this sense remains "attached" to the elements/objects/things that move within the 
camera's frame, rather than being freed from it. The swaying of the trees or 
movements of the clouds, serve as the moving-body in the frame or become the 
vehicle by which movement occurs in the frame. What we have in all the three 
installations, therefore, is a single "slice of space" in which movement occurs inside 
a spatially determined immobile frame. However, if space and movement are to be 
understood as being indivisible from each other, the movements that occur inside 
this frame, even if simple, produce duration.274 That is, as noted earlier with 
Deleuze, movement cannot be separated from space.275 A fixed space with 
movements inside produces duration, but now we need to consider the type of 
duration produced. In an immobile frame one needs to consider that movement is 
limited and attached to what occurs inside the frame and that this type of framing 
does not produce changes in the states of duration experienced. 276 
In addition to the fixed frame, there are the variable elements such as light, 
wind and fog. Unknown factors such as stray animals, automobiles and others, also 
reveal their presence from time to time in the composition of the pixels. However, 
while these variable elements are a direct translation of the camera's calibration of 
light values and there is also the independent rate of the pixel's movement, there is 
yet another element in between that needs to be accounted for. This in between is 
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invisible but fully present at all times and without its presence there would be no 
pixel transmission or art project. In this sense its presence warrants the project's 
workability or stoppage. Passing through and connecting the camera to the digital-
screen, it is the electrical circuitry of cable/satellite connections, to whose behaviour 
the set is constantly subject. It can cause technical failures, interferences or major 
interruptions. This component in the project I would mark as leaving the set partially 
open. Fiberglass, wiring or electromagnetic transmission becomes that very literal 
thread connecting part to part, and likewise, to the Open. In fact, as the operation is 
an autopresentation, it also becomes the installation's connection with the Open. 
However, while the electrical circuitry connects a remote webcam to a digital-
screen, it simultaneously also proffers to be a constant menace, threatening the 
disconnection of the set from the Open. 
While the electrical circuitry generates the connection or link between the 
parts to the Open, it must be pointed out that it is configured to move in a single 
direction. In this sense the set is to be understood as being only partially open to the 
whole, from the camera end. Rather than being open from both ends where changes 
in the direction of flows might take place from each end, giving rise to exchanges, 
the set is more like our circulatory system in which the valves only open in one 
direction. The current "passes through" the art-producing assemblage, which gets 
swept up in changes. Since electronic flows operate at microseconds, any minor gaps 
in the electron flow, as evinced in the ordinary fluctuations of an alternating-current 
179 
circuitry, are largely imperceptible to the senses. The electronic system occurs as a 
continuous flow in human perception. 
We can also note on the other hand that the movement of the pixels is tied to 
the cun-ent and that their movement is dependent on the electron flow. It is important 
to assess if such a dependency can be constituted as real movement. If the electric 
cun-ent keeps the pixels in motion, it would be hard to understand this causal 
contingency as a movement between part and part. The electrical circuitry allows 
each pixel to always be in progress allowing each image to continually build up. At 
this point we need to come to a key understanding of whether the pixel's movement 
across the screen at a set rate of 1 pps is real movement or if it is to be considered as 
an abstract time as Bergson had considered in his critique regarding film projectors. 
The rate of the pixel's transmission from the camera-grid to digital-screen is 
unrelated to the environmental movements occurring in the camera-image. For this 
reason we could allowably say that it is a calibrated and an abstracted time. In this 
way, the environmental movements in the camera-image and the pixel, while not 
unrelated, are independent of the other's movement. While controlled by the 
electronic system it is in, the pixel moves autonomously, regardless of which 
movements are transpiring in the landscape, although it con-esponds to the camera-
image by virtue of its transfer of points-in-space from the camera-image to the 
digital-screen. 
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If we constitute the pixels' movements to be the real movement in the 
installations, we would need to uncover the temporal relations between the different 
parts of the installation. In order for there to be real movement, the pixels' 
movements would need to change or affect another part which, in tum, would 
qualitatively change the whole. We could understandably say that the pixels' 
movement across the screen continually changes the image, which in tum changes 
the whole series.277 It would be common sense to observe that the linear progression 
of pixels from the top to bottom of each screen makes up an image and therefore, the 
change in the one produces a change in the other. In such a scenario a provisional 
movement could be said to occur between pixels and a single image on the digital-
screen where, changes in the pixels' constitution, changes the image produced. 
However, the movement between pixels and image are unequal or of uneven 
scales. In addition, we also need to consider, as in the montage of movement-images 
that shot A+ shot B = X, in which Xis the change produced in the whole film. For 
instance, in shot A and shot B, which are different physical movements, a qualitative 
change is produced in the film. The two parts affect each other qualitatively, 
producing a change in the whole. Real movement is what occurs between two 
different parts which, when connected to each other, qualitatively affect and produce 
a change in the other, thereby changing the whole. 
Other than the movements occurring inside the camera-frame, dependent on 
the constant changes in the environment, the change produced in the system that is 
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Glenlandia, produces little real movement.278 There is the movement of the pixel, 
however it is independent, and it is unclear how it would bring about a qualitative 
change. As part of a unidirectional flow, it does produce change -- it builds up the 
image through aggregation -- but this is not a qualitative change. The accumulation 
of pixels building up the image, in this instance, would be characterized as a 
quantitative change, producing a difference in degree rather than a difference in 
kind.279 
In order to consider the question of real movement in these artworks further, 
whose scopes are nothing less than being timescapes after all, I will dwell in depth 
on the question of what Bergson called "pure duration." But I will need to question 
what kind of image of time these live, autopresentations in digital media present. Is 
this a new image of time? If so, how does it differ from the movement-image or the 
time-image discussed in the previous chapter? Beyond the specifics of these works 
however, I will come to inquire into notions of numerical multiplicities, 
simultaneities, spatialization and presentism, in what are the possibilities offered by 
live new media works. In order to take up these considerations, I will discuss the 
pixel, sets, frames and the whole series further, but now in their work as a whole. I 
will consider an examination of these timescapes from the perspective of real 
movement and duration. 
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Duration 
When one frames something, a select image is cut out and separated from the Open. 
When we observe the pixels moving across the screen in Fenlandia, our 
consciousness operates by deterritorializing the image from the landscape. Each 
completed digital-screen forms an image/digital-frame and over the period of a year, 
several hundred frames are generated. When a specific frame is generated, it is 
similar to what happens in scientific experiments. For the latter, Bergson writes, our 
consciousness operates by isolating and cutting out systems from the whole. 280 But 
he also writes that this tendency is exhibited only on a temporary basis. We 
eventually recognize that the (entire) isolated system, such as the special image 
Glenlandia is part of a larger whole, where all elements of the universe 
interpenetrate and are connected with each other. 
Moreover, according to Bergson, what connects such an isolated system to 
the Open is a thread. Writing that the solar system is connected or attached to the 
sun by a "thread" (and this can be a very thin thread), Bergson deliberated that 
"throughout the length of this fine thread, the dun~e immanent to the entire universe 
is transmitted, even to the smallest particles of the world where we live. "281 To 
summarize, the universe or the Open is connected to all, including the minutest 
particles through this thread. It is therefore through this thread that we should be 
able to connect one set to another, such as the (provisional) ones established in 
Glenlandia and eventually, to the Open. In this sense, the thread would connect the 
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parts to the whole, where the slightest movement in the part changes the whole 
entirely. Every minor or individual movement is therefore a part of the movement of 
the Open, which continually changes. This is the qualitative movement of duration, 
where duration itself is movement and in which there is a qualitative relation 
between part and whole.282 The slightest movement of the part qualitatively changes 
the whole. Duration is not the mere "capture of time," as distant observation or that 
which occurs through visual representation, rather it is the actual or real movement 
between part and part that qualitatively changes the whole. Ultimately, for Bergson, 
there are no separate and distinct identities in the universe, only vibrations of the 
Open. Birds, clouds, light intensities, the art project, our consciousness itself, are 
eventually all flows, each having their own rhythm of unfolding dun~e that makes up 
the Open. 283 
Rodowick in Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine (1997) writes that movement 
itself is a mobile section (or a mobile framing) of duration or duree.284 In 
considering this idea for Collins's works, the movements of the variable elements 
within the landscape come to constitute a mobile section of duration or duree.285 The 
variations in the mobile flux of universal matter, therefore, change the pixel's 
constitution and such micro-changes, which continually aggregate, second-by-
second, also change each image on the digital-screen (a single frame). 
Correspondingly, a change in a frame also produces change in the entire series. The 
pixel, in this way, as a part of the image-forming, produces a change in each 
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image/digital-frame. Furthermore, a frame, which can be constituted as an 
intermediate image, itself produces change in the whole series. The movement 
constituted so far, it would seem, passes from the framing of the camera to 
calibration of the pixel's set rate to digital-frame where, a change in one part 
produces a change in the entire series. We need to inquire, therefore, what this type 
of change produced is. 
The frames, in continually following the micro-rhythms and micro-intensities 
of the environmental elements in front of the camera lens, also continually come to 
be modified. One frame to the next produces the visible signs of movement by virtue 
of the shifts recorded on each screen. Duration, which is movement, is changed by 
movement itself. Movement expresses a qualitative change in duration or in the 
whole. The changes occurring in the frames, as they are experienced live would 
come to represent the change in duration visually. Ifwe are to understand each frame 
as a moving part, then such a moving part positions itself in relation to the 
movement of the whole series. If this is the case, we could attribute real movement 
to the three digital installations. 
However, before it is possible to answer in the affirmative I will need to in 
fact ascertain if each frame is a moving part, and if so, what type of movement is 
produced in each frame. Given the nature of the pixel transfer from one point-in-
space to another at a set rate, I will need to consider if a frame in The Spectroscope 
or Fenlandia is a mobile or immobile section of duration. In considering Bergson's 
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third thesis on movement, Deleuze writes that an instant is an immobile section of 
movement and movement itself is a mobile section of duration. 286 Given that each 
frame is produced by an aggregation of pixels, I will need to examine whether a 
frame in this series is merely an accumulation of instants (of points-in-space), or 
whether it is in fact a mobile section of duration, which produces real movement. 
The whole: temporal relation or spatial accumulation? 
I have noted earlier that there is direct correspondence between the two provisional 
sets, although the movement expressed occurs in only one direction rather than in 
both. This unidirectional relationship establishes a linear structure. A multi or 
bidirectional relationship would have, on the contrary, randomized this structural 
hierarchy, whereby the relations between them might have moved in both/many 
directions. Moreover, the established rate of the pixel production produces a 
predictable, determinate movement rather than a random and unpredictable one. In 
multi/bidirectional relationships, a qualitative temporal movement can emerge, 
where an alteration in one part comes to affect change in another part, transforming 
the whole. In the works in discussion, on the other hand, a fixed rate and direction 
has been established where it is unclear to say whether temporal relations, in the 
manner discussed above, have occurred. The set order of things, from camera-image 
to digital-screen produces a single continuous formation, a single moving order that 
is Glenlandia, Fenlandia or The Spectroscope. A qualitative temporal relation, on 
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the other hand, would be one in which movement occurs between parts, each of 
which would affect and modify the other to produce a change in the whole. That is, 
there would be movement occurring at different rates and also random movement in 
the directions between the camera-image and the image produced on the digital-
screen. The image produced in one would alter the other, producing a change in the 
whole; except, this exchange from both sides, does not occur. Despite not having 
such a qualitative relation between the parts and whole, there is another type of 
relation occurring. There are the parts (camera, pixels, digital-screen/frames and 
seties), which make up the whole, however, in this part-whole relation in place of a 
qualitative multiplicity, in which images affect each other to produce changes in the 
whole, we have a numerical multiplicity, in which the image is a continuous, 
accumulative whole. 
Numerical multiplicity 
The transmission of a pixel from a point-in-space on the camera-image to its 
corresponding point-in-space on the digital-screen, we must note henceforth, is the 
transmission of data or information. While the pixels transmit data/information 
instantaneously and simultaneously from camera to digital-screen, we must also note 
that each image is constantly in the process of being built.287 We must come to terms 
with this situation to understand the image of time in these particular types of live 
digital media installations. The digital-screen takes 21.33 hrs. to develop into a full 
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frame. This time frame then produces a complication, because when we say that 
there is no gap between camera and digital-screen in the transmission, it can only be 
pat1ially true. While there is the time of micro-seconds in the transmission of a pixel 
from camera to digital-screen, it is minor, and does not produce any humanly 
perceptible gaps, intermissions or stoppages within the piece. The extremely quick 
rates of electrical currents, which occur in microseconds, are humanly imperceptible 
and do not alter perception of the installation. The transmission of a pixel every 
second is perceived as the flow of a moving line, as a continuous flow in time on the 
digital-screen. 
However there is another, more perceptible time, which is more interesting to 
examine. While there is a continual transmission of information from camera to 
digital-screen, each digital-screen is always in progress and always forming an 
image. This image is the unrelenting movement of the present overtaking the visual 
traces of the recent past. In this sense there is a spatial overlaying, in which a 
constant movement of the pixels proceeds to fill up each screen. The spatial 
displacement of the older screen by the newer one exists in a continuous state of 
distention, occurring over the duration of the installation.288 The perimeter of this 
spatial displacement is constantly shifting spatially on-screen in a perpetual state of 
alteration and is dependent on the relation between the pixel's position on-screen and 
the end of that digital-screen. There is only one instant (one second or less) when we 
can say that there is no spatial displacement by the new pixels of the older screen. 
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This instant occurs only at the bottom when the frame is fully completed and forms a 
singular image. We should note furthermore that the image produced by the camera-
eye and the image generated on the digital-screen will not be identical, given the 
environmental changes occurring over the period of 21.33 hours for each screen to 
build up. 
In processual works such as these, there is always something happening but 
not quite arrived at, generating some kind of anticipation for the spectator. The 
spectator is always in the midst of this movement of progression. The installation is 
nearly always in a partial phase in which, what is being experienced is at yet 
unfinished, expanding and constantly filling up with new pixels. To put it another 
way, the whole of each frame is constituted by this unrelenting movement of "filling 
up," by overlaying whatever came before. This movement, of being in a single 
continual process, cannot be understood as the gaps produced in the interstitial 
period in time-images. Interstitial periods produce virtual relations, where the virtual 
relations occur in the gap between two parts that zigzag between pasts and presents. 
What is being processed here, on the contrary, is more like an unfinished part, in 
which its continuous accumulation adds up to what is the whole frame. There is no 
temporal gap here to speak of. In this sense the whole frame is constituted by virtue 
of the sum total of its pixilated parts. These unfinished wholes, at whatever stage of 
progression they might be on the digital-screen, are numerical in nature and are 
substantively different in kind from the film-frame. 
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When we perceive images generally, we perceive them as being "full 
pictures" or in complete frames. We certainly do not perceive an image by virtue of 
a pixel forming every second. The internet transmission, which occurs pixel by pixel 
and progresses line by line, delivers a continuous stream of pixels building up to an 
image. The installation does not present a stream of fully completed images of what 
the camera-eye sees, which is a full frame. Most digital media pieces that present 
observance as part of their project do also present a continuous stream of completed 
(whole) frames. For instance, Nurit Bar-Shais' piece FUJI, was a live installation 
that presented over two dozen views of Mt. Fuji. Each of the views was a whole 
image presented in continuous time over the period of four seasons.289 The 
instantaneity between the numerous cameras on-site and their digital transmission to 
computer screens was, therefore, much greater compared to Collins's projects. In 
Collins's pieces, the instantaneity is partial, comparatively speaking, as it occurs at 
1 pps, in what is a linear relay of single points of the camera-image, over the period 
of 21.33 hours. In this sense, each frame or image is a paradox of sorts, in what is 
ostensibly an instantaneously transmitted point, which produces a full image at the 
glacial speed of 21.33 hours. 
If we consider film, in order to examine the frame further, a single frame 
expresses the conditions of the whole: each film-frame is a whole image. In the case 
of a fade, the whole image fades to or from a black or white screen; in a dissolve, 
one whole frame dissolves into another whole.290 The transformation in any ordinary 
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film fade-in/out or dissolve occurs between two whole film-frames, which are the 
parts that make up the shots, which make up the whole film. The fade-in/out or the 
movement between two heterogeneous shots, therefore, is the relation of one part 
affecting another part to change the whole, constituting a qualitative order. In the 
live digital installations the image is, on the contrary, an unfinished and linear 
progression from the top to the bottom of the screen to make up a whole frame. 
Frames, produced continually over a year, make up hundreds of frames to produce 
the entire series. Each frame is formed pixel by pixel and moves along in successive 
lines horizontally, in descending order,291 much like the firing electron gun of old 
television sets. The microstructure of each individual pixel is fully formed and each 
pixel transmitted is fully defined, coded and distinct in itself.292 The pixels that make 
up each digital-screen/image, thereby, move through a numerical order to form a 
whole; that is, they move progressively from 0-7100. 
In presenting the distinction between what is subjective and objective 
Bergson, in Time and Free Will, wrote that the latter can come to be defined by its 
ability to be known in such a way that it can be divided in an infinity of ways. What 
is objective can be grasped by thought before these divisions occur without anything 
changing in the object itself. Thus, divisions are already visible in the image of the 
object even when they are not fully realized. These divisions are actually perceived 
or at least perceptible in principle. He writes, "this actual, not merely virtual, 
apperception of subdivisions in the undivided is precisely what we call 
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objectivity. "293 What is objective, therefore, has no virtuality, in that everything in it 
is actual. The digital installations are actual, in which each pixel is the measurement 
of a single point-in-space and time. It is produced as a value from a point-in-space 
every second, and therefore, each pixel represents a discrete section of space in time. 
There is nothing hidden in its constitution or in its workings and because matter, 
such as a pixel, has no interior as such and hides nothing the pixel is like matter, 
which Bergson writes, "spread[s] out as a mere surface ... [it] is no more than what it 
presents to us at any given moment."294 
What we see are pixels forming every second aggregating into an image. 
This image or frame, we could say, could be divided and subdivided infinitely 
without changing it in kind. Each image, because it is complete in and of itself, is 
quantifiable, and therefore divisible into wholes, halves or quarters, or added up to 
form the sum total of the frames archived. Their addition or subtraction from the 
series is what presents to the spectator the continuous movement of a whole over the 
span of a year. Each image or frame can be divided into spatialized units that are 
infinitely divisible into the sum of its parts, or each frame can be added up into the 
whole number of frames constituted over the period of a year, where each unit is a 
true number.295 
Cinema's time-images, on the other hand, cannot be numerically divided in 
this manner. In the first instance, there is no "whole" to speak of, as images are 
fragments of time that appear from the outside. In time-images the whole is the 
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outside, and such an outside cannot be divisible into the number of shots in a film. 
Each shot is a fragment of the outside, and the links between fragments of time 
occur in the virtual relations between them. Shots do not come into relations with 
each other through physical continuity in space or time; instead, they are 
disconnected optical and aural images that relate with each other through virtual 
connections. The "whole" is, therefore, disconnected fragments of time, linked 
together through virtual connections. Virtual connections produce the movements of 
thought, which is real movement. Virtual connections are real movements because 
they produce changes in the states of duration experienced. Real movement, 
therefore, produces real duration. 
In the movement-images of cinema there is a whole and this whole, rather 
than being closed is "open upon the world," which is itself the Open.296 Each 
shot/set is never absolutely closed and is always connected to the Open, even if by a 
"thin thread."297 For this reason, movement-images do not produce a homogeneous 
or spatialized time.298 However, there is an organic unity, in which each shot is part 
of the multiplicity within the whole.299 In movement-images what produces the 
movement of the whole is the continuity narrative. Shots are linked to each other in 
space and time, producing the physical movement of the whole: causes lead to 
effects and actions lead to reactions. Movement in one shot produces a change in 
another, qualitatively changing the whole. The whole, therefore, is not divisible into 
the number of its shots/parts. Shot A + Shot B affect each other to produce a 
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qualitative change in the whole. For this reason, shots are not a true number that can 
be infinitely divisible into the sum of its parts to make up the whole. 
On the other hand, the ability of certain types of digital media installations to 
divide and add up infinitely, without producing a qualitative change in the whole, is 
particularly why they are a numerical multiplicity. In the installations, while there is 
a change in the whole, it is a quantitative change. Each image/frame is a collection 
of pixels moving from the top of a screen where a new image begins at 0% and 
proceeds to form a new (actual) whole at 100% coverage of the frame. This 
numerical accumulation of the whole is exactly the same for the entire series. The 
(values of) hue, luminosity and intensity converted into a pixel-7frame-7series, in 
this manner, become a quantitative representation of duration rather than being 
duration, or actual movement itself. The pixel-as-measure plots points on a 
graph/digital-screen, rather than generating the qualitative change of the whole. 
It must be understood that everything in these installations is actual even if 
everything is not realized -- the frame and series is continually forming. Both the 
camera-image and its spatially correlative twin, the digital-screen, have fixed 
borders established in advance. The frame of the camera-image is static, although 
environmental elements move in and out of it (the installation's connection to the 
Open), as with early cinema cameras, where the movements produced only occur in 
front of the camera. The borders/frame established in these works are neither open 
nor fluid. Fixed borders, such as these, close and delimit what Rodowick would call 
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their dissolution "into a continually changing series of temporal relations. 11300 The 
lack of camera movements into and through space delimits the elements being 
filmed from getting caught up in relations with space, which would constitute the 
relations that would occur by chance with the Open. In mobile shots, borders would 
be continually fluid, dissolving from start to finish and form temporal relations with 
the elements, as they move in space.301 The borders in these live, single-shot works, 
on the contrary, can be experienced only as a fixed and singular series of what 
appears to be a completely homogeneous space. However, even though the frame is 
fixed, the system is open to the world on one end. It is therefore not a completely 
closed system, as it produces movement albeit minimal. The images that result in 
The Spectroscope or Fenlandia occur without shifts in their angles, locations or 
perspectives, but its connection to the Open on one end, produces the variations in 
the images. 
However, being a fixed and continuous transmission system spanning over a 
year, it does not generate any possibilities in the transitions or movements between 
its parts. 1t is a continuous and unvarying transmission system that does not produce 
gaps and interruptions between its parts, and as a result, it does not produce virtual 
relations. There is only one very long uninterrupted channel to contend with. While 
the clouds, fog, movements of the seasons move in and out of the camera-frame, 
they nonetheless enter into the preestablished space set by the camera framing. After 
the calibration of a point-in-space from the camera-image, that point is transmitted 
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to the digital-screen. What is immanent to the Open becomes cut out and 
deterritorialized in the installations, entering into a different relation: the immobile 
space of the camera-frame. Moreover, the fixed position of the camera-frame 
disallows it from getting caught up in the "net" of what Bergson called duree. In 
such a net, the materiality of elements (trees, hills, fog, cats, clouds) would 
constantly move in the flux of life in relation to the mobile/fluid borders of the 
camera-frame. A relationship, a temporal relationship between camera and the Open 
cannot fully occur if the frame remains static. As a consequence, the uniform, 
hierarchical direction from camera-image to digital-screen, produces an experience 
of movement that is limited and partial. The unidirectional relation between the parts 
produces one continuous movement of pixel-accumulation, but this is not real 
movement. 
Establishing a fixed frame with a fixed transmission system reduces the 
temporal relations between the parts (camera~7digital-frame ~7-series) to 
convey a singular, continuous movement of the whole time. This whole is 
established by the homogeneous time of the system (there is no real movement 
among the parts), in addition to the abstract time of the calibrated pixel.302 However, 
duration, according to Bergson, is what divides up, and duration divides constantly, 
presenting heterogeneous movements in time. Such heterogeneous movements in 
time are not differences in degree, but changes in kind; they produce changes in the 
states of duration experienced. Duration, therefore, cannot divide up without 
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changing in kind; duration yields changes in kind precisely in the process of dividing 
up.303 This is why real duration is a qualitative multiplicity. The lack of changes in 
kind in the live installations do not break up duration. On the contrary, the 
continuous transmission over a year, presents a singular, homogeneous movement, 
bringing about a numerical multiplicity. 
In fact, the camera-image, the calibration and transmission of the pixel, the 
digital-screen, the electric current, are the parts arranged in a specific order. Other 
than the unidirectional order between these automated parts, there seems to be no 
real temporal relationships (as a qualitative movement between them), except for 
when the spectator enters the space of the works. The differences that occur within 
each of these works and among them, therefore, may be understood as differences in 
degree, rather than differences in the kind of duration experienced. In Glenlandia 
and Fenlandia, where the varied environmental factors introduce the changes, the 
differences in light intensities, fog, birds and other varied elements surveyed by the 
camera-eye through a fixed frame, present a difference in degree in the value of each 
pixel and no more. With The Spectroscope, these differences are even less because 
the camera is inside a room where there are no environmental changes to speak of. 
The only changes that occur were in the period of light received, its direction and its 
intensity. As a result, the images on the digital-screen are nearly identical to the 
camera-images and to each other. 
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The images that we see on the digital-screen are largely spatial changes -- the 
colourscapes, striations and light intensities -- in frame after frame. While these 
changes produce differences in how the images look, there is a very low degree of 
difference produced in the kind of duration experienced in the series. Throughout 
each series, a pixel is transmitted from one point-in-space in the camera-image to the 
digital-screen. And, because the camera is connected to the Open, the transmission 
may be considered a heterogeneous space. However, while the elements in the 
established space are changing (fog, light, clouds), the space itself is immobile by 
virtue of the fixed frame. We need to consider whether there is movement 
established between the sections.304 Thus, what are the sections, and what is, if any, 
the nature of movement between them? 
The sections are the individual digital-frames, of which there are 
approximately 411 produced over the year. As a new digital-frame begins 
immediately from the top after it reaches the bottom, the movement between them 
occurs in continuous time. Such a continuous time does not produce temporal 
variations (between pasts and futures), making it a homogeneous time. However, 
while the movement of the present is continuous, there is a layer of the recent-past 
underneath. When viewing the digital-screen, we come to perceive the present 
overlaying the past, generating some temporal variation. The touching of the present 
and the recent past produces a low degree of heterogeneity. The spatial variations 
found in the live images occur therefore from two elements. The first is the camera's 
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connection to the Open and the second is from the dynamic layering that occurs 
between the present and recent past. 
We are hard pressed to find the qualitative multiplicity as within L'lntrus. 
L'lntrus, we saw, introduces lines of differentiation from shot to shot, which produce 
differences in kind. A qualitative multiplicity, by which duration or subjectivity is 
defined, Deleuze writes, "plunges [thought] into another dimension, which is no 
longer spatial and is purely temporal. It moves from the virtual to its actualization, it 
actualizes itself by creating lines of differentiation that correspond to differences in 
kind. 11305 Each movement of the film, which is a fragment of time, produces 
continual relations with the outside, producing a heterogeneous time. The shot that 
returns produces a difference in time, plunging thinking into a different dimension. 
The difference experienced from shot to shot moves beyond spatial change to create 
different experiences in time. The temporal movements between pasts and futures 
constantly generate movements of thinking that puts thought into a relationship with 
the virtual. 
In the installations, on the other hand, in the building up of pixels to form a 
whole image, the entirety of time is given. In this whole of time we find that the 
returning image expressed in the digital-frame progresses at the same rate, produces 
the same type of movement and moves in the same direction throughout the series. 
And, although there is a partial connection to the Open, this connection produces 
spatial, rather than a difference in the experience in time. The temporal movement of 
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the installations is uninterrupted, continuous and constant. In the return of what is 
similar, thought is interiorized and there is very minimal connection to the outside. 
The "thin thread" that connects the installations to the Open produces limited 
connections to the virtual. In the uninterrupted durational continuity, the perceived 
instants of time that are the pixels, which collect on the digital-frame become 
predictable and foreseeable. 306 The images aggregating on each digital-frame 
produce the thinking of the same type of movement. Even if we consider the 
touching between the present and the recent past, this identical movement occurs 
continuously over the span of a year and does not vary. This continuous, predictable 
movement does not plunge thinking into different, unexpected dimensions, which is 
critical for producing the movements of thought. 
A continuous whole: a new image of time? 
What I had initially set up as two sets, the camera-frame and digital-screen, we can 
now note to be one system in terms of its temporality. There is a flattening out that 
occurs in this digital transmission arrangement and we can say that the provisional 
two sets are temporally connected to each other to form a single system. The sets 
themselves are spatially separated and have not collapsed into one, but rather, what 
they generate has become the aggregation or accumulation of one continuous whole 
as the temporal relations between the two sets are connected in time. 
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Duration, what changes continually in time, is also the indicator of change 
itself. Duration, correspondingly, is also changed by movement itself. Just as the 
camera-frame remains fixed, the direction of the movement of the whole 
assemblage, from camera to digital-screen, does not change. The various movements 
of the elements are captured in the pixels-forming every second, but capturing does 
not express the relation of a movement occurring between the discrete elements of 
the system itself (camera, pixel, digital-screen, frames). The capturing that occurs is 
a translation, in which the real light conditions prevalent in the landscape are 
converted into the numerical value of that pixel on the camera-image. It is an 
automated, technical application, rather than the generation of something new, 
which would be a transduction.307 Moreover, that pixel on the camera-image is 
electronically copied and transmitted to the digital screen. Capturing, therefore, 
cannot come to express a qualitative change in duration, between part and part that 
produces a change in the whole. 
What we have is a system in which the pixel transmission between the 
camera-image and the digital-screen produces the temporal connection between 
them, making it a continuous whole. The system is fixed and unidirectional and the 
three installations function largely, although not completely, without producing a 
qualitative relation among the parts. As I will discuss below, the installations 
fonction by instantaneous and simultaneous transmission and this is in remarkable 
difference to the time-images in L 'lntrus, which function through seriality. In the 
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time-image, each image is a fragment in time and functions as a part in a continuous 
and heterogeneous series: a succession of variegated events, which work through 
their relations between each other. 
In the time-image movement is produced by way of the relations constituted 
in the virtual moments between the heterogeneous shots/images. Movement, 
thereby, occurs not in the actual images themselves (not in the actual events shown), 
but in the virtual moments of thinking, between shots. Sutton writes that this is 
large! y ,the legacy of Muybridge's construction of the cinemascope, where each 
photogram is a fixed instant in time which, when strung together, produces the 
perception of movement. 308 Thus we should note that movement is not given in 
actual images but produced in perception, between instants of time. 
In order to have real movement therefore, a closed whole cannot be given, 
nor is it giveable. In The Movement-Image, Deleuze points out that when the whole 
is constructed, it is assumed that everything is given.309 But as soon as the whole is 
given eternity is produced. Such images of eternity are captured in the poses of 
sculptures from ancient Greece. Time is timeless and stands still; it is no more. 
Within the totalization of a whole there is no longer any room for real movement 
(between parts) and therefore, for real duration. 
In the Movement-Image, Deleuze points out that philosophers considered that 
the whole was a meaningless notion because it could never be given, nor was it 
giveable. Bergson, however, changed this understanding by saying that the whole is 
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not giveable because it is the Open.310 Because duration changes continually, and 
when we find ourselves in a duration, we may conclude that "there exists somewhere 
a whole which is changing, and which is open somewhere."311 Movement-images, 
which make up the whole, however, are not a closed world, "they are open upon a 
world."312 
In time-images, where the whole is the outside, and therefore never given, 
we experience the movements of bits and pieces, of fragments of time (time-
images ), and in the virtual connections between these bits and pieces, in our 
perception of them, we occasionally receive glimpses of movement. 313 This is real 
movement or pure duration. In the Movement-Image, Deleuze points out that 
'"immobile sections + abstract time' refers to closed sets whose parts are in fact 
immobile sections, and whose successive states are calculated on an abstract 
time."314 Closed sets, therefore, do not produce movement; they are immobile and 
do not open up to the world. With respect to the installations, therefore, while the 
pixel does present an abstract and regulated time, the installations are open at one 
end from the side of the camera, and in being open upon a world, they become "a 
register in which time is being inscribed."315 
Moreover, even while sections may be immobile, movement can be 
established between sections, expressing the changing of the whole. 316 In this 
understanding, the digital systematization that presents the continuous whole of time 
does produce physical movement between the frames. The pixel's transmission from 
203 
camera to digital-screen maps what is happening in the landscape and while the 
systematization is unidirectional and hierarchical, this mapping of movements does 
produce some varying movement on the digital-screen. But while such a mechanized 
conversion from camera-eye to digital-screen maps movements, which change from 
frame to frame, it differs qualitatively from real movement. The movement produced 
is the incremental accumulation of instants. It is a quantitative spatialization of 
pixels as time, as a representation. It does not produce the temporal experiences of 
duration itself, which occur in the virtual movements of thought. While the images 
produce variations in their colours, textures and light intensities from frame to 
frame, we do not experience any significant difference in states of perception or in 
states of consciousness. The actual production of 411 frames (or more) in each 
installation does not produce qualitative changes in states of mind. 
The continuous movement of the pixel from one frame to the next does 
produce a physical change in the images. This is because it follows the same 
identical path of movement. Each frame that forms follows the repetition of the same 
movement at the same rate of progression. The frames resemble each other, the ones 
being formed resemble the previous ones and, as I have suggested, there are some 
variations in terms of their physical make-up. Despite these variations, however, 
each frame is a repetition of the same movement that preceded it. The movement of 
pixels on each frame and between them becomes predictable of future movements. 
Although the pixels accumulate and the image becomes larger, our state of 
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perception remains constant. In this regard we must heed Bergson when he writes 
that real movement is the transference of a state rather than of a thing. 317 
Presentism: simultaneity vs. series 
On another note, transmission to the digital-screens in galleries is instantaneous. In 
each installation, the camera-frame is coordinated both temporally (pixels) and 
spatially (frame) with the digital-screen of a gallery, with the latter frame being 
exponentially larger. Each point on the digital-screen corresponds to its spatial 
equivalent on the camera-image. This is much like the mathematical grid found in 
Renaissance perspective, where the measurements between the landscape/figure and 
the grid drawn on the canvas correspond. 318 It must be noted here however that there 
is a difference between the digital-screen and Renaissance perspective, because the 
latter relied on the peculiarity in our perception of things. In order to accurately 
render forms, artists re-configured objects in space in order to produce what was 
logically real to human perception from the centre of the image's frame. For 
instance, pillars were drawn thicker at the base of buildings becoming narrower at 
the top, rather than accurately rendered as actual forms, as straight pillars. 319 In the 
digital transmission systems, which are automated, representation does not occur 
through the re-configuration of objects in space. What is reproduced is an exact copy 
of the hue, luminosity and intensity of the prevalent environmental conditions in the 
camera-image. Thus, while there is spatial equivalency in Renaissance paintings 
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between the grids overlaying the object and image, the image is manipulated to 
coincide with human perception. 
To draw upon another example, in the Hyperrealist art movement from the 
70s,320 an image from a slide was projected onto a canvas affixed to a wall. The 
image projection, thereby, increased the size of the slide several times, which the 
artist then painted. One result of these paintings was that they became magnified 
copies of the slide-image. The slide and the painted canvas corresponded and related 
to each other in this way. In both, Renaissance perspective and in Hyperrealism, the 
object (landscape or slide) and image (painting), became copies of each other. 
However, in each case they were temporally separated from each other through the 
interstitial moment produced (in the act of rendering) between them. 
In the live digital media pieces, although the camera-image and digital-
screen are not identical reproductions, they are temporally connected. The pixel 
transmits only a micro-section (a point-in-space) of the camera image, the 
accumulation of which forms an image every 21.33 hours. In all three series, while 
the camera-image and digital-screen are spatially separated,321 they are temporally 
connected. They are temporally connected to each other by Bergson's "thin thread" 
which, in this case, is the camera's transmission of pixels to the digital-screen every 
second. While separated by distance, the instantaneity of digital transmissions 
reproduces the conditions prevalent in the imaging of the landscape on the camera-
image. Such an instantaneous transmission is not the same as the seriality or the 
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succession of shots produced in the time-images of cinema. Seriality juxtaposes one 
image with another. The pixels are, on the contrary, a simultaneous reproduction of 
the conditions of the "now" as surveyed by the camera-eye. Within such a 
systematization, I have established that the microseconds between each pixel are not 
humanly perceivable as natural phenomena and that there is no interstice, 
interruption or gap between the parts and the whole of each system: a pixel from the 
camera-image appears to be transmitted instantaneously and seems to be seen 
. 1 1 h d. . 1 322 s1mu taneous y on t e 1g1ta -screen. 
As noted in the previous chapter, virtual states occur in the interruptions and 
interstices between parts, inducing the possibility of changes in states of perception. 
In these live, auto-digital systematizations, because the transmission is instantaneous 
and simultaneous, there are no intervals or interruptions between the parts. This 
continuous, uninterrupted system sets back the production of virtual spaces to a 
minimal, leading to the conclusion that within such continuous, uninterrupted 
systems, there is a reduced production in the movements of thinking and for the 
possibility of newer connections and relations to form. 
In the camera-image, the pixel's numerical value is produced through the 
conversion of actual light conditions in the environment into a mathematical value. 
In the camera-image, each pixel, which is a particular point-in-space, has a particular 
value. This measurement is then instantaneously superimposed onto another frame --
the digital-screen. The pixels's movements across the digital-screen are, therefore, 
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the simultaneous superimposition of points-in-space in time from the camera-image. 
The pixel's movement in time, therefore, comes to measure simultaneities. At point 
X we have hue Y, and from these points-in-space accumulating on the digital screen, 
pixel by pixel, we come to measure time. When we watch the pixel move at the rate 
of 1 pps across the digital-screen, what inevitably occurs is that we end up measuring 
time as a visual, physical representation. The experience of time becomes a 
spatialization. 
Since the transmission of the pixel from camera-image to digital-frame is 
instantaneous and simultaneous, the installations do not produce gaps or interstices 
between the parts. The accumulation of pixels on the digital-screens, frames and 
series, presents a continuous whole in chronometric time. Each pixel is a unit of 
time. It is precisely in the absence of interstices that time can come to be measured 
chronologically, in such a manner. The trajectory of the pixels creates a continuous, 
physical, quantitative movement of the whole. In the installations there are no 
temporal gaps produced in which virtual movements might be generated. As we saw 
in L'lntrus, virtual movements are produced in the interstices and also that interstitial 
time cannot be measured. Heterogeneous movements, in which time bounces 
between pasts and futures, produce virtual spaces in which thought plunges into a 
different dimension. Such virtual movements of time cannot be measured nor can 
they be made measurable visually by plotting simultaneities/points on a graph. 
Points on a chart mark instants in time which, as Deleuze has written, are immobile 
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sections of movement. Movement, which is a mobile section of duration, cannot be 
captured therefore through the plotting of points. 323 
On another related point, Mullarkey writes that within the confines of a 
homogeneous space, there can only be one possible position of an object at any one 
time.324 While the installations do not have a completely homogeneous space, given 
their connection to the Open, they are very minimally heterogeneous. Moreover, all 
the system's parts are unidirectional and fixed. This minimal heterogeneity is one in 
which the pixel is only in one possible position at any given time in its transmission 
from a point-in-space on the camera-image to the grid of the digital-screen. Its fixed 
rate and linear progression means that there is little variability, or even the 
possibility for variation to occur in its movement. To generate virtual possibilities, 
however, a heterogeneous spatio-temporality would need to be produced by way of 
generating different rates in addition to bi/multi directional movements between the 
parts. 
In live projections such as Glenlandia, pasts and futures have almost 
disappeared; only the present condition of the "now" hurling over the recent past 
(the older layer under the new image) is exhibited on the digital-screen. With a 
present unfolding at a constant rate and continually in a singular direction, there can 
be no leaping in time between different pasts and futures, which would bring about 
the virtual movements of thought. The possibility of some virtual movement could 
conceivably be generated, although it would have to be produced in virtue of a 
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singular and fixed perspective of the immediate present overlaying the recent past. 
Such a possibility would be unlikely. 
Having considered the "now" of the installations, the notion of "the" present 
must also be considered carefully. The present, Bergson distinguished, cannot be 
captured as the understanding of conditions that are settled and bounded, and 
therefore must be problematized. Some scholars have erroneously typified Bergson's 
attention to the present as the "ambiguity of the present" or an "indefinite field" or a 
"temporal hole. "325 Notwithstanding these mischaracterizations, Mullarkey writes 
that Bergson wanted to problematize the tendency to homogenize the very 
understanding of what constitutes the present. In problematizing "the" present he 
drew attention to which present was being attended to. Thus, just as a neonate 
endures the span of an hour differently from an adult, we could similarly note that 
the "now" of the installations experienced by diverse spectators would be varied. 
Bergson, therefore, brings attention to the notion of the present, as that which is 
relative and multiple. 326 
The pixel, which is a point-in-space transferred from the camera-image to the 
digital-screen, simultaneously reproduces the conditions of the "now" on the digital-
screen. As its movement across the digital-screen occurs, its rate of progression is 
independent and does not follow the movements occurring in the camera-image. The 
conditions of the "now" are superimposed on the digital-screen as they occur at a 
point-in-space in time. Not only is this superimposition simultaneous, but we 
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inevitably end up counting these simultaneities, in which time becomes a measured 
quality. Each digital-screen/frame is an image, which becomes the measurement of 
time= 21.33 hours. 
With regard to superimposition, Lev Manovich states that in digital 
compositing, concerns with time have become transposed with those of spatiality. In 
celluloid film, which is typically constituted from a simple image (the whole frame), 
the images produce a virtual relation in their juxtapositions to each other. Film, 
therefore, functions through seriality, in which intervals/interstices produce the 
temporal relations of one image to another (of part to part). Whereas film works 
through the series, digitally generated images, including the live transmissions, are 
produced by compositing layers. In digital processes of mixing, images are no longer 
simple images which are juxtaposed to each other. They occur in a multitude of 
combinations: as entirely computer-generated/simulated or as pro-filmic enhanced 
with layers of transparencies, and all within a single image. Thus several layers are 
digitally composited together to make up a single image. 327 Layering, in which the 
different transparencies might have different origins and where concerns lie with 
their seamless blending together (simultaneity), rather than in their juxtaposition 
(series), becomes one of the key techniques distinguishing celluloid from digital 
media. This technique of assemblage, according to Manovich, redefines our concept 
of the moving image. 
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As I have analyzed throughout this chapter, if we consider any single frame 
in any of the three installations, we find that what we no longer have a simple image. 
Each digital-frame is constituted by the superimposition of the "now," which is a 
single point-in-space in time of the camera-image, upon the digital-screen. While the 
demands of these particular installations do not require additional layering, the 
superimposition of the "now" over the recent past on the same frame extended over 
the period of a year, does constitute one. Moreover, the accumulation of pixels as 
instants of time, are seamlessly blended together to form a single image, making up 
each digital-frame. A single digital-frame/image represents 21.33 hours. Each pixel 
transmitted every second, represents a different time on the same image. This type of 
image is complex and different from analog cinema. 
Thus as Timothy Murray comes to inquire in his recent essay, "Time @ 
Cinema's Future," wherein lies the future of new media art?328 With the 
disappearance of the irrational interval and a virtual space, what new is being 
produced here? What, importantly, are the new movements of thinking, what new 
thoughts are being generated in the efficacy of the new digital automaton? I will sum 
up my thoughts on this matter in the concluding paragraphs. 
Difference and repetition 
The material conditions of different technologies give rise to differences in their 
affective and conceptual matter. When changes in material and technological 
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conditions occur, the forms change, bringing subsequent changes in the affective and 
conceptual matter. The technologies of film such as the light-sensitive celluloid 
strip, film-camera, chemical baths, editing, projector and screen, and those of digital 
technologies such as the pixel composition, grids, algorithms, connectivity/circuitry, 
computation, transmission systems, interactive screens, bring about differences in 
the signalectic and sensorial matter. In addition, their differing techniques, such as 
juxtaposing/seriality and simultaneity/compositing, to name one, present differences 
in their forms. Differences in the sensorial matter, therefore, point to differences in 
the technological materiality, techniques and forms of the image. In philosophically 
considering analog and digital technologies and their relations, significant 
conceptual differences begin to emerge. The material conditions give rise to visual, 
sensorial, affective matter, presenting differences in the conditions for thinking each 
medium and technology. 
In repeating my inquiry on the type of duration produced in live, single-
channel, automechanized digital installations, different formal elements seem to 
emerge: numerical multiplicity, spatiality, continuity, presentism, instantaneity and 
simultaneity. This newer type of matter brings along implications as to what their 
conceptual differences from analog film might be. However, this line of argument 
has been contested on grounds of medium specificity, namely that film is not a 
specific medium, as it cannot be understood to have an essential quality. This 
statement supposes (correctly) that what film is and does cannot be defined as such, 
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as its fluid understanding displaces any limitations imposed upon it. And since film 
has the potential to be and operate in myriad ways, it cannot be pinned down to be a 
specific medium. Its conceptual difference to digital media would therefore be 
ineffective. 
For instance, the medium of film has typically been defined in different 
ways, including as Carroll has written, as having no medium specificity. 329 
Nevertheless, as I have argued throughout this chapter, there are significant 
differences in the production of analog and digital images. In order to be able to 
consider and acknowledge these differences, I will need to differ to Rodowick's 
suggestion that it should be possible to invoke the concept of a medium in ways that 
do not reduce film to an essentialism. 330 
While pursuits in film have historically been variegated by way of the 
different uses of materials, formal styles, movements, hybridizations and 
trajectories, an idea of a medium that is flexible needs to be preserved. These 
differences need to be acknowledged while also affirming certain common 
properties and a history of practices, which allow it to be labeled so. The use of the 
word "film" itself allows its differentiation from other forms such as sculpture, 
painting or music. Allowing for its plural and flexible practices is key while also 
desisting medium-specificity or essentialism. In light of Rodowick's arguments, I 
take analog celluloid-film as being a different medium but which is to be understood 
as non-essentialist. 331 
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Moreover, while traditional filmmaking is a technology and has several 
techniques, (camera or camera-less, filmic or film-less) it is also a particular albeit, 
non-essentialist, medium. Digital technology, on the other hand, cannot be 
understood as a medium unless, as Rodowick deliberates, computers are a medium. 
It is a technology whereby different media come to be processed, in what Manovich 
writes is, "a media synthesizer and manipulator."332 Digital technologies process 
data in which "computerization turns media into computer data."333 Hence, music 
can be numerically manipulated and algorithmically converted into visual data; 
emotional quotients converted into paintings; and random words selected from the 
world wide web into poetry. In the case of Collins's installations, environmental 
conditions were numerically converted into pixel values, which then became digital-
images. Digital technology, among other aspects, is the computational process 
whereby all analogical data such as light or sound can be converted into numerical 
values and bits of information. This information can then be infinitely manipulated 
and changed into other forms of data. As Rodowick writes,"[ d]igital practices call 
for transformation, dissemination, recontextualization, and even transmutation into 
other kinds of perceptual outputs."334 
According to Rodowick's argument, then, analog and digital technologies 
need differentiation and cannot be lumped into the supercategory of "moving 
images," which he charges Carroll of doing. 335 The issue of whether analog and 
digital technologies, which have different material conditions, produce similar or 
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dilfferent types of images, is also one of the inquiries of this chapter. In light of this 
integration/separation, two aspects need attention: the first that distinction between 
analog and digital technologies must be maintained in order to understand the 
specific types of images they generate. And, second, since digital technologies 
produce newer types of images, there is also a newer type of signalectic matter. As I 
have tried to show, the two differ ontologically. This second aspect is crucial if we 
are to distinguish digital images from analog ones given that Rodowick, Manovich 
and Steigler draw the ill-favored connection between informatics and digital 
technologies, with Steigler linking information systems with worlds of art. 336 
Whereas cinema's materiality has usually included a camera, celluloid film, 
projector and screen, it has always been understood to be "moving images," even if 
in certain films movement was not apparent, notably in Chris Marker's La Jetee 
(Jl 962). 337 As Carroll writes, what cinema needs to show is the possibility of 
movement, and this it does. However, if we are going to affirm Rodowick's 
suggestion of keeping digital and analog-film technologies distinct, it is unclear what 
the moving images of digital technologies might be referred to. As noted in my 
examination of Collins' s installations, the accumulation of instants on a screen, in 
the form of pixels, is very different from real movement that produces real duration. 
Complexifying the issue further, Rodowick questions whether digital images 
are even images in the conventional sense. Produced by transmission systems that 
convey information-data, they are akin to signals rather than images. A celluloid 
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film image, in particular; is a whole image, ontologically different from a digital 
image, which is produced from pixels and scanning rates. On the other hand 
Rodowick writes that numerical data, which make up a digital image, have no 
physical presence. This aspect has been contested by Marks in Touch (2002) where 
she asserts the materiality of the electron in digital technology. 338 In light of these 
fundamental differences in the image's make-up, digital images are ontologically 
different from analog-film images. The digital image returns as difference to the 
analog image. 
There is also one more difficulty that rears its head and this difficulty is with 
respect to nomenclature. The use of a category such as "film" designates its 
institutional, conceptual and formal practices. "Film," therefore, is more than merely 
semantics; there is a material and therefore a formal and conceptual difference 
between film and digital film/media. In the absence of a clear distinction between 
"celluloid film" and "digital film" in common parlance, it is unclear how one may 
proceed with respect to the movement of digital images. What is movement in 
digital images? As I have examined, the movement that occurs takes place through 
the spatialization of time. And this is not real movement. As filmmaker Babette 
Mangolte asks, "[ w ]hy is it difficult for the digital image to communicate 
duration ?"339 
If cinema is to be considered as the movement of images arising from the 
projection of a celluloid film-strip on a screen, then the "movement" of digital 
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images in the installations have been understood as the accumulation of numerical 
data. Moreover, in "digital film," it is supposed that movement arises from 
computer-generated algorithms, which Rodowick claims is erroneous. He writes, 
"movement through virtual space is badly characterized as a mobile frame, for it is 
not a record of movement through physical space, but a synthesis of motion 
perspective according to the criteria of perceptual realism. Indeed nothing moves, 
nothing endures in a digitally composed world. The impression of movement is 
really just an impression - the numerical rotation and transformation of geometrical 
t::lements."340 
In order to resolve this conundrum institutional production, populist 
understanding and sometimes scholarship revert to a short-hand, in which the two 
types of movement remain equivalent and undistinguished. This circumstance, 
which is problematic, will nonetheless have to suffice, until a better terminology 
evolves. "Digital films," at least for now, will have to be considered "cinema." The 
understanding of cinema -- institution, form, concept -- will from necessity have to 
become fluid, moving between celluloid-analog and digital-technologies. 
The signalectic matter from digital technologies will be seen to produce 
cinematic forms, which may alternatively be referred to as cinematics. Cinematic 
material will include moving images, be they constituted from celluloid or digital 
technologies. Thus, while undesirable, it remains unclear whether Susan Collins's 
digital installations might fall into the "cinematic" category. What seemingly 
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appears to be the temporal movement of the work, especially the durational 
unfolding of the images, needs to be problematized, even if it is to be subsumed 
under the supercategory of"moving-images." Along this vein, what is cinematic 
would therefore include the vast number of experimentations in durational works in 
digital media including varied artists such as Eijah Liisa Ahtila, Stan Douglas, Sam 
Taylor Wood, Bill Viola, or even James Campbell. However, while this imposed 
understanding that digital technologies produce "cinema" may be applied, I will 
nonetheless keep the two technologies distinct in the fifth chapter as part of my 
examination also dwells on questions of difference in the perception of signalectic 
matter. 
Conclusion 
When one initially encounters the digital timescapes there is some recognition that 
the piece is about something unfolding on the digital-screen. A pixel forming and 
being transmitted every second to the digital-screen draws our attention to 
movements that we come to perceive as a flow of pixels. The formation of a pixel 
every second phenomenologically comes to resemble a moving line or a data-flow of 
some sort, in which one might be able to decipher a landscape. This decoding 
depends on which stage of the digital-screen one enters the piece.341 Being 
processual, one is immediately drawn to the systematic progression of each pixel, 
which at some point in time would come to be recognized as a present. The 
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movement of the pixels transit across the screen overlaying the image that came 
before. In this overlay, the old and new continually touch each other in what is the 
newly formed present of each new pixel. 
The set-up, where the recent past and present coexist on the same screen and 
come into relation with each other, produces an extraordinary visual effect in which 
the present seems to be forging ahead to erase the recorded past. In this temporal 
flow there is one single movement in the installation, where the disappearing past 
appears to be devoured by a rapacious "now." Its presence, which is also inscribed 
and material, will in tum be swallowed. What is emerging now is expected to be 
eroded by what will come in the immediate future, which imparts an ephemeral and 
intangible quality to the passing present. Nonetheless, this movement, which occurs 
continuously throughout the duration of the installation, generates predictability in 
the temporal movements. 
As the spectator stands and gazes at the screen there is a certain insight that 
there is an unfolding of a "now" being transmitted from an "elsewhere," as its past is 
being erased simultaneously. There are two presents unfolding concurrently, of the 
landscape and of the spectator's. In this fundamental encounter with the work, both 
presents overlap and unfold simultaneously, producing a contingency; herein lies the 
heterogeneity of the installations. 
One finds that upon closer examination, the flowing movement of a line is a 
succession of pixels forming every second. There is some recognition that the piece 
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is about the flow of time that comes to be designated by the second-by-second 
movement of the pixels. We must come to note two important aspects here that time 
is conceived visually as a flow of pixels, and as time comes to be visually recorded 
on a screen, it becomes represented and subsequently, spatialized. What we have is a 
visual translation in which time becomes spatialized in the movement of pixels 
across the canvas. Contemporary digital media images in recording, mapping and 
tracking data flows, in the attempt to capture what is temporality, shift the relation of 
time to space. Temporal relations, in which duration is experienced/experiential 
(virtual) as that which divides continually, comes to be displaced by a continuous 
trajectory of (actual) instants ohime. What appears to be about time becomes a 
spatialization, through the accumulation of recorded data (as pixels in this case) on 
the digital-screen, which is then archived. 
Works such as Glenlandia and Fenlandia, which survey a given 
environment, or other process-oriented art works, which map the flows of data 
transmissions, or listening posts, which count specific words/ phrases used over the 
internet, are all works that offer the translation of data in varied forms. In The 
Spectroscope, the actual light conditions from the environment serve as raw data, 
which is converted to the numerical value of pixels in the camera-image. Pixels, 
which are the points-in-space on one grid, are then transmitted to another. In this 
uninterrupted mapping and tracking of movements in the environment, duration, 
which is constantly dividing and interrupting, becomes reduced to the continuous, 
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uninterrupted singularity of the present. Duration, on the other hand, produces the 
heterogeneous movements of time, creating the virtual movements of thought, which 
affect and change other pasts and futures. The conversion of light conditions into an 
actual value of the pixel, which is transmitted to another screen and then 
accumulates, produces a translation in which the change that occurs in the whole is 
numerical rather than qualitative. Variations in the colourscapes, textures and 
luminosity produce differences of degree in the actual images, rather than produce 
transference in the states of being. 
Moreover, the temporal relations between the relative past and the present 
occur as spatial relations, conceived as a visual representation. What in L'lntrus 
becomes the transduction between world and mind remains invisible. What we have 
here is the continuous and instantaneous translation of data transmitted into an actual 
visual record of time. Time is information. The digital-screen becomes the visible 
record of the material conditions, rather than being more than such actual conditions. 
As Lev Mano vi ch asserts, the introduction of the computer produces a paradigm 
change from concerns with time to those of space.342 
This displacement of temporality by spatiality also informs an understanding 
of the relations between the visible and invisible. The contemporary form of art is 
the art of the visible, where all the material aspects of the image come to be 
celebrated. In the materiality of the visible, and in the visibility of its material 
production, Ranciere writes, "the essence of the image [is] guaranteed by the very 
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mode of its material production. "343 The transmission and recording of all details 
over the period of a year seeks to bring us a total movement, attempting to make 
visible all aspects of the landscape's spatio-temporality. But as mentioned earlier, as 
soon as the whole of time is given, eternity is produced. Movement in time occurs 
only when that totality is withheld. It is not ironic then that many critics introduce 
live new-media works on duration by referring to them as being "timeless. "344 That 
timelessness is experienced is precisely because such works do seek to present the 
totalization of time, and such a totality is less effective in presenting real movements 
between the parts, which produce duration. As Deleuze wrote, the eternal poses of 
classical Greek sculpture present a sense that they are "timeless." But when time is 
timeless it is no more. 
In movement-images, the whole is achieved through the physical movement 
of images. Shots (parts) affect and change others to form a qualitative whole. The 
movement of shots relate to the logic of an inside with respect to plot and narrative. 
Causes give rise to effects, and actions produce reactions in the protagonist, 
producing the sublime relations of the narrative whole. While movement-images 
produce the physical movements of images to make up the organic whole, time-
images produce the virtual movements of thought, bringing thought into an 
encounter with the outside. The whole, in time-images, is the outside. Each shot, 
which is a fragment of time, arises from the outside and it is only in the links 
between them, in the cracks and fissures that the virtual movements of thought 
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occur. Here we occasionally receive glimpses of movement in our perception of 
them. 345 This is real movement or pure duration. What occurs in them remains 
unsaid and invisible. 
The pixels, on the other hand, are the actual physical representation of 
instants of time.346 Instants of time are immobile points charted on a digital screen 
and do not produce real movement. Their accumulation at a particular rate and 
direction produces images that vary in their colours, hues and textures but qualitative 
movement cannot be charted by plotting points on a digital screen. They produce a 
numerical multiplicity in which the whole changes, but only through the 
accumulation of points. While they present the actual whole, the experience of 
duration cannot be reduced to spatialization in images. The continuous, actual whole 
produces few interruptions or gaps reducing its connections to the virtual, which 
would produce the transference of states in duration. Because the installations are 
the accumulation of instants at a set rate, which proceed in a single direction, the 
type of movement produced does not lead to real duration. 
The facticity of the world is revealed in its technicity and expression, where 
the structures of technological organization and utterance become a system of 
references, which construct the significance of the world. 347 The recording and 
transmission of data and information by computerization constitutes the facticity of 
the contemporary world, whereby informatics and art come more and more 
frequently into a convergence with each other by way of their organizational 
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tendencies, functionalism and mechanics. The facticity of the pixel moving across 
the digital-screen in Fenlandia carries with it the informational present and the 
anticipation of what is to come. Yet we understand that in its coming is also its 
predictability, a repetition which occurs without difference. That is, the pixel's 
mechanization and formation converts what is indeterminate to what is determinable 
in the constitution of the possibilities that creates works of art. As Stiegler writes, 
"Facticity, understood as what makes possible the attempt to determine the 
indeterminate ... forms the existential root of calculation. 11348 
Since the continuing integration of computerization in public and private life 
in the last two decades or so, we have come to see that the forces of calculation 
organized by facticity have become an essential trait of technics. This force of 
calculation comes to permeate, designate and form the organizing principles of 
certain types of digital media artworks which survey environments, map the flows of 
information, track positions of objects and individuals and chart trajectories. The 
essence of art and thinking becomes suffused with worlds of calculation, yielding a 
ma thesis universalis. 349 These worlds of calculation, information and data 
transmission enter into relations with thought and thought of the world itself draws 
upon predictability and what is actualizable. Predictability, by surveying, tracking 
and mapping, determine actual movements in space and time and comes to reduce 
the virtual possibilities in the connections, relations and intensities between two 
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things. This virtual dimension that enters into the relation between two objects is 
displaced by the continuous flow of information in data transmission systems. 
Tracking, mapping and charting information streams is an endless activity, 
an on-going dispersionary process that Deleuze writes, distinguishes Foucault's 
nineteenth century disciplinary society from its contemporary form. This 
contemporary form is the corporatization of society, which has produced various 
"societies of control." In the societies of control, the image of the mole is displaced 
by the serpent and the language of the individual and enclosure is replaced by 
dividuals and codes. Whereas in disciplinary society the production of goods was 
constituted through what was a definable quantity, such a capitalism of production is 
now being replaced with a capitalism of the product -- where there is an endless 
marketability of commodities in the derivative flows of the stockmarket. He writes, 
"the family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer the distinct analogical 
spaces that converge towards an owner --- state or private power -- but coded figures 
-- deformable and transformable -- of a single corporation that now has only 
stockholders. Even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the Open 
circuits of the bank."350 Live-art productions, which chart the free-floating 
movements of environmental factors and track fields of activity, enter into a 
mapping of presents. These works surf on what is the relentless generation of the 
present where perpetual data streams modulate its processural flows, which come to 
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be exhibited in major galleries. This new image of the "perpetual now" displaces the 
generation of what is concentrated and discontinuous. 
In addition to this displacement of concentrated analogical spaces to the free-
floating modulation of numerical ones, the digital autopresentation of pixel 
movements produces another displacement, from memories transducing pasts and 
futures to what contains the information of the present. Ranciere writes, 
"information is not memory. It is not for memory that it accumulates; it labours only 
for its own profit. And this profit is that everything is immediately forgotten for the 
affirmation of the sole abstract truth of the present and that it affirms its power as the 
only thing up to this truth. The reign of the informational present rejects out of hand, 
as unreal, what is other than homogeneous process and what's indifferent to its 
autopresentation. "351 The truth of only the present jeopardizes virtual connections to 
pasts and futures, impairing the imaginative possibilities produced in the movements 
of thinking. Dwelling in the perpetual and simple present diminishes the invention 
and fabulation of what are futures to come, or of people and places that have been. 
In trying to arrive at a conclusion therefore, I would need to ask along with 
Murray, whether live single-channel productions such as those in discussion produce 
what is the unthinkable.352 Is Deleuze's material automatism of images, which he so 
lauded in his cinema books, capable of producing thought from the outside in new 
media works such as these? With the disappearance of the interval, what new is 
being produced here? As Murray expresses, "wherein lies the 'future' in the art of 
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new media? ... Might there be a way in which informatics combines with the artistic 
performance of the digital archive to reinvigorate the placeholder of the 'future' 
itself, particularly in relation to the complexification of its informational present?"353 
This very important and difficult question can only be addressed through specific 
works, which might allow moments of complexification of their informational 
present. 
A key aspect of coming to terms with a work of art would be in how one 
comes to meet or experience what is the fundamental force of an encounter with the 
work. One would need to ask therefore, whether the fundamental force encountered 
in any work, including Glenlandia, Fenlandia or The Spectroscope, presents an 
impression of recognition, a sensation that allows an understanding of its processes, 
or if it presents an analogy. Does it work upon an understanding between the 
faculties, which unites them into recognition of something? In these works do I find 
myself recognizing the connections presented? Or, on the other hand, does a work 
leave my faculties in pieces, in disarray, in bafflement, and do I, on the contrary, 
encounter an intensity that forces me to think new connections and relations? Do 
these works take my faculties to their limits, where I am called to search beyond any 
solutions reserved in my memory? Do I need to go beyond my particular memory in 
coming towards what I feel and sense? 
Live single-channel med_ia works such as the ones I have examined, it 
appears, generate a moderate capacity for the virtual movements of thoughts. For 
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one, the pixel's transmission from one grid to another, its rate of movement across 
the digital screen, its accumulation, which produces images, is not an identical print 
generated from the camera-image but rather a complexification of the present. The 
grids, while spatially separated are temporally connected by a single point-in-space. 
Each image/digital-frame is the accumulation of instants in time, and most 
impressively, even while the progression of the pixels remains fixed and the 
structural composition is static, the images produced are variations. The varying 
textures and colours in the images are generated by virtue of the installations' s 
connection to the Open. 
Thus, on the one hand, we have a translation in which light is converted into 
the pixel's value, but on the other hand, because the transmission is a micro transfer 
of points-in-space, we do not have an identical reproduction. The images produced 
on the digital-screen resemble the landscape, but are not exact copies. In the case of 
The Spectroscope, however, the limited environmental changes produce fewer 
variations from the camera-image. This translation process produces a resemblance, 
and the degree of the digital-image's resemblance to the landscape is dependent on 
the varying environmental conditions, which generate the differences in each frame. 
Each digital-frame comes to present original and spectacular visuals, preserving the 
singularities in the ebb and flow of matter, which it receives from the environment. 
Thus we have the changes occurring in the environment, but because the 
organizational set up of the apparatus is fixed, it delimits environmental interaction 
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with it and therefore a temporal relation. By virtue of instantaneous simultaneities, 
from camera-image to digital screen, a nearly homogeneous time is produced. Since 
there are no differential movements among the parts and there is only the 
aggregation of pixels on the digital-screen, real movement is not generated. The 
continuous, uninterrupted movement of each installation does not produce real 
duration. 
The automechanization connects the installations to the Open, but only on 
one side and in one direction. They connect with the Open but only as the receptacle 
of those changes occurring within the environment. Given their connections and 
circuitry, they are unable to interact or produce a relation of movement to it. The 
fixed camera-framing, singular direction, fixed transmission rate, linear progression 
and the continuous time of the whole system, remains unchanging. In a preset 
system such as the installations, the parts generate the same movements, which are 
repeated in the production of each frame. The variations in the images occur, 
therefore, by a predetermination in their structure. But because the system is 
connected to the Open at one end, the images that occur produce a partial difference 
by virtue of being dependent on the changes produced in the environment. 
Does this partial difference produce the capacity for generating thought from 
the outside? What connects the installation to the Open occurs through a thin thread: 
the fixed camera-gaze overlooking the landscape. The installation therefore provides 
the capacity for thought from the Open, but it is severely restrained as the camera 
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does not interact with the environment and also because the installation's circuitry 
continues in only one direction. This movement therefore is caught in what becomes 
anticipated and what is predictable. Such a movement sweeps thoughts into a 
particular direction, circumscribed to the movement of one kind -- the movement of 
the present. This movement of the present, I have tried to note, is also the moment of 
actualization, in which connections to the virtual are diminished as the movements 
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Chapter Four 
Conceptualizing Cinematic Folds 
lliltroduction 
There exists only what is perceived. 
--Deleuze355 
From considering interstitial aporias and temporal continuity in the previous two 
chapters, I will now move to the concept of the fold, to examine duration in media. 
Unlike the interstice, which is an actual, material fissure between two things/shots, 
the fold is an ontological process by which perception of the world produces the 
impression of things in the mind. Folding is something that occurs in the mind, in 
which the virtual relations between the actual objects/fields occur in a free and open 
time. The fold that occurs, therefore, is between the actual, material world and (the 
real, virtual) mind. In considering the metaphysics of the fold, I will attempt to show 
how the duration experienced in the encounter of a media object occurs in the 
folding among objects/fields. In the context of cinema, I have referred to this folding 
among objects/fields as cinematic folding, which gives rise to a free and open virtual 
time. Cinematic folding therefore gives rise to the movement of time between pasts 
and futures, experienced outside the chronometric measurement of seconds, minutes 
or hours. This time is what Deleuze has called aionic time. 
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The metaphysics of the fold offers a framework that stretches and expands 
beyond what is traditionally considered to be filmic. Folding not only includes the 
folding among phenomena that traditionally constitute film but also, more 
expansively, that film phenomena continue into the world as much as the world 
continues in them. Such a framework conceptualizes how an image of the world can 
come to tremble in the mind and proceed into the different worlds of science, 
philosophy and art. In order to conceive this constant flow between images and 
mind, we should take into account that there are infinite force fields between 
them. 356 Corresponding to tremors in science, which echo in art and philosophy, 
vibrations in film resonate in worlds of painting and poetry. Indeed as Gilles 
Deleuze has said, "[t]here is no work that doesn't have its beginning or end in art 
forms."357 
In order to conceptualize the virtual time of the fold as the framework of this 
chapter, I will begin by considering Andrei Tarkovsky's film Mirror (1975). This 
work may be characterized as including flows of the auricular/musical, the literary 
and the painterly, which are fields that fold into and out of each other in the film. 
What is musical, literary or painterly, however, are the fields that enfold the film, in 
that they continue and extend beyond it or for that matter, what is filmic. In the 
extension and continuity of folding beyond a particular film, they arise and pass 
through a film. Their flows emerge from an outside, continue and then disappear 
from films into other territories. 
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In conceptualizing the cinematic as also occurring from fields that extend 
beyond it, from an outside, I will move beyond the traditional duality of the inside-
outside relations between film and world. That is, I will question the traditional 
duality in which perception occurs specifically in relation to the images being 
perceived. The interiority of the film's plot and narrative, specific to its diegesis, 
should be understood now as being open and fluid with the outside.358 Such a 
thought will allow me to examine what the cinematic is beyond the interiority of the 
film-image's actual visibility, which is frequently delimited to the serial movement 
of film frames. Moreover, I suggest that what is cinematic not only includes the 
virtual movements between actual images, but also that these virtual movements are 
asynchronous, in that they fold between the images of the film and those of the 
world, as they occur in the mind. In Mirror, for instance, Leonardo da Vinci's 
drawings and Bach's music generate a kinetic force in which the character, Alexei, 
as well as the spectator, come to reflect on the works themselves, and not merely as 
they relate to the film itself. 
The twisting and folding that takes place among the fields occurs through 
that which is impalpable between them. These indiscernible movements, for 
instance, between the musical and painterly, are the virtual movements occurring in 
the mind. These virtual movements I will consider to be the invisible spectrum of the 
perceptible. It is in this virtual time moving between different fields and terrains that 
duration of media events is experienced. Duration, thereby, should be understood as 
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occurring in the lived time of media events, in which pasts and futures come to fold 
and unfold in the perception of matter. 
Incipient to the fold is the curvilinear line. This curvilinear line is the line of 
movement and of perspectivism, which occurs between two fields in hyperbolic or 
curved space. The curvilinear line is therefore the line that emerges from the folding 
among micro fields such as sound, light, movement or matter, which swirl around in 
hyperbolic space. These micro fields of matter are the genetic elements of the 
image. 359 Micro fields of the genetic elements produce tiny micro foldings among 
them in the experience of sensory data. Micro foldings of micro matter generate 
sense perception of tiny inklings that are barely perceptible. Upon aggregation, 
however, micro perceptions become stronger perceptions, in which inklings develop 
into the clarity of ideas. What was initially obscure becomes clearer in perception. 
Micro perceptions, therefore, stretch out to become the larger, macro surfaces of 
thoughts and consciousness. I will examine micro perceptions in chapter four and 
then move on to macro perceptions in chapter five. The two chapters will therefore 
have an extensive relation to each other, in that they move conceptually from an 
examination of micro foldings and micro perceptions in Tarkovsky' s Mirror to 
macro foldings and macro perceptions between media events in the next chapter. 
I will undertake a multifaceted approach to this chapter on Tarkovsky's 
Mirror, moving between empiricism and theoretical examination. For the first I will 
engage in an inquiry of molecular processes, studying how the genetic elements of 
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the image come to behave on curvilinear surfaces. This study rests on Deleuze's The 
Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988/1993), which in tum draws upon Leibniz's 
study of the monad; it would be accurate to state therefore that the empirical work I 
undertake stems from an intertwining of my own observations of the film and also 
from Deleuze's Leibniz and monadology. At their micro level, I will track the 
genetic elements of the cinematic image as they fold and unfold in time, where the 
forces of compression come to mold the image in particular ways. From these minor 
folds I will present an impression of the semi-large mezzo folds in .Mirror among 
sense perceptions, of what is becoming painterly, musical and poetical. Such an 
understanding will allow me to present the relations between the micro forces of the 
genetic elements and how they come to shape the larger mezzo movements of the 
film in the workings of a hyperbolic geometry. In the following chapter I will sketch 
out the larger macro folds among media events from these mezzo folds. 
The theoretical aspect of this chapter will trace the relation between the 
continuous force fields between images and mind in which I will draw upon a 
discussion of matter and perception. Such a discussion will include Henri Bergson's 
ontology of images, in which the whole world is understood to be a set of images. 
Rather than being treated as discrete orders, matter and perception will be 
understood as continuous flows that resemble each other. Bergson's ontology, which 
sets out to overcome some of the major impasses in western philosophy between 
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dualisms such as inside-outside, subject-object or mind-matter, will be of critical 
importance in my consideration of cinematic folding in this chapter and the next one. 
In Mirror, the painterly, literary and musical fields fold into and out of each 
other, where it is not possible to know where each begins or ends. Moreover, the 
fields extend beyond that which is Mirror, their flows arising from and disappearing 
into the outside. The interstice's aporia or disjunction between images now becomes 
a continuing topological line which folds between two fields, the distinction between 
the two occurring in the continuous line. Whereas the interstice is a broken line, the 
fold carries out the continuous movement of a line that travels between different 
fields. This topological movement connects fields into continuously greater and 
greater unbroken wholes. Cinematic folds therefore form by interlocking 
connections between micro fields of light, sound, matter and movement in time. The 
folds between micro fields aggregate into larger fields, making up the painterly, 
poetic, or musical. The folds between these larger fields, as we will see in chapter 
five, extend towards the differentials between media-events and to the socius itself, 
ultimately enfolding the entire world. The folding of matter in perception produces 
continuous duration. 
Leibniz's aesthetics of curvature therefore undoes the Cartesian-Euclidean 
geometry, which offers a flat space and a grid-structure. Within a grid-structure the 
absolute clarity of perception becomes possible in which objects are separable, 
distinct and perceived through the abstract unity of rational cognition. In the 
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aesthetics of curvature, on the other hand, bodies are fluid, indistinct and 
inseparable. 360 It allows for levels of transparencies in perception generated between 
the continual movements of micro and macro perception. 361 In the perception of a 
temporal media object light, sound, movement and matter begin to undulate in time. 
Matter on a hyperbolic plane is not perceived through a stable frame or as being 
distinctly clear. Rather, a temporal object is perceived fluidly, as it folds and unfolds 
between obscure and distinct perceptions. Perception is fluid, generating the 
continual movements of thinking. Levels of perception give rise to thresholds of 
thought in that obscure perceptions produce unclear thinking and distinct perceptions 
give rise to clear thought. What generates the fold between image and mind occurs 
through the level of perception of the material image (whether strong or weak), 
which folds into thresholds of virtual thought (obscure-clear). The fold between 
image and mind, thereby, occurs in the perception of things, giving rise to the virtual 
time of duration in media events. 
In The Fold, Deleuze also develops the point of view that minute infinite 
perceptions are formed in relationship to the molecular movements of bodies in 
hyperbolic, curvilinear space. This idea, drawn from Leibniz's vision of differential 
geometry, is one in which the curved line traverses and cuts through all matter. The 
entire universe undergoes curvilinear transformation in virtue of the multitude of 
microscopic particles swirling through the universe, imbibing matter with active 
forces. 362 The world conceived in a hyperbolic curved space brings forth an infinite 
244 
series of curves and inflections in which an inflection is the elastic point and 
therefore, an ideal genetic element of the variable curve or of a fold. 363 Within an 
infinity of curves, each curve is a unique variable, and enclosed within each curve 
resides a unique point of view. Each of these points of view or inflections generate 
the plurality of perspectives, an infinite diversity of subjectivity in the varied fields 
stretched across any scientific, philosophical or artistic endeavour. 364 
A hyperbolic geometry therefore presents multiple perspectives, which 
include the infinite points of inflection and refraction on a curved surface. A curved 
surface is a transpositional space that no longer presents a central or unified point as 
in a grid or on a flat surface; on the contrary, its curvilinear surface reflects and 
refracts the endless movement of unreal and distorted hyperbolic planes. As 
Henderson and Krauss write, in early twentieth century art movements, the 
aesthetics of a hyperbolic, non-Euclidean geometry presented a new sense of 
modernism. Cubism, for instance, dislodged realism, rationality and the perspective 
of a centered world, offering worlds that were distorted, fragmented and decentered 
instead. 365 
I will begin this chapter by developing the notion of a hyperbolic space 
further, in which I will situate cinema and specifically, Tarkovsky's film, Mirror. I 
start by laying out the micro fields of the image, which fold and unfold in time. This 
folding and unfolding in perception occurs through the intermodularity between the 
senses. The image, it is to be noted, is a dynamic field of experience in perception, 
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which modulates in time. Images, moreover, rather than being in stable states are to 
be understood as indeterminate as they are in states of becoming as they fold and 
unfold from different territories. Rather than being delimited by either their mental 
or material ontological status, they rove anywhere from conceptual to visual to 
haptic or sonorous forms, filling up the world as they extend, bend and return from 
one territory to another. In these movements we can already perceive changes in the 
status of images from being to becoming in the world. This becoming is constituent 
to the activity of micro perceptions, which oscillate between the levels of sensations 
experienced. Strong sensations give rise to distinct thoughts and weak sensations 
give rise to unclear thoughts. In a hyperbolic curvilinear space, therefore, the 
continual movement of micro perceptions produces layers and layers of 
transparencies, as perception continually moves between the two poles of distinct 
and indistinct sensations, which give rise to clarity and ambiguity in thought. These 
states are different to the clarity, definitiveness, discontinuities and discreteness 
constructed in the workings of a Cartesian-Euclidean geometry. 
Towards curvilinear, hyperbolic spaces 
In a hyperbolic geometry the curvature between two dynamic fields, such as sound 
and light in film, is conceptualized differently from a Euclidean geometry of space. 
By virtue of the bending surface of a hyperbolic space, the perception of objects in 
the world is connected to an undulating body unfolding in time. Such a body may be 
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characterized as having an elastic surface and also as being more fluid than the hard, 
stable and finite body of Euclidean geometry. 366 The elastic and plastic curvature of 
a body undulating in time is not absolutely definable and neither is it starkly discrete 
from others. Instead, it should be understood as being continuous with what it 
envelopes or what envelopes it, generating a curved surface between them. In a 
hyperbolic curved space, bodies cohere with other bodies making them continuous, 
fluid and mobile in their contact, in which they fold amongst each other. 
I will trace this continuous movement between bodies enfolding each other 
in my consideration of the image in Mirror in which I will track how the musical, 
literary and painterly fold into each other. At their micro level fluvia or a multitude 
of molecules fold and gather into each other forming bodies. The aggregation of tiny 
molecules, swell into larger surfaces, these larger bodies making up the mezzo folds. 
Micro surfaces aggregate and fold into greater expansive bodies, which in tum fold 
to make up the vast curvilinear surfaces of the world and universe. A larger body, 
therefore, is made up from the aggregation of molecular matter. 
However, in keeping with the continual movement of universal molecular 
flows I will also need to consider micro forces, which apply pressure and change the 
forms of bodies. Micro forces transform unformed elastic matter into shapes, 
surfaces and bodies, molding and transforming matter into the elastic architectures 
of the different media events. These micro forces are "plastic forces" that traverse all 
bodies, including media practices and conceptual spaces. They are to be understood 
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as being material, mechanical and conceptual. The intensity of pressure exerted by 
micro forces, be they mechanical or conceptual, therefore, changes the shapes and 
surfaces of media bodies, affecting the folds being produced between them. The 
forces applied to a body not only change that body, which is plastic, but also 
produces its relational change in another body. For instance, the level oflight-
intensity produced in an image will not only make an image brighter or darker, but 
also induce a differential of relations with other images which succeed it in a filmic 
sequence. Micro forces generating a lightness or heaviness in the image produce 
micro sensations which, upon aggregation, take on a "shapelikeness, "367 becoming 
the larger bodies of, for instance, poetic gesture. Thus micro forces give shape to 
images along a continuum, effecting changes in the structuring of bodies as well as 
enabling changes in the direction of their flow. 
Just as bodies fold into each other forming greater wholes, we must also note 
that bodies fold into perception, in which perceiver and perceived form a relation of 
what becomes that greater whole. 368 As I will show in more detail in the next 
chapter, perception, or the point from which a view becomes available, forms a 
circuit with the matter that it perceives and in this relationship, perception becomes 
internal to matter. In this sense perception and what is perceived fold into each other. 
Such a point of view must be understood to occur on the curvilinear surface of the 
earth in which the molecular movements of an image's genetic elements, and their 
micro perceptions, fold and unfold into each other. 
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A fold occurs where two strata come into contact with each other, where the 
active compression of molecular forces result in their twisting in which inner 
surfaces come to touch outer ones. The fold, therefore, undoes any notion of 
definitive fields where bounded bodies generate discrete entities. The connections 
and relations between various strata of inside and outside present gradations and 
layers of gray zones in perceptions and, therefore, in the transparencies of thought. 
The connections and relations among the mezzo fields that I track must be seen 
through such a relation in which the painterly, poetical and auricular/musical, rather 
than being discrete entities become shapelike as they fold into and out of the other. 
What this means is that in the image-event Mirror, molecular flows of light, sound, 
movement and matter as they endure in time, take on a shapelikeness at their mezzo 
levels, developing into perceptual forms, of what becomes painterly, poetic or 
musical. Conceiving films through molecular flows, therefore, undoes the traditional 
dualism of what is interior and exterior to filmic bodies, making the continual 
mobile body of micro flows a media event.369 
In undoing the Cartesian duality of mind and body, Leibniz rejected any 
suggestion that perception of a form depend on a body. He considered instead how 
perceptual experience might occur as an instance of thought. In his theory of the 
monad he came to write that objects might be experienced as inner spaces, through 
mental representations, in which the entire world is expressed within the monad. The 
monadic self is a metaphysical point, existing in an enclosure without doors or 
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windows, where what is folded inside becomes the virtual, mental envelope of the 
entire world. 370 What this means then is that the inner folds of perception present all 
the possibilities and potentialities of what an image can become, carried in its virtual 
potential, as the rhythms, movements, matter, light intensities and sound frequencies 
of an image come to fold in our perception in time. From this latter condition of 
virtual potentiality in the mechanism of perception, I will develop my approach to 
the folding among the senses in the perception of images in Tarkovsky's Mirror. 
In the creative moment of difference taking place in a media event, the 
virtual object is actualized from the realm of thought. Virtuality, therefore, is always 
in a li~inal state of emergence, an abstract realm of immanent potential. Expression 
is therefore the actualization of such immanence occurring in the duration of a media 
event in the fold where images meet mind. Monadic selves, which express 
themselves, are possibilities that become actualized in composite substances. Such 
expressions are perceived in qualities such as sound, colour, the movement of an 
object or in other phenomena. Realized in the flux of matter, they shift, vary, migrate 
and transform, conditioning perception and thought.371 
Folds within folds 
Micro fields of light, sound, movement and matter in time, the genetic elements of 
the image, come to generate perceptions. The aggregation of micro fields into larger 
and larger fields generate increasing thresholds of clarity in perception, and these 
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thresholds are the shapings of larger bodies of what I have characterized as the 
painterly, poetical and musical in Mirror. Perception becomes stronger and more 
distinct as it comes to recognize shapes and forms, achieving states of increasing 
clarity. Micro perceptions, therefore, unfold into the clarity of macro perceptions, 
which are larger surfaces. Micro perceptions, which make up each sense organ, 
function by their folding and distending movements, presenting the clarity or 
indistinctness of a sensation, object or concept. 
However, while each sense is composed from a mass of micro perceptions, 
each sense is itself produced from the aggregation of many different senses. It is 
therefore noteworthy that a particular sense is the aggregation of different senses. 
For instance, vision is at least accompanied by hearing, touch and balance, while we 
understand that our sense of taste is accompanied by vision, touch and smell. 
Visually impaired people are sometimes known to "see" through their ears, in 
addition to their heightened sense of touch and it is in this spirit that Deleuze writes, 
11painting is thought: vision is through thought, and the eye thinks, even more than it 
listens. "372 Brian Massumi, moreover, has conceptualized the interconnection among 
1the senses to be so complete that vision takes place in a "crowded bubble."373 Vision 
is produced in a field of experience, which includes not only light and colour, but 
also movement, balance, sound, tactility and taste.374 The experience of an image-
event therefore has two main components: micro perceptions which fold and unfold 
251 
in each sense generating clarity or indistinctness, and that each sense itself is the 
aggregation of many senses. 
Correspondingly, the shaping of a mezzo field, such as the painterly, occurs 
by a multitude of folds among light, sound, movement and matter, which vibrate in 
time. Depending on the density of folding among micro perceptions, each sensory 
organ perceives gradients from clarity to indistinctness, and vision itself folds with 
other sensory organs to produce a field of experience. In the perception of an image, 
therefore, vision, tactility, aurality, proprioception and other senses become engaged. 
The image-event thereby is constituted in the intermodular connection among the 
different sensory organs in which each sensory perception is interconnected with 
other sensory perceptions.375 The folds of perception in a painterly field move 
continually between the genetic elements of the image, crinkling into minute folds 
making the sensations we feel obscure or stretching out to macro perceptions, 
making the field of experience clearer. 
What is an image? 
But before we can move further, I will need to inquire into the nature of the image 
itself. Leaping into the chaosmos of images in a film such as Mirror sets us chasing 
a simple yet elusive question: what is an image?376 We might enunciate by saying 
that the image is in our line of sight as we view Leonardo da Vinci's drawings, the 
photographs of Alexei's mother, the actors' performances or WWII events unfolding 
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before us in Mirror. We can also say that an image erupts into thinking as we watch 
the movement of the long grass swirling in the wind, in the delicate touch of a 
whispered word, such as when little Alexei whispers "papa," or in the cognitive 
dissonance of loud machinery at the printing press. Images, we can say thereby, 
rather than being delimited by their materiality, suffuse the world of the film as they 
extend, bend and return modulating anywhere through gradients of perception, 
memory and cognition.377 They travel between vision, taste, sound and touch. They 
rove under a dim light unformed, obscure and barely perceptible and speed 
ingeniously with the clarity of thought elsewhere, passing through events and 
bodies, and move between qualities and substances. In these movements we already 
perceive changes. We find that we no longer think about an image as it comes into 
view as a material object on the horizon of our sight that refers to a concrete frame 
in the film. Rather, we can come to say that an image captures us as we move 
together through infinite relations in different territories. Instead of encountering an 
image set before us we can say, therefore, that we endure a relation through 
changing mobile connections as we move through the universe of the film. We see 
that images move us from childhood smells into thinking and from imperceptible 
sounds into memory. Thinking, memory and perception move between thresholds of 
clarity and obscurity as they ascend and descend from the qualities and substances of 
actual images that come to be experienced. And in this mobility we also apprehend 
that the nature and relations of qualifying what an image is becomes an enterprise in 
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sedating and paralyzing them. When we begin to see the movement of images as 
they traverse through actual and virtual territories -- sensual, conceptual, perceptual, 
cognitive, haptic -- we might say that images endure an eternal exodus, perpetually 
fleeing, dissolving and emerging in an infinity of ways, and that we become with 
images. An actual image carries into a memory, which then changes the qualities of 
the actual image being encountered. Such a change necessitates discarding questions 
on the ontology of the image's being and we inquire instead about its becoming or its 
ontogenesis: what can the image do? 
In a curvilinear geometry, matter not only folds into other matter, as sound 
folds into light in the make-up of the moving image, but also importantly, perception 
folds into matter.378 As we traverse through the different territories matter and 
perception, or the actual and virtual, form the two indissoluble parts of the whole. 
The matter of an image being perceived forms a fold with the perceiver. Perception, 
therefore, occurs in the fold between perceiver and what is being perceived. In this 
manner it can be said that perception forms a relation of the whole with images as 
they move through the different (actual-virtual) territories. 
Little pricklings, tiny perceptions: micro forces 
In the next two sub-sections I will undertake an empirical approach in which I will 
engage in an examination of how the molecular fields of an image take on the forces 
that they do in the curvilinear space that occurs between matter and perception. I 
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will attempt to present how fields of light, sound, movement and matter fold into 
perception, generating micro sensations. Such micro sensations dwell at the level of 
the barely perceptible. Before I track how perceptions give rise to micro sensations 
in Mirror, a film which is ultimately sensate, I will need to present several vignettes 
from the film in the sub-sections to follow. However, a description of the scenes will 
be insufficient for presenting this film with much justice, as image-flows should be 
experienced in their powerful intensity as they course through time and in the 
context of the film; moreover, the linear, linguistic structure of a language-system 
cannot come to achieve the immediate impact of images on perception. 
Nonetheless, I will begin in the middle of Mirror where we find ourselves in 
the midst of an unfolding memory as experienced by Alexei, one of the main 
characters in the film. As he speaks over the telephone to his pre-teenage son Ignat, 
who has been left alone in a large apartment, he asks ifhe likes any girls. Upon 
!gnat's response that "girls are awful," Alexei starts by recalling his own heart throb 
when he was !gnat's age during the war, a memory that forks into other bits of 
memory from his childhood. Alexei remembers that she was a redhead with chapped 
lips. We see her smiling dressed in an ill-fitting tattered grey coat walking over the 
frosty landscape. Slipping into his past Alexei moves in and out of memories, 
unleashing the force of what is a most compelling sequence in the film. Weaving 
together the flows of personal and social events, Tarkovsky's narrative brilliantly 
interweaves the deeply emotional minor events of his own childhood with 
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documentary footage from WWII. The footage, in tum, presents the global scope of 
events sweeping over Europe and Asia during the war. Shifting between the poetic, 
historical, political and painterly we find ourselves experiencing the desolation and 
pain of Asafiev, an orphaned boy. We also listen to a poem written by Tarkovsky's 
father, Arsnei, as the weary march of nameless soldiers proceeds through mud, snow 
and along rivers. We see images of the atom bomb detonating; the ·euphoria 
experienced at the end of the war; a mass rally celebrating Mao's rise to power as 
millions wave their copies of the little Red Book. We even find ourselves looking at 
a reporter filming a dead body on the street, which looks eerily like Hitler's. 
Cascading among these shots, almost as an undercurrent, is a glimpse into 
Asafiev's own little life. As part of WWII training, we see him, along with other 
boys, learning how to aim rifles in a shooting range. We glimpse the struggles he 
faces with his peers and instructor as they trudge back and forth, the slow tracking 
shots following the characters around. The harshness of Russian winters and the 
desolate countryside are presented in dull grey tones, the scene a glimpse into the 
misery of war-time routine. Yet, the slow, listless, grey shots with the boys and 
instructor plodding about on the wooden floor, combined with the dull sounds 
hanging in the frozen air and the crunching snow below as they walk, is filled with 
melancholic beauty. 
Following a terrifying image of the atom bomb exploding, we are transported 
from the miserable conditions of war to a particularly beautiful shot; the landscape, 
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to our astonishment and relief, is now flooded with brilliant sunlight and the squeals 
of children's laughter. In a scene that looks like it was painted by the 16th century 
Dutch master Pieter Bruegel, the Elder, we see children sledding and milling about 
among the snow-covered rolling hills dotted with trees. Their dark coats stand in 
strong contrast to the white snow as they flitter merrily over them. In mid-ground we 
see a boy climbing the hill and coming towards the camera; the film's languorous 
rhythm reveals the boy to be Asafiev, carrying a suitcase. As he approaches the 
camera he is framed in close-up, his plaintive, almost blank face revealing that he is 
elsewhere, deep in thought. From the hollow sounds he tries to muster with his 
pursed lips we perceive that he is trying to whistle, and streaming down his cheeks 
are tears, which are becoming crystalline in the icy air. He turns, moving a few 
metres away from the camera and gazes at a tree. In a most surprising occurrence, a 
little sparrow flies and lands on his head. The flight of this little bird alighting on 
Asafiev's head is emotional, as it is magnificent. 
From this vignette, I would now like to draw upon the micro forces that have 
been generated. Stimulating the sensory organs, micro forces generate tiny 
perceptions, inducing the visceral and psychic atmospheres of an image. In the 
sequence of the shooting range, the dull gray tones of the sky, the barely perceptible 
hollow cawing of crows while bullets are being fired, the brown, oversized and 
tattered coats worn by the characters, the dull echoey sounds of snow crunching 
under the instructor's heavy boots, his slow, languorous movements, and the listless 
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movement of the camera shots, all constitute the imperceptible forces of the 
ellements. The dull gray tones, hollow sounds, slow movements and tactile surfaces 
are the micro forces, animating and giving expression to not only what but how we 
might come to sense and perceive the moving image. Micro forces shape and 
contour images, producing endless variations and relations in the light tones, colour 
gradients, sound underlays and overtones. They can produce subtle alterations in the 
camera's movement through space and in the image's tactility, as images fold and 
unfold in time. Micro forces, therefore, produce imperceptible shifts in the strata of a 
movmg image. 
In the shooting-range, the gray tonalities of the sky, the long wooden gallery 
frosted over with ice and the tattered overcoats are some of the visual elements that 
our eye passes over. The field of vision overlaps with other sense-fields, such as 
sound, tactility and movement in time in the perception of a moving image. The long 
overcoats that the boys and instructor wear are thick, baggy, tattered. The shooting 
range is made up of long wooden beams tied together by thick rope, making the 
walls of the open-air gallery coarse, worn out, and in addition, layered over with ice. 
The raw, physical materiality of the objects, as well as the actors' faces, their 
gestures, affectations and movements, give rise to micro sensations. In perceiving 
these elements we could say that vision folds not only into our aural sense but also 
into our sense of tactility, speed and balance. We experience sensations from 
perceptions gleaned from the images, which fold into each other in our body's 
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reception to them. As we come to experience the scene at the shooting-gallery, the 
image modulates between appearing dull, sad and rough-hewn as it flows in time. 
These micro sensations give rise to melancholic feelings, generating an atmosphere 
in relation to the moving image. Creating an atmosphere through micro forces 
through our experience of them in time and space is different from verbalizing 
"melancholia" through, say, dialogue, which would present an abstract idea of such 
a quality linguistically. Moreover, as there is little verbal definition accreting the 
spatio-temporality of the film, and because the scene occurs as a wave of memory 
from the past that continually bifurcates from one event to another, the spectator 
bears an obscure and ambiguous relation with the image-experience. 
The flat lighting-scale of this scene distributes light in such a way that it 
gives all the elements in the pro-filmic space even tones. In such a lighting-scale, 
darker objects are given more light than lighter objects so that the light reflected 
back from all the objects is in equal quantities. Flat lighting-scales therefore produce 
less variability in the colour tonalities of an image, making the micro gradients of 
light between figure and ground less definable. Elements seen in even, equalizing 
tones become less dramatic to the eye, producing a continuation between objects, 
allowing for an imperceptible blurring among them. Producing little differentiation 
between objects, gray colour tonalities can propagate what is perceived to be a 
colourless scene. Perceiving little variability in the image means less excitement for 
the eye as it scans the image. This subtle lack of differentiation to the eye between 
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the object-ground relations produces micro sensations that have even-tones. In the 
context of the film, the grey-scale of the images, of snow, ice, long tattered 
overcoats and wooden beams, produces a dulling effect. As we are drawn further 
into the sequence, not only is each shot of a long duration, but its slow tracing 
movement across the figures of the boys, instructor and landscape make the overall 
action nearly motionless and almost frozen in time. In the lugubrious movements of 
the long-takes, in which the camera hovers ponderously over the characters, we find 
our spirits sinking. 
The shooting range's drab light tones and the slow takes coax a solitary, more 
circumspect attitude in the spectator. Layered in between these varying sense 
perceptions, is the drift of dialogue. Occurring mostly between Asafiev and the 
instructor, the dialogue's delivery is generally sluggish, transpiring in deliberately 
drawn-out words, punctuating the scene. In the words which flow to our aural 
perception in a different scene, we find out from another boy that Asafiev became an 
orphan during the Leningrad blockade. The tears that stream down the boy's face, 
the instructor's stiffening up, marked by the hollow cawing layered with the disquiet 
of firing bullets, the words echo and hang in the empty frozen landscape. The micro 
forces of the image therefore, which produce the indefinable and vague sensations of 
dullness, sadness and melancholia, become punctuated by the sparse dialogue, which 
effectively transforms the spectator's emotional state. The undulating micro forces, 
which vary from frame to frame, subtly increase or decrease the intensity of the 
260 
image. They are tiny imperceptible substances able to produce shifts in the physical, 
mechanical and material spaces of the image The level of exertion applied by micro 
forces continually shifts the physical, elastic architecture of the film and therefore, 
also, shapes it's conceptual milieu. 
Between murmurings and a vociferous howl 
Micro forces modulate the image opening it up to an infinity of possibilities by way 
of their differential relations, proportions, qualities and geometries. These 
differential relations give rise to micro perceptions, which are tiny and infinite 
inklings that are barely felt, hardly sensed and not yet at the threshold of 
consciousness. Micro forces, thereby, modulate the image producing indistinct 
sensations, inclinations and feelings. In the scene described in Mirror, the gray light 
tonalities, the slow moving shots and the echoing sounds produce inclinations in the 
spectator's perception of them, rather than any sense of clarity. These inclinations 
are a multitude of micro folds created in the image's infinite relations, and they are 
like "dust. .. mist or fog. "379 Tiny inklings aggregating in particular ways become 
great swelling surfaces like voluminous, bulbous crumples which, in tum, little by 
little, distend and extend into a large sinuous fold. These larger zones are those in 
which micro perceptions have unfolded into the clarity of macro perceptions that 
draw upon the clarity of a thought. What are the micro perceptions of grayness, 
slowness, coarseness and echoes distend into the misery of a child-soldier's training 
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camp during the war. The aggregation of tiny creases of micro perception, therefore, 
unfolds into the macro perception of consciousness. These two movements of 
perception, Deleuze writes, cannot be opposed to each other. Instead, some 
perceptions lead to others. From obscure rumblings we come to perceive a particular 
sound, dust becomes a colour, a line forms a specific image and inklings become a 
thought. Thus we can say along with Deleuze that "I project the world 'on the 
surface of a folding' ... ," a surface upon which thought folds or unfolds between 
obscurity and clarity. 380 
Moreover, as vision folds in with auricular, kinesthetic, proprioceptive, 
somatic, tactile and other senses, a multitude of folds becomes generated. These 
folds within folds, operating between the mechanisms of micro and macro 
perceptions, come to sense the flow of time, movement, matter, light and sound of 
the cinematic image. This sensing of the various fields is an open and free time, and 
one in which the virtual time of duration unfolds in media encounters. 
In what is the development of tiny little folds or inklings opening up to the 
great fold of consciousness, we come to perceive the clarity of forms and sounds.381 
In a cinematic image this clarity can be of two types. It can emerge at a molecular 
level through what is initially an abstract or unfocussed shot, which in time reveals 
an object in a shot (or sequence), producing a local meaning. On a molar level we 
can say that clarity might be possible at the level of the whole film, in which an 
intentional consciousness comes into play. Such consciousness would produce 
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associated meanings that align the film within social, historical, theoretical or 
philosophical ordering. 
In Mirror, however, while there are levels of transparency we are hard 
pressed to find distinct intellectual clarity. In Difference and Repetition (1968/94), 
Deleuze expounds on Leibniz's distinct-obscure and clear-confused perceptions. 
Distinct perceptions are those that grasp differential relations and singularities, while 
obscure perceptions are indistinguishable from each other and through which 
singularities cannot be grasped. 382 In the context of Mirror, it would be possible to 
say that the film largely moves through various states of obscurity in which the 
spectator is bewildered by the continually changing faces and characters. There is no 
clarity given as to who the characters and actors are, or their relations to each other; 
they seem to blur into and out of each other. (At the risk of mixing metaphors, this 
visual blurring corresponds to Leibniz's [auricular] murmuring sounds of the sea.) 
The film, in this corresponding sense, moves through various stages of indistinct 
"murmuring" so to speak. For instance, sometimes the same actor plays two different 
characters and the spectator is given little reference as to their relations or causal 
connection. At the beginning of the film we see Alexei's mother played by the actor 
Margarita Terekhova. Later on Terekhova also plays Alexei's wife in other scenes, 
blurring her roles continually between wife and mother. Moreover, in a haunting 
scene shot in slow motion, while still playing the role of the mother, her reflection in 
the mirror shows a much older woman. This older woman is Tarkovsky's actual 
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mother, Maria Tarkovskaia, who emerges as an apparition from the future. In 
another splendid scene, his mother, the same older woman, appears again. In this 
scene we find Ignat (Alexei's son, who also plays Alexei at the same age) in 
conversation with another older woman, who is unknown and appears mysteriously. 
She sits at the dining table drinking tea and talks to Ignat. She asks him to read a 
selection from a particular book, which turns out to be Pushkin's letter to Chaadeyev 
from 19 October, 1836. She then suddenly asks him to open the door of the flat. 
Upon opening the door, Ignat finds the older woman Tarkovskaia waiting. 
Appearing confused, she leaves almost immediately, saying she had knocked on the 
wrong door. Upon !gnat's return back to the room the unknown woman has vanished 
and we find him standing alone, the dilapidated walls and peeling paint enveloping 
him, signaling memories of a past. 
Similarly, in the concluding shots of the film we see three generations of the 
same family appearing interchangeably on different planes of the screen. In the first 
of these shots we see Alexei's father as a young man with his expectant wife, Maria, 
in close-up in the foreground. The second is a medium long-shot in which the 
grandmother, Tarkovskaia, is walking with young twins in the countryside by a 
beautiful cottage. One of the twins is Alexei, who is one of the main characters in 
the film. This cottage is where his (and also Tarkovsky's) early childhood unfolds. 
Throughout the film pasts and futures rotate back and forth in equal measure, 
including in this concluding sequence. In fact, the rotation of pasts and futures 
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creates a blurring among them, making them indistinguishable from each other. The 
multitude of faces and memories, which fold into and out of each other, generates a 
chain of confused and indistinct perceptions for the spectator, who is all but lost in 
the to1rent of faces and events, trying to connect family genealogy and history. 
However, half way through the film, from among the many faces and 
circumstances swirling around, we come to the scene at the shooting range. This 
scene is important as the flurry of faces and events unfold into the (relative) clarity 
of form at the end of this sequence. We are transported to this scene immediately 
after we see lgnat talking to his father on the phone about a red-headed girl with 
chapped lips. This conversation, we find out only later on (and after several 
viewings), occurs post WWII. What becomes clearer at this point are the ravages of 
war gleaned from the diverse clips of documentary footage sown through the various 
sequences: weary soldiers walking in the mud; Berlin in ruins; the mushroom cloud; 
the cockpit of a bomber; and others. Tarkovsky deftly interweaves these clips of war 
footage with the experiences of young Alexei's war training at the shooting range. 
From these interpenetrations between documentary footage and fiction, between a 
social and personal history, a measure of clarity arrives: in a flippant comment 
offered by another boy, we hear that Asafiev has been made an orphan. The social 
and personal consequences of the war's brutality are reflected in the close up of 
Asafiev's face upon which the camera hovers for a few brief seconds, punctuating 
the moment with some clarity. 383 
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Thus, from the incongruity between the numerous events and faces joined 
together, sprinkled with sparse, vague dialogue, some clarity begins to emerge. From 
Tarkovsky's childhood impressions of war, the misery at the children's shooting 
gallery and the training of child-soldiers during the war, the spectator begins to 
weave connections. However, these connections, rather than being distinct or 
definite, can only be understood to produce relatively greater clarity, and only in 
comparison to the generally disjointed flow of the images. Thus, while the film 
distends towards an emerging consciousness, a clear consciousness is tenuous at 
best. This scene can hardly be understood as providing a distinct understanding of 
the relations between characters and the unfolding events. 
For the most part, however, the film moves in the reverse direction, in which 
the emerging clearer vision is completely undone. We are swept into the 
multitudinous depth of micro perceptions where folds divide endlessly, creasing into 
ever minute ones, of a thousand indistinct murmurings. Terekhova, who plays 
Alexei's mother Maria, and also his wife Natalia, and Ignat Daniltsev, who plays 
Alexei at twelve and Alexei's son Ignat, make the continual transitions between pasts 
and futures of the actors and characters disorienting to the spectator. The oscillating 
roles between mother and wife, and the two boys, constrain a clear understanding of 
the film. Moreover, the film makes transitions between black and white, 
monochrome, sepia and colour, in which the past is not typically associated with 
black and white, nor is the present linked only to colour. Mirror, in such a manner, 
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produces gradients of uncertainties and thresholds of understanding, vacillating 
between senses of obscurity and a fragile clarity. 
In these continually moving transparencies, layering obscure and clear 
perceptions, we are continually sensing the film. Large or tiny differentials in the 
image's composition come to be perceived through the receptive organs, in which 
subtle changes in camera movement can produce the difference between the senses 
of stability or uncertainty. For instance, a tripod-mounted shot will produce greater 
stability than a hand-held one, which will produce a lingering or hovering stillness in 
the image. Similarly, subtle differentials perceived in colour tonalities, gradients of 
lightness-darkness and sound intensities, can produce shifts in meaning. In the 
differentials sensed in micro-macro perceptions, perception contracts and distends 
between the indistinct blur of images and glimmers of intelligibility. This sensing 
movement is, in effect, how natural perception works. 384 
lFrom acentered to acentered perception 
While there is a continual undulation between micro and macro perception, a critical 
difference between natural perception and perception in film must be noted. Mirror, 
through its close-ups, long-shots and variable camera movements, unhinges the 
anchoring of the perceiving subject and the world. Thus while setting up an implicit 
knowledge of the world by way of the variability in camera movements and shots, it 
also presents a second intentionality for natural perception. With respect to such a 
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second intentionality, Deleuze's claim is that cinema's perception deviates acutely 
from natural perception, in that it forces us to think differently and to create new 
concepts. 385 Rather than present an image, which then becomes the world, cinema 
presents the world, which presents its own image. 386 In presenting an image, cinema 
"substitutes an implicit knowledge" that gives rise to a second intentionality, 
differing from natural perception.387 For this reason, phenomenology on the one 
hand condemns cinema for its misconstrued perception and on the other, lauds its 
ability to uncover new forms of vision between the perceiver and perceived. 388 
In Bergson's later philosophical works, on the contrary, he had depended on 
cinema to demonstrate normal human perception, claiming them to be similar. In 
Creative Evolution (1907111 ), Bergson wrote that cinema was much like natural 
perception, in that "we take snapshots, as it were, a passing reality ... Perception, 
intellection, language so proceed in general. "389 Bergson was able to compare 
natural perception and cinema only by ignoring the artificial nature of the 
cinematographic image (its second intentionality). Ignoring the artifice, he wrote that 
cinema did not present photogrammes but rather immediate images, as in individual 
snapshots, which were then strung together like a cinematograph inside us. 390 
Cinema presented the movement-image already corrected, by virtue of this stringing 
together of images. Flaxman writes that his attention to mechanism outweighed his 
understanding of the synthetic nature of the cinematographic image. While the 
phenomenologists were willing to admit that perception in cinema was misconstrued 
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and different from natural perception, Bergson regarded cinema as being too much 
like natural perception, as both the cinematographic image and perception were 
normal and conventional.391 Bergson's dismissal of cinema therefore occurs chiefly 
on account of cinema's analogy to perception. 
However, by holding the position that cinematic and natural perception 
correspond with each other, Bergson renounced a more radical insight he had made 
in an earlier work. In Matter and Memory (1896/1911 ), when he had written that 
"instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves 
outside the things in order to recompose their becoming artificially,"392 he had 
implied a second intentionality for perception in cinema, and such an assertion is 
more pertinent to my discussion here. 
Despite Bergson's later critique of cinema he had insisted on its acentered 
perception. His model of consciousness presents a state in which matter flows and 
changes continually, without attaching to points of anchorage or to a centre. It 
becomes essential to Bergson to reveal however that centres could be formed at any 
point -- or what Deleuze will call macro perception -- in order for the view to be 
finned up instantaneously. Thus, Bergson writes, "I say in consequence that 
conscious perception must be produced" and that would be the result of an effort of 
deducing whether the perception was natural or cinematographic. 393 However, he 
complies that cinema's lack of anchoring did have a distinct advantage in which 
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perception can move from acentered state to acentered state instead of moving 
towards a centre, which is a remarkable difference with phenomenology. 394 
Mirror's unhinging of the spectator, as I have tried to show, occurs not only 
on account of the variable shots from close-ups, long-shots, pans, long-takes, high-
angle or low-angle shots, but also these varying shots contain heterogeneous 
elements (characters, memories, emotions, dreams, documentary footage). The 
spectator, therefore, moves from one acentered state to another, never attaching to a 
centre, except at certain moments as noted earlier. These moments emerge only 
briefly in which a greater level of clarity is generated and where a centre can come 
to be firmed up before elements dissipate once more into micro flows of obscure 
murmurings, of faces, memories and rotating temporalities. 395 
The spectator moves through the various rhythms of the film's materiality, 
the micro forces shaping its physical, mechanical and conceptual spaces. Excepting 
for the punctual moments of clarity, we find perception moving from one image 
fragment to another, unable to get a sense of the whole. Moving from one acentered 
state to another, the spectator finds her/himself drifting through the images. Such a 
state of drifting is different from being in a self-conscious state of observation and 
distance, in which the spectator consciously and actively understands, connects and 
conceives the film's fragmented narrative elements. If the latter were the case then 
our consciousness of the film would be about something. We would perceive a 
sensible form (a Cartesian-Euclidean geometry) that would anchor the "I" in which 
270 
the world of the film encountered is understood through a self-consciousness that is 
intentional. 396 
However, we reside in various states of drift moving in and out of thresholds 
of conscious perception and states of transparencies. 397 The film vacillates between 
the two poles of clarity and obscurity, between consciousness intentionally produced 
and that which dissipates into indistinct murmurings. In this sense the mechanical 
and physical flows of the film, by way of the projector rate, cinematography, mise-
en-scene, sound and editing fold into our perception, generating not only sensual 
perceptions but thereupon, also its conceptual spaces. However, rather than always 
being conscious about the characters' lives or the narrative sequence, as 
linguistically structured elements occurring in the film, we find ourselves adrift in 
the images. Brief moments of clarity emerge in this drifting through, which are 
points of anchorage, in which consciousness takes shape. In Bergson's materialism 
consciousness, therefore, rather than being about something (as in an intentional, 
active representation or representative of), is something, constituted on the plane of 
immanence. 
Matter, perception and images 
In order to understand immanent consciousness as becoming, rather than being about 
a representation of something, the flows between image and mind become 
imperative to the argument. In order to perceive these flows I will need to discuss at 
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considerable length Deleuze's conceptualization of the virtual and also Bergson's 
insights into how perception, matter and images continue to flow into each other, 
rather than being separated and disconnected elements that are given to a Cartesian-
Euclidean geometry. Critical to this section is charting the conceptual flow between 
matter and consciousness, in which a theoretical exegesis of Deleuze's virtual 
transcendental materialism will come into discussion. 
In a hyperbolic, curvilinear geometry, the folds among light, sound, 
movement and matter, as they endure in time, are understood to make up the image. 
Considering that the brain is the screen upon which images unfold, image and mind 
form a continuity. This continuity allows us to understand the processes of 
perception at work in the world, whether it be watching a film, reading the news, 
participating in interactive media or walking in a garden. Deleuze's ontology allows 
an understanding of how micro matter folds and unfolds in the brain. In the 
discussion below I will briefly attempt to sketch out how space and consciousness 
come to enfold and unfold from each other. Such an examination will provide 
further insight into the folding of micro and mezzo fields in Mirror. That is, the 
micro fields of light, sound, matter and movement produce what I construe to be the 
painterly, poetical and the auricular/musical fields. These mezzo fields are the 
virtual relations occurring in the experience of duration. Not only do these mezzo 
folds generate the film but, as I attempt to track in the next chapter, a virtual 
topology presents the condition in which different images from different media fold 
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into each other in perception. Such an understanding will allow us to focus on 
kinetics and affectivity, as the two conditions that produce media events, 
confounding questions of medium specificity. 
For Bergson, consciousness, objects and matter ultimately were understood 
as flows or the flux of the world, rather than as discrete or autonomous entities. In 
Bergson's ontology of images, which will become an entry point into Deleuze's 
philosophy of the fold, Bergson understood the idea of the image to be in the very 
interior of things. Such an attempt, Rodowick writes, was to overcome the dualism 
of what is interior-exterior, realism-idealism and subject-object, dualisms that have 
run through the major currents of western philosophy. 398 Since the eighteenth 
century, the image has been considered to be a representation of matter, a 
representation of a field of something, as knowledge, which exists outside our 
consciousness, as a secondary order of reality. 399 
Knowledge was also tied to perception in a particular way in philosophical 
idealism and realism, where knowing is achieved by seeing. In realism, what one 
represents to oneself is that which is assumed by natural law or through the laws of 
nature,400 in what is called 11 a thing. 11401 In idealism, one represents to oneself 
according to what is presumed to be the laws of thought,402 what is called 
"representation. 11403 Thus for realists, the orderliness of natural phenomena lies in a 
cause that is distinct from perceptions themselves. Whether the cause is knowable by 
an effort of metaphysical construction or it remains unknowable, it is arbitrary. For 
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idealists, on the other hand, perceptions are the whole of reality and the orderliness 
of natural phenomena is a symbol by which possibility is indicated alongside real 
perceptions. Thus, in Bergson: Thinking Backwards, Moore writes, "for realism as 
for idealism perceptions are 'veridical hallucinations,' states of the subject projected 
outside itself. 11404 Moore continues that the idealists and realists thereby present the 
more or less old problems of marrying the mental and the physical, the inside and 
the outside.405 In both cases Rodowick writes, however, that the mind, in its pursuit 
of knowledge, becomes separated from matter and time including Spirit, which also 
exists outside time and matter. Such a separation of mind from matter and time has 
been the ontotheological current of western philosophy. Bergson, instead, considers 
the continuity between mind, matter and time, writing that "[matter] exists just as it 
is perceived; and since it is perceived as an image, the mind would make of it, in 
itself, an image. 11406 He therefore considers matter and image to be in continuous 
flow with each other, yet distinct from human perception.407 
Thus we come to the crisis in how one order -- consciousness -- passes into 
another order -- space. In idealism, this passing between consciousness and space is 
resolved through pure images in consciousness, in the laws of thought. In 
materialism, on the other hand, this crisis of the connection between what is the 
deepest inside with what is the farthest outside is resolved by reconstituting the order 
of consciousness through material movements. Such a material movement is 
presented in the crystal image of time in Deleuze's The Time-Image (1985/89) in 
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which he presents how the present coexists with the past, an insight from Bergson. 
The virtual actualizes by differentiating itself into the past and present, which form a 
circuit with each other. This is the crystal image of time, in which the past and 
present coexist. This crystalline seed is a micro circuit connecting inner strata with 
those outside. It is a mode of actualization out of which emerges the expanding 
circuitry of the universe. The virtual, in circuit with the actual, Alliez writes 
therefore, occurs in virtue of the real maintaining an ontological indifference among 
Image, Movement, Matter and Light.408 Such an ontology he calls a "transcendental 
materialism." 
Deleuze's transcendental materialism 
To further address the question of immanent consciousness I will now establish 
Deleuze's materialist ontology through which greater clarity on the conceptualization 
of the fold might be achieved. In The Signature of the World (2004), Eric Alliez 
questions what the ontology of the virtual is. He writes that in the ontotheological 
tradition, the quasi-genetic foundation of idealism allowed for the conceptualization 
of God's existence to become his real existence based on the very notion of this 
concept of God. However, by removing the notion of God, the purest form of the 
logical ideal can be reasoned out: the a priori correlation between thought and the 
most abstract being God, who is emptied of any material substance. This correlation, 
Alliez argues, is contrary to the simplest formulation of Bergsonian materialism, in 
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which "the virtual is not actual but as such possesses an ontological reality that 
contests and exceeds any logic of the possible. 11409 Indeed, in the classical argument, 
existence is taken to be the same thing as the concept, except that existence lies 
outside of concept, in a context that is different from any sensorial dynamism, in 
what Deleuze explained as "arbitrarily extracted from the real. "410 This logic of "all 
or nothing," in which "without this Being or this Form you will have nothing but 
chaos," prevented the leap into ontology. Such logic presented either the 
formlessness and groundlessness of the non-being, or the homogeneous chasm in 
which neither differences nor properties existed.411 With dialectics, similarly, the 
negative accounts for actual terms and real relations, as long as they are understood 
as being separate from the virtual and also from the movement by which they come 
to be actualized.412 
This all or nothing logic also characterizes Laura Marks' tracing of the 
electron in Touch (2002), in which the physical quantity of the electron marks the 
claim to her materialism. It is the physical electron through which Marks makes the 
assumption that "what is virtual must be immaterial, transcendent," presenting the 
other side of the matter-consciousness divide.413 The electron, as physical 
substance, establishes the material presence of digital imaging, thereby suggesting 
the inverse correlation that the immaterial is transcendent. When transposed, the 
logic establishes materiality as that which is non-transcendental. As noted, such a 
relation presents the classical terms by which existence (material) and concept 
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(immaterial) become equated as either "all or nothing." Instead, Alliez writes that 
through a Deleuzian ontology of the virtual, the virtual actualizes itself by 
differentiating itself into the virtual past and the actual present. This differentiation 
does not occur through negation (dialectics) or similitude (idealism), but through its 
play of difference, in which new generation becomes possible. A virtual ontology is 
a materialism, which could be termed a "transcendental materialism," in which 
matter= energy.414 Such an ontology opens up the field of virtuality to the concrete 
totality of the past in which, qua Bergson, time splits into two flows, of presents 
which pass and another in which pasts are preserved. 
Bergson's notion of pure duration differs from its own coexistence by virtue 
of its bifurcation, of the immediate coexistence of the past with the present. This 
difference rises up to an absolute potential or the virtual, forcing thought to "begin 
with the materiality of difference insofar as this materiality designates the new in the 
making. "415 In this way Deleuze considers the virtual as the pure concept of 
difference, as the "jouissance of difference" that opens up the virtual to the concrete 
totality of the past. "Life is the process of difference," Deleuze writes, in which 
difference is the differenciation that is produced through the movement of a 
virtuality that is becoming actualized, according to its own internal differentiation.416 
It is in this sense that the virtual is real and material, retaining its objective, 
ontological consistency and is able to produce its differentiation in the production of 
the actual. The virtual, Deleuze explains, is "the mode of the non-active, since it 
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only acts in differentiating itself, in ceasing to be in itself, all the while keeping 
something of its origin. But it is in this very respect that it is the mode of what is. "417 
This mode of the "what is," Alliez writes, is the "inside of the outside in its powerful 
non-organic life. In other words, quite precisely, the very mattemess [ matierete] of 
being."418 This matterness of being, thereby, displaces the opposition between matter 
and life through the continuity of Bergson's pure duration, in which the totality of the 
past exists in the mode of a virtual coexistence with the present. 
In The Time-Image Deleuze writes that the virtual image exists outside of 
consciousness, being neither consciousness nor the psychological state for which it 
is commonly mistaken. When digging into the past to search for it, we look for these 
pure virtual images, which only exist in partial modes of actualization. We "leap" 
into the past, as it were, to place ourselves in these purely virtual images, which have 
been preserved through time.419 The present, which is the actual moment, is 
contemporaneous with the past that passes, its virtual image, the "image in the 
mirror." In Mirror, as the young Terekhova wipes mist off a mirror, she does not see 
her own image reflected back, but an older woman's - she has a visionary leap into 
her future. Thus every moment of our life presents these two flows, these two 
heterogeneous components, in which the actual and virtual, perception and 
recollection/visions exist contemporaneously. 
However, Deleuze writes, pure virtuality does not have to be actualized, as it 
forms the smallest circuit with it. The circuitry of the actual and the virtual coexists, 
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forming the smallest circuit of the crystal. The virtual is correlative to the actual, and 
this seed serves as a base for all other circuits. This little circuit, or crystalline seed, 
has its internal limit, and also an external, reshapable and variable envelope: the 
crystallizable universe.420 The circuitry between the seed and the universe enfolds 
everything, "House and Universe, Heimlich and Unheimlich."421 Dreams, memories 
and worlds, are the variations of the Whole. They are Deleuze writes: 
... degrees or modes of actualization which are spread out between 
these two extremes of the actual and the virtual: the actual and its 
virtual on the small circuit, expanding virtualities in the deep circuits. 
And it is from the inside that the small internal circuit makes contact 
with the deep ones, directly, through the merely relative circuits.422 
Thus Alliez writes that it is the virtual that allows a truly transcendental materialism, 
bringing forth Deleuze's philosophy of becoming, of immanence, of difference and 
of the event. 423 
Deleuzo-Bergsonian ontology 
This capacity of the virtual also offers an understanding for Bergson's claim, which 
Deleuze sustains that on the plane of immanence, everything is either an image or 
matter. Based on this understanding that matter and image are continuous with each 
other allows Bergson to overcome the inside-outside, subject-object dualism in his 
philosophical treatise. In the first chapter of Matter and Memory Bergson develops 
his theory of pure perception, which he describes as the "lowest degree of the 
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mind."424 Writing that the body is one image among others and that "every image 
acts on others and reacts to others, on 'all their facets at once' and 'by all their 
elements'," Deleuze writes that he comes to dislodge the separation between body 
and image. 425 The body and brain in such a system are themselves images, among an 
infinite set of other images, constituted on the plane of immanence.426 The plane of 
immanence is where movement comes to be established among all the different parts 
of each system and between the different systems, which "crosses them all and stirs 
them up together. "427 And this stirring prevents the different parts and systems from 
becoming a closed set; it is a mobile bloc of space-time, a machinic assemblage of 
movement-images.428 On the plane of immanence the body is therefore matter or an 
image, a plane upon which Deleuze writes, "the movement-image and.flowing 
matter are strictly the same thing. "429 However, Deleuze questions that if the body is 
itself an image, which is movement, and consciousness is itself an image, "how 
could images be in my consciousness since I am myself image, that is 
movement? "430 
As noted above, Bergson distinguishes matter and image from human 
perception. This distinction leads Deleuze to ask how it is possible to extract human 
perception from the flowing state of matter. To answer this question we should take 
note of Rodowick's suggestion that we first start by thinking the plane of immanence 
as an open whole that cannot be understood as an immobile section; it cannot be 
thought of as an enclosing frame, which would then make it a spatial abstraction.431 
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In addition, we need to include Moor's suggestion on perception. Writing, if bodies 
exist then it is sufficient for images to exist and that the existence of images is 
sufficient for perception to occur. Thus, he presents one important condition for 
perception: contact. Perception arises from the interactions between ordinary objects 
and those objects which are like our bodily selves. Thus one of the principal 
conditions in Bergson's ontology is that a body capable of initiating change must be 
in contact with its environment and such contact is called perception.432 If movement 
on the plane of immanence is of a universal variation, where all mass/bodies are 
vibratory matter, the smallest atom produces its effect in a changing whole, in which 
bodies are affected and in tum come to affect each other. The kinetics between the 
micro flows on the plane of immanence however is, on encounter, still too 
undefined, unsettled and has not yet consciously arisen. At the original encounter, 
therefore, it is not possible to distinguish human perception from the flow of matter 
and images. Thus it is only in the cooling down stages of an encounter, when images 
start to settle into us that human perception begins to draw out and distinguish itself 
from the flow of matter and images. This is the stage in which consciousness about 
something begins to take shape. 
In the passages above I have tried to show the processes at work in the 
perception of an image from the perspective of a Deleuzo-Bergsonian materialism. 
In this view, image and mind, rather than be understood as separate and distinct 
orders, should be understood as continuous flows that form a whole. Such a 
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possibility arises on the plane of immanence upon which flowing matter or an 
image, are continuities of the other. Within such a flow, in which the body is one 
image among others, the separation between body and image and also the dualisms 
between matter-mind, inside-outside and subject-object come to be dislodged. 
Rather than being discrete, the two orders must be understood as continuities that 
make up the whole. 
In the actualization of virtuality the movement of the virtual is that of 
differenciation, by which thought is forced to arise with the materiality of difference. 
And such mattemess of thought/being displaces the distinction between matter and 
virtuality, the virtual becoming differenciated into the real and material. This 
differenciation presents the conditions for a virtual transcendental materialism, in 
which we can now come to say that inside-outside, subject-object interiority-
exteriority are continuous flows that pass into each other. Matter and image, 
composed of the same elements, arise in the vacillating curved space of a hyperbolic 
geometry which fluctuates between immanence and intentional consciousness. 
Rather than being two separate and distinct entities, which operate discretely, they 
form a qualitative whole. 
In the differenciation of virtuality into the actual, human perception begins to 
emerge from the flow of matter-images and it is in this movement of differenciation 
that I will argue that the mezzo folds of consciousness begin to develop. At this 
juncture, therefore, I will start to draw upon the notion of how micro flows develop 
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into larger mezzo flows in a curvilinear hyperbolic geometry. These mezzo flows of 
painterliness, auricular/musicality and the poetical in Mirror are to be understood as 
fields of experience of the perceiving eye, which senses the variation among light, 
sound, movement and matter in time. It is thereby in the perceiving eye that these 
fluctuating flows become "formlike, "433 from the virtual relations generated among 
the micro fields of the temporal image. In this understanding, the encounter with the 
temporal image occurs in an unbounded field of sensations, in which the folds of 
cinema give rise to the free and open virtual time of duration. 
Flow of movements 
From the tiny folds emerging among light, sound, movement and matter in time, I 
will now consider their aggregation into the larger vector flows of the film: the 
painterly, poetic and auricular/musical. Macro fields emerge when the micro 
elements begin to aggregate into larger fields. From dust appears a line or a colour 
field, an underlaid sound gives rise to music or poetry. Vibrating micro fields begin 
to forge identifiable shapes, tones and rhythms of the film. These multiple vectors on 
a hyperbolic curvilinear surface fold into and out of each other, but also enfold and 
unfold between internal and external flows. That is, not only are light intensities 
enfolded in the rhythms of movement, in the tactility of matter and in sound 
undertones, as in the shooting range, but also that these micro fields fold into 
perception. Folding between the fields occurs in the mind. 
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With respect to the latter it must be understood that the folding among the 
micro fields into the larger mezzo fields and the folding between the extrinsic pleats 
of matter and the intrinsic folds of perception (image-mind relation), is to be 
comprehended as the very same movement. This is the same movement because the 
folding among the micro fields occurs in perception, and as noted earlier, "matter 
exists just as it is perceived. "434 Suffice to say for now that exteriorities and 
interiorities fold into each other, making the pathways between matter and 
perception fluid. I will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, how the extrinsic 
movement of matter forms a fold with perception.435 For the remainder of this 
chapter, however, it will be enough to say that what is painterly in the film occurs by 
the intertwining among extrinsic physico-micro fields of light, sound, movement and 
matter with the intrinsic inklings, sensations, perceptions and memory, in which a 
continuous undulation endures between exteriority and interiority. 
Micro fields of what can be characterized as being painterly in a moving 
image imbibe the movements of painting: light, colour, lines, movement, rhythm, 
intensity, aurality, taste, balance, textures, shapes and so forth. The becoming-
painterly in a temporal medium envelopes a field of variations and proportions 
among these elements, as they undulate in time. In this regard we come to 
c~xperience painterliness in an open field of dynamic forces, in which perception 
folds continually between these mobile elements in time. What is auricular is the 
enfolding pitch, timbre, sonority, tonality, meter and density of sounds, which 
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include musical harmonies and composition, but also what is tactile, colour-light-
based, visual, olfactory, kinesthetic and temporal. What is auricular in a moving 
image, therefore, folds into the luminosity and hue of colours, patterns of light and 
into the rhythms and speeds of camera movements through space and in time. 
Similarly, the forces of poetic language, by way of rhyme, metre and resonance, 
folded into the genetic elements of the image, can be evocative. The dynamism of 
words can impel the movement of images into routes beyond the merely obvious by 
way of rhetoric, symbolism, irony, ambiguity, metaphor or metonymy. The force of 
a word can saturate and enfold light or the movement of matter with an intensity, or 
throw it off kilter entirely. 
To underscore, therefore, the senses operate through the intermodal 
connections of experience, in which painterliness is not merely vision or sight, but 
also that which is literally experienced through movement, tactility and aurality in 
experience.436 For instance, congenitally blind patients learn to see through aurality: 
"I see it move, because I hear it. "437 The experience of a painterly, musical or poetic 
image~ therefore, brings into the mix an intermodular system of receptions, which as 
Massumi writes, are "event perceptions combining senses, tenses, and dimensions on 
a single surface. "438 What is painterly, musical or poetic might only be differentiated 
from each other by virtue of variations and relations in light, sound, movement and 
matter, combined with the field of experience of the perceiving eye. The painterly is 
not merely vision, but also tactile and aural, just as musicality is aural and visual and 
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the poetic is rhythmic and imagistic. Angles, scales, tonalities, translucency and 
speeds come into mobile relations in the variation among the genetic elements. 
Fields of experience, therefore, cannot be determinable in any measurable or 
unifiable way except by the perceiving eye, in which these variations come to be 
experienced. The mezzo flows of poetical, auricular/musical and painterly 
movements fold into the workings of what becomes the macro image-event, Mirror. 
The duration experienced by the audience moves by way of a continual folding in 
time, between the event's exteriority and the interiorization of such an event.439 
Stirrings 
I don't know what would have happened to the film if the buckwheat 
had not blossomed. This was immensely important to me. 
--Tarkovsky440 
Out of the seven brilliant films that he made, Mirror is Tarkovsky's most 
autobiographical film and perhaps also his most complex one. Based on memories of 
his childhood, his family and photographs found in a family album, it is a deeply 
intimate gaze into the life of the character Alexei, taking us from his early childhood 
to his untimely death in mid-life. Growing up in the early 1930s, Tarkovsky 
recreates impressions of a single life interwoven with visions, dreamscapes and 
documentary footage from WWII. A film without logic or p1ot, it can only be 
described as a flow of images cascading through a myriad of associations. Rotating 
between pasts and futures in which impressions of childhood memories, adult life, 
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dreams, documentary footage and fiction come to connect, the shots and sequences 
enter into a fluid relationship with each other. 
Tarkovsky and his crew painstakingly set up each scene while working on 
the shooting script and spent two entire days deciding which plant should grow in 
the garden between the house and burning shed. Ultimately he decided on a potato 
plant, which sprouted yellow lilac flowers. In another incident he asked members of 
the community to sow part of the field in front of his childhood house with 
buckwheat, as the white flowers were an essential part of his childhood. His 
childhood house, the well and the shed were, furthermore, rebuilt from photographs 
in family albums.441 When all the sets were completed he invited his mother to take 
a look, which turned out to be to her satisfaction.442 
In the opening scene we see a young Maria, Alexei's mother, smoking a 
cigarette. She is sitting on a rough wooden fence overlooking a field of tall grass, 
which periodically swirls in the wind. This image is reconstructed from a 
photograph taken of his mother Maria Tarkovskaia in 1932. Her hairstyle, posture, 
attitude and dress are all carefully recreated in the film. For certain scenes he had the 
same dress made in varying colour tones for the character, in order to accommodate 
the changing light conditions of the shoot. In the opening sequence we also see two 
children who are twins with shaven heads. Tarkovsky, also a twin, recreates the 
shaven heads from when he himself was a very young child; the bonnet worn by one 
of the twins in the film is identical to the one that his grandmother had sewn for his 
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twin sister during the war years. The laces on the windows, the washed sheets hung 
out to dry, the wooden beams of the house, the large glass vase, the cat sitting on the 
windowsill, the white enamel basin collecting rain among numerous other objects 
create the atmospheres inside and outside the house, and are all meticulous 
recreations of his past. For the shooting range scene describe earlier, he consulted 
war experts in order to make sure that the instructor's military cap and the wound on 
his scalp were as authentic as possible. The river's current, its colour and depth, the 
weeds growing along the embankment were all carefully considered, especially 
when actors had to walk past the river in any given scene. 
Every aspect of the pro-filmic space, including colour gradients, light 
intensities, textures and flows were of the essence to him. Tarkovsky's attention to 
de~tail came from the view that if he was stirred by the special qualities of the 
materials utilized, which aroused memories and generated associations for him, then 
it would also be possible for audiences to be moved by such objects and textures. 
Synessios writes that this process goes even further so that what was an inextricable 
part of his childhood was recreated to express the truth of a particular moment of his 
life. On set, he and the crew spent most of their time talking together about intimate 
aspects, immersing themselves into the atmospheres and the characters of the 
film.443 
However, once filming started, he cast aside the entire shooting scrip, opting 
instead to write new scenes and dialogue each day. One of the main characters, 
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Margarita Terekhova, who plays Alexei's wife and also his mother, was never given 
the script until the day of the shoot. This was because he did not want her to find out 
what happened to her, nor what would happen to her in the future; he only wanted 
her to live through the moments that she would be acting that day. He believed that 
scripts were merely an occasion for reflection and that they had to be shed once 
shooting started. A film, he believed, should grow organically from the objects and 
locations touching the moods of the characters and director, transporting them to 
their intimate inner spaces. In an interview that he gave in 1985 he said that of all the 
films he had ever made, Mirror was nearest to his concept of cinema. His aesthetic 
and ethical preoccupations, including his ideas about rhythm, editing, mise-en-scene, 
framing, his conscience and responsibility as filmmaker, all find voice in this film. 444 
Important to my discussion is the force of his films, which he said should 
flow from an inner psychological reality, in which the director should generate a 
unique sense of time. This sense of time he famously referred to as the "time-
pressure" of each shot, which is independent from real time. By real time he means 
to indicate the time of chronologically laid out events of a narrative and also the 
abstract, standardized time of a clock. By time-pressure, Tarkovsky means the inner 
sense of time, through which a distinct personal reality can be created. He wrote that 
the cinematic image was "essentially the observation of a fact flowing in time." 
Attention to time yielded an abundance of memories, which, in tum, moved freely 
in time in his films. Cinema therefore raises, in Proust's words, "a vast edifice to 
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memories. "445 In Sculpting in Time, Tarkovsky describes cinema as "a sculpture 
made out of time," a notion that informs every aspect of his filmmaking, including 
the camera movements, rhythm, decor, texture, mise-en-scene and editing. 
Combining these elements together changes the flow of time, creating the distinct 
"time-pressure" of each shot. Each shot and sequence therefore has its own imprint 
of time. Rather than editing generating the rhythm of a film, the time-pressure 
composes the rhythm in which, each shot vibrates with its own internal time and 
makes the film come alive. 446 Tracking such an internalized time, which spreads 
through every shot in the film, Tarkovsky generates some of the most brilliant 
timescapes in cinematic history. 
Painterliness 
Pursuant to the make-up of each shot's internal time-pressure, which generates the 
rhythms of Mirror, and the painstaking attention given to the mise-en-scene, some of 
the most deeply affective cinematography in cinema has been created. The sequence 
noted earlier, in which children are playing in the snowy hills by a river, where, in 
the concluding shot we see a sparrow alighting on Asafiev's head, is reminiscent of a 
painting by Pieter Bruegel the Elder. Entitled, Winter Landscape with a Bird Trap 
(1565), Tarkovsky's images makes the painting come alive. The moving images 
animate the proportions, rhythms, colours and light gradients of the painting. These 
visions from paintings are not unusual. Indeed, all his films have allusions to 
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paintings either directly, as in Andrei Rublev (1966), which he devoted entirely to 
the life of the fine icon painter from Medieval Russia, or indirectly, as in the 
Bruegelian landscape. In this, Tarkovsky's films are painterly in two ways: they 
directly reference paintings and they adopt the affective gradients of painting . 
. In one direct reference Alexei, as a young boy of twelve, is looking at a thick 
massive book placed on a rough wooden table. In this medium close-up shot he is 
su1Tounded by trees and foliage enveloping his dacha (house) in the countryside. In 
an earlier scene we see him leafing through this very book, which he now gazes at 
intently. The spectator perceives that his keen attention to the book makes it special 
to him. Shortly after, we hear his twin sister teasing him about how she would reveal 
to their parents that he had stolen it. In an earlier scene, seated by the window 
enraptured, we see his hands, with fingernails laid under with dirt, leafing through 
the pages of this thick old tome. Absorbed in its contents, he turns the large pages of 
what are Leonardo's drawings and paintings. Each drawing is interspersed with 
tissue paper which, when he turns them, produces tiny, infiltrating sounds. As he 
leafs through the book music, following from the previous shot, floats into the air; it 
is Bach's St. Matthew Passion. As the minor rhythms of the music softly folds into 
the densities of Leonardo's drawings, a solemn, deeply personal moment affects the 
air. It is a transformative moment that takes us into deep quietude, as we absorb its 
beauty. Touching not only Alexei, but also the spectator's senses, this scene is highly 
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suggestive of Tarkovsky's personal love of music and paintings, whose myriad 
references are woven into each of his films. 
Even if not presenting direct allusions to old painters, almost any shot that 
Tarkovsky creates is a painterly composition, and this would be true for any of his 
films. The colour-tones, light-intensities, rhythms, compositions, the attitude of the 
characters, their gestures, affectations and postures can only be described as live 
paintings moving in time. The painterliness of his films emanates from the time-
pressure of each shot, the attention apportioned to the mise-en-scene and 
cinematography, the combination of which generate the transparencies of perception 
and, correspondingly, the moods and atmospheres of the moments. In recurring 
visions from his childhood, we see the shaven twins at age five in various scenarios. 
These scenes, like haunting dreams, weave into the film at various moments. Shot in 
monochrome and in slow motion, they are mesmerizing, coming to present the 
unspeakable and deeply emotional forces sweeping through childhood. 
In an early sequence we are introduced to the twins when they are little, their 
two shaven heads joined together in some secretive collusion. Sitting on a wooden 
bench at a dining table, they giggle and play with each other in whispered tones. A 
few shots later, after the scene where a shed catches on fire, a cut brings us to 
Alexei, sleeping peacefully in bed. He is cocooned in layers of white sheets which 
show lace at the edges. The film is shot in sepia tones, with the barest hints of 
colour. The hand-held camera sways slightly as it hovers over the bed and we notice 
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his eyelids twitching. Suddenly, he awakens. Sounds float through the air filling up 
the atmosphere as we see him staring intently at something offscreen, still entwined 
in sheets. The shot cuts to an image that recurs several times in the film. It is a black 
and white shot in slow motion in which the tall grass and dense foliage sways in the 
breeze. These shots are always softly accented with the hollow sound of wind 
blowing through the grass. The sound is still very low, hovering just above what is 
barely perceptible, emphasized now with the echo ofbirdcalls. The camera tracks 
through the foliage where, all of a sudden, a gust of wind forcefully bends the young 
trees and vines, the sound of the wind intensifying. The shot then cuts back to little 
Alexei, who is now lying in bed his eyes wide open. In a whispery, hoarse tone he 
calls, "papa." A birdcall thickens the air and we see him rising out of bed, with a hint 
of bells ringing, suggestive of a procession of sad-clowns. We see a lace curtain 
hanging against the window, the image of the little boy in his dressing gown leaping 
out of bed. The folds of the enveloping sheets, the hanging curtains, the strangeness 
of the gleaming ornate metal balustrades of the bed-frame, all creating the aura of a 
haunted dream. In these dream-shots nothing is explicable; the atmospheres created 
are thick with feelings of the unknown experienced sometimes in childhood. In these 
dreams, invisible things occur through mysterious silent forces, inducing irrational 
fears. 
These shot compositions with hints of perceptible sound are intangible, 
expressing the enigmatic forces experienced in childhood. These delicate yet 
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powerful vignettes, shot in black and white and in slow motion, emphasize the 
qualities of depth, form, pattern and texture rather than emotion, which is suggested 
more through colour tones. The intensity of sensations experienced in black and 
white tonalities is much more acute than if experienced in colour film. The varying 
light tonalities reflecting off the different objects arranged in the mise-en-scene also 
create greater dynamics between light and shadow, enhancing the image's dramatic 
qualities. We frequently see slivers of light escaping from his childhood dacha, 
which sometimes appears as a dark haunted house. Tarkovsky's camera, always in 
motion, weaves between darkness and shadow, between large expanses of drab walls 
and dimly lit windows, much like the dark and light tones experienced in 
Rembrandt's Baroque paintings. Black and white tones distinct to dreams bring out 
the patterns, forms and textures of the voluminous white sheets, the shadows 
produced by the hanging lace curtains, the folds of the papery-thin cotton 
nightgown, the dark shadows on the walls, the glimmer of shiny objects. All these 
forms and patterns articulate the abstract qualities of dreams by emptying the image 
of colour. 
The slow motion of the dream sequences enhances this abstract vision where, 
what is occurring, follows only an inexplicable strange force. Everything familiar is 
somehow out of reach, floating away in the night air. Nothing is graspable when 
Alexei in his loose nightgown approaches the doorway and a white cloth flies 
miraculously through the adjoining room. The image that follows of his mother 
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washing her hair is perhaps one of the finest haunting scenes in the entire film. 
Almost weightless, she dangles her white arms about unsteadily, accompanied by 
echoed sounds of water dripping from her abundant hair. At this point the light 
intensity is increased, imparting a silvery glow to the image, making the shot ever so 
slightly out-of-this-world. The affected rhythm of Maria waving her arms about in 
slow motion transmits a vaporous weightlessness to the figure, suggestive of an 
apparition in a Henry Fuseli painting. 
Auricular sensations: micro sounds, poetry, music 
Accentuating the light and colour, the gestures of the figures, the camera movements 
and the slow-motion are the beguiling sounds underlaying the film. The sound 
tonalities are rarely noticed consciously as they hover at a level where they are 
barely perceptible. Sometimes hinting by presenting undertones and sometimes 
heightening the image's dream like qualities, they glide through, whisper and haunt 
the air around and beyond the screen-space. The hollow echoes of familiar birdcalls, 
Alexei's rasping cry, the faint ringing of bells, the sound of trees bending to a fierce 
wind and water dripping, fold into the visual qualities of the image. These tonalities 
appear as sounds floating in the air, cascading back and forth from one shot to 
another, circulating at various timbres, pitches and volumes. Rather than convey 
messages or meaningful dialogue they bring the senses to experience feelings that 
are not yet graspable. These feelings are evocative, bringing the mind into inklings 
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of pasts; their hints stirring up memories covered with layers of dust. These sounds, 
full of echoes, generate vague, nebulous feelings, awakening fragments of 
experience, of uncertain memories. Their reverberation in these dreamscapes kindle 
and animate the spectator's senses to submerge into the deep pasts of childhood. 
Alongside these sound tones, however, is the more perceptible and concrete 
voice ofTarkovsky's father, Arseni, reciting his poems. His voice punctuates the 
film at various points. Such a point occurs when the documentary footage of the war 
is shown. In one particular clip we are shown soldiers walking in long stretches of 
muck along riverbanks and sometimes in knee-high water. They are weary and worn 
out, some with guns slung on their backs, some without shoes, some with torn pants. 
They seem to be pulling thick ropes attached to a crude raft which carries a huge 
cannon. We hear subtle sounds of water being treaded by soldiers as they walk, 
occasionally accompanied by the beating of military drums. As the soldiers walk in 
harsh conditions, we see stoicism in their demeanour. The tones are gray and flat and 
fill up the scene with a heavy airlessness that is suffused with a penetrating silence. 
This silence is suddenly pierced with poetic gesture, where the non-diagetic 
recitation comments and reflects on the condition of human immortality flowing 
through time through the different generations and into the future. It begins, "I trust 
not premonitions/ I fear not omens/ I flee not from slander or poison/ There is no 
death. We are all immortal/ All is immortal/ Fear not death at seventeen/ Nor at 
seventy/ There is only reality and light." Sweeping the film into poetic gesture, the 
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voice and images fold into each other. However, the fold produces a dissonance, in 
which the words of the poem are in counterpoint to the image. What is the weariness 
of the soldiers is to be considered through the greater condition of humanity, 
"serving forefather and grandson." In carrying out this movement through time, from 
one generation to another, the poem tries to console the heavy losses that the men 
have borne. While the penetrating voice is in sympathy with their courageous and 
heroic acts, their weary faces and bodies show a less valiant aspect. They are worn 
out by the brutality of a war. 
It is this poem that weaves between the war footage and the aforementioned 
Bruegelian scene, where children are playing on the snowy hill. Speaking of the 
future, the poem moves on to "I rise in the stirrups of the future as a boy." At this 
point the image cuts to the scene where children, like dark little speckles, ar·e playing 
in the white snow. There is a tree in the foreground and a river running through in 
the background. A horse draws a sleigh and a boy slides his sled on the snow. We 
see Asafiev carrying a briefcase climbing up the hill; there is a resemblance here 
between the weary gait of the soldiers and his own. He stumbles in the snow as he 
climbs, just like the soldiers walking through mud and then he takes a glance 
backwards, as if into the past, towards the merry scene. As he climbs the hill the 
recitation continues: "I am content in my immortality/ With my blood coursing from 
century to century/ I'll gladly give my life./ For a safe comer of warmth/ If life's 
swift needle/ Did not draw me on as though I were a thread." Through this recitation 
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we see him emerging from the background, a small figure which becomes larger in a 
medium close-up shot. As he walks he is lost in thought, expressing a blank stare. As 
he stands in front of the camera it is not hard to notice that he is alone, a lonely 
figure separated from the other children who play merrily with each other. His 
isolation stands in strong contrast to the vast expanse of the countryside and also, 
more poignantly~ to the poetic text itself, which speaks of being content with 
immortality. To a young boy who becomes orphaned by war, this sensibility holds 
little comfort. Image and sound, once again, produces dissonance. The scene is 
tinged with irony as we hear the idyllic words and come to understand the real 
conditions suffered by the boy. As the poem draws to an end, the camera has a full 
close-up of his face. Teardrops are streaming down his cheeks as he bravely tries to 
muster a whistle; he then looks sideways, into the distance. 
Musicality 
Perhaps the most moving phrases in the film occur in the folding of music with 
vision. While there are elements of irony and dissonance between vision and sound, 
for the most part, vision is synchronized with the sounds that underlay it. Glimpses 
of light, hints of camera movements, the tactility of the objects, are synchronized 
with haunting, barely perceptible tones. The film, however, is swept to another level 
with the darkly intense Baroque musical scores. Set alongside the languid visual 
elements that are deeply personal, Bach, Pergolesi and Purcell's music set us on an 
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inward journey throughout the film. Perhaps it is that the attunement between image 
and sound maintains such perfect pitch at certain moments in the film that their 
assemblage is transformative. They take the spectator to the depths of 
contemplation, even towards a spiritual experience. 
In one such experience near the end of the film Alexei, as a boy of twelve, 
along with his mother, have arrived at the house of a doctor's wife. His mother Maria 
wants the doctor's wife to buy her turquoise earrings, as she needs money. The two 
women disappear into an adjoining room leaving Alexei waiting in the room alone. 
What follows is a simple reverie that Alexei has, which turns into a meditation on 
the cinematic gaze and on the reflection-image. What is important is that this 
movement inward would not occur with the same intensity were it not for the music, 
which carries the affective flows of the camera's gaze, Alexei's gaze and the 
spectator's gaze (and contemplation) seamlessly. 
The scene is bracketed by the flickering of an oil lamp accompanied by the 
faint sound of milk dripping from a table into a pool on the floor. Apart from these 
hints of sound there is a pervading silence, which all the more accentuates the music 
when it becomes audible. The room is encompassed mostly in darkness and shadow 
but for the gold light-tones from the flickering lamp. The walls made from wooden 
beams have rich brown tones, matching the ornate wooden furniture. The scene is 
enveloped in stillness as Alexei settles on a wooden stool set in the room; his hands 
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folded into each other, he appears awkward and out of place. He lacks shoes and his 
feet are muddy from the long walk earlier. He crouches, his posture caving in. 
The shot then cuts to a table with two bulbous potatoes on it, one with half its 
skin peeled, the peel lying alongside. The small pool of spilt milk accunmlating at 
the edge of the table gives off a chalky white colour that is conspicuous against the 
dark furniture. Upon hearing a faint sound of liquid dripping, a characteristic 
Tarkovskian sound-tonality, the camera pans slowly downward. The furniture all 
along the vertical axis is drenched with milk, which quickly takes on an ominous 
aura. We see this chalky liquid accumulating in an expanding pool on the floor, the 
dripping sounds becoming emphasized. At this point a passage from Bach's St. John 
Passion begins to envelop the air almost imperceptibly. 
The camera cuts to a shot of Alexei's head, which is set against a broad oval 
mirror hanging on the opposite wall. Alexei finds himself looking into this oval, 
immediately transfixed. Unable to tum away from his own gaze he is absorbed in 
looking at his own reflection, the camera zooming into this reflected image. 
Suggestive of a Baroque painting, the image is a portrait of Alexei, with the still life 
of potatoes and spilt milk appearing to his rear, all these elements enframed by the 
oval borders of the antique mirror. As the music swells, the camera zooms slowly 
and continuously into the mirror, Alexei's deeply reflective gaze intensifying. 
Suddenly, the light tonalities change from the soft golden glows into a more bluish, 
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cooler light. At this point Alexei is deeply lost in contemplating his own image, as is 
the spectator, the light changing his image subtly so that it is turning into a specter. 
This magnificent shot which takes Alexei to an inward passage 
contemplating his own image, also finds the spectator gazing at him reflecting on his 
own gaze. This gaze forks into another gaze in which the spectator finds themselves 
attentive to their own inner states. There are therefore at least three levels of 
affective movements folding into each other at this point: the camera's gaze, Alexei's 
and the audience's. This movement of reflections, which springs and emanates 
continually from the one to the other, is carried out seamlessly by the somber tones 
of the music. The Passion, itself a solemn hymn, is entwined in this flow 
bequeathing the movement of reflections. The music produces the kinetic force 
m~cessary to affect the visual elements and also, in tum, to be affected by them. The 
auricular folds into micro fields of light, movement and matter, enveloping the 
spectator's field of experience; it is a transformative moment in the film, in which we 
come into an encounter with ourselves. 
The next shot cuts not to Alexei's reflection, but directly to him as he looks 
into the mirror. His pale face has some shadows on it, his hair flaming in orangy-red 
tones, the rich dark wood surrounding him glimmers at certain angles. The camera 
slowly zooms into a close up, revealing all at once a serious, sad, blank and beautiful 
countenance. It is a deeply affective moment, nothing short of a powerful intensity. 
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Virtual movements: mezzo fields 
Flows of musicality, painterliness or the poetical, as I have suggested, occur through 
micro flows, which aggregate and diffuse in time, presenting a constant flux in the 
film's intensities, rhythms, tonalities and textures. Bach's St. Matthew Passion, 
Fuseli's nightmarish apparitions or Arsenei's poems are not specific to Mirror, yet 
their appearance present micro sensations, aggregating into the very becoming of the 
mezzo fields. Needless to say, what is musical, painterly or poetical in Mirror does 
not occur by the mere injection of Leonardo's sketches or Bach's musical excerpts, 
which could be characterized as organized molar fields. Rather, the becoming 
musical or painterly of Mirror occurs by the micro tonalities of sounds, the micro 
textures of light and colour and the micro movements of the long durational shots to 
enfold each other. As Massumi writes, "the visual limit-field is [in]sufficient to 
produce vision. "447 Vision, in fact, is produced from the intermodalities among the 
various senses, forming an "open ... field of experience. The virtual self-standing of 
vision actually takes place in a crowded bubble. "448 From the multitude of different 
micro movements emerges the aggregated body of painterliness, a larger body 
assembled from the various camera movements, colourings, textures, movements, 
shapes and sounds. Painterliness arises from among the different micro movements 
that emerge in perception as what is painterly. It emerges from the micro folds 
between colour, movements, sound and tactility. Painterliness might be 
characterized, therefore, as a hyperbolic topology of a virtual field of experience. 
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In the image of Alexei peering into the mirror reflecting on his image there 
are several micro movements. In this scene we have the rich dark tones of the wood 
enveloping the room, the gold tones of light from the flickering oil lamp, the music 
of the Passion, the slow pans of the camera hovering in the air or zooming into a 
close-up of Alexei's face and so forth. As the spectator gazes into the image, each 
micro field forms relations with the others. Each of these dynamic fields are mobile 
blocks which become partial objects in which its others maintain their virtual 
relations in a given moment.449 In this scene, the visual elements, sound, tactility and 
camera movements present their flows across each other as partial objects giving rise 
to the whole -- the cinematic image. And, as Massumi writes, "any whole is 
virtual. "450 The cinematic image thereby emerges through virtual relations that are 
imperceptible but, nonetheless, perpetually circulate with the dynamic micro fields. 
That is, the cinematic image occurs in the folds between micro fields and their 
virtual hyperbolic topology. 
Virtual movement is therefore the greatest movement of what become 
cinematic, generating poetical and painterly fields of experience.451 And while 
virtual movement of the cinematic image is the "indistinctness" of micro movements 
between fields, Deleuze writes that it generates the "transformation of terms" in 
which the relations between the various micro fields become modified. 452 Where the 
greatest movement occurs is also where the duration of thought and perception are 
altered in their becoming.453 The virtual event arising in an image can be any two or 
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more fields, and although imperceptible and never fully formed, temporally makes 
them its own. Virtual events, thereby, create those relations and speeds that the 
images' densities accumulate, in between clarity and ambiguity of the perceiving 
eye. 
Thus, rather than draw from what at times have perceived to be two settled 
and singularising mediums such as poetry and painting, we set forth from molecular 
relations, from the speeds and movements of two assembling bodies or dynamic 
fields. Dynamic fields fold into each other through the virtual relations occurring, 
forming an image. We move from open assemblages into other open assemblages; it 
is, as Deleuze and Guattari write, the situation of machines connecting to other 
machines to infinity, and where we also find that "the self and non-self, outside and 
inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever. "454 These dynamic fields are 
thereby desubjectified, empty of ego, becoming wholly processes. The virtual 
relations of the cinematic flux generating between fields, moreover, move in the fold 
between the extrinsic-physico mechanism (organic-inorganic-synthetic matter) and 
the intrinsic-psychic mechanism (desire-spirituality-mental perception) in the 
connection between the poetic and painterly machines.455 In the associations and 
synchronizations of dynamic fields in flux, the poetical-historical-painterly-musical 
in Mirror pass into each other making it impossible to know where each body begins 
and ends in the image. In the virtual relations of the image, the cinematic (and non-
cii.nematic) flux passing across dynamic fields gives rise to sensations of an emerging 
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form-likeness: musicality, poetics or painterliness. In the scenes where Alexei is 
leafing through the book of paintings by Leonardo, when he gazes into his reflected 
image in the mirror or when we see Asafiev climbing the hill, the intermodality 
among the senses presents its encounter with the object(s). These mezzo fields are 
emergent, unbounded and also, therefore, fields of experience of the perceiving eye. 
The folding between fields brings forth the measureless, virtual time of duration, in 
which objects are in flux and in the making. 
Shared terms of measurement: a note 
In addition to the folding of extrinsic matter into perception, a brief note needs to be 
added with respect to the historical and cultural memory planes of images. The 
interpenetration between film images and spectator brings us into another 
relationality between image and mind, as images come to be experienced in several 
dimensions. On the one hand, there are the "shared terms of measurement" that 
Ranciere writes about.456 These shared terms generate a predisposition to how 
relations have come to be expressed over time in literature, poetry, the visual and 
performative arts. Shared terms among the arts, in their aesthetic, social, 
philosophical or political dimensions have been perceived and come to be 
understood in certain ways. It is in and through such expressions, in their varied 
resemblance, similarity or simulation to other events occurring in the world that we 
can come to perceive them partially or fully (or escape them altogether).457 
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On the other hand, the familiarity and deftness with which Tarkovsky 
constructs his cinematic form with respect to such shared measurements might 
escape the spectator unfamiliar with these terms. However, while the more particular 
forms might escape some, such Bruegel's landscapes, the reference to Pushkin, the 
Bach or Purcell's scores, most spectators today would be quite familiar with images 
from WWII. Mao's famous portrait, the fervent waving of the little Red Book and 
mass rallies, the mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are well 
recognized. The circulation of these images forming a world memory of common 
images in the western cultural vocabulary, in tum, also generates personal memories. 
Accompanying these familiar images are the various musical scores and sound 
effects. Scores from classical and popular music, recognizable in themselves, also 
form a collective musical vocabulary. 
Beyond musical compositions however, there is a stockpile of micro sounds 
and micro images, which we have come to perceive and register. These micro 
sounds, associated with media images, are the various sound tonalities from which 
we are able to sense a dangerous situation or a comical one. Micro images, similarly, 
present a short-hand for associated meanings and values in the social realm. 
Learned, digested and accreted over years by watching Hollywood and large 
distribution films, as well as from television programming, the internet and new 
media sources, the specific timbre, pitch and resonance of these sound tones and 
image fragments convey common cultural registers, invoking sensations, moods or 
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emotions. These micro sounds and images become the shared terms of measurement 
from which we come to sense the forces flowing through media machines. In the 
hands of a creative artist, these common terms may be inverted, combined or 
divested from their commonly understood measurement, producing nuances in how 
we come to experience familiar sounds and images. 
In coming to terms with the flows between image-mind, it must be 
understood that movements located outside what is the cinematic continue into the 
image-event. That is, whatever flows and touches, passes through the image-event 
and ultimately emerges to an outside. Flows constituted from an outside, pass 
through an inner space, proceeding to another. Leonardo's sketches or Bach's 
Passion flow into the image-event from an outside, from what is classified as 
Renaissance art or Baroque music. These movements flow into what is an inner 
psychological space from which Tarkovsky comes to produce and relay from within 
his own movements of these, as another fold. In the further folding of movements, 
therefore, what is outside comes to touch what is inside. Moving through such an 
inner psychological space (which includes the variations among fields such as 
drawings, music, dreams and memories), Tarkovsky produces his own singular 
assemblage of these - Mirror. This singular movement emerges into an outside, the 
image-event. Moreover, in receiving movements from the outside, movements from 
within are evoked for spectators. In these enfolding spaces the farthest outside 
comes to touch the deepest inside in the fold between matter and consciousness. The 
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scene in which Alexei gazes into his own reflection in the mirror, the image folds 
and unfolds continuously between micro fields that layer and cascade through it, 
creating sensations and impressions. Undulating between the gold micro tones of the 
oil lamp, the rich colours and textures of wood furniture, dripping milk and peeled 
potatoes, the base tones and harmonic form of the Passion along with the languid 
camera movements, the event folds not only between character-image-spectator, but 
also through a history and through cultural traditions of painting-music-technique. 
Memory-images, dream-images, fictive and imaginary spaces are those 
virtual, immanent images in stages of becoming. Images, therefore, rather than being 
incubated from a self-sustaining and impervious inside, are produced in the folds 
between personal memory, a world memory, documentary footage, historical, 
cultural and other realms. Mirror, therefore, constitutes such an inside-outside space 
in which the extrinsic folds of matter (music-painting-documentary footage) 
continue into the intrinsic folds of perception (Tarkovsky's childhood-war-dreams-
creative impulses), which then continue into the world (the film itself). This 
touching between the inside and its expression to the outside occurs through the 
infinite movement of matter folding between infinite worlds and infinite minds, 
inflecting and refracting points of view in a curvilinear space. In a universe of 
images what is matter and what is consciousness become interpenetrating flows: "an 
image is the expression of matter. .. matter is tantamount to perception. "458 Within 
such an ontological materialism it will become possible to say therefore that what is 
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matter and mind form a fold and are continuous flows. The traditional dichotomies 
of what is inside-outside or what is subject-object will be considered further in the 
following chapter, in virtue of an ontological indifference among image, movement, 
matter and light, which are equivalent to each other in the materialism put forward 
by Henri Bergson. 
Conclusion 
In considering Mirror through its painterly, poetical and auricular/musical flows, I 
have tried to show how the aggregation of micro folds develop into a shapelikeness. 
Light, sound, movement and matter unfolding in time can aggregate and swell into 
surfaces, which become auricular/musical, painterly and poetical. The fold of 
musicality is the aggregation of various micro fields folding into each other. Pitch, 
timbre and intensity along with light, colour, balance, materiality, rhythm and 
movement are factors. Similarly, what constitutes the mezzo fold of painterliness 
occurs not only from the folding among micro fields oflight and colour, but also 
from movement, rhythm, tactility, sound and balance. Just as pure sound is not 
sufficient for the auricular experience, the pure visual field is insufficient for 
producing vision. The different sensory organs come to fold into perception through 
the intermodular connection among the senses, giving rise to the painterly, poetical 
and auricular/musical folds. Their connection forms a virtual hyperbolic topology of 
the moving image. 
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The folding among fields of micro matter forms shapes, and these shapes 
take form through virtual relations occurring in the mind. In these virtual 
connections of folding, duration is experienced as a continuous flow that moves 
between perception and the temporal media object perceived. The virtual relations 
experienced in the fold between image and mind, give rise to a free and personal 
time that is not given to the chronological measurement of time. 
In the continuous movement between image and mind, perception folds and 
unfolds between clear and obscure sensations. Through dialog, words or other 
linguistic devices in a film, the folds of perception distend into the larger sinuous 
surface of thought, which bring greater clarity to the media object. On the other 
hand, such clarity can be destabilized when micro fields fold into each other 
endlessly. In vague dialog or in the murmuring of sounds, the auricular field 
becomes cryptic and indefinable. The different sensory organs fold into each other 
endlessly producing an incomprehensible mass of folds that make perception 
inchoate and obscure. In these folding and distending movements, in which 
perception oscillates between indistinctness and clarity, we come to experience the 
film. 
In taking the forms of painterly, musical and poetic shapes, Mirror does not 
unfold through the internalized logic of a story and plot or through linguistic 
elements that would generate the clarity of thought. Rather, the film produces 
amorphous shapes. The strands of colour, sound, movement and matter enduring in 
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time give rise to sensations in the spectator, producing impressions. These 
impressions, woven together, make up the shapes of the film. These shapes produce 
gradients of sensation and thresholds of thought, rather than distinct thinking. 
From the strands of colour, sound, movement and matter that the spectator 
connects with, memories come to be evoked. Memories emerge from the micro 
sensations rather than the other way around (that is, memories do not produce micro 
sensations). Micro sensations evoke the depths, arousing memories in the spectator. 
From the micro impressions produced, the larger painterly or poetic fields of the film 
emerge. 
Dream-shots, hallucination-shots, vision-shots and other types of shots, 
therefore, evoke memories and fields of experience in the spectator., From ambient 
sounds, the monochromatic film stock and high-key lighting looms a strange figure 
of Maria waving her arms about as she washes her hair in the water barrel. In the 
capacity of micro sensations to be affected by each other in a virtual topology of the 
image, the spectator courses through a whirlwind of emotions and sensations from 
which memories are evoked and fields of experience come to be formed. 
From the circulating fragments of time -- the vision-shots, memory-shots, 
dream-shots -- the spectator experiences their own fleeting connections with them. 
The different shots are the varying streams of time, of many pasts and futures, and 
are to be understood as bodies without organs. As they arise in the film, we come to 
form our own experiences with them. Shots of past memories and of future visions 
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circulate as free bodies, generating our momentum with them as we move along with 
them. These shots take us into spaces and emotions specific to the film, and in doing 
so, they also transport the spectator to their own memories, thoughts and emotions. 
In Mirror, filmic matter, rather than arriving linguistically through the 
narrative structure and plot, is encountered through the plastic mass of material, 
which is a-signifying and a-syntactic. This material is neither a language-system nor 
a language. The modulation of images between sensory, kinetic, intensive, affective, 
rhythmic, tonal and other flows makes up the image's signaletic material. In the 
whirlwind generating from among these forces, neither logic nor reason might be 
extracted from Mirror. 459 Only when language gets hold of this amorphous material 
that utterances arise, becoming a system of language, which then comes to reference, 
airnnge and categorize thoughts and concepts. Contrary to this end, Mirror 
specifically, and works of art in general, should not be attributed to purposefulness 
and neither should they be experienced in the logic of reason. By virtue of its 
sensually formed matter, the image as whole is perceived through the virtual 
relations occurring among micro fields. In this understanding, Birgit Kaiser writes 
that Deleuze's Leibniz of The Fold suggests a reinvention of aesthetics that turns 
from the Kantian strain. As Caygill notes, Deleuze provides "a series of complex 
concatenations between a topology of perception--which stresses the continuity and 
complexity of a complex and intuition in opposition to Kant's rigorous separation of 
them--and a theory of affectivity. 11460 
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The Leibnizian ground of aesthetics is to be found in Alexander G. 
Baumgarten's Metaphysica (1742) and Aesthetica (1750/58), works that credit him 
with being the originator of the discipline of aesthetics. Contrary to .the 
Enlightenment spirit of rationality, especially that of Christian Wolfs, Baumgarten 
argues for the proper consideration of what was derisively referred to as the lower 
faculties. Holding that philosophy reduced to logic and reason presents a narrow and 
limited range of understanding, he advocated overcoming this deficiency by 
broadening inquiry into the other faculties "of the soul." Aesthetics was this 
broadening of the field, in which he sought to consider forms of thillking beyond the 
"distinct." Logic and the "distinct," therefore, were narrow forms of science and 
knowledge in his estimation, which "reserve[ ed] the laws of sensate and vivid 
knowledge, even if it [knowledge] should not rise to distinctness, in its most precise 
sense, for a separate science. This latter he [the author] names aesthetics."461 In his 
foundational Aesthetica, published a decade later, he presents aesthetics as scientia 
cognitionis sensitivae, drawing upon Leibniz's theory of perception, presenting the 
differentials of consciousness in the relation between the "confused" and the 
"distinct. "462 
In the return to Leibniz's theory of perception, superseded by Kant's 
transcendental aesthetics, Deleuze reintroduces the continuity of m!cro perceptions 
between the dark depths of the obscure ground and the bright light of a distinct one, 
and therefore of the continuity between logic and aesthetic truth and also between 
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sensations and conceptual thought. Sensations enfolded in conceptual thinking bring 
the one into relations with the other, wherein Ranciere writes that such an 
enfoldment points to the power of the sensate itself, in which it is of and also for 
thought. 463 Perceptual experience moves in between distinct and indistinct zones of 
sensation, which correspond to clear and obscure thought, undoing the discreteness 
between sensation and thought. Forever caught in movements between the 
enveloping darkness and the emerging light, we find ourselves wandering in 
Tarkovsky's masterpiece, moving into the evening vespers and treading into the faint 
rays of an emerging light. 
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Chapter Five 
The Folding of Media-Events: liquid memory, liquid perception 
... the infinite fold separates or moves between matter and 
soul ... the outside and the inside. Because it is a virtuality that 
never stops dividing itself, the line of inflection is actualized in the 
soul but realized in matter, each one on its own side ... inspiring a 
new harmony ... 
-- Deleuze 464 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I tried to show that what becomes the film Mirror is in fact 
the confluence of micro flows among the genetic elements which fold into each 
other in the moving image. Their aggregation extends into what are the larger flows, 
which I have sketched, emphasizing dynamic fields of perception of what becomes 
painterliness, poetic gesture and musicality within the singular filmic event. The 
film's macro flows occur therefore by the aggregation of micro flows of the genetic 
elements, in which macro perceptions are the product of differential relations 
established among micro perceptions. 465 In extending the conceptual personae of the 
fold to this chapter, I will continue tracking micro flows and micro movements, but 
now in how they produce the folding between media-events and also how such 
folding might produce singular experiences. Sound, light, movement and matter as 
they endure in time fold amongst each other to constitute the singularity of an event. 
I will therefore need to change tenor from the specificity of a single work in order to 
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consider how perception, matter and the image work in a single interpenetrative 
circuitry among varied media-events. Such an approach will lead me to address 
major issues such as perception being internal to matter, the ontology of image-
matter and the matter-image, subjectless-subjectivity, the nature of an event and 
machinic consciousness, all of which are constituent to the relation of folding 
between media-events. With such an undertaking I ultimately hope to underscore the 
position that the metaphysics ofthe fold produces continuities in duration in the 
encounter with media events. In the folding of images from one event to another, 
memory and perception come to fold into each other, making the experience of 
duration continuous. In tracking the enfoldment of memory and perception in 
duration, the relation of sensation in works of art to the production of thought will be 
scrutinized. 
Rather than establish the theoretical ground from which the exegesis of 
media-events proceed, I will oscillate between the ground of theory and media 
analysis, and so advance the interpenetration between theoretical examination and 
empiricism. In this chapter I continue expanding aspects of perception in Bergso-
Deleuze's ontology of the image, as well as present Deleuze's ontology of 
subjectivity, the event and machinic consciousness.466 However, while this chapter 
focuses on Deleuze and Bergson's materialist ontology, these elements will come to 
be shaped by the liquid wave of the fold, with Deleuze-Leibniz. The fold will 
become the constant force that molds the discursive elements of this chapter, the 
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conceptual movements and the shape of the fold being complimentary rather than 
antagonistic. 
I.- t! r~' '""'71'"1" 
Central to my consideration in this chapter, I will present the movements in 
perception beyond cinema, to show how memory and perception move between 
images that are cinematic and non-cinematic in the experience of a media-event. The 
media-events chosen, such as POL and Model! 5, which are two live perfonnances 
by the German duo Granular Synthesis, the performances by Survival Research 
Laboratories, and Toni Dove's Spectropia, produce these liquid movements between 
the cinematic and non-cinematic. Moreover, this movement of liquidity also presents 
the opportunity for considering the complexity of the present. As I will show, the 
continuous moving line of the present occurs in the folds, between the perception of 
matter and layers of memory. 
Moving from an introduction of POL and Model! 5, I consider how it is 
possible to extract conscious perception between what is "real" in the world and 
what is the "appearance of the real" (the cinematic image), in the unfolding event. It 
is from this constant condition in perceptual movement, between the "real" and 
"appearance" that the major questions and queries of this chapter arise. In trying to 
grasp the folding between what is traditionally considered non-image-matter (the 
real) and the matter of an image (cinematic) in contemporary live media-events, I 
will consider Bergson and Deleuze's ontology of the image. In the folding between 
perception and media-events, the ontological difference among the genetic elements 
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of the cinematic and non-cinematic image will come into question. Contrary to this 
understanding I will consider Bergson's postulate that the world is made up of 
images, wherein the cinematic and the non-cinematic come to be considered equally 
as images. 
The plane of immanence, on which the world is made up of images, 
perception of what is "real" and "appearance" becomes minor in degree. This 
condition of imperceptible difference generates an understanding in how perception 
comes to fold between cinematic and non-cinematic images. In live contemporary 
performances such as POL or Toni Dove's Spectropia, images fold from cinematic 
to non-cinematic ones. Moreover, it should be understood that perception not only 
folds between the "matter-image" ("real" thing) and "image-matter" ("appearance" of 
thing), but also into memory.467 In the folding of perception with memory, the past 
and present coexist. Actual images fold into the virtual past and in this regard, 
perception folds among paintings, films, literature, plays, digital media and so on. 
The folding among events into memory develops a further understanding of how the 
inside comes to touch the outside in relation to mechanical, physical and conceptual 
fields. Shifts in these fields cause shifts and upheavals in the fold between the 
perception of events and virtual pasts. 
I will also consider the mechanism of perception itself, which occurs in the 
fold between the actual and the virtual, in order to track the continuous flow between 
matter and consciousness. In the experience of Model! 5, the euphoric audience 
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resembles and extends from the vibrating sound and image-matter. Perception of the 
event occurs, therefore, by a stretching out of vibrating matter to the receptive organ, 
wherein the inner psychic realm and the actual material vibrations received from the 
media-event come to form the smallest possible circuitry. In these tiniest of folds I 
will establish two queries: how do media-events come to fold and unfold from each 
other and how do differences and repetitions come to be negotiated. In examining 
what folds into perception as that which occurs between the actual and the virtual, I 
inquire into the virtual potential of performances. This virtual potential, in its 
actualization in the different unfolding media-events, comes to present the newness 
of experience. 
One major trajectory of this chapter therefore is related to this fluidity 
between perception and memory, which folds to form the newness of experience. In 
the latter part of this chapter I develop this trajectory more fully, showing how 
perception of media-events folds into memory in works by Grannular Synthesis and 
Survivial Research Laboratories, how films fold into paintings, as well as how a 
single interactive media work, such as Toni Dove's Spectropia, folds between film, 
theatre and video games. 
The major question of perceptual movement between cinematic and non-
cinematic images unfurls the two important trajectories of this chapter. The first, 
noted already, is related to the fluidity between perception and memory, which fold 
to form the newness of experience. The second trajectory proceeds in the direction 
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of establishing the materiality of the world in which, Bergson's postulate that the 
image is at the heart of matter and at all points in space, becomes key to 
understanding the machinic processes of the world. In understanding the image at 
the heart of all matter, the nature of images comes to be revealed as luminescence: 
images are figures of light, possessing visibility from an inside. From this postulate 
images present their own conditions of consciousness in which, consciousness rather 
than being about something as a representation of something, is something. Images, 
in this sense, are to be understood as a primary order of reality, rather than as 
secondary (as representations of the real). 
A world in which images present their own conditions of consciousness, the 
eye is the surface which comes to reflect that consciousness. The eye, as reflecting 
surface, presents the workings of the world that turns away from individualization 
and from a psychologized subjectivity. From this ground it becomes possible to 
consider the machinic processes of media-events, which give rise to difference and 
points of view. The points of view or perspectives achieved by reflecting eyes on a 
hyperbolic, curved surface are infinite, bringing forth the heterogeneity of 
difference. Subjectivity or the perspective from which a point of view occurs, 
therefore, is multicomponential, heterogeneous and non-individuated. Subjectivity, 
rather than a collection of personal experiences and as the condition of interiority, is 
instead the point from which the world comes to be reflected, in its objective 
structuring. From Leibniz's postulate that the world is in the subject as much as the 
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subject is in the world, the separation of world from subject becomes impossible. 
Subject and world arise in relation to each other, as an enfolded objective structure, 
undoing the notion of the subject's independence from world. A subjectless-
subjectivity and its relation to world condition the development of Deleuze's 
machinic consciousness in which, the infinite points of inflection on the curvature of 
the world establish not only the plurality of points of view, but also that each point 
within this infinity is a singular difference and a deterritorialized vision. 
In light of the above, I will develop how the conceptual persona of the fold 
presents a movement away from conceiving events through the mechanistic 
determinability of chronological time. In considering the virtual time of media-
events, the twisting of matter occurs in the fold between perception and memory. In 
hyperbolic space, physical, mechanical and conceptual forces come to exert pressure 
upon plastic matter, causing the matter of media-events to twist and tum. It is from 
the condition of perception and memory touching that the various strata given to a 
media-event curve into and out of the other. A strata's inner realm comes to fold with 
the outer regions of another, an activity achieved by the folding of matter which 
exerts forces on that matter. Amelia, a dance by La La La Human Steps becomes 
sculptural and a walk in the countryside with Richard Long becomes a performance. 
Toni Dove's Spectropia moves between cinema, theatre and video games. 
Pierception, arising in the movement of matter that is coming into experience, folds 
into the virtual past, generating possibilities for new experiences. A scene from 
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Tarkovsky's Mirror folds into a painting by Peiter Breugel, The Elder. The virtual 
past, in this way, coexists with the unfolding present, coming to provoke and shape 
the experience of new media-events. The folding between pasts and presents 
requires that we move away from the application of mechanical time (Chronos) in 
approaching experiences. The folds of any event yield an infinity of reflections and 
refractions, which move in multidimensional ways and are unencumbered by 
clockwork regimes. The time of experiences, thereby, oscillates between internal 
realms and matter, where virtual pasts come to shape presents and where presents 
may also continually come to be reformed and reinvented and thereby affect changes 
in pasts. 
Unsettling media frames 
As I noted in the previous chapter, the mobility of images traverse from one territory 
to another, whereby images move from and between sensual, conceptual, perceptual, 
cognitive and haptic realms. In this mobility, images transform from one quality to 
another: musical notes plunge into colour, or non-sense words arouse emotional 
sound textures. In this uncongealing, elastic quality, we might find that 
apprehending and qualifying what an image is arrests and paralyzes its fluidity. 
Thus, instead of inquiring about what the image is at defined points in time, we need 
to inquire into its onto genesis, its continual states of becoming as it moves through 
qualities and substances in time and space. Moreover, in the shifting transparencies 
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of clear and indistinct perception, the sensate gives rise to conceptual forms. Fields 
of perception aggregate into larger fields, in which inklings and sensual micro 
perceptions take on "shapelikeness," of thresholds of consciousness. It is with these 
two ideas, of elasticity and transparencies that I will commence this chapter, 
pressing into the molecular movements of the image's genetic elements. Elasticity 
and transparencies unsettle the boundedness of the image, which has come to be 
codified through its technological plane, for instance, the specificity of slam poetry, 
performance art, video, sculpture or dance. Indeed, as I have come to examine 
throughout this dissertation, the image is to be understood as suffusing the world, in 
excess of its traditionally assigned technical frame, which denotes a specific 
medium. 
The image's genetic elements, which aggregate and form the rhythm and 
flow of an image, fold among each other, furnishing the senses. 468 Along the 
continuum between micro and macro processes of perception, we come to perceive 
layers of indistinctness and clarity in images. In a media-event, light, sound, 
movement and matter in time, as molecular aggregates on the plane of immanence, 
circulate in smooth spaces, constituting the universal flux of life. It is over these 
fluid conditions of bodies' kinetics and affectivity that we begin to geometrise space 
and time by erecting various frames: performance art, film, video installations, 
digital video, drawings, animations, diagrams, texts, scripts and so on. Over fluid 
movements of genetic elements, of bodies propelling through smooth space, frames 
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of reference come to be constructed solidifying what are tendencies and efforts in 
motion into the discrete categorization of physical objects. These frames generate 
stratifying tendencies enabling interpretive practices and ultimately, signifying 
experiences through the logic of sense assigned to that frame. 
The functioning of media forms, thereby, occurs through an overcoding of 
their effects and standing, where experience becomes bounded and supplanted by the 
pre-assigned effects derived through the cognitive faculty -- in the (Kantian) mode 
of possible experience. The medium becomes a signifying one and therefore is 
coded by virtue of its ability to designate possibilities. For instance, such 
designations would include general pronouncements such as "dance is movement in 
space," "cinema is narrative," "painting is colour." As if the creative function of art 
could be containable in the possible experience unfolding within the field designated 
by the formal structures of that medium. Smith writes that this would mean that such 
unfolding would occur through the management of the experiences forming; in brief, 
such experiences would occur, if even partially, by externally applied formation. 469 
While the image's genetic elements constitute the folds of the cinematic 
image, micro perceptions sense what are the negligible differences of "assent" and 
"descent" between the "matter-image" and "image-matter. "470 This degree of 
difference comes to be gauged in the relations, variations and aggregations of 
vibrating substances, between what is world (real) and image of world 
(appearance).471 Perception of matter on the plane of immanence Maurizio Grande 
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writes therefore, is the movement-image minus cinema (the real or non-cinematic) 
and cinema is the movement-image minus matter (the appearance).472 This minor 
difference in the degrees of reality occurs in the modulation of the eye as it perceives 
material images in the world and cinema's image-matter. That is, in the modulation 
of the eye there are negligible differences in the degree of perception between 
cinematic and non-cinematic images. This modulation of the eye, Eric Alliez writes, 
is Deleuze's lines of double movement in which, the ascent and descent of 
perception between world and the cinematic image occurs.473 Such a modulation 
occurs in the live performances of Granular Synthesis. 
Matter, perception and image 
In performances such as POL (1998), Model! 5 (1997) and Noise Gate (1998) by the 
German performance duo Granular Synthesis, it is impossible to express where the 
boundary between live human bodies (a performer and spectators) and the image 
projections of a performer's body lies.474 In their expanded cinema performances, 
there is something indeterminable that occurs between the bodies of audiences and 
the machine-modulated sound and image projections onscreen: there is a 
heterogeneous continuity between the performer's live body, the image of the 
performer's body projected on-screen and the live bodies of spectators. In their 
immersive installations, on some five to eight giant panels, live digital images of a 
performer's body are projected. These images course through the panels with 
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extreme rapidity, accompanied by earsplitting sounds. The digital image-sound 
streams cascade through the giant panels with feverish rhythms in which the images 
and high-pitched sounds are generated from computers. Coursing through the 
immense screens, the live image of a performer's body is broken down into two or 
three frames called "grains," transforming the image-flows into a highly synthetic 
and artificial sequence. Upon initially encountering this live expanded-cinema 
performance, the spectator's body enters states of disorder and confusion, as it is 
pulverized by the event-phenomena. However, with time, the bodies of spectators 
attune and synthesize with the pulsating images of the digitized body. The computer-
generated micro-images, which break down ordinary reality into micro sound-image 
or grains, generate the variations that make the performances highly mutable. In 
these media-events, the projected images of the performer's body and the spectators' 
bodies exist in continuity with each other and thereupon, they are in a perpetual state 
of flux. 
The stretching and folding between the genetic elements of the projected 
image, as well as the modulation of perception between matter-image and image-
matter, requires a closer examination of perception, matter and the image. In the 
performance, how do we perceive light, movement or sound folding from one image 
into another? Or, how does perception modulate between the cinematic image of the 
performer's body and the non-cinematic images of spectators' own bodies? These 
questions necessitate an inquiry on the linkages and folds between matter and 
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consciousness, that is, in an exploration of the vinculum between image and 
perception. Whereas in the previous chapter I considered matter and perception, in 
this chapter I will take on the task of considering the folding movement between 
consciousness and space in greater depth. 
In materialism, the crisis of the connection between what is the inside with 
the outside is resolved by reconstituting the order of consciousness, through material 
movements.475 Bergson's materialist ontology in Matter and Memory overcomes the 
inside-outside dualism in virtue of the continuity between matter and image. He does 
so by constituting the body to be one image among others in which, "every image 
acts on others and reacts to others, on 'all their facets at once' and 'by all their 
elements'."476 The performer's body, the image of the performer's projected body and 
the bodies of spectators in space are in continuous kinesthetic relations with each 
other as they move in synchronicity with each other. Here, what is perception of an 
image and movement in space become an assemblage of different parts of a 
continuous whole. This passing of consciousness into space and space into 
consciousness is resolved in virtue of perception becoming internal to matter itself. 
If we recall, in Bergson's theory of pure perception, characterized as the 
"lowest degree of the mind," 477 the world is made up of images in which the body 
and brain are both images among an infinity of other images. Move,ment occurs 
among the different parts and between the different systems, where they collide, 
affect and vibrate on the plane of immanence. This "stirring up" prevents the 
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different parts and systems from becoming a closed set, in which movement of the 
image and flowing matter are "strictly the same thing. "478 It is a mobile bloc of 
space-time, a machinic assemblage of movement-images. Thus, in a question that he 
poses, "how could images be in my consciousness since I am myself image, that is 
movement?" we may note that Deleuze is suggesting that the body is itself an image, 
which is movement and furthermore, that consciousness is itself an image.479 In 
virtue of this materialist postulate, therefore, the bodies of the perfo,rmer and 
spectators are to be considered as matter or an image on the plane o'f immanence. 
In these immersive installations, movement and sonic energy are unleashed 
at such intense capacities that they generate and induce some form of physical 
transformation in bodies. Such transformations frequently cause other bodies to 
resonate with the frequencies produced by the electro-digital machines. At the 
cellular level, the sonar and visual energy generate the capacity to energize and 
excite cells plunging the organized, molar body into disarray. The spectatorial body, 
physically inundated with rapidly cascading images and noise, is overwhelmed by 
the audio-visual molecular vibrations, which literally pummel its cells through the 
ear-eye-skin organ. This cellular sensory overload, after reaching its threshold of 
chaotic movement, begins to adapt to the energy waves being bombarded and 
eventually becomes synchronous with the audio-visual frequencies that it is being 
subjected to. Maintaining a level of sympathetic attunement with these frequencies, 
the cells in the body begin to resonate with the image-sounds. This is a coexistence 
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of two different durations: cells and sound-image frequencies. When vibrating at the 
same frequency, the thrust and power of image and sound is not experienced as 
excess by the body enroute to processes of molecularizing; a synchrony herein 
emerges between them. Cells have therefore entered into a zone of proximity with 
the convulsing image-body and sonic-waves, in which organic and non-organic 
matter fold into each other. 
Synchronizing with the sound-image, the molar body becomes molecular. In 
its liquefying, the body experiences floating sensations, living as it does in an 
intensified or extreme state of becoming image-sound. In this pulverization and then 
modulation of the cellular body to the image-sound frequencies, we have two 
movements: liquefaction and synchrony. The molar body in this sense dissolves into 
its environment and then comes to synchronize with it. And in this movement we 
pass from the initial states of chaotic turbulence and obscurity into a synchronization 
with that turbulence, into a partial clarity of perceptions. From micro perceptions, 
where an infinity of tiny perceptions form the chaotic states of differential relations 
in the initial encounter, these chaotic states begin to smooth out somewhat when 
micro perceptions begin to unfold into the clarity of macro-folds. Such clarity begins 
to emerge when the liquefied body comes to synchronize with the velocity and 
frequency of the sound-image. However, it must be noted that a total clarity never 
emerges, and the thrill of the performance is to maintain states of indeterminacy and 
obscurity. Granular Synthesis' sonorous and electro-digital performances create 
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states in which the cells come to resonate at the frequency of sound-image 
molecules. In this resonance we must understand that the bodies of spectators fold 
into and modulate with the sound-image frequencies, where it becomes impossible 
to note where each begins or ends. 480 
How perception arises 
In considering that there are minor degrees of difference between what are cinematic 
and non-cinematic images, the spectator's perception modulates between image-
matter (visual images) and the matter-image (their own bodies).481 In the modulation 
of the eye among the various images, the performance necessitates that human 
perception become deducible. In experiences such as these or others, including a 
musical performance, dance, theatre or film unfolding in time, we need to ask (along 
with Deleuze) how it is possible to extract perception from the flowing state of 
matter. In order to consider this question I will first establish how perception arises 
in order to present an understanding of how human perception can come to be 
extracted from performances such as POL or Modell 5. 
To answer this question of how perception arises, I will tum to Rodowick, 
who suggests that the plane of immanence should be understood as an open whole 
that cannot be understood as an immobile section. The plane of immanence cannot 
be thought of as an enclosing frame, which would then make it a spatial 
abstraction.482 In POL or Model/ 5, movement on the plane of immanence is of a 
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universal variation, where all mass/bodies are vibratory matter, including the 
spectators, performers and image-projections. The performer's movements produce a 
chain of resonances, in which her gestures are processed within the computer 
producing the "grains" or micro fragments of her movements. Within such an 
assemblage a grain of sound-image, which is the smallest part, produces its effect in 
a changing whole. Her image projected on-screen as sound-image grains is the 
vibratory matter, which the spectators encounter. This vibratory matter "expands 
with heat" in the spectator's initial stages of the encounter. This initial heat of 
perception, where everything is chaotic, the nascent image perceived by a spectator 
is not consciously willed and is only to be understood as derived from kinetic 
energy: the movement of molecules that they are being subjected to generate 
"exchanges of heat" and are much like "the pull of gravity" on objects.483 However, 
as the rhythms of the performance settle into the spectators with time, the heat of the 
initial encounter cools down and then comes to be "illuminated by the cold light of 
stars." 484 As perception becomes stabilized or firmed up, micro perceptions distend 
into macro perceptions, forming thresholds of clarity. Such clarity in perception 
reveals luminous matter. This luminous matter has induced Deleuze to assert that the 
entire plane of immanence is made up of Light. Perception, therefore, occurs from 
this light energy propagating throughout the universe.485 This is in distinction to the 
understanding that perception occurs by the organization of the human eye by which 
one comes to perceive the world as a stable horizon. 
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In a world constituted by images, perception is itself an image -- the 
perception-image. A perception-image forms only when an image comes to be 
reflected by an eye. If an image is not perceived by an eye, it is only because it has 
not come to be reflected in one as yet.486 For the perception-image to be formed the 
images propagated into the universe or into the screening/performance space, must 
come to be reflected by an eye. Thus, for an image such as a perception-image to be 
formed it is sufficient that a body/eye exist and correspondingly, perception occurs 
by virtue of the existence of an image. Perception arises thereupon from the 
interaction among the various images, such as those between ordin~ry objects and 
those like ourselves propagating in the world -- between those images projected onto 
screens and those images like our bodily selves. Thus, rather than perception being a 
representation or a picture of objects or of things, perception arises from the 
interaction between images. One of the principal conditions of perception therefore 
is this contact between images in which, a body capable of initiating change, must be 
in contact with its environment. This contact between image and environment is 
11 d . 487 ca e perception. 
Perception is therefore not only a means for receiving movement but, in tum, 
is also connected to an action. It is not a faculty which emerges by adding some sort 
of subjective accretion to the perceived object. Carried by the brain, perception is, on 
the contrary, a process of restriction or a subtraction from the world.488 Because it is 
impossible to perceive the thing in its entirety, Bergson wrote that "we always 
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perceive less of it, we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather 
what is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic interests, ideological 
beliefs, and psychological demands. "489 It works to translate external sensory-data 
flows through the senses into an ensuing motor-action and for this reason, perception 
is sensory-motor. Rather than producing representations, perception helps the living 
image to navigate and function in its environment and to control and operate in its 
surroundings. Applying such control in order to function in one's environment is 
acquired by such a subtraction, which removes the noise or extraneous elements that 
are in excess of such a function.490 It removes what is of no interest to its vital 
functions in order to carry on its existence491 and in this sense, it subtracts from an 
initial cosmic flow of mutually interacting images.492 These deletions are temporal 
phenomena wherein dun~e, inherent in matter, is condensed in our perception and the 
miniscule differences of rhythms and movements in the material realm, come to be 
congealed in a perceived quality.493 What we ordinarily call representation is 
therefore a subtraction, a conversion from all the complex flows of matter into a 
selective rendering of an image by perception. An image thereby becomes a 
representation by such a process of "cutting out," filtering or by isolating it (the 
closed set) from a greater complexity of the open. What is reflected by the selective 
eye is a discriminating representation and the organ of perception by selecting what 
is of interest to it, comes to reflect the light from the plane of immanence.494 Such a 
selection of the eye to what is of interest and of importance to it, Bergson wrote, 
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occurs by a virtual action. 495 It is important to understand perception therefore as 
active and as an action within a world of action, rather than as a representation of 
things.496 
The images that we see in Mirror, POL or Noise Gate are luminous 
reflections of matter and if elements do not appear to the eye, it is because they have 
not come to be reflected in that eye. Bergson's preferred term for such a perceived 
property is this capacity of reflecting. The idea Moore writes is that when we 
perceive, what we perceive is a reflection back to us of our possible course of 
action.497 As noted above, for an image to be formed it is sufficient that an eye exist. 
In this sense, the eye, matter and image are all part of the changing whole before us -
- the media-event -- and it should be emphasized that none of these can be 
considered as secondary representations of the other. As Rodowick writes, the eye, 
matter and brain must be understood as continuous with each other, each of which is 
caught up in the flux of images.498 
In Granular Synthesis's performances such as Modell 5, the performers, 
computers, modulated image-body, the electro-digital circuitry coursing through the 
panels projecting the high-velocity machine-movements, the synthetic sound-image 
grains and the spectator's participation, create the media-event. In this connection 
between spectators and installation, bodies enter the zone of indiscemability with the 
electro-digital circuitry, in which an absolute contact is maintained between them 
physically, emotionally and psychically. In the flow of movements occurring during 
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the performance it is impossible to know the moments of shift between cellular 
matter and sound-image grains. What we have here is an organism in which minor 
differences in the degree of reality perceived between cinematic and non-cinematic 
images occur. Fluctuations in perception fold between organic matter and the 
synthetic time of machines, where it is impossible to know the moments of shift 
between cellular matter and sound-image grains. One recalls Deleuze's meditation 
here, where, on the plane of immanence he writes, body=movement: 
External images act on me, transmit movement to me, and I return to 
movement: how could images be in my consciousness since I am 
myself image, that is movement? And can I even, at this level, speak 
of 'ego,' of eye, of brain and of body? Only for simple convenience; 
for nothing can be identified in this way. It is rather a gaseous 
state.499 
The "I am myself an image that is movement" recalls states of perception for which 
there are no spatial or temporal coordinates available, or a stable horizon of the 
world. It is the topsy-turvy world of gaseous states of perception where coordinates 
are unavailable and matter is obscure, unclear and dense with micro folds. In this 
world one experiences a nonstop oscillating movement where the liquefied body 
folds between image and movement, between what is the cinematic image and the 
non-cinematic image (the "real" body). The eye modulates between the ascent and 
descent in perception, between what is image, movement, light, sound and matter of 
the performance, in which the degree of difference in the two images is indistinct. 
Mind, body and matter in continuity with each other are caught up in the flux that is 
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the media-event, where it is impossible to know where the grains of image-matter 
and the cellular body begin or end as they fold into experience. 
Perception as internal to matter 
So far I have outlined what the conditions for perception are, in that it is the contact 
between image and environment; it is subtractive and forms the first aspect of 
subjectivity; and, last, it functions as an active state, perceiving what is of interest to 
it. However, before it is possible to unfold how human perception can be extracted 
from the state of flowing matter, as in Granular Synthesis's performances, which 
move back and forth from cinematic and non-cinematic images, I need to elucidate 
another critical function. What requires further examination is how what is perceived 
(matter) and how perception occurs (eye), are to be understood as forming the 
circuitry of a single whole. Thus, rather than conceiving matter and the eye as 
outside each other in the traditional sense, conceiving perception as internal to 
matter will help understand how human perception is deducible from the flowing 
state of movement-images. 
Conceiving perception as internal to matter will also first help us to 
understand Tarkovsky's approach to editing Mirror and therefore, also the flows that 
make up the film. As noted in the previous chapter, the time-pressure in each shot 
was important in not only generating but also in organizing the flow between the 
different scenes and sequences. Rather than edit by following the conceptual lines of 
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a story, the time-pressure of each shot comes to compose the flows of the film and in 
this sense a shot comes to edit itself according to the internal rhythms and flows of 
the images. For Tarkovsky it was a matter of recognizing these internal patterns in 
an image's composition, a task that took seven months and some twenty trials. Each 
of the previous attempts at editing fell apart because the images did not hold together 
by an internal connection, their linkages somehow ringing false notes. One day in 
desperation, as he and his editing crew attempted to reedit the images again, the film 
suddenly came alive. The scenes and sequences miraculously fell into place and the 
images flowed into each other, like in a "bloodstream. 11500 The film suddenly 
radiated with luminosity. This "falling into place of the images" we can now 
understand as the images constituting their own conditions of consciousness. 
When images form their own conditions of consciousness we have 
perception that is internal to matter, rather than being formed from an outside. In 
developing his materialist ontology, Bergson wrote that perception does not occur 
with a perceiver situated outside matter, but rather occurs in things themselves, just 
as noted in the Mirror example above. Bergson expands on this difficult idea in the 
first chapter of Matter and Memory. He presents a point "P" which, when observed, 
strikes light to the various cells of the retina, transmitting neurological impulses to 
the brain. From this it might appear as if perception takes place in the brain; 
however, the rays that point P emits and the transmission of these rays to the brain 
all form part of the circuitry of a single whole. And most importantly, Bergson notes 
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that "the luminous point P is a part of this whole; and that it is really in P (in matter 
itself), and not elsewhere, that the image of Pis formed and perceived. 11501 This 
process is not one in which an image forms in an individual consciousness and then 
projects itself into an exteriorized point P, the more common understanding of 
perception. 502 
Mirror or POL is to be understood as the expression of matter in continuous 
movement in the universal flux rather than as the representation of matter arrested at 
certain points in time. When expression is matter in continuous movement, 
perception is part of the action and becomes internal to the event. When the body 
becomes image or movement, there is no internal-external division between a 
material and image-producing reality that divides the perceiver from what is being 
perceived. The spectator becomes a part of the whole relation in which perception 
occurs from within the image flow. 503 In the infinity of images, in which the living 
image perceives another image and reacts to it, the relation between perceiver and 
perceived can be understood to be a whole. Hence Bogue writes, "if perception is 
said to take place in any specific location at all, it is not within the perceiver, but at 
the object perceived where the genuine qualities reside. Perception is in things; then, 
not inside the perceiver. 11504 From within the connections and relations of the 
performance unfolding, between performer, mixers, spectators and the electro-digital 
circuitry, perception takes place. 
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Put in another way, in an ordinary cinematic shot, the infinity of the universe 
becomes transformed into it. Each shot from a different position, therefore, re-marks 
the subject, which prehends the universe. 505 The world is in the subject as much as 
the subject is in the world, as Leibniz's notion of the monad would indicate. Flaxman 
writes therefore that "the subject is a point at which the universe sees itself: the 
subject synthesizes the world from a particular point of view, but the subject also 
derives from that world, each perspective constituting a self-synthesis -- the 
'concentration, accumulation, coincidence of a certain number of converging 
preindividual singularities'. 11506 
In a cinematic shot, which is matter+ movement, the image of matter (the 
shot) is composed from where the subject deduces a perspective, constituting a self-
synthesis. That is, first of all, matter forms its own image: the shot or event 
transpiring is the very matter that forms the image. Second, matter also forms its 
own perspective. The filmmaker/artist synthesizes the world from a particular point 
of view. That is, the filmmaker's point of view becomes the perspective from where 
the image is formed/taken. This perspective, which is formed by the subject, is itself 
the world: the universe sees itself from the position or point of view that the subject 
occupies. It is therefore conceivable as Bogue notes that perception is in things and 
not inside the perceiver. In the case of POL, the artists and participants form their 
own perspectives of the event and therefore, there are many different perspectives of 
the same event formed. Perception, movement, image and matter, which have minor 
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differences, but as continuities of each other, all form the flow of the media-event. 
Perception, thereupon, occurs from within such a material flow coming to pass, 
whether it be Mirror or the Model! 5 performance. Perception is constituted 
therefore from within the material conditions making up the luminous matter-object 
itself, not from an individual, separate consciousness. 
As noted earlier, the entire plane of immanence is made up of light energy, 
which propagates throughout the universe. And in such a universe we might now 
come to understand that by virtue of perception taking place internally from within 
that matter, perception occurs in the light-matter (object) itself. The special image 
(that which perceives -- the perception-image), which exists within the circuitry of 
light-matter, is therefore also the light-image. If the living image is also a light 
image, then, as Deleuze observes, "the eye is in things, in the luminous images 
themselves. 11507 And when the "eye is in things," he is responding to Bergson's 
paradox of the image that "the photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, 
already developed in the very heart of things and at all the points in space. 11508 With 
an assertion such as this, Bergson maintained that the photograph is already 
developed in images, presenting a paradoxical situation. However, Deleuze 
questions his assertion, writing, "how is it possible to speak of an Appearing, since 
there is not even an eye?"509 
Deleuze resolves Bergson's paradox by equating light with matter. The plane 
of immanence is made up of light in which the fluctuations in light mark out the 
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various images. If images are made up of light we can see how images themselves 
are "lines or figures of light" or "blocs of space-time." For this reason, cinema 
understood only as pure movement is no longer enough, as this movement is also 
light. More than the notion of light being akin to a cinematographic image, it also 
presents the condition of visibility or of appearing in the world. 510 With appearance 
comes the actuality of the material world, which is no longer a virtual perception of 
things. 511 Rather than consciousness operating as a beam of light which illuminates 
things in the dark, light immanent within matter itself is consciousness, as a set of 
images. And it is in this sense that we can come to understand Bergson's paradox 
above that the photograph is already at the heart of all things and at all points in 
space. 
For Bergson things are already luminous in themselves. Consciousness 
therefore does not have to function as a beam of light that is shone upon things in 
order to illuminate them. Rather than consciousness being about something where 
things become illuminated by consciousness, all consciousness is something. 512 This 
proposition brings us back to Tarkovsky's time-pressure shots by which the editing 
process works itself out. The internal connections between images become crucial to 
making the images come alive. The luminous images projecting their own conditions 
of consciousness upon the film suggests that Tarkovsky's part was to recognize this 
internal flow. That the image preexists itself as primary matter suggests its own 
movement. Recognizing that movement among images, so that the images are not 
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sc~parated from their own movement, is the task. The image does not become 
privileged to Tarkovsky's consciousness in this form, but rather, to its own 
conditions. In this sense the images are not given to a human consciousness but to a 
machinic one in which, the internal relations among images compose their own 
conditions of luminosity and visibility. The relation then is not between human 
consciousness and image, but between image and image, in which perception is 
internal to the images being cut together in sequence.513 This relation presents the 
condition of a machinic consciousness, an idea that I will develop further in the next 
few pages. 
Such a luminosity or consciousness, therefore, does not emerge in opposition 
to the world, but is diffused in the world; it is not an instance of being of a different 
nature from the world, it is the world.514 It is the first order ofreality, not the second 
(as representation). Light, in cinema, is no longer that of a single human 
consciousness conditioning images from an outside. Rather, as with Mirror, images 
comprise their own condition of visibility from an inside: the images are figures of 
light.515 Due to the dispersion oflight throughout the universe, cinematic images 
become diluted with the light of the atmosphere enveloping them. In cinema or in 
expanded cinema, therefore, the luminosity in images can only app~ar when the 
atmospheric lights are lowered. Bergson points out thereupon that it is not a question 
about "how perception arises" in things, but rather, "how it [becomes] limited." 516 
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Subjectless-subjectivity and the event 
In a universe in which matter, eye and perception all occur as continuous flows of 
each other on the plane of immanence, perception is internal to matter. Such a 
proposition lays the ground for understanding the universe as machinic. In order to 
understand movement, visibility and consciousness as machinic for my purpose 
here, further discussion of perspective and point of view are needed. Such 
elucidation is necessary lest these terms retreat into a universalist p~rspectivism that 
transcends all points of view, or into a banality of "personal experiences" redolent to 
a traditional subjectivity. Bryant writes that such senses of the terms are frequently 
predicated on the abolition of difference and alterity which, in fact, need to be 
preserved. 517 
What is important to grasp is that perspectivism and point of view, while 
selecting and excluding, do not belong to the subject. Rather, Bryant writes, "a 
subject belongs to, occupies, or is occupied by a point of view or 
perspective ... Perspective is indeed a condition for the production of truth because it 
exercises a selection which allows diversity or beings to show forth, to manifest 
themselves."518 Moreover, ifa perspective does not belong to a subject which makes 
claims to "my personal point of view," it is also not dependent upon it; that is, a 
subject need not even be present to the development of a perspective. In this sense 
perspectives are not individuated, rather, individuals and subjects are 
individuated/differentiated by perspectives. A perspective is to be understood as a 
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system or a structure which allows for differentiation to occur in individuated 
subjects and in this sense, precedes the subject.519 A perspective is no longer 
understood as interiority, or as being interior to the subject, but rather as an 
"objective structure which the subject occupies much as one might occupy a field or 
plane as a medium of movement. "520 As noted in Leibniz's proposition earlier, the 
world is in the subject as much as the subject is in the world and therefore, it is not 
possible to think the subject as separate from world. Bergson's postulate that 
perception is internal to matter is not in contradiction to the above, as subject and 
world arise in relation to each other, forming an objective structure. 
Thus, rather than retreating into an individuate and personal subjectivity, the 
traditional notion of the subject who is the "ultimate essence of individuation," is 
destroyed in such a system.521 We have now arrived at a subjectivity which is 
subjectless, understood beyond its typical reference to the individual in what Bains 
calls a "subjectless subjectivity." Such subjectivity is a "direct, non-discursive auto-
possession -- a non-human for itself.. .A 'fourth person singular"' that is not a 
Cartesian geometrical space. 522 Such space is a real space, at the intersection of 
multiple components: material, semiotic, biological and others, comprising all the 
components making up human subjectivity or interiority. 523 Such a multi-
componential subjectivity is a multiplicity of heterogeneous components, 
underscoring Whitehead's process of concrescence, whereby, "a fragmentary whole 




understood as a whole complex in which all the different components are 
dilstinguishable from each other but each forms an indissoluble part of the whole that 
endures continuous duration.525 Whitehead writes that such subjectivity is to be 
understood as an event, as "an occasion of experience," and as a "processual, pathic 
intensity. "526 
Drawing from this understanding the camera shots, which modulate the eye 
in a film form the subjectless-subjectivity, the occasion of experience of the event. 
The point of view of that subjectivity (the shot) is to be understood as presenting 
what comes to be reflected in that system (cinema) by that eye (the camera-eye), a 
system with an infinity of views. The world, or for us the world of the media-event, 
therefore, which is "an infinite series of curvatures or inflections," comes to be 
reflected in the camera-eye, in which the "entire world is enclosed in the soul from 
one point of view. "527 Such an understanding of subjectivity brings us to Deleuze's 
machinic universe. 
A machinic consciousness: the heterogeneity of ontological thought 
The undistinguished sense between perceiver and what is being perceived noted 
earlier, also follows through in how Bergson treats the different images -- visual, 
sonic, tactile and others. Images as things, or images as visual appearances, have 
minor ontological differences to each other and on the plane of immanence, where 
movement/matter/image/perception become continuous, image-movement and 
351 
matter-flow are indistinct. As we will see, what is "real" and "appearance" maintain 
an ontological continuity among image, movement, matter and light. 528 The ground 
has been laid to initiate a consideration into Deleuze's question: how it is possible to 
deduce human perception from within the state of flowing matter? As I will attempt 
to present an answer, I will need to distinguish whether the machinic perception 
found in film is the same as in live performances. My own inquiry concurs with 
Alliez's conclusion that all perception is deduced from a cinematic milieu, that the 
cinematic milieu forms the genetic elements of all contemporary perception. 
In order to consider the implications of Bergson's theory of perception for the 
cinematic image and for the material world, we have noted Deleuze's tum from 
Bergson, in which Deleuze equates matter with light (Bergson wrote that matter was 
movement). In a world consisting of images, Deleuze, in equating matter with light, 
proposes that all images are made from the same "matter" irrespective of whether 
they are directly perceived by the eye (the "real") or are the cinematic type 
("appearance" of the thing). 529 The image, which is a block oflight, comes to be 
formed only when it is reflected by an eye. (That an eye exists is sufficient for an 
image to exist.) Until such a reflection occurs however, an image remains virtual, its 
actualization occurring through reflection and within a flow of light. An 
actualization occurs therefore when a living image or the centre of indetermination 
selectively reflects light within this flow and brings into existence a. given indivisible 
circuit of light.530 If the image is already in things, as Bergson noted, then images 
352 
~ : , ~ ":" ! 'l'Y', I T 
proliferate the universe in their virtual state and it is only in their passing through 
living images that they come to be reflected. This reflection transforms virtual 
images into their actualization. 
If the image did not pass through the centre of indetermination, we would 
have a mechanical universe rather than a machinic one. We would need to ask then, 
as Deleuze does, if such a universe of images, in which "every image acts on others 
and reacts to others, on all their facets ... and by all their elements," is a mechanical 
universe. 531 Were it not for the intervallic period produced in the centre of 
indetermination, the chain reaction from perception to affection to reaction of the 
sensory-motor regime, which produces predictability in the movement-image, would 
become part of a mechanization process. In starting with the living image on the 
contrary, which selectively reflects light and thereby actualizes the image, the 
process begins in between perception and reaction, undoing the predictability of a 
mechanical universe. This gap produced in the centre of indetermination produces 
the shift between perception and the automatic action upon things, producing 
unpredictability in the process. 
We have seen that in Bergson's materialist ontology there is a difference in 
degree between the different images on the plane of immanence and that while the 
relation between two images, such as between cinematic images and other images is 
there, it is ontologically minor. Bergson's ontological materialism therefore lays 
open a world in which Eric Alliez writes, "the identity of the real and of the image 
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(that which appears) results in the affirmation of an ontological indifference between 
Image [ ], Movement, [ ] Matter [ ], and Light. "532 However, despite this 
indifference, Alliez contends that there is a slight degree of difference, no matter 
how imperceptible, between "matter-image" ("real") and "image-matter" 
("appearance"). And this negligible difference Deleuze noted was found in the 
"double movement of ascent and descent along lines of differentiation" between 
what is matter-image and image-matter.533 Thus we should understand that while the 
difference is negligible there is a degree of difference between images which are 
cinematic and those which are non-cinematic; and secondly, while retaining a degree 
of difference from each other, they constitute a continuity between them. 
Taken in the sense above, an ontological indifference means that swirling 
about on the plane of immanence, the world is image, movement, matter or light 
(keeping in consideration their continual differences in degree to each other). This 
Brownian vortex is a world in states of pure molecular vibrations in which the eye is 
in the undulating matter. (The eye is in things.) The eye, moving in matter, is 
presented with variations in the relations of images to each other. Close-ups, long-
takes, low/high-angle shots or slow motion, present the eye with modulations 
reflecting the differential relations emerging among the images moving it from one 
acentered state of perception to another. This modulation of the eye is cinema's 
camera consciousness that opens out to duration as a whole. Such a camera 
consciousness allows for a different perception, 534 which Alliez writes gives rise to 
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the genetic elements of all sound and visual perception. That is, cinema's machinic 
consciousness is the genetic element of all contemporary perception. 
In Mirror or L 'Intrus, it is necessary to understand that it is from camera 
consciousness that it becomes possible to deduce human perception (rather than the 
other way around that human perception produces a camera consciousness). From 
the different shots swirling around the anchoring of the "I" is reproduced, 
determining space-times and the horizon of the world. In the differentials of the 
varying shots being perceived, the eye modulates from one acentered state to 
another. Camera consciousness, thereby, in moving from acentered state to 
acentered state suppresses the anchoring of the "I" until, as Bergson wrote, it comes 
to be firmed up into conscious perception. It is from camera consciousness therefore 
that human perception comes to be deduced and firmed up, in which the anchoring 
of "I" takes place. From the differential sound-image elements of a shot, Alliez 
writes, human perception "re-produce[ s] the anchoring of the 'I"' and the horizon of 
the world as a "special image" that is central and privileged. 535 The eye, therefore, in 
deducing.from camera consciousness, comes to determine spatio-temporal 
coordinates, coordinates which anchor it on the stable horizon of the world. 
Moreover, it is important to note that a machinic consciousness, by way of 
presenting camera shots which continually modulate the eye, is no where near what 
might be referred to as a unified perception. A machinic consciousness is, in fact, 
quite different. In the eye's modulation among the various images Alliez writes that 
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"we have a metacinema of ontological thought" which, by virtue of the differential 
relations among sound, optical, spatial, temporal and other elements, enables another 
perception entirely. This perception differs from the unity of images emergent in 
h 1 . 1 . 536 p enomeno og1ca percept10n. 
Yet at this point we need to pause momentarily as another element needs 
further clarification. An important consideration in line with my task in this chapter 
has been to consider the folding among different media-events. While camera 
consciousness is incipient to cinematic perception, I need to question whether such a 
machinic consciousness also applies to POL or the Model/ 5 performances, both of 
which oscillate from cinematic to non-cinematic images. In order to consider this 
question of machinic consciousness in the performances, I will first need to consider 
the folding among fields. I will therefore briefly consider how the modulation 
between cinematic images and live non-cinematic images in such performances 
become continuous and smooth. Thus, do images fold imperceptibly between the 
"appearance" of the real in cinema and that which is "real" in front of the spectator 
in a live performance? 
I have already come to consider this question partly by way of Deleuzo-
Bergson's ontology of the image. From the condition that the world is a set of 
images, I have noted that cinematic and non-cinematic images have minor 
ontological differences on the plane of immanence. In terms of image, light, 
movement, matter and sound, what becomes "appearance" and what is "real," 
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therefore, are to be understood as tiny degrees of differences. As Maurizio Grande 
writes, "[i]n other words, we can say that matter is the movement-image's plane of 
immanence minus cinema, and that cinema is the movement-image minus matter; 
thus it is one of the degrees of reality and not simply an 'illusion' that is supposed to 
replace the real. "537 
Having said the above however, it needs to be underscored that while any 
two fields are to be understood as having imperceptible degrees of differences, 
including fields constituted from the matter-image and image-matter, different fields 
are nonetheless variations. Thus while the cinematic image and the movement of the 
personal body are imperceptible degrees of difference, each field is to be understood 
as having a variation that produces the differentials in consciousness. Each different 
field connects to another through the fold. The fold is therefore where two fields 
have entered the zone of indiscemibility. In the fold it is no longer possible to know 
where one field ends and the other begins. In POL or Modell 5, the fold brings about 
the copresence of cellular matter and the electro-digital circuitry. In this sense, 
Deleuze writes that a fold is of a part, and never a point. It never dissolves into 
points, but folds into another fold. 538 
In POL or Model/ 5, movement flows from one acentered state to another 
without establishing a centre or a reference, in which consciousness is something as 
it endures in time. The electro-digital circuitry's sound-image grains and the 
spectators' movements are folded into and continuous with the other. The fold 
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between the two fields, therefore, forms the singular flowing body of the image-
event. The performer's image-body and the spectators' real-bodies fold without 
discrete centres or points of reference, becoming one continuous movement in time. 
It is a mobile bloc of space-time. The event is to be understood therefore as an 
assemblage of various heterogeneous components folding into each other. The 
different fields fold into each other to form the individual singularity of a 
heterogeneous complex. 
In returning to the question of machinic consciousness, it should be 
understood that the electro-digital circuitry generates the drive and propulsion, 
which ~he heterogeneous components come to resemble. From this electro-matter 
that flows without discrete centres or points of reference, perception comes to be 
deduced. Human perception comes to be abstracted from machinic consciousness, 
making it purely impersonal. 539 As noted, Bergson considered that for the view to be 
firmed up conscious perception must be produced from the state of flowing matter, 
which has no points of anchorage. 540 This human perception is therefore deduced 
from camera consciousness. It is from camera consciousness that the "I" comes to be 
reproduced and anchored on the horizon of the world from which space and time 
coordinates become determinable. This machinic, non-human flow, from which 
perception comes to be deduced, forms the genetic elements of all sound and visual 
perception. 
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The modulation of the eye, as it moves in synchrony with the surfaces 
produced by the electro-digital circuitry, comes to reflect those surfaces. While all 
the different components make up the heterogeneous relations of the event, cellular 
matter comes to vibrate and synchronize with the electro-digital circuitry. The 
performance is therefore similar to the cinematic experience. Just as machinic 
consciousness in cinema moves the eye from one acentered state to another, the 
electro-digital vibrations synchronize the movement of the spectators' bodies in the 
performance. Moreover, given the modulations among the spatial, optical, sonic, 
temporal and other relations, a second intentionality is produced, in which the 
images are unsettling and not given to the unity experienced in phenomenological 
perception. A machinic consciousness, on the contrary, gives rise to a very different, 
deterritorialized vision, which is the genetic element of all sound and visual 
perception. 
Thus, because cinema suppresses the anchoring of the "I," it allows us to go 
back upward to the state of pure molecular vibrations of "pure uninterrupted 
becoming. "541 This becoming, Alliez writes, implies a deterritorialized vision. It is 
deterritorialized by virtue of no longer presenting the "sublime relations" of the 
sensory-motor regime, found in movement-images. Movement-images produce an 
indirect image of time, in which time becomes secondary to the logic and needs of 
the narrative. Time-images, on the other hand, give us the direct image of time as 
they produce time internal to the event. Rather than follow the needs of a narrative, 
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they allow for the "pure uninterrupted becoming" of the event. In giving rise to 
uninterrupted becoming, they produce an aberrant time, from which the 
disconnectedness and asynchrony between sound and image, produces a 
deterritorialized vision. 542 
Moreover, in L 'Jntrus and Mirror, images arise from an outside from which 
thought comes to be encountered. This thought from the outside disrupts and 
disconnects the narrative flow, producing a new subjectivity. Thought from the 
outside, Alliez writes, "inscribes our contemporaneity, in the rupture between man 
and world. "543 This rupturing that cinema produces, is a new form of thinking. This 
single connection between the inside and outside, which comes to be connected in 
the brain, allows us "to define thought as the only object-subject of modem cinema 
and cinema as the most contemporaneous image of modern thought."544 The time-
image of cinema generates this new "thinking image," a new image of thought. 
Linking cinema to this new thinking image, Deleuze writes, "we must no longer ask 
ourselves, 'what is cinema?' but 'what is philosophy?"'545 This new thinking that 
cinema produces, becomes the work of philosophy. 
In machinic thinking, therefore, the universe "becomes a cinema in itself, a 
metacinema."546 It should be understood however that while Alliez's claim that 
camera modulation gives rise to the genetic elements of all perception is defensible, 
such a proposition is valid only up to a point. Given the newer and continually 
emerging digital technologies, computer generated images and algorithms present a 
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different set of conditions for thinking images. Digital images produce the newest 
forms of the image. Nonetheless, as noted in the third chapter, it is uncertain where 
this new image of the "perpetual present" takes us with respect to real duration, 
thinking and virtual relations. 
To sum up certain aspects of this and previous subsections, so far I have 
considered that perception is internal to matter and that matter is continuous with 
images. With respect to the proposition that in a world of images what is cinematic 
and non-cinematic are equally image, I have established three major points. The first 
of these is that there are minor ontological differences on the plane of immanence 
between what is real and appearance in terms of the image, movement, matter and 
light. The world becomes a universe of images or a metacinema in which, what is 
image-matter (appearance) and the matter-image (the real) become minor 
differences to the senses. The flow among image, movement, materiality and light 
constitutes the continuity in perception between image and matter. It is in this spirit 
that Bergson wrote that the world is made up of images. Second, while the degrees 
of difference among these fields are negligible, their differences need to be 
maintained. Such a difference and continuity can be maintained in the metaphysics 
of the fold. The folds among the different fields form a temporal continuity of the 
image-event. The folds between parts give rise to their continuity. Any event, 
therefore, is a heterogeneous complex of the many different fields folded into each 
other. Key to understanding the context of folding in this chapter is that the fold is a 
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virtual relation that gives rise to the continuity among fields and that it gives rise to 
an open and free time in the experience of temporal media objects. 
Third, differentials in the relation between shots modulate the eye, producing 
a camera consciousness. The different camera shots produce the eye's modulating 
perception, which moves from acentered state to acentered state without establishing 
a unified or stable horizon. In live audio-visual performances such as POL, 
perception folds from the images (electro digital circuitry) to the body, between 
cinematic and non-cinematic images without establishing a stable or unified horizon. 
In cinema, as in live performances, therefore, we see a machinic perception. Such a 
machinic consciousness is the genetic element of all sound and visual perceptions 
that inscribes contemporary life. 
In the next section I will attempt to draw closer to the mechanism of 
perception itself by considering the material movement from sound-image-matter to 
the receptive organs in Model! 5. I will examine how the mechanism of perception 
causes matter and consciousness to fold into each other and moreover, how, in such 
a fold, we could start thinking about constituting the different media-events. The 
greater folds of media-events arise in perception, in which the traditional dualities of 
the inside-outside of matter and consciousness will be dislodged. 
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The fold between matter and consciousness: the mechanism of perception 
The sound and image electro-digital circuitry of Model! 5 cascades through the 
gigantic panels in which, vibrating matter undulates with expression. This feverishly 
vibrating sound and image-matter creates bodily sensations in which cells in the 
body are first pulverized and then achieve synchronicity with the vibrating matter. 
Vibrating matter produces molecular movements, which stretch out into the 
atmosphere and such an extension occurs by virtue of its elasticity.' This elasticity is 
the tendency and effort of vibrating matter extending in motion to the sensory 
organs. When we perceive sounds and images it is by virtue of such a movement of 
stretching out from the vibrating matter to the receptive organ. Molecular 
movements, thereby, resemble the vibrating matter by virtue of a projective 
geometry, and such a resemblance is equated with what resembles -- the participants. 
The participants in states of euphoria resemble "something," and such a resemblance 
is an affective quality. The waves of molecular movements resembling the vibrating 
matter are therefore produced in matter, in the form of bodily sensations received by 
the participants. The euphoria in the performance resembles the sound and image 
matter; it necessarily corresponds with this relation of extension and resemblance of 
the vibrating matter. 547 Physical mechanisms therefore work by propagating 
movement, and just as a stone creates ripples in the water, matter c~rries vibrations 
that affect other physical bodies. 
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Thus we have an extrinsic physical causality which, through waves of 
molecular movements, passes from one body to another, to infinity. The excitation 
from the sound and image matter extending into the bodies of participants occurs 
through an impulsion or an excitation of the physico-organic mechanism. There is 
however yet another causality, an intrinsic, psychic one of perception. Through the 
psycho-metaphysical mechanism, qualities, which resemble the vibrations 
contracted through the organism, are perceived by consciousness. The vibrations 
contracted by the physical body are therefore not merely limited to the physical body 
itself, as these intrinsic psychic perceptions will resemble the infinite, tiny fluvia of 
molecular movements. 548 This psycho-metaphysical mechanism of perception is 
therefore the intrinsic psychic causality of the (material) image, resembling its 
vibrating matter. 
Perception of the intense physical velocities evokes strong vibrations 
gathered by the receptive organs. 549 The high-pitched sonic frequency and the high-
velocity orbiting of the visual images generate disorders in the body through 
abnormal pulse intensity. While the eye-skin-ear system is aroused, perception does 
not reproduce these frequencies; perception, instead, is evoked by the frequency of 
the vibrating sound-image matter through resemblance in the receptive organs, by 
extension or by projection. In this extending movement, affective qualities are 
projected and such qualities are the "natural sign" of perception which, in this case, 
is elation. The psycho-metaphysical mechanism of perception therefore corresponds 
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to the conditions of the receptive organ by the propagation of movement. 550 
Molecular movements therefore produce sensations in fleshy matter551 and this 
relation between matter and perception is one of resemblance, where states of 
euphoria come to resemble the sound-image matter in extension. The intrinsic 
psychic mechanism therefore resembles the impulsion of the extrinsic movement, 
the two mechanisms are therefore the two differential but inseparable halves of a 
whole.552 
As the participants move between states of obscurity and clarity through the 
unfolding performance, the thresholds of consciousness achieved correspond to the 
vibrations contracted by the organ; conscious perceptions thereby resemble the 
vibrations contracted through the organism. 553 Moving in between the two poles of 
tiny perceptions and the great fold of consciousness, perception establishes what are 
the "inner folds" through the intrinsic psychic mechanism (which receives its 
vibrations from the physico-metaphysical mechanism of perception). These inner 
folds, Deleuze writes, are like a matter that must be organized into outer pleats. The 
folds of consciousness thereby resemble the pleats of matter, in which consciousness 
comes to resemble the performance. In this resemblance of perception to matter, 
what is intrinsic resembles the extrinsic, producing the fold. 554 The theory of 
folding, at its very core, is a quadripartite system: perception straddles tiny 
perception and the great fold of consciousness (the inner and outer folds of 
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perception); and, matter straddles the tiny folds and their amplification on a 
receiving organ. 555 
The (inner) folds of perception however, which resemble the pleats of matter, 
come to direct them. Perception, which resembles matter, directs matter. In Leibniz's 
monadology, God creates matter in conformity with what resembles him, "making 
men in his likeness." In such a scenario, Deleuze writes that we move from one 
aspect of perception to another which is "no longer solely the representative of the 
world" (physical does not flow to the mental), "but becomes the representation of an 
object in conformity with organs. God endows the monad with organs or the organic 
body corresponding to its perceptions ... I have a body because I have a clear and 
distinguished zone of expression. "556 That which "I express clearly (the moment 
having come) will concern my body, and will act most directly on my body, 
surroundings, circumstances and environment. "557 What is important to note here is 
that movement flows from the inner folds of perception to the pleats of matter, rather 
than the other way around. The monad, therefore, expresses the world according to 
its body: that which I express concerns my body and acts directly on my body, my 
surroundings, environment and circumstances. Thus, in Leibniz's Monadology he 
writes, "what happens in the soul represents what happens in bodily organs. "558 The 
action of bodies upon the soul therefore expresses the world. 
Perception occurs in the fold, in what is the smallest possible circuit between 
the inner psychic realm and the extrinsic pleats of matter, which it resembles, 
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between the virtual inner dimension and the actual vibratory matter. This fold, 
between the virtual and actual expresses the two sides of perception, although these 
two sides express the very same thing -- the world. The world is therefore taken as a 
double process, in which it is virtuality that is actualized in material bodies. 559 What 
this means then is that the world exists virtually in all its potentiality with all its 
possibilities, some of them becoming actualized in bodies. The inner folds of 
perception, therefore, present all the possibilities and potentialities of what a media-
event can become, carried in its virtual potential -- as the rhythms, movements, light, 
sound and matter come to fold in our perception of them. The intrinsic psychic 
mechanism of perception presents all virtual possibilities, portending an ideal 
preexistence of the world, of what a media-event can become. This potential is 
carried out in the pleats of matter by bodies, in the process of actualization of a 
media-event. Such a virtual potential also therefore exceeds all of that which makes 
up the folds of matter: the participants, technologies, techniques, and also what is the 
pre-signified outcome of a given event. 
The mechanism of perception works in such a way that it resembles matter. 
Perception occurs in the fold between the virtual potential and the pleats of matter, 
where the virtual potential of perception generates all possibilities for the 
actualization of matter and events in the world. From this latter condition of virtual 
potentiality, in the mechanism of perception, I will now develop my approach to the 
folding of media-events. In the remainder of this chapter I will develop an 
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understanding of how media-events and perception fold into each other to make up 
the newness of experience. I will present how the fold generates the connection 
between the inside and outside, where movements from the outsid~ link to 
movements produced from within, forming a singular, deterritorialized vision of the 
world. I have considered that the image, matter and consciousness all form 
continuities in the flow of a media-event, constituent to the flux of life. Perception is 
situated internally within this flow of matter in a film or a live media performance. 
The perceiving eye reflects the light-matter in the universal flux forming a circuitry 
with it. Towards this end I will now focus on how works by Granular Synthesis fold 
into performances by Survival Research Laboratories, how paintings can fold into a 
film and how film, theatre and video games fold into a single interactive media-
work, such as Toni Dove's Spectropia. 
Media Frames as dynamic 
Rather than proceed from known fixed entities in the forms of specific media, the 
movements, rhythms and speeds of media-events fold and unfold in our perception 
of them. Perception, in reflecting mobile fields of light, sound, matter and movement 
in time, folds and unfolds into dynamic, elastic fields that are poetical, musical, 
dramatic and others. These dynamic fields are in distinction to those frames 
designated and conceived as singular mediums: poetry, music and drama. As noted 
earlier, each sense is the aggregation of other micro-senses, their folding and 
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unfolding generating thresholds of clarity and obscurity in which we are forever 
sensing the world. 
For instance, Femand Leger's Ballet Mechanique (1924) has frequently been 
referred to as being dance-like. 560 The choreography of camera movements 
presenting the internal flows between the shots, in addition to the editing, can 
become the rhythms of dancing. Thus the statement, Leger's Ballet Mechanique 
becomes the rhythms of dancing, ascribes perceptual qualities to the internal 
movements and rhythms of its shots, and also to its editing. The varied shots of 
people and geometrical objects in the film generate the internal movements within 
the shots and also the formal movements between them. The formal movements, 
when cut to specific lengths of time, form the rhythms of the film, making the 
accents and tempo of the moving objects dance-like. Dance, moreover, rather than 
merely denoting a singular field, of a body in movement in space, is constituted from 
processes in other fields such as musicality, the performative and the dramatic. 
These fields, in tum, are the aggregations of qualities such as rhythm, stillness, light 
and sound, which come to compose the movement of an image in time. Micro 
movements of matter, light and sound in time, therefore, constitute what become the 
larger bodies of performance, musicality or dramaticality, which constitute the field 
we can ascribe to as becoming dance-like or that which is dancerly. The rhythmic 
form of the film, achieved through the camera angles, the length and types of shots, 
their formal compositions and the editing process, arranged within the scope of the 
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musical tempo of the sonata rondo pattern, generates the dance-like qualities of 
Ballet Mechanique. Similarly, Amelia, a dance performed by La La La Human 
Steps, are sculptural. 561 The exceedingly quick pirouettes of the dancers' movements 
suddenly freeze into eternal poses, invoking sculptural forms in space. Likewise, a 
sound poem in performance can take on emotional colours and a walk can take on 
the flow of performance art, such as Richard Long's walks through the countryside. 
The speeds and relations between at least two fields in visual poetry, such as sound 
and textuality, 562 which extend further into other fields such as movement and time, 
fold into each other, constituting the "image of sound. "563 Images come to be 
generated from folds micro-aggregating, produced among movement, matter, light 
and sound in time. 
Liquid memory, liquid perception 
I will now consider how memory folds into perception in media-events. I will 
discuss how, in the encounter with a temporal media object, images from different 
past events fold into the present. In particular, I will sketch out how performances by 
Granular Synthesis and Survival Research Laboratories (SRL) fold into each other, 
as well as consider some notable examples of paintings by Peiter Breu gel and Jam es 
Whistler with Tarkovsky and Aleksandr Sokurov. 
In order to consider how POL, an expanded cinema performance folds into a 
noise performance by SRL, I will begin by considering the performances as two 
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mobile fields of space-time. The former is constituted by the electro-digital circuitry 
of giant sound-image panels and the latter is an assemblage aggregated from old 
discarded war equipment and fabulous reinvented machines; both events are 
performed live with audiences and make up singular events. 
In their 1991 performance at the Barcelona Art Futura exhibition, the 
performance given by SRL was so earth shattering that people living one kilometer 
from the performance site panicked that an earthquake was taking place and called 
in fire brigades and ambulances.564 In these performances various giant robots such 
as the "flame hurricane," "inch crawler," "shockwave cannon" and others produce 
high electric currents and hurl flames, water and pressurized air at each other. They 
operate in a loose choreography combating with each other in what some people 
have described as a "post-apocalyptic monster truck rally." In addition to hurling 
flames and using pressurized air, the massive high powered robots and engines blast 
sonic frequencies at decibels that make eyeballs and kidneys vibrate at levels only 
experienced in war. 565 Extreme nausea, revulsion and the "liquefying" of guts is 
experienced, whereupon, spirited fans recommend eye, ear and breathing protection 
for the uninitiated. At the cellular level, SRL's machine noises generate the capacity 
to energize and excite cells plunging the organized, molar body into disarray. The 
body, physically inundated with noise, is overwhelmed by sound molecules, which 
literally pummel its cells. 
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Similarly, with Granular Synthesis, the high energy sonic frequencies plunge 
the body into states where the sound is projected at such a feverish pitch that 
audiences begin to hear "physiologically" rather than aurally. The spectator's body, 
which vibrates beyond levels found in ordinary experience, lives in an intensified 
state. In such a state of intensification the body reaches a different threshold. 
Frieling writes that in these performances, "the audience physiologically 'hears' 
through the body, combin[ing] to create an effect of conscious polarization and the 
removal of all perceptive distance from this stream of audio-visual data. 11566 The 
perceptive distance removed, audiences' bodies begin to resonate intensively. 
Visually, SRL's bestial machinic-creatures, such as the flame hurricane or 
shockwave cannon, generate jarring and grating robotic movements, presenting a 
relation to the disturbing and agitating movement of the performer's vibrating head 
in POL. The former's mechanize gaits, gestures and poses serve a single aim: to 
destroy everything in their path. These performances are reminiscent ofB-grade 
Godzilla films from Japan made in the 50s that warn of nuclear threats. The 
threatening evil qualities of these mechanical creatures are matched by their 
exaggerated size, typical of comic-book proportions, as they hurl flames and thunder 
across the performance field. The movements of these performing robo-creatures 
produces differentials in consciousness from the performer's vibrating head in POL. 
Nonetheless, their threatening quality, although comical to some extent, somehow 
produces a relation in which the one folds into the other. While the robo-creatures 
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are amusing, they nonetheless also physically threaten the other creatures and 
therefore, indirectly, also the audience. In the POL performance, the threat is less on 
a physical level than on a psychological one, in that the micro-grains of the image 
produces the pulverization of the performer's body. 
It is therefore less in the visual qualities than in their sonic connection that 
the two form a relation. The highly charged noise frequencies, pitch and velocities in 
both performances produce great levels of excitation, even anxiety. In a sense, their 
relation to each other emerges by their sonic intensity, which physically assaults the 
spectator. In the SRL performance, the bestial creatures annihilate ,their opponents 
by tearing apart, smashing or burning the others. In POL, the image of the 
performer's head moving at super-sonic machinic speeds across the giant panels 
presents the dehumanization of the body. In both these performances, the 
psychologically threatening aspects are heightened by the sound frequencies in 
which, the intensity generated in the present, gives rise to the pulsations experienced 
from the past. In the actual perception of the SRL event, memories of POL begin to 
emerge. 
The differentials among the genetic elements in the two images make up the 
differentials in consciousness in the perception of the events. 567 The changes in the 
rhythms, movements, sound and light from one media-event to another, come to be 
perceived as the variable geometries of the image's genetic elements. The particular 
differentials fold from one event to another in time as difference to, and also as a 
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repetition of the elements. Perception of the highly sonorous sound densities from 
SRL's machine-generated noise performance folds into the memory of the highly 
intense computerized sound of Granular Synthesis. But it should be understood that 
these perceptions are unconscious and that they do not have an object and do not 
refer to physical things. The differentials in rhythms, movements, sound and light 
from one media-event to another are the differential relations that comprise 
unconscious perception, and in this sense, they have no objects nor do they refer to 
physical things.568 Deleuze writes that perception in this sense is hallucinatory, in 
which one grasps figures without objects: "through the haze of dust without objects 
that the figures themselves raise up from the depths, and that falls back again, but 
with time enough to be seen for an instant. I see the fold of things through the dust 
they stir up, and whose folds I cast aside. "569 The haze through whfoh instants of 
clarity occur, in which figures come to be grasped, is the haze of infinite tiny 
perceptions of the vibrating sound-image-light intensities, which invades 
consciousness and folds with the memory of the other. As we experience the SRL 
performance, we are therefore always caught in these processes, of trying to perceive 
within the haze of folding perceptions and memories. 
The haze becomes thicker sometimes in contemporary interactive digital 
media art works, in which the dynamic fields of film, video games and theatre 
become enfolded within a single performance. In Toni Dove's interactive cinema, 
which utilizes both cinematic time and real-process time of digital media, the actual-
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virtual circuits multiply in light of such continual temporal movements. 570 In her 
interactive installation Spectropia, we have nomadic time in which the actual 
narrative itself wanders between different historical periods, producing a haze of 
folding perceptions. 571 The past is no longer that which is merely the individual 
spectator's memory, but is also the past of the narrative. This means that the past 
becomes a collective memory that spectators participate actively in its making. Such 
a narrative time that moves fluidly between pasts and futures not only allows for the 
rambling between the different historical periods to occur by "collapsing time" as 
Scott writes, but also by how the complexified haze of the present comes to be 
enfolded in the web of the different historical periods. 572 
The narrative itself starts in 2066 with a young archeologist Spectropia who, 
in search of her father, is transported to 1930s New York. When her time traveling 
machine short-circuits, she ends up in the body of another woman. This narrative 
gives rise to the movements between three historical periods: the future (2066), past 
(1930's) and present. The virtual past and future fold into the actual present as 
players or participants navigate through the interactive digital movie by way of their 
physical movement and speech. Their physical actions trigger video segments, 
which are uploaded from computers to the gallery screen. Audience members, 
assisted by trained performers, can then use physical cooperation to spontaneously 
unfold dialogue between onscreen characters, by speaking to them, which generates 
a response in real time. Spectators, thereby, navigate through cinematic spaces, 
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move a character's body, as well as alter and create the soundtrack. As a 
performative interactive space that uses a mix of motion sensors, v:ocal triggers, 
speech recognition and synthesis, Spectropia folds between theatre, cinema and 
video games. Transporting the body between pasts and futures, the physical body 
extends itself into the virtual space of cinema, by executing choices in the narrative 
flow. 
What folds in perception, therefore, is that which occurs be,tween what is 
actual and virtual, between the actual haze of images unfolding in the performance 
and memory. Matter, in this interactive cinematic performance, is ]?ecoming through 
a multitude of interactions and through memory, which is virtual. In Spectropia, 
perception continually modulates between the actual and virtual in the flux of 
matter. While perception navigates and functions in its environment, the fold of 
perception is between the actual haze of what is present (the various actual 
narratives presented, of pasts and futures) and a virtual past. Needless to say, just as 
the movements of the world change from moment to moment, they also change in 
the performance, accumulating over the length of the performance .and forming a 
common, yet specific memory for each participant. 573 From this common memory in 
the performance, the events transpiring come to fold into each other and be 
perceived. In this fold, the virtual potentia1574 of the media-event comes to express 
itself. This virtual potential is one in which (the common) memory· and the unfolding 
present are synthesized in perception, to produce the continual "new" of experience. 
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What we have are different times enfolding each other: the past enfolds our 
experience of the performative present. The fold of perception therefore circulates 
between the virtual and the present, bringing us once again to the "curve of time" in 
which the present, as Bergson wrote, becomes indivisible. This indivisibility of the 
present is a continuous, heterogeneous movement in which, perception of sensations, 
feelings and potentialities move continually between pasts and futures. Perceptions 
of the present therefore continually fold between different virtual times. Our bodies, 
in this sense, have virtual extensions in space, stretching out towards pasts and 
futures. What is important to point out is that while the current body extends into 
virtual pasts and futures, an image that survives in our pure memory comes to fold 
into the haze of the present. Such an image, which survives in memory and is 
materialized into the present, becomes actually lived. An image that is recalled from 
the past therefore coexists with the present event, and then comes into a repetition as 
it endures in the present. 
Difference & repetition 
Recalling an image from the past is a psychic repetition however and occurs in the 
difference of the present moment. Thus, on the one hand, when I experience an 
image in an SRL performance, I recall an image from my pure past, in what was the 
performance POL. Such a calling into the present from the pure past materializes the 
virtual potentialities of that image and in my calling up such an image I make it 
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active, making it capable of provoking movements575 as I interact with a film or a 
digital media work. The materialization of an image from the past therefore comes to 
coexist with the present. Importantly, the present itself undergoes a repetition with a 
difference in our experience even of the same film, video or interactive work --
making the experience a new one in time. Similarly, the present image may also 
change how the past will come to be perceived in a future moment. 
Tarkovsky's Mirror has drawn several comparisons to the Dutch master 
Peiter Breugel's painting, Winter Landscape with a Bird Trap (l 565). The sequence 
in Mirror in which children are playing in the snowy hills by a river, recalls this 
painting. Tarkovsky's moving images makes the painting come alive, capturing the 
proportions, rhythms, colours and light gradients of the darkly spo~ted figures 
playing. Similarly, with Aleksandr Sokurov's The Second Circle q 990), a film in 
which the son sits motionlessly by his father's coffin, recalls a painting by James 
Whistler, Arrangement in Black and Gray (1871 ). Whistler's portrait of his mother is 
awash in dark tones -- her long dress and the dreary curtains take up the greater part 
of the space in that painting. In both instances, perception folds between the 
paintings and films, where the light intensities, formal compositions, gestures, 
movements and stillness fold from the one to the other. But as Ranciere points out in 
The Future of the Image, it is not merely a simple likeness that occurs between two 
images. It is more than mere resemblance, more than a bare repetition. Neither 
Tarkovsky nor Sokurov's films could be said to be faithful reproductions of the 
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original paintings in the least. What occurs is an interplay of operations that 
produces, on the contrary, an alteration of resemblance, an alteration that Ranciere 
writes is necessary in what we call art. 
Tarkovsky's Mirror, in which the light intensity and colour, the movements 
of children playing in the background and their squeals, generates sensations of 
joyfulness similar to the Bruegel. Nonetheless, Asafiev's situation as a boy who is 
orphaned in the war, offers an interplay of operations to that image of children 
playing in the painting. The one image folds into the other in our perceptual field of 
the two. However, as the scene unfolds, we come to interact with it in the 
complexified present -- as a difference from the memory of that painting. 
Tarkovsky's reference to the Bruegelian landscape is uncoupled frQm its original 
meanings or intentionalities. 576 The sensations perceived through the colours, 
movements, depth-of-field and sounds recall the Bruegel, and all the while 
presenting the sensations of the gay scene, Tarkovsky proceeds to the image of an 
orphaned boy who, as he is shot in close-up, shows tears streaming down his face. A 
double operation occurs here, in which the close-up of Asafiev occurs as a 
fragmentation through a cut. The cheerfulness of the landscape is undercut by the 
boy's tears which, when shown in close-up, presents the action in its essence, as a 
repetition with a difference. Images in this sense are not intransitive. Alterity, 
Ranciere writes, enters into the very composition of images. 577 
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The changes in the rhythms, movements, sound and light from one media-
event to another come to be perceived as the variable geometries of the image's 
genetic elements in which particular rhythms, movements or sounds fold from one 
event into another as they are separated by the interval of time. In folding, the 
intrinsic mechanism of perception presents virtual potentialities, which come to be 
actualized in media-events. Macro perceptions, Deleuze writes therefore, are the 
product of differential relations established among micro perceptions. The 
differential relations of what comes to be perceived in consciousness are brought 
about by an unconscious psychic mechanism of perception. 578 The continual 
movement of images in perception folds between the actual and virtual, between the 
unfolding haze of what is present and the virtual potentialities of a past that selects 
and provokes, giving rise to the differential relations of the unfolding, complexified 
present. 
Conclusion 
The image-event's psycho-physico flux579 passing across dynamic fields gives rise to 
feelings and sensations that fold from one event into another. From the manic 
intensities of becoming in POL, to the winding memories and luminescent skies of 
Mirror, to the grating and jolting motion in SRL's robotic performances, events 
circulate continually in the fold of perception between the actual haze of the present 
unfolding and the real virtual presence of time. The virtual past materializes with the 
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unfolding present, provoking the movement of thought in the present, in which 
memories coexist. Virtual movements become materialized as inklings, feelings and 
sensations, which begin to arise and take shape with consciousness. In this 
movement arising the monad expresses the world: I express what happens to my 
body as I experience the event. The experience of the event is that which I will 
express concerning my body, my surroundings, environment and circumstances. 580 
Such a folding and unfolding in time among matter, memory and perception 
performs the interplay of the differential relations in consciousness, generating the 
newness of experience in art works. 
In a world of images, cinematic images and non-cinematic images are to be 
understood as images with imperceptible degrees of differentiation between them. 
On the plane of immanence, the identity between what is "the real" and "the 
appearance of the real" becomes a matter of degree, their ontological difference 
becoming minor in terms of how light, matter, movement and sound come to be 
perceived. The luminous matter of images, which present the conditions of 
consciousness in and of themselves, come to be reflected in the eye. 
In the time-images of cinema, thought is encountered from the outside, 
rupturing the hermetically sealed world of the narrative. In this rupture, an 
asynchronous, deterritorialized vision is produced, which is the most 
contemporaneous image of thought. In time-images, the outside constantly interrupts 
the narrative sublime through the constantly changing shots. The close-up, long take, 
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the hand-held hovering shot, high-key lighting, the empty shot and others, all 
modulate the eye in which, the state of flowing matter constantly changes from one 
shot to the next.581 The eye, therefore, comes to perceive from thisimachinic flow. 
From this machinic flow of differential matter, space-time coordinates come to be 
established. Perception, therefore, comes to be abstracted from the conditions of a 
machinic consciousness in cinema, making perception purely impersonal. 582 This 
machinic, non-human flow of differential matter forms the genetic ~elements of all 
sound and visual perception inscribed in contemporary life. 
With respect to the folding between cinematic and non-cinematic images, as 
in Model/ 5 or POL, movement similarly flows from one acentered state to another. 
From cinematic (appearance) and non-cinematic images (the real body), matter 
flows without a centre of reference or a stable horizon. Image-matter and matter-
image is that in which audiences' bodies and the performer's projected images of the 
body are imperceptible degrees of variation in perception. In these performances it 
becomes impossible to know the distinction between live bodies and sound-image 
grains. Cellular matter folds into the electro-digital circuitry entering the zone of 
indiscemability, in which the various components form an indivisible unit. This unit 
is a space-time assemblage. It is the singularity of an event unfolding in time. 
It must be underscored, nonetheless, that while the two fields are minor 
degrees of variation, they are variations. Cellular matter and the electro-images are 
two bodies that overlap and continue into each other. What folds, therefore, are the 
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two parts (a fold is of a part and never of a point). 583 Cellular matt~r and the electro-
digital circuitry are two dynamic fields which form a fold, maintaining continuity 
between them. The fold between the two parts is what gives rise to their continuity. 
The fold is a virtual relation that arises in the connections among fields. It gives rise 
to an open and free time in the experience of temporal media objects. 
The folding among fields in the mind gives rise to the complexified present. 
The complexified present is that newness brought into the fold of experience, where 
the outside of the event comes to touch the virtual inside of memory, making up the 
I 
curve of time. This touching is Deleuze's "pure force of becoming" in which we are 
carried by the dynamism of the momentum, where we are affected and come to 
affect other bodies in a continually shifting whole. 584 Swept into this momentum, we 
experience a loss of ground in which thought no longer clings to a pre-given identity 
nor can it be unified; rather, the folding between event and virtual past generates 
difference in the repetition. The introduction of the outside to the inside therefore is 
the occasion for a new relation, inducing a new thought. The unknown, unperceived, 
chance encounter of images in media-events, therefore, continually,reinvent 
thoughts, bringing Flaxman to iterate that "chance introduces invention into 
thought. .. The rule is -- improvise. "585 The impetus for art is to experiment, 
improvise, tinker. Artists are tinkerers and experimenters of materials, incorporating 
familiar materials in unusual ways at their maximal creativity, the folds in the 
material base continually regenerating and reinventing the movements of thought. 
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Images, which produce sensations, force us to think. Works of art, which 
induce sensations are, machines for thinking. In the fold between the actual image 
and virtual pasts of memory, the sensations experienced catalyze a kind of thinking. 
Thought is moved by the intensity of sensations as sensations bring about thresholds 
of thought that are thinkable. The folding of the image-event before us with virtual 
pasts produces such singular intensities that bring about thresholds of thought. 
Thinking, therefore, turns to sensations and to art, which is constru~ted for this very 
purpose of producing sensations. 586 The folding of perception of the various media-
events into virtual memory brings about the complexified present and introduces 
difference into thought in time. 
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Conclusion 
If thought searches, it is less in the manner of someone who possesses 
a method than that of a dog that seems to be making uncoordinated 
leaps. 
--Deleuze587 
In chapters two and three of this dissertation, I considered the difference and 
repetition of the interstice as the mechanism by which to examine duration in the 
time-images of cinema and in the automechanized digital installatlons. In the last 
I 
two chapters I considered the difference and repetition of the fold, generating an 
! 
understanding of how perception and memory endure in time in t4e experience of 
media events. In each chapter, my aim was to consider the differe:t).ce and repetition 
of how duration comes to be endured in the mechanism of the interstice and in the 
metaphysics of the fold. Time was the method by which the interstice and fold came 
into examination in which their micro (local) and macro (historical) levels were 
scrutinized. Time was also considered as processual, in which the duration of media 
events were observed through interstitial disjunctions and in the folding among 
fields. Through my observations I have tried to shape how the interstice and fold 
produce the virtual relations of time in media events. This shaping was conveyed 
through the five major inquiries mapped out in the first chapter. 
From these five areas of inquiry, I will conclude my observations on the 
interstice and fold. I will summarize the differences produced in tli!e image of time in 
the time-images of L'lntrus and in the digital installations Glenlandia, Fenlandia and 
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The Spectroscope. I will wrap up how duration unfolds in these w0rks by way of the 
interstice and then draw upon the potential of these works for the movements of 
thought to occur. The next section will bring to an end my discussion on the 
machinic processes of media production that give rise to a machin~c consciousness, 
in which thought encounters the non-thought. I will attempt to show how a non-
human, machinic consciousness is produced by the asymmetrical movements of the 
interstice and fold, the one being a horizontal temporal heterogen~ity, the other 
occurring through a perspectival topology. I will next consider the emergence and 
vanishing points forming patterns of visibility-invisibility in media works, in which I 
bring to an end my discussion on the relations of the whole, on matter and 
consciousness, subject-object relations, and what constitutes the inside and outside 
in the works taken up. I will conclude by picking up the thread with which I began, 
on the image of time, but this time specifically focusing on the digital image. 
Summarizing and noting its difference from the time-image will present a brief 
opportunity to observe the workings of contemporary digital media practices and on 
the possibilities of future practices. 
The interstice and fold: resonances and incommensurability 
The field of queries undertaken by way of the interstice and the fold show that the 
two form different images of thought. Their formal, conceptual and material 
qualities, as well as their processual relations, of how media come. to be examined, 
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are incommensurable. The interstice operates as a physical mecha~ism by which 
media's conceptual and formal ground comes to be made. The fold operates as the 
ontological ground from which media events come to be perceived. However, while 
this difference of physical mechanism and ontological ground presents processual 
variation in approaching questions of duration, at times their conceptual and material 
forms generate resonances with each other. 
A resonance between two fields, Jean-Clet Martin writes, shows "a 
multicomponential ensemble, formed from relations of resonance between melodic 
curves· ( courbes) alien to each other. "588 A resonance between two' elements, rather 
than showing a reflecting image or having a symmetrical correspondence, is a 
relaying movement. In the same way, the theoretical considerations of the fold and 
the physical process of the interstice have to be understood as relaying movements 
of duration in terms of their formal, conceptual and material make up. Thus while 
the interstice and fold are understood as incommensurate movements, their 
I 
conceptual and material resonances relay movements between them to make up the 
complex whole. Each must be regarded as a variation of the innumerable curvatures 
of the surface, each presenting a different image of thought. Whether a practical or a 
theoretical field, 589 the interstice and fold are to be understood as singular concepts, 
each concept including a multiplicity of components. 590 And while they present a 
difference to each other, they are non-oppositional and singular. Moreover, each has 
its unique generative, transformational and diagrammatic element through which 
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new movements of thought might be produced for itself. In having a multiplicity of 
components, concepts continually transform through time and are historically and 
genealogically inexhaustible. The interstice and the fold are nomadic movements in 
continual processes of transition, coming to be territorialized, deterritorialized and 
reterritorialized. In the making and unmaking of concepts Martin writes, "each 
builds bridges near other concepts that occupy the same plane,"591 the bridges 
between concepts producing resonances among them. The bridges between the 
interstice and the fold generate resonances among their conceptual, formal and 
material realms. Nonetheless, while the interstice and the fold generate resonances 
among them, they are also asymmetrical and incommensurate because one is a 
physical mechanism and the other is a theoretical ground. 
My work in this dissertation has been to unravel the movements of the 
interstice and fold in relation to specific media works. In this sense the interstice and 
fold have "pulled thoughts along," sometimes through diverging paths. 592 Both the 
interstice and the fold move through various strata of visibility-invisibility, series-
folding, disruption-continuity, planes of consciousness-perspective; these images of 
thought, as Deleuze writes, "[guide] the creation of concepts. "593 The images of the 
interstice and fold that I have presented occur through a mental geometry, in which 
each geometry has depended on the perspective being formed at a given moment in 
time. What is caught and reflected by the eye presents a cutting out from the 
complexity of the world, a subtraction and a limitation, which at each moment 
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becomes contingent on a variation of factors, whereby certain elements are estimated 
to be more important than others. This tentativeness on each geometric shape 
presents moments of uncertainty, each mental shape projecting its singular 
dimension. 594 Each concept becomes a shape drawn from a tangle of conceptual, 
formal and practical concerns, which sometimes resonate between, sometimes 
traverse the boundary divide, and sometimes proceed elliptically from, the other. 
Deleuze writes that an image of thought is not merely its method, but 
something deeper, "a system of coordinates, dynamics, orientations: what it means 
to think and to 'orient oneself in thought."' 595 Each field therefore generates its 
orientations and trajectories, presenting its interferences with the other. 596 In this 
dissertation I have attempted to compose such a mental space, in which I have 
delved into the dimensions, the system of coordinates, and the range of possibilities 
generated by the interstice and the fold. I bring this exploration to an end with a 
diagrammatic schematization of this mental space in the remainder of the conclusion 
below, drawing together zones ofresonance and the vanishing points of each terrain. 
The interstice and the image of time 
The difference in the workings of the interstice in analog and digital media is critical 
as it brings forth its own condition of operations and relations in each, allowing us to 
consider the difference in the image of time produced. By bringing about a 
difference in the analog and digital image, the interstice produces an analysis of the 
395 
two media, as its own kind of thought. 597 In examining the workings of the 
interstice, differences emerge with respect to two fundamental and interrelated 
operations: in how duration unfolds and in the relation between the actual and 
virtual. 
In L 'Intrus, the interstice produces the sense of the paradox, aporias, 
invisibility and imperceptibility, generating the film's virtual multiplicity. Time 
unfolds through discontinuities in the film, in which images are in;ationally 
connected to each other; various shots are linked in disordered ways, erratically 
breaking up the film's temporal planes into pasts and futures. Moreover, in these 
temporal gaps, fissures and aporias, the actual-virtual connections come to multiply, 
producing a qualitative multiplicity. 
In the digital installations, Glenlandia, Fenlandia and The Spectroscope, 
time unfolds uniformly over the span of an actual year. The movement of the pixels 
proceeds in only one direction, yielding the singular temporality of continuous 
presents in which, gaps, interruptions or aporias are altogether eliminated. The 
installations are what Henri Bergson refers to as a "multiplicity of exteriority"598 or a 
multiplicity of space, in which spatial division produces the differences between 
frames. While a multiplicity of exteriority produces a difference, it is a difference in 
degree of spatial changes made, rather than a change in the kinds of states 
experienced. The pixels and frames function as parts that allow for an unlimited 
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subtraction, addition or division of the whole series, producing a numerical 
multiplicity. 
In a qualitative duration, the whole is indivisible into its parts, showing that 
parts cannot be added, subtracted or divided to make up the whole. The part alters 
the entire dimension of the work, opening out to duration as a whole. A change in 
kind occurs when the part "plunges" into a different dimension, transiting from the 
spatial or actual to the virtual dimensions of the work. Deleuze writes that real 
duration is that which produces a constant change in kind by "plung[ing] into 
another dimension, which is no longer spatial, and is purely temporal. 11599 The part, 
in plunging the work into a different temporal dimension opens out to the whole of 
duration, it qualitatively changes the experience of the whole and in this sense, the 
whole is not divisible into its parts. Evacuated from spatiality, the temporal 
dimension puts us in touch with the virtual. 
In emerging from this plunge, the virtual is also that which is on its path to 
becoming actualized. The virtual is the movement of actualization itself, it is that 
potential on course to becoming actualized. As seen in the digital installations, this 
movement of actualization is lacking because the pixels and frames, which make up 
the form of the image, are already given. And even though not everything is 
realized, everything on the digital screen is the actual.600 In the steady uninterrupted 
continuity of pixels streaming across the digital screen, the work does not plunge 
into a different dimension. Other than the transmission of the actual pixels, which 
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make up each frame, there are few other relationships experienced. As Bergson 
writes, everything is "already visible in the image of the object. 11601 Duration in the 
installations occurs by a spatialized representation, in which temporal experience is 
flattened out into representation. In this visibility, the digital installations reduce 
their connections with the virtual. 
Movements of thought 
In examining the operations of the interstice as it functions in the two media, some 
fundamental differences are produced in how each creates the potential for new 
movements of thought to arrive. The presence of the interstice inc~eases connections 
to the virtual, producing greater divergences and variances for the movements of 
thought to occur. The operation of the interstice produces its own logic and thinking 
by virtue of generating sensations, which give rise to the movements of thought. The 
erratic, irrational cuts of L'lntrus arrive from the open outside and shift continually 
between pasts and futures. They introduce a profound unrecognizability and 
unknowability in the movement between shots, forcing the limits of intellectual 
engagement with the world; they force the movements of thinking. 
In the digital installations, to the contrary, the movement of the pixels on the 
digital grid produces a single continuity and is conspicuous by the absence of the 
interstice which would produce disruptions in the spatio-temporality. A pixel 
transmitted every second produces a frame approximately every 23 hours, and while 
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there is variability in each frame with respect to the hue and luminosity of colours, 
there is little qualitative change in terms of the temporality of the piece. What 
returns, therefore, produces the same direction and the same type of movement in 
the pixels. The movement always presents the force of a continuous present and this 
present offers little variation in the movements of thought. The spiritual automaton 
of the cinema which, through the interstice, introduces a new thought from the 
outside, becomes the automaton in the digital installations that proµuces little 
variation in the movements of thought. 
The return of the same brings about a mechanistic world in: which being and 
becoming are neither distinct nor opposed to each other. D. N. Rodowick writes that 
in the history of philosophy, what used to be considered true was understood through 
the eternal and changeless, as the constant of time. What was "true:>' was given to a 
constant law, to principles of identity and of contradiction. Truth was something 
preexisting in time and was passively discovered.602 Instead, if thought is always 
changing, as in time-images, what is true becomes an activity, and ,thought is in 
relation to time, which is always changing. L 'Jntrus, in forcing the movements of 
thinking, make thought an act.603 In the film, thinking is an act, a fqrm of becoming 
as a movement in time. In each shot arriving from the outside, what returns is 
difference, which brings variation and multiplicity. The world of L 'Jntrus is in 
continual change; it is a nonmechanistic, unstable, undeterminable world that is 
constantly becoming and in flux. 
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Each returning image in the film presents a new fragment in time. This 
encounter brings difference to thought which is no longer beholden to what preceded 
it. In this returning difference, the images falsify the narrative logic found in 
movement-images. In the organic narration of movement-images, or as I have tried 
to show in the digital installations, what returns is the same. Rodowick writes that in 
organic narration, the images that return seek to identify with the ~elf-same as that 
which is True: it confirms "the image ofTruth."604 Truth occurs as the repetition of 
the same through identification that confirms, or as resolution in the narrative, rather 
than as difference. In time-images, in the difference of each returning image, 
falsification is built into the narrative logic. This falsification of narrative logic gives 
rise to what Nietzsche called the "powers of the false." Deleuze points out that the 
artist's power of falsification or to falsehood gives rise to fabulation and for 
imagining a new world and for a new people to come, as a political act. The will to 
falsification is an affirmative thought that is artistic, active and creative. 605 Through 
such a will Roland Bogue writes that "life becomes 'the active force of thought' and 
thought would become 'the affirmative power of life ... Thinking would then mean 
discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life. "'606 
Thinking as the machinic flow of matter: towards a machinic consciousness 
In the automated flow of matter from the outside that forces thinkh1g, time-images 
are the "spiritual automaton" for Deleuze through which film becomes the 
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autonomous thinking machine. The images that arrive, flow automatically, forcing 
the brain into contact with what is unknown and undefined. In this sense the spiritual 
automaton is also the viewer, whose encounter with the images produces thinking. 
Bogue writes that the spiritual automaton is both the viewer and the images, in 
which mind is immanent within the images. This relation is rather like the mobius 
strip in which the inside and outside lack absolute differentiation and become one 
continuous form. 607 
The spiritual automaton is therefore a mode of thought through which images 
from an outside are encountered. These images from the outside are alien images 
which, heretofore, are as yet unknown. The erratic sequences of time-images 
produce affects or forces, which Deleuze and Guattari write are beings in and of 
themselves, generating another way ofthinking.608 The forces that shock the body 
arrive by images that are a-signifying, a-syntactic and formed non-linguistically.609 
Thinking, therefore, does not occur by linguistics but by this pre-linguistic image-
matter which has its own logic. It is a language in which "images and signs, are of 
another nature. "610 In this way time-images give rise to a seeing function in which, 
as Deleuze has famously written, the brain is the screen of cinema:upon which 
images unfold. 
Pure duration is the continuous heterogeneity in the flow of matter, and 
important to the automatic movement of image-matter is the interstice, which 
produces qualitative changes in the movements of thoughts. Whether by the 
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projection-machine of cinema or by the transmission system of digital technology, 
the machinic flow of matter produces the movements of thought. However, while the 
movement of matter in the installations is unidirectional and produces the return of 
the same, time-images put thought into contact with the outside. In as much as time-
images force us to think from an outside, Artaud writes that film also allows us to 
encounter the darker, unknown forces, which are "concealed beneath things, the 
images -- crushed, trampled, slackened, or dense -- of all that swarms in the lower 
depths of the mind."611 These images, Daniel Frampton explains, are those which we 
"cannot think: [as they are] beyond our experiences. "612 And in having this capacity, 
Artaud writes, film's automatic projection has the capability of moving beyond 
human thought, liberating thought from human thinking. 
The idea that film puts thought in touch with the unthought is central to 
Deleuze's philosophical opus with Guattari, and extends to his thinking on cinema. 
The plane of immanence, they write, is "that which must be thought and that which 
cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within thought. "613 The fold between what is 
the most intimate inside and the farthest outside brings together this distance and 
proximity of thought, the "to-ing and fro-ing" producing the infinite movements of 
thought. 614 
In time-images the mechanism that produces the unthought is the interstice 
by virtue of the irrational connection produced between two different images. Many 
images of this type come to mind in L'lntrus. We find a heart dripping with blood in 
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the snow, a face frozen in ice and the image of the unknown woman laughing, as she 
glides through the snow on a sled drawn by Huskies. In Mirror, there are at least a 
dozen of these, three of these being the image of long grass swirling in the wind, 
water dripping from ceilings, and the apparition of the mother flailing her arms after 
washing her hair in a barrel of water. The automated movements of the installations, 
on the other hand, while they liberate thought from human thinking, have a scarcity 
of connections to the virtual, producing a limitation upon the heter9geneous 
movements of thought. Their potential to move beyond human thinking is limited to 
a singular movement of thought. 
Although thinking occurs in the machinic flow of matter in both media, in 
time-images, the dynamic complexity in the heterogeneous movement of matter 
propels the movements of thought. In their ability to propel diverse movements, the 
time-images of cinema think what we cannot: film thinks what we cannot think.615 
The internal connection in the relation of image to image becomes important to 
understanding that images are not given to a single human consciousness, but to a 
machinic one. Having separated from the movements of the world, the images 
produce internal relations among themselves, composing their own conditions of 
luminosity and their own movements of thought. In this internal relation, images 
produce their own conditions of consciousness, outside of a human one. 
What becomes non-individuated when examined from the metaphysics of the 
fold, is perspective and/or point of view, which does not arise from· a single thinking 
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human subject. In fact, a point of view is to be understood as part of a structure: a 
point df view, rather than being individuated by a thinking subject, is one that comes 
to be reflected in an objective structure. In this sense a point of view precedes the 
thinking human subject and is the point of differentiation of a structure. For instance, 
in Bresson's films, characters speak in flat monotones. This flat delivery is 
disconnected from any particular character that would reflect an interior monologue. 
Rather, as Bogue writes, such a speech occurs from an outside of narrative relations, 
which is part of a free indirect vision, not given to any particular individualized 
character's point of view.616 In this sense what the character utters precedes the 
character, and rather than being individuated, the character's speech could be given 
by any other characters in the film: the objective structure of the speech precedes the 
character's utterance. In such a relation, subject and object are enfolded into each 
other in which, as Leibniz noted, the world is in the subject as much as the subject is 
in the world. Perspective, traditionally given to the individual and to interiority, 
shifts to a view on an objective structure, which a subject occupies in time. 
Perspective, and therefore thought, becomes non-individuated, a subjectless-
subjectivity and machinic in such a system of relations. 
Thoughts generated are part of this objective structure, arising and receding 
in relation to it, rather than independently of it. A structure, such as the world of any 
media-event, produces "an infinite series of curvatures or inflections" and an infinity 
of views, which come to be reflected in as many spectatorial eyes.617 In POL or 
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Model/ 5, the performers, spectators and electro-digital circuitry make up the 
objective structure. In this live event, cellular matter folds into the electro-digital 
circuitry in which live bodies and sound-image grains enter the zone of 
indiscemibility. The experience of events occurs from this state of flowing matter, in 
which perception moves from one acentered state to another. Conscious human 
perception comes to be deduced from this heterogeneous complex of the performers' 
image-body and the spectators' real-bodies, without discrete divisions or points of 
reference. This heterogeneous complex becomes the flowing body of the image-
event and it is impossible to know where one ends and the other begins, as image-
matter (appearance) and matter-image (body) fold into each other as an indivisible 
whole. The electro-digital circuitry generates the movements of thought. 
In cinema, the eye comes to be modulated by the variations presented in the 
relations of images. Long shots, close-ups, high-angle, slow motion and others come 
to make up the movements presented to the eye, which is undulating in this matter. 
The images produce a non-human vision, in which the eye becomes a "floating eye" 
freed from any stable point of view.618 This modulation of the eye gives rise to a 
machinic perception/ram which human perception comes to be deduced. Space and 
time coordinates come to be established, anchoring the "I" from this undulating 
matter, giving rise to a camera consciousness that opens out to duration as a whole. 
Camera consciousness, therefore, sets in motion the continual modulation of the eye 
and presents a vision that is not unified. 
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Perception folds with image-matter (cinematic-appearance) or matter-image 
(non-cinematic-real). Perception in media-events, such as POL, L'lntrus or 
Spectropia, folds into images or the electro-digital circuitry, giving rise to a 
machinic consciousness. Such a consciousness constitutes the objective structure, 
whose curves produce inflections and refractions, the perspectives on an objective 
structure. The movement of folding among these occurs between the haze of the 
actual perception (the images being encountered) and the virtual memory of pasts, 
bringing about the complexity of the present moment. 
Cinema's time-images and the images of digital media, when examined 
through the workings of the fold and interstice, give rise to the sensate in bodies 
which bring about awareness and allow for the movements of thought to occur. The 
relation of image to image (interstice) and the relation of perspective to objective 
structure (fold), generate the automatic production of images in both mechanisms 
and in both media. The two concepts introduce a terrain in which images themselves 
think and are an automatic, non-human form of thinking. In the interstice, 
aberrational movements of thought occur through an outside whereas in the fold, 
differential perspectives occur through an infinity of refractions and inflections of 
matter on an objective structure. Non-human, automatic thought, as Frampton 
writes, allows us to think what we could not have thought: "[t]he unthought is a 
thought 'outside' thought -- Deleuze's new cerebral images define themselves 
through this relation of the inside and the outside -- an unsummonable, inexplicable, 
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undecidable, incommensurable outside."619 Non-human, automatic thinking replaces 
regular vision by presenting different points of view. It produces, Deleuze writes, 
"the genesis of an 'unknown body' ... like the unthought in thought, the birth of the 
visible which is still hidden from view. 11620 
Emergences and vanishing points: visible-invisible 
While the interstice and fold both produce sensate matter essential to the movements 
of thought and for generating conceptual knowledge, their temporal planes might 
erroneously be seen to generate differences in the experience of time. While 
interstices produce spatio-temporal gaps, fissures and aporias, folds produce 
continuities by bodies being enfolded in other bodies. From a topological 
perspective, however, bodies enfolded in other bodies present continuities and 
differences with each other. It must be noted therefore that ultimately, in this 
examination, both the interstice and fold produce continuous heterogeneity 
necessary for real duration. However, while the outcomes of these two concepts 
resonate, their processes differ. 
While the fold presents its own particular logic and sense in the examination 
of media, its difference to the interstice is processual and formal, more than its 
outcome. That is, matter examined through each figure shows a dissimilar travelling 
route, generating differences in the terms and conditions that they engage and draw 
upon. Nonetheless, interstices and folds both produce qualitative multiplicities in 
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their relations to the virtual. For instance, while interstices produce gaps and fissures 
in knowledge and duration, increasing relations to the virtual, the continual line of 
duration in the folds between bodies appears and disappears from a topological point 
of view.621 This appearance-disappearance is due to the twisting arid coiling up of 
matter in the folds between bodies, making bodies appear and vanish. The folds 
between bodies bring about patterns of visibility-invisibility, reson,ating with 
interstitial repetitions. 
Just as the interstice breaks up vision and time, so too does, the fold, plunging 
thought into the depths. However, there is a difference in how this rupturing occurs. 
I 
While the interstice produces aporias, the twists and turns of folds produce 
gradations and transparencies. For instance, in L'Intrus, in the cuts 1 between howling 
dogs-Trebor polishing his dagger-a glimpse of a dead man being wrapped in 
tarpaulin-Trebor making love to a woman, we have a diverging series. Each shot 
presents its own line of flight in a chain of disjunctive images. In this chain, the 
image that recedes dissolves itself, and what returns is not an image that retains the 
identity of the previous shot, but an intensity. This intensity is of a,pure movement, a 
pure event, which each changing image conveys. Intensity here is pure motion or 
pure spirit and occurs as a pre-individual singularity in the entire sequence. This 
pure spirit is the pure uninterrupted becoming of the event, which gives rise to the 
direct image of time. The returning intensity of each shot is the only continuous 
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aspect conveyed, because in a disjunctive chain, what links two shots becomes the 
invisible. The disjunction between shots is total, occurring in the form of aporias. 
In examining time-images from the mechanism of the fold, there are 
gradations and thresholds by which bodies emerge from or sink into the depths. 
What arises and fades from view is related to the elasticity and mobility of the fold 
between perception and image. Levels of obscurity present degrees of understanding 
that is sometimes faint and at others distinct, the movements of thinking ranging 
between the poles of confusion and clarity. Bodies come to be viewed in the 
shadowy light of dawn and dusk, in which contours disappear into darkness 
generating hints and suggestions. Inklings in perception build up to the great fold of 
consciousness, bringing about moments of clarity. At other times, .clarity unfolds 
into the minute crinkles and creases of unclear perceptions, making things obscure. 
Such fluctuations occur in a sequence of shots in Mirror during Asafiev's journey. 
The shots of him at the shooting range with other children are interspersed with 
documentary footage from WWII; he later reemerges in a shot in which he walks up 
a hill. In this entire sequence, movements of thought vacillate fro~ senses of 
confusion to fragile clarity, from the puzzlement of seeing childre~ at a shooting 
range to when a child soldier informs the instructor that his parents died during the 
Leningrad siege. The liquid relations of the fold between image and perception 
allow for thresholds and gradations in the movements of thinking, beyond that of 
concretization, the latter occurring through narrative detail, explicit dialogue or 
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through the ordering of cause and effect. The elasticity in the fold between 
perception and image allows for conceptual shapes to emerge and fade with varying 
transparencies, showing shades of visibility that dissolve into the darkness or light. 
In sensing the world perception moves continually between distinct and obscure 
perception in which media objects are in states of flux, perpetually in the making. 
Such an open time moves beyond what is clear and determinable in the images, and 
therefore also in thinking. 
The whole 
What constitutes the whole in film and digital media when examined through the 
relations of the fold, may be understood in at least two ways. First, the world of a 
film is suffused in other worlds such as those of other films, documentaries, art 
forms, histories, literature, etc. What constitutes film phenomena therefore occurs by 
the virtual relations of folding and enfolding of fields, a fold between two fields 
creating a force. 622 A spiritual force, or thinking, is therefore produced by the act of 
two fields folding together. In Mirror, worlds of art make up its force fields, in 
which the painterly, poetic and auricular fold into and out of each other. In the 
mechanism of the fold, the continuous line of duration extends in each direction to 
make up infinitely smaller and greater wholes, not only with respect to a film, but 
also to the history of film. In this sense, a film enfolds other films and is in tum 
enfolded by others, referencing conventions, technological innovations, styles, 
410 
histories and other fields. Any decreasing or increasing wholes should be understood 
as only a partial whole however, as each whole enfolds the infinitesimally small or is 
enfolded by the infinitely large, which are virtual spheres. 
Second, with respect to perspective in film or digital media, the whole is to 
be understood as including these virtual spheres, the outer regions into which images 
evaporate approaching the dazzling conditions of white light or receding into total 
darkness. The continuous line of duration disappears and emerges between these 
regions of virtuality, in the liquid relations of the folds between m~tter, perception 
and memory. Perspective, therefore, occurs in relation to the whole, which is 
constituted by the entire objective structure, which includes all virtual-actual 
relations; it is internal to the whole and does not occur outside structure. Perspective 
I 
and structure therefore make up the relations of what constitutes the whole. 
Depending on the perspective that the subject (artist) occupies, ~egions may or may 
not be perceptible to the senses, although their presence might hover and be sensed 
at the edges of conscious perception. 
The actual makes up the images in a film, installation or media-event, 
constituting what is perceptible from a differentiated point of view. The actual, 
however, does not include the virtual whole of time, which presents the totality of all 
possibilities or differentiations. The actual is what has come to be actualized from 
such an infinity of virtual possibilities ( differenciation). A perspective is this 
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actualization. The world of a film or an installation that comes to be actualized by 
the artist is a singular actualization from all virtual possibilities. 
The interstice, on the other hand, links fragments of time together from the 
whole of pure memory. What is visible in time-images are the dis joined slivers of 
Time. In L'Intrus, the organic-inorganic-synthetic assemblages of human, non-
human, landscapes and synthetic elements make up the temporal planes, which 
Deleuze refers to as the different planes of consciousness. We encounter animals, 
characters and actors biking, walking or being dragged in the snow; we see cows 
grazing in fields of grass, dogs barking, snow falling in city streets among other 
shots. Importantly, however, we never quite come to understand the relations among 
the different shots. Each shot is a fragment of time that is disrupted by another, 
constituting the "impossible continuity" of the film: each shot presents an aberrant 
movement that opens up to duration as a whole. The erratic and dissonant shots 
linked together in a chain arise from different temporal planes. Rather than arising 
from the necessity of a plot attending to the needs of a narrative, these haphazardly 
emerging temporal planes constitute what Deleuze writes are fragments of the whole 
of pure memory. Each actual shot, arising from a different plane of consciousness, is 
a fragment of the virtual whole of pure memory or a world memory. Each fragment 
constitutes the force of a memory that leaps out of the order and logic of 
chronometric time, presenting duration that diverges from what precedes or succeeds 
it. Such a series of fragments generates a continuous multiplicity. These fragments 
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are Bergson's pluralities of the different rhythms of duration that make up the whole, 
a continuous heterogeneity, in what he calls pure duration. The whole of Time, 
therefore, is constituted by the heterogeneity of different times. 
The relations of matter-consciousness, subject-object and insicJe-outside 
On the plane of immanence, upon which image and matter are the same thing, it is 
not possible to distinguish perception from the flow of matter and images. Within 
such a flow, the body is one image among others, and separation between the two 
orders of body and image, matter and mind, inside and outside and subject and 
object come to be eliminated. Moreover, in the process of differenciation, in which 
the virtual comes be actualized into the material and real, the mattemess of thought-
being displaces the distinction between matter and virtuality. In the process of 
differenciation, as Alliez writes, thought is forced to arise with the materiality of 
difference on the plane of immanence. Matter and consciousness, rather than being 
understood as two separate and distinct orders, are to be considered as forming the 
qualitative relations of the whole. Deleuze's transcendental materialism brings forth 
the conditions in which matter and virtuality arise, revealing the two sides of 
perception from which the world comes to be expressed. 623 In perception, therefore, 
the world in all its infinite possibilities exists as a potential, presenting all the 
potentialities of what a media event can become, which perception comes to 
actualize in a double process. On the plane of immanence, therefore, matter and 
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virtuality are in states of immanence and exist as potentialities, which come to be 
actualized by perception in a media event. 
The event therefore, examined through the process of inte~stitial disjunctions 
or by folding, presents its distinctions. In the perception of an event, pasts, futures 
and unfolding presents dynamically weave together through interstitial disjunctions 
or twist and fold into each other. Each mechanism presents a difference to the other 
in the way that an event comes to be examined, generating a diffe~ent image of 
thought. A different image of thought therefore gives rise to different visual, 
affective, technical and formal differences. 
I 
In both the fold and the interstice, what constitutes the outside is continually 
in touch with the inside. Likewise, the orders constituting subject-object relations 
become indiscemable in the experience of media-events. Howeve~, the mechanism 
of the interstice continually dislodges a given shot, forcing the engagement with an 
outside, whereas in the fold, matter continually enfolds or is enfolded within other 
fields. In this relation, their movements differ, the former is a broken line that is 
horizontally oriented, the latter, a continuous line on a curved hyperbolic surface. In 
interstitial disjunctions, the visible-invisible relation works by aporetic disjunction, 
the invisible bringing forth virtual connections. In the fold, what is visible appears 
on the surface from a topological point of view, in which matter disappears into the 
twists and folds of the virtual depths or heights. What is hidden frqm a given 
topological point of view, is matter's increasing or decreasing vi~al wholes, 
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extending to the infinitesimally minute or to the enveloping, colossal universe. 
Visibility in the fold is therefore dependent on changes in the perspective or in the 
point of view from which an event comes to be perceived . 
. In examining POL, Modell 5 or any media-event through the fold, a 
synchrony emerges between the spectators' bodies folding into the sound-image 
molecules. Cells resonate and enter the zone of proximity with sound-image 
molecules and it becomes impossible to denote where each cell and molecule begins 
or ends. Organic and non-organic matter fold into each other giving rise to 
conditions of consciousness that dissolve inside-outside regions. Perception arises 
from the conditions emerging from the event itself, including the interactions 
between various images such as those objects propagating in the world and our 
selves. Eye-matter-image are all parts of the changing whole of the media event, and 
the event's qualities emerge from the eye's capacity for reflecting these qualities. For 
an image to be formed, it is sufficient that an eye exist; images come to be formed as 
the eye is modulated in things, in matter, in the event itself, the eye reflecting the 
event's qualities. In reflecting the image's qualities, what the eye "sees" is already an 
action, the third movement of subjectivity. What the eye reflects is therefore not a 
passive condition. As Flaxman points out, the subject is in the world as much as the 
universe is in the subject, "the subject synthesizes the world from a particular point 
of view ... the subject is a point from which the universe sees itself. 11624 
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In the interstice the event comes to be examined processually through the 
broken line of a horizontally oriented series, where the interiority of thought 
encounters a disrupting outside. This constant interruption and contact between the 
inside and the outside of relations brings forward a jarring heterogeneity that leads to 
questions of what a film is. In the time-images of L'Intrus, the different planes of 
consciousness show runaway shots of howling Huskies, snowy landscapes and 
oceanic depths. In addition, we also glimpse a heart dripping with blood in the snow, 
a head frozen in ice and random people emerging and disappearing without the logic 
of a continuous interiority, associated with the cause and effect of ~he movement-
image. What is external to the film-event enters the inside by way of a disrupting 
and disjunctive logic that presents intellectual aporias that frequently do not reveal 
the relations between two images. 
With respect to the fold in Tarkovsky's Mirror, the documentary footage 
from WWII, da Vinci's drawings, Bach's St. John Passion or Arseni Tarkovsky's 
poems enters the pro-filmic space as non-diagetic elements. The documentary 
footage, painterly, musical and literary movements enter from an outside and fold 
into the characters' ponderings or with Tarkovsky's own musings, to make up the 
various shots in the film. Moreover, the spectator's gaze of the caqiera zooming into 
Alexei as he gazes at his reflection in the mirror, presents the infinite movements of 
enfolding insides and outsides. The spectatorial-gaze is enfolded in the camera-gaze, 
I 
which draws upon the character gazing at his own reflection in the mirror. These 
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movements of folding and enfolding gazes further draw the spectator into an inner 
contemplation by which he/she becomes attentive to his/her own internal states. 
Furthermore, the allusion to Breugel's Winter Landscape and the inclusion of 
Tarkovsky's own childhood experiences, which are constructed in detail, enter the 
work. But these random images of time, whether in Mirror or in L'lntrus, and 
whether examined from the mechanism of the interstice or through the fold, enter a 
point of indiscemability. In either case it becomes impossible to know whether a 
shot functions as a character's memory or is a figment of their imagination and 
fantasy. Neither is it possible to know whether the shot is objectively oriented as part 
of the narrative, or as we see in Mirror, presents aspects of the filmmaker's personal 
memories. Tarkovsky moves from filmmaker, subject and character in which, as 
Deleuze writes, "the self and non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any 
meaning whatsoever. "625 These types of encounters make the cinematic/media event 
indiscemable and indistinct with respect to the relations of the real-imaginary, 
inside-outside or subject-object. The inside passes through into the outside, where as 
Rodowick puts it, "perception occurs in space, memory occurs in time."626 In 
Deleuzo-Bergson's ontology, it is no longer tenable to understand relations of 
inside-outside, subject-object through Caterisan dualisms in which each is a distinct 
and separate field. The actual-virtual continually form a circuit and pass into each 
other. 
417 
Similarly, the film/media event, whether examined by way :of the fold or 
interstice, not only expresses elements constituted from an outside, but is also 
enfolded in history, in technological changes and in the socio-cultural traditions of 
the visual and performative arts, making it impossible to know where each begins 
and ends. Moreover, as Ranciere writes, the shared terms of measurement in how 
relations come to be presented over time in the literary, musical or visual arts, or in 
I 
philosophy and science, have come to be perceived in certain way~. Their references 
in a film might therefore produce a familiarity by which we come to perceive them 
fully (as with the mushroom clouds in the documentary footage or:da Vinci's 
drawings in Mirror), sometimes partially (as with the Breugel reference), or might 
escape them altogether (the head in frozen ice as an intellectual aporia). 
In the encounter of the inside with the outside, in both the interstice and the 
fold, the non-cinematic becomes cinematic. What enters the field of the image-event 
is cut out from the environment, either by way of abrupt disjunctions in the 
interstice, or by degrees of vanishing points in the fold. By either method, images 
come into a relation with other images, and in such a system, theY:become 
desubjectified and wholly processes. In the relation of image to irriage, therefore, 
images are cut off/dissolved from narrative requirements, leaving us with pure 
images and visions that produce their own particular movement. Shots are connected 
to shots in the any-spaces-whatever of interstitial disjunctions; in the fold, different 
fields fold into each other in perception. In both, the undeterminable connection 
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between shots removes the cues that would distinguish the real from the imaginary 
or the physical from the mental. The any-spaces-whatever of the interstice, or in the 
fold between image and mind, both dislocate the logic of cause and effect. Shots 
connecting or touching illogically, either by way of the broken horizontal line, or by 
the enfolding-folding of shots, generate a differential in the image-series. The spatio-
temporal difference between shots generates moments of fabulation in which 
thinking is produced in the circuits between actual-virtual images. This constant 
modulation of the actual-virtual generates film's spiritual automatop, putting thought 
in touch with the non-thought. This dynamic momentum between thought and non-
thought is Deleuze's "pure force of becoming," making up the curve oftime.627 No 
longer the occasion for a pre-given identity, thoughts become instants for continual 
reinvention, presenting the occasion for a new relation to occur. 
Through my inquiry I have tried to show that the interstice and the fold 
present two approaches to examining duration and images in media production. 
While they are asymmetrical and incommensurate with respect to their processes, 
their movements, sporadically, also produce resonances, yielding ~imilar conceptual 
and material forms. 
Each produces machinic consciousness and puts thought in touch with non-thought 
and the actual in touch with the virtual. Each produces regions of visibility-
invisibility and dissolves the orders constituting the subject-object, real-imaginary 
and inside-outside relations. However, while their outcomes correspond, the 
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processual pathways by which their conceptual and material movements come to be 
patterned, by way of their coordinates, dynamics and orientations, the two form 
different images of thought. 
New image of time: presentism 
The automated digital installations, Glenlandia, Fenlandia and The Spectroscrope, 
present a difference in the image of time produced. In these works, time comes to be 
spatialized in the form of an image that represents the continuous now: presentism. 
While what enters the environment produces changes in the image's composition, the 
installations' unidirectional bearing produces a predictability of the now. The pixels 
moving across the screen carry with them the continual informational present, and as 
they generate the same temporality, they only bring about the continuous now. This 
continual now anticipates the future in a predictable return. This temporal 
predictability does not produce difference in states of consciousness, but brings 
about the return of the same type of image. 628 From one frame to the next, time in 
the installations is thought through only in the form of the present, which remains 
unchanging and self-identical. 
Second, the transmission and recording of data on the digital screen presents 
what is the visible surface of time. Time, as a visible surface, expresses a conversion 
from experience to its spatialization. This visible surface of the actual image, 
therefore, comes to constitute the facticity of the contemporary world. Time is no 
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longer something that is experienced, but that which is signified as the surface of 
what is seen. Importantly, time in these works is of a secondary order, of 
representation and signification rather than as active force, as creative or as 
becoming. 
Third, in the surveying and tracking of environments and in the mapping of 
information data flows, worlds of art come into contact with the forces of 
I 
calculation. Bernard Stiegler writes that at the root of predictability lies calculation, 
which attempts to determine what is undeterminable.629 In digital installations such 
as these, the essence of art and thinking becomes infused with worlds of calculation, 
yielding what he refers to as a mathesis universalis. 630 
Last, the unidirectional and continual mapping of the present, which arrives 
as the predictable, foreseen future, changes our relation to the heterogeneous time 
experienced in time-images. The temporal variance of pasts and futures in time-
images, which brings about the modulation between the actual and 1 virtual is reduced 
to the actual and to what is interior to thought, to what is the same returning 
movement. In a numerical multiplicity time is converted to the continuous 
spatialization of visible surfaces, rather than plunging thought into. a different 
temporal experience. The time-images of L'lntrus and Mirror are therefore 
ontologically different from the installations' digital images. The image of time 
changes from one that is a continuous multiplicity to one that is merely continuous, 
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from moving between memories and futures to merely the present, bringing 
profound implications to worlds of art. 
It should be emphasized that while the installations discussed here present a 
return of the same, they represent aspects of what makes up the durational works of 
digital media rather than the totality of all digital media productions. The automated 
processes of digital media works in their tracking, mapping and surveying of 
environments and of ecologies, need to be modulated to generate greater temporal 
variations. Such variations would occur by the introduction of randomness in order 
to bring about the actual-virtual circuits necessary for the movements of thought to 
occur. Without generating temporal variations, digital works are frequently 
predisposed to remain connected to algorithmic calculations and to predictability in 
their operational systems. While randomness might be introduced into algorithmic 
functions, such a constituted randomness would also follow a predictable logic. 
Unpredictability, therefore, depends on how randomness is generated in 
computational systems. 
Variations can be introduced into the narrative sequencing by software. 631 
The ordering of the various shots comes to be linked together in real time and 
changes each time a work is viewed. Software sequencing introduces a level of 
unpredictability to the cinematic structural forms, however, even within such works, 
the mutable form becomes part of the predictability. The parameters of randomness 
have been set ahead of time, making the unpredictability part of the algorithmic 
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sequencing. In such works, shots have been pre-designed and constitute the database 
from which such unpredictability might arise. Thus, notably, while the sequencing of 
the shots presents an unpredictability, such unpredictability does not arise from an 
infinity (the virtual whole), but from a finite set of actual shots avai~able in the 
database. In this sense, these works are semi-random as randomness is available only 
in a particular manner and in the form of narrative sequencing. Furthermore, 
I 
randomness arises only from within the limitation of pre-designed shots. Such 
software sequencing should be understood as once again producing1 a numerical 
multiplicity, rather than a qualitative multiplicity. The whole in such works occurs 
more by the addition and subtraction of given shots rather than from the infinite 
possibilities available in what is the unthought, alien outside. These images produce 
the return of what has already been preconceived (and is available in the database) 
and therefore, these images are part of what becomes predictable. 
In closing, it should be said that the image worlds of digital
1 
media that 
exclusively draw upon the possibilities of what computer clocks and algorithms 
offer, have often only partially been satisfactory in contemporary art. Instead, works 
that utilize digital media and also move between memories and futures to come have 
provided a way out from the tsunami of digital automatons. Toni Dove's Spectropia, 
and some others, lead digital art worlds in this direction.632 While aigital 
technologies present a different ontology of the image, changing the material 
conditions and therefore sensorial, affective and conceptual matter, these in and of 
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themselves do not present the conditions of real duration, as examined in the works 
discussed here. What is necessary for real duration is continuous he~erogeneity, in 
the continually changing directions in movements through time and ,space, so that 
differences of kind in states of consciousness are produced. In the random 
connections to the outside, in disruptions to the interiority of thought and in 
generating aporias, connections to the virtual multiply. Difference in the movements 
of thought enacts a political will to imagine the creative possibilities of new worlds. 
What is important in a media event, therefore, is not merelY'its technical 
plane, but that social, technological and semiotic components criss-'cross, making up 
its "ontological intensity. "633 Such a criss-crossing of the different vectors generates 
the event's dynamism, creating a shape·from infinite possibilities. J\s Pearson writes, 
"the 'machinic' is a mode of evolution that is specific and peculiar to the 'becoming' 
of alien life. "634 Machinic evolution, therefore, not only comes to bear upon the 
machine-machine connection, but also to organic-inorganic-synthetic ones. A media-
event should function in a relationship with other virtual and actual machines, 
should cross many thresholds, genuses and species and work by invention, 
connection and involution. Media-events should transform determinate points into 
indeterminate ones so that the ontological boundaries between subject-object, inside-
outside, visible-invisible become confused and multiply the unknown factors, testing 
the limits of the faculties. It is therefore fitting to end with a quote' from Deleuze: 
"Culture [ ... ] is an involuntary adventure, the movement of learning which links a 
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sensibility, a memory and then a thought, with all the cruelties and violence 
necessary ... '"635 
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